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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses the resolution made by the Shariah Advisory Council of the Malaysian 
Securities Commission (SAC) which resolves that the crude palm oil futures contract is 
permissible. This resolution is controversial as it collides with the resolutions of other 
mainstream or internationally represented organisations of Shari'ah scholars. These 
mainstream resolutions rule that the commodity futures contract transgresses Sharf'ah 
principles. However, the SAC contends that it is permissible on the principle of public 
interest (ma#a~ah) and on the notion that trading regulations have overcome Sharf'ah 
prohibitions; namely, that of gharar (uncertainty) and maysir (gambling). The focus of this 
thesis is thus to analyse the adequacy of the SAC resolution in terms of its coherence with 
the real trading of the crude palm oil futures contract as well as the adequacy of the crude 
palm oil futures legal framework in overcoming Sharf' ah prohibitions. This is an area 
which has not been given adequate attention in the current literature. Apart from the 
liteniture on the legality of the commodity futures contract, this thesis examines the legal 
framework of the Malaysian commodity futures market as well as the American and 
European markets. To compliment this research, non-structured interviews and discussions 
have been undertaken. In the final analysis, the data gathered from the interviews and 
discussions, as well as the relevant literature, evidences that the SAC resolution is not 
coherent with real trading and that the elements of gharar and maysir have not been 
eliminated by the trading regulations. Additionally, the analysis finds that, contrary to the 
argument of its proponents, the commodity futures market has failed to represent its 
purpose as a risk management tool as well as a price discovery tool. In summation, an 
inadequate resolution would inevitably undermine the SAC's, position as Malaysia's sole 
Islamic capital market's Sharf'ah advisor, and Malaysia's reputation as the international 
Islamic capital market hub. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
I nt rod uction 
1.1 Thesis: At a Glance 
"However loudly the opponents of interest condemn them as sinful, there will be 
people prepared to articulate reasons why they are beneficial to Muslims, consistent 
with the spirit of Islam, and in keeping with the ban on riba ... Efforts to develop 
Islamic derivatives amount to an insurance policy against a future ban on options 
and futures." (Kuran, 2001: 28) 
This thesis is a study of the resolution made by the Shariah Advisory Council of the 
Malaysian Securities Commission (SAC) which resolves that the crude palm oil futures 
contract is permissible (SAC resolution). This resolution is a contentious one as it conflicts 
with the resolutions of other mainstream, or internationally represented, organisations of 
Shari'ah scholars. While the mainstream organisations of Sharf'ah scholars rule that this 
trading transgresses the principles and fundamentals of the Sharf'ah, the SAC argues that it 
is permissible on the principle of public interest (ma$labah) and on the notion that the 
trading regulations have overcome Sharf'ah prohibitions. This study will critically 
examine the adequacy of the SAC resolution from the aspect of its coherence with the real 
trading of the crude palm oil futures contract and the adequacy of the crude palm oil 
futures contract legal framework in overcoming Shari'ah prohibitions. This subject is 
undertaken as it has not been given adequate attention in existing literatures. 
This chapter will commence by giving a brief background on the subject which will lead to 
the reason as to why this study is being undertaken. This will be followed with the aim of 
this study, its objectives, research questions, its contribution and limitations. A later section 
of this chapter will explicate the study's research methodology, and this chapter will end 
with a brief outline of the thesis. . 
1.2 What is the Crude Palm Oil Futures Contract 
Simply put, the crude palm oil futures contract is a future sale and future purchase of crude 
palm oil. However, this sale and purchase transaction is not like any ordinary retail cash 
sale and/or purchase of commodity. The difference lies in the intricate trading system of 
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the crude palm oil futures contract, as describ~d by the Malaysian Securities Industry 
Development Corporation: 
"Futures are contracts, legally binding agreements, made on the trading floor of a 
futures exchange or via an electronic screen dealing system, to buy or sell something in 
the future. That something could be gold, tin, cocoa or palm oil, a foreign currency, 
shares or interest rates. Each contract specifies the commodity, the quantity, quality 
and time of delivery or cash settlement. The buyer and seller of a futures contract agree 
on a price today to be delivered and paid for in the future ... In most cases, actual 
delivery of the underlying security does not take place. Instead, the contracts are closed 
out by opposite deals before the delivery date is reached." (2007: 1-3) 
In Malaysia, the trading of crude palm oil futures contracts began in the Kuala Lumpur 
Commodity Exchange! (KLCE) where it was first traded in July, 1980? KLCE then 
became the world's first trading site for crude palm oil futures contracts and the price of its 
crude palm oil futures contracts became the global benchmark price. The purpose of 
trading crude palm oil futures contracts, then, was to assist local crude palm oil producers 
to hedge, and at the same time to utilise it as an instrument for price setting, and the 
dissemination of market information, as a means to reduce market risk (Rasiah and 
Shahrin, n.d.: 7).3 This role was later developed to include speCUlation - where traders can 
use crude palm oil futures contracts to make gains from the movements of the crude palm 
oil futures price. Due to globalisation, the KLCE, now known as the Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad (the Exchange), becomes a platform for global fund managers and 
proprietary traders to trade and be part of an active commodity market instantaneously 
(Bursa Malaysia Derivatives, n.d.: I). 
1 In the midst of the 1990s, the KLCE set up the Malaysian Monetary Exchange (MME) to trade financial 
futures, though during the same period, a financial futures exchange, the Kuala Lumpur Options and 
Financial Futures Exchange (KLOFFE) had already existed. Both the MME and KLOFFE had different 
trading instruments and trading systems. The MME followed the KLCE open-outcry trading system by 
launching its first derivatives product, the Kuala Lumpur InterBank Offered Rate (KLIBOR). The KLOFFE, 
meanwhile, started with the Index Futures which is based on screen, namely, the KLOFFE Automated 
Trading System (KATS). On January 1998, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) completed its 
acquisition of KLOFFE and by the end of that year, the KLSE had merged with the MME to form the 
Commodities and Monetary Exchange of Malaysia (COMMEX). The merger of the KLOFFE and 
COMMEX changed the landscape of the Malaysian derivatives market where all the derivatives markets 
were subsumed under one new entity called the Malaysian Derivatives Exchange (MDEX). The MDEX is 
now known as the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad (the Exchange) (Pheng, 2009: 2). For more insights 
into the historical development of the financial derivatives market, please see Securities Commission (2004). 
2 Nonetheless, physical delivery of crude palm oil was less than three per cent of the trade involved as the 
role of the futures market was to serve as a financial or "paper" market. This infrastructure made Kuala 
Lumpur the world's palm oil capital (Pletcher, 1991: 633). 
3 Before the crude palm oil futures contract began its trading in KLCE, the Joint Selling Committee, located 
in London, was authorised to quote crude palm oil futures prices and to receive supply commitments from 
shipping companies, which were all based on the decisions of brokers in Europe. 
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The crude palm oil futures contract is currently the most actively traded of derivatives in 
the Exchange as compared to the nine other derivatives products offered and traded.4 It is 
reported that as at 31 December, 2011, from a total of around 9 million derivatives 
contracts, 5.9 million are crude palm oil futures contracts (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 20l2b: 
8). The trading of crude palm oil futures contracts alone have contributed to almost a third 
of the total trading revenue of the local derivatives market, totalling Ringgit Malaysia 51.2 
million (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2012b: 46). 
1.3 The Crude Palm Oil Futures Legal Framework 
In Malaysia, the crude palm oil futures contract is governed by a set of legal frameworks. 
This framework is led by the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 (the 2007 Act), which 
is its principal statute.5 Apart from the 2007 Act, the crude palm oil futures contract is also 
regulated by the Capital Markets and Services Regulations 2007,6 the Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad Business Rules/ and the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad 
Business Rules.8 This legal regime governs the whole trading operation of crude palm oil 
futures contracts, including the features or the standard specification of crude palm oil 
futures contracts, the manner in which crude palm oil futures are created and traded on the 
Exchange and their settlement in the Bursa Malaysia Derivative Clearing Berhad (Clearing 
House). Rule 102 of these two Business Rules clearly stipulates that all persons trading on 
4 Other derivatives that are offered and traded at the Exchange: Commodity Derivatives: USD Crude Palm 
Oil Futures and Crude Palm Kernel Oil Futures; Equity Derivatives: FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Futures, 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Option and Single Stock Futures; and Financial Derivatives: 3-Month Kuala 
Lumpur Interbank Offered Rate Futures; 3-Years Malaysian Government Securities Futures and 5-Years 
Malaysian Government Securities Futures (Bursa Malaysia, 20l2a). The Securities Commission (2011: 41) 
in its Capital Market Master Plan2 has projected the growth of the derivatives market by the year 2020 to 
reach a notional value of Ringgit Malaysia 4.2 billion. 
S This is the principal body of statutory laws that regulates the futures industry (as well as the securities 
industry). It comprehensively encompasses matters pertaining to, inter alia, administration and futures trading 
activities, market intermediaries, establishment of the Exchange and Clearing House, the Securities 
Commission's enforcement power, and capital market offences. In order to insulate futures trading and 
guarantee the performance of futures contracts against legal and credit risk, the Act has laid out provisions, 
the effect of which being that its provisions prevail over the written law of contract and insolvency. 
6 This Regulation governs matters pertaining to safeguarding capital market investors and futures market 
institutions from adverse financial or credit risk. It regulates, inter alia, payment and maintenance of deposit 
and the Fidelity Fund, the purpose of which is to compensate clients from financial losses suffered from 
defalcation or fraudulent misuse of monies or property caused by capital market intermediaries. 
7 This Business Rules prescribes "house-keeping rules" for the Exchange. This rule is intended to ensure fair 
and open market on the Exchange and to provide protection to the public in its contact with the Exchange, its 
rarticipants, and registered representatives. 
This Business Rules is the "house-keeping rules" for the Clearing House. It elaborates the procedure of 
settlement which its participant must adhere to. In view of the fact that the Clearing House guarantees the 
due performance of futures contracts amongst its participants, the rule emphasises that the liability of the 
Clearing House is limited only to the losses resulting from the non-performance of its contractual obligations, 
to its participants. The Clearing House's liability is however, not extended to any third party. 
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the Exchange and settling through the Clearing House, and all contracts made therein, are 
subject to this legal regime.9 
1.4 \Vhat is the Shariah Advisorv Council (SAC) 
The SAC was established by the Malaysian Securities Commission on May 16, 1996, by 
virtue of section 18 of the Securities Commission Act 1993. 10 The establishment of the 
SAC was part of the Securities Commission's agenda to create a more organised and 
efficient Islamic capital market. The SAC advised the Securities Commission on all 
matters pertaining to Islamic capital market issues and the development of an Islamic 
capital market. Members of the SAC were appointed by the Securities Commission and are 
comprised of experts in Islamic commercial law (fiqh mu(amaliit), Islamic jurisprudence, 
Islamic finance, and other relevant disciplines (Securities Commission, 2006: V).II 
In 2010, the 2007 Act was amended by the Capital Markets and Services (Amendment) 
Act 2010. By virtue of this amendment, the SAC is officially inaugurated as the sole 
authority in ascertaining the applicability of Shari(ah principles for the purpose of the 
Islamic capital market business or transactions. 12 With this statutory power, the SAC is 
able to change the status of the conventional capital market business or transaction into 
becoming "the Islamic capital market business or transaction". Section 2 of the 2007 Act 
enumerates the areas for this transformation, which includes any transaction relating to 
futures contracts, and the establishment, operation and maintenance of a futures market. 
The SAC's power to do so, is however, caveated by principles of Shartah. 
The key to the 2010 amendment is that it elevates the position of the SAC hence 
empowering its resolution. Being the sole reference for the Islamic capital market in 
Malaysia, its resolution is to be considered, referred to and held binding upon the 
Exchange, the Clearing House, their members, the judiciary as well as the arbitrators. 13 
Nonetheless, as will be shown in the later part of this chapter, the judiciary argues that they 
9 The hegemony of this regime surpasses even conventional law relating to contract. 
10 Section 18 of the Securities Commission Act 1993 empowers the Securities Commission to form a 
committee which would assist the Securities Commission in its statutory duty. The Securities Commission 
was established on March 1, 1993 for the purpose of developing the securities and futures market in 
Malaysia. It is a self-funding statutory body with the power of supervision, investigation and enforcement 
over the capital market industry. It reports to the Ministry of Finance (Securities Commission, n.d.(b)). 
II See section 316C of the 2007 Act. 
12 See section 3l6A of the 2007 Act. The SAC is also empowered to determine its own procedure. 
13 See section 316E and 316F of the 2007 Act. 
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still retain the power to determine whether such financial instruments are Shari' ah-
compliant. 
The 20 I 0 amendment also delineates the statutory functions, or duties, of the SAC, which 
are as follows: 14 
(a) to ascertain the applicability of Shari'ah principles on any matter pertaining to 
Islamic capital market business or transactions and issue a ruling upon references 
made to it; 
(b) to advise the Securities Commission on any Shari' ah issue relating to Islamic capital 
market business or transactions; 
(c) to provide advice to any person on any Shari' ah issue relating to Islamic capital 
market business or transactions; or 
(d) any such other functions as may be prescribed by the Minister of Finance. 
In performing its duties, the SAC adopts two methods of research. Firstly, the SAC 
evaluates conventional capital market instruments through the lens of Sharifah. In 
examining such products, the focus of the SAC is on the structure, mechanism, and the use 
of such instruments. Secondly, the SAC formulates and develops new financial capital 
market instruments which are in compliance with Shari'ah principles (Securities 
Commission, 2006: 2). The underlying notion behind its operation is to ensure that the 
approved instruments are not inconsistent with any of the Shari'ah principles, namely: the 
elements of ribii (usury), cheating, gharar (uncertainty or cheating) or other such practices 
forbidden by the Sharifah (Securities Commission, 2006: vii). 
1.5 The Driving Force: An International Islamic Capital Market Hub and The 
World's Second Largest Exporter of Crude Palm Oil 
The establishment of the SAC and the proliferation of numerous permissive resolutions on 
conventional capital market instruments, including crude palm oil futures contracts, are 
part of the Malaysian government's agenda to establish Malaysia as an international 
14 See Section 316B of the 2007 Act. 
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Islamic capital market centre (Securities Commission, 2001: 174).15 Being the only 
country in the world which validates crude palm oil futures trading as Shari'ah-
compliantl6 , Malaysia prides itself as being a pioneer and at the forefront oflslamic capital 
market development. The proliferation of such SAC resolutions may be driven by the 
governing system where members of the SAC are being appointed by the governmentl7 
and their remuneration and allowance are determined and paid by the Securities 
Commission, a body answerable directly to the Ministry of Finance. 18 
Furthermore, until 2007, Malaysia had been the largest producer and exporter of palm oil 
and palm oil products in the world. 19 However, Indonesia has since overtaken Malaysia 
and is now the leader in the crude palm oil production and export industry (Teoh, n.d: 5). 
Despite Indonesia also contributing greatly to crude palm oil production and being located 
geographically next to Malaysia, Indonesia has, to date, not issued any such similar 
resolution on their crude palm oil futures contracts. 
1.6 The Rationale for Permitting Crude Palm Oil Futures Contract 
On November 26, 1997 the SAC resolved that the crude palm oil futures contract was 
permissible?O The contract was permissible as it was free from Shari'ah issues, namely, 
gharar (uncertainty), maysir (gambling), buying something that does not exist (bay' 
ma'diim), speculation, and the non-exchange of counter-values ('iwadh). The SAC also 
ruled that the crude palm oil futures contract is permissible on the basis of public interest 
15 The aim of becoming an international hub for the Islamic capital market was part of the national plan 
introduced in the Malaysian Capital Market Master Plan. This plan maps the direction of Malaysia's capital 
market over the next ten years from the period of 2000 till 2010 (Securities Commission, n.d.(a)). 
16 Sharf'ah-compliant means that the product that are imported from conventional finance and converted into 
Islamic products. Meanwhile, Sharf'ah-based means that products that have been produced on the basis of 
Islamic law rules and principles, for example, salam and mu~iirabah (Lahsasna and Hassan, 2011: 37). 
17 Section 316C(l) stipulates that "The Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the King) may, on the advice of the Minister 
after consultation with the Commission, appoint persons as members of the Shariah Advisory Council...". 
18 Section 316C( 4) states that "The members of the Shariah Advisory Council shall be paid such 
remuneration and allowances as may be determined by the Commission." 
19 Malaysia currently accounts for 39% of world palm oil production and 44% of world export. Malaysia is 
able to sustain its production and contribution due to the growing global need for sustainable oils and fats 
(Malaysian Palm Oil Council, 2012). Malaysia'S contribution in the palm oil industry is not only in terms of 
its mass palm oil-based production but also its crude palm oil futures price being referred to as the global 
grice benchmark (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 20 12b). 
o Besides SAC, the Shariah Board ofIran's Securities and Exchange Organisation (SEO) has also permitted 
the trading of futures contracts (Securities and Exchange Organisation, 2009). Their futures contracts used 
billion, copper wires and gold coins as their underlying commodities. According to Dr Ali Saleh Abadi 
(2009), the Chairman of the Board and President ofSEO, SEO is planning to launch other underlying futures 
commodities; namely petrochemicals, oil, agricultural products, metals and securities. 
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(ma~labah) and on the notion that the trading regulations have overcome the Shari' ah 
prohibitions; namely, that of gharar and maysir. 
The impetus for such a ruling could be traced back to Mohammad Hashim Kamali, the 
main driver behind the legitimacy of crude palm oil futures contract in Malaysia. Kamali 
(1997, 1999, 2000, 2000, 2002(a), 2002(b) and 2005) has conducted extensive studies on 
the legality of commodity futures contract, particularly in his 1999 paper, which explicates 
the rationale for permitting crude palm oil futures contract in Malaysia. His main thesis is 
that the crude palm oil futures contract is a new mode of trading. Thus being a new mode 
of trading, it needs a fresh response, formulated in light of its operative procedures. 
Furthermore, as it is a centralised and carefully regulated mode of trading, embedded with 
the clearing house guarantee mechanism and contract standardisation, the prospect of risk 
taking and uncertainty (gharar) have been virtually eliminated. 
1.7 Why Study the SAC Resolution'? 
Study of the adequacy of the SAC resolution is warranted on the following grounds. 
Firstly, Kunhibava, in her thesis, discovered that the SAC resolution was not adequate. She 
found that: 
" ... the SAC had not discussed the ·reality of futures trading. Even though it involved 
trading in commodity futures most of the players do not take possession. This pertinent 
feature was not dealt with." (2009: 56). 
In addition to this, she also found the need for further research into examining the internal 
rules, regulations, and guidelines of current boards of trade and exchange. The purpose of 
this examination is to determine whether these legal regimes could actually overcome the 
Shari'ah objections in commodity futures contracts. 
Secondly, the in-depth analysis of the SAC resolution and the crude palm oil futures legal 
framework revealed that there are adequacy issues with them. While the crude palm oil 
futures contract and its secular-based legal framework are not subject to Sharl'ah 
proscriptions, namely; gharar and maysir, the duly SAC-resolved crude palm oil futures 
contract and its governing legal framework must and should be free from these Shari' ah 
prohibitions. The importance of this notion is clearly stipulated in a report by the Islamic 
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Capital Market Task Force of the International Organization of Securities Commission 
where it states: 
"In relation to Islamic capital market products and activities, regulators should 
begin to consider issues related to the clarity and consistency of regulation and their 
application. Furthermore, regulators should consider and/or review its capital 
market laws to ensure that it adequately deals with the risks associated with the new 
products structures based on the Shariah principles ... " (2004: 52) 
Thirdly, despite resolutions on the validity of financial instruments having been issued by 
the Shariah Advisory Council of the Central Bank of Malaysia and the Shariah Advisory 
Body of the financial institutions, the Islamic banking and financial industry, in Malaysia, 
often has to face legal battles which challenge the validity of their Shari"ah-compliant 
instruments. For example, in 2009, in Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad v Lim Kok Hoe & Anor 
And Other, the Kuala Lumpur High Court ruled that the bank's Bayr bi-thaman al- 'ajil 
(BBA) home financing facility, which had operated and existed in Malaysia for the past 
twenty five years, was contrary to the religion of Islam. The validity of the BBA financing 
facility was also tested in Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v Adnan Omar,21 Dato' Hj Nik 
Mahmud Daud v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd, 22 Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd v 
Emcee Corporation Sdn Bhd,23 Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd 
& Ors; Koperasi Seri Kota Bukit Cheraka Bhd (Third Party) And Other Cases,24 Affin 
Bank Berhad v Zulkijli Abdullah,25 CIMB Islamic Bank Bhd v LCL Corporation Bhd & 
Anor26 and Tan Sri Abdul Khalid Ibrahim v Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad & Another 
Case. 27 The validity of the bank's leasing financing facility is also challenged in the case of 
Tinta Press Sdn Bhd v Bank Islam (M) Berhad. 28 
While the Malaysian Islamic capital market has yet to be tested with such a legal battle, 
with increasing interest in this market, legal challenge on the validity of SAC-approved 
financial instruments is foreseeable (Oseni and Hassan, 2011: 96).29 From a survey on the 
21 (1994) 3 CLJ 735. 
22 (1998] 3 CLK 60S. 
23 [2003] 1 CLJ 625. 
24 [2009] 1 CLJ 419. 
25 [2006] 1 CLJ 438. 
26 [2011] 7 CLJ 594. 
27 POlO] 4 CLJ 388. 
28 [1987] CLJ (Rep) 396. 
29 The potential for such legal challenges is perhaps due to the interpretation of section 56 of the Central 
Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, in which its provision is similar to section 316F of the 2007 Act. Mohammad 
Zawawi Salleh J. states in the case of Mohd Alias Ibrahim v RHB Bank Bhd & Anor [2011] 4 CLl 654,682, 
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performance of the Shari'ah Committee in the Malaysian Islamic banking and financial 
market, Hassan et. al. found that: 
" ... in the current practice many Shari' ah advisors have limited exposure to and 
knowledge of banking practices at the ground and technical levels .... Furthermore, 
lack of detailed disclosure proceedings, discussion and deliberations of the meeting 
of Shari'ah advisors, particularly regarding product approval and/or issuance of 
fatwa, could raise queries about the validity of the rulings given. This is because a 
healthy discussion is always hindered by lack of disclosure of specific reasons and 
justifications, especially when rulings or Jatwa issued are questionable." (2010: 3) 
Although the Securities Commission (2012: 3 -5) maintains that the 2010 amendments have 
the effect of binding the courts with SAC resolutions, the legal battles faced by the Islamic 
banking and finance industry demonstrated otherwise. Thus, SAC resolutions may still be 
up for legal scrutiny and legal battle. 
Finally, an inadequate resolution undermines Malaysia's pOSItIon as an international 
Islamic capital market centre. Shari'ah-compliance is a key feature in an Islamic capital 
market. The Bursa Malaysia defines Islamic Capital Market (lCM) as: 
" ... the market where activities are carried out in ways which does not conflict with 
the principles of Islam. The ICM represents an assertion of religious law in capital 
market transactions where the market is free from prohibited activities and 
elements such as riba (usury), maisir (gambling) and gharar (ambiguity)." (n.d.: 2) 
It follows that the reliability of the Shari'ah approval process and the credibility of such 
approval processes are central to its integrity (International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions, 2004: 57). Therefore to sustain this position in the wake of opposing 
"If the court refers any question under section 56(1 )(b )29 of the Act 70 I (Central Bank of Malaysia 
Act 2009) to the SAC, the SAC is required mainly to make an ascertainment, and not determination, 
ofIslamic Law related to the question .. .In this sense it can be seen that the SAC is not in position to 
issue a new hukm Syara' but to find out which one of the available hukm is the best applicable in 
Malaysia for the purpose of ascertaining the relevant Islamic laws concerning the question posed to 
them. For example, in a matter where there are differences of opinion regarding the validity of a 
certain Islamic finance facility, SAC can be referred to ascertain which opinion of the jurists is 
applicable in Malaysia. This ascertainment of Islamic law will be binding upon the courts as per the 
Impugned Provisions. It will then be up to the courts to apply the ascertained law to the facts of the 
case. And at the end of the matter, the application and final decision of the matter remains with the 
court. The court still has to decide the ultimate issues which have been pleaded by the parties. After 
all, the issues whether the facility is Shariah compliant or not is only one of the issues to be decided 
by the court." (own italic) 
This legal interpretation is mismatched with the expectation of the Securities Commission. See Oseni and 
Hassan (2011) and Yaacob (2010) for more exposition on this issue. Please also see Tan Sri Abdul Khalid bin 
Ibrahim v Bank Islam MalaYSia Berhad (Guaman No: D4-22A-2l6 TAHUN 2007). 
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resolutions from three distinguished international bodies of Shartah scholars3o, Malaysia 
inevitably has to ensure that its Shari'ah-compliant crude palm futures contract is true to 
its label. 
1.8 Aim and Objectives of the Study 
For the reasons stated, this study aims to investigate the adequacy of the SAC resolution. 
To meet this aim, this research will firstly analyse the contention of the SAC resolution and 
discern the coherence of the SAC contention with the real trading of crude palm oil futures 
contract. Secondly, this research will investigate the relevant parts of the crude palm oil 
futures contract legal framework which have not been explored by existing literature. An 
in·depth analysis of this part of the legal framework will enable the researcher to determine 
whether the trading regulations have actually overcome the Sharf' ah prohibitions inherent 
in the crude palm oil futures contract. 
1.9 The Research Questions 
The central question of this study is to examine whether the SAC resolution is adequate. 
Specifically, this study will address the following two general questions: 
1- Whether the SAC resolution is coherent with the real trading of crude palm oil 
futures contracts? 
11- Whether the legal framework of the crude palm oil futures contract has overcome 
Shari' ah prohibitions inherent in crude palm oil futures contract? 
1.10 The Research l\lethodology 
In answering these research questions and achieving the research objectives, this study 
adopts the qualitative research methodology. The study embarks on its exploratory process 
by first gaining an adequate understanding of the crude palm oil futures contract and its 
trading process. This is done by studying the literature on commodity futures contracts. 
The comprehension gained from this literature aids in the understanding of crude palm oil 
30 The Mecca-based Islamic Fiqh Academy (IF AM), the Jeddah-based Islamic Fiqh Academy (IF AJ), and the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). 
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futures statutes, regulations and its other by-laws.3 ) This legal framework is not studied in 
isolation. Legal frameworks from other jurisdictions are also examined, for example the 
trading regulations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, as well as other 
European countries. Case laws from Malaysia as well as from these countries also form 
part of the legal analysis. The reason for referring to the American, British, and European 
legal framework is because their commodity futures markets are more mature and their 
commodity futures case laws are more extensively reported. Moreover, the trading of 
commodity futures contracts is generally similar globally. 
The knowledge gained on crude palm oil futures contract is then analysed by comparing 
them to the SAC resolution as well as to resolutions from the internationally represented 
body of Shari'ah scholars, namely the Mecca-based Islamic Fiqh Academy (IF AM), the 
Jeddah-based Islamic Fiqh Academy (IF AJ), and the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). The IF AM, the IF AJ and the 
AAOIFI have been chosen as most Muslim countries in the world are members of these 
institutions, Malaysia being not excluded?2 In this part of the research, the literature which 
discusses Islamic law on contract, commerce, and particularly the legality of commodity 
futures contract is studied. At this level, the literature referred to is mainly written in 
English by contemporary scholars with reference to Arabic literatures being beyond the 
expertise of the researcher. Despite this, the formulation of the Shari'ah issues inherent in 
crude palm oil futures contract is distilled mostly from English written literature, which 
comprises most of the existing literature on the legality of the commodity futures contract. 
These Shari'ah issues then became the foundation for the selection and identification of 
legal provisions examined in this study. 
Thirdly, in addition to the above method of textual analysis, the researcher has also 
conducted non-structured interviews and discussions with crude palm oil futures traders, 
crude palm oil producers, as well as Shari'ah scholars from the Securities Commission and 
the SAC in Malaysia. The objective is to gain information which is not available in the 
. texts as well as to increase the understanding of this subject. The additional views and 
31 This legal framework is the law applicable and enforceable in Malaysia as of March 31,2012. 
32 AAOIFI for example has almost 180 members representing more than 46 countries (AAOIFI, 2010: vii). 
Besides IFAM, IFAl, AAOIFI and SAC, other Shari'ah advisory institutions have also resolved that the 
commodity futures trading is not in accordance with the Shari'ah. Please see Permanent Research Committee 
ofthe Board of Great Scholars in Saudi Arabia (as referred to by ai-Amine (2008: 21); European Council for 
Fatwa and Research and India based Islamic Fiqh Academy (as referred to by Kunhibava (2009: 48). 
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insights garnered through this method complement the analysis of the trading regulatory 
framework and its related Sharrah issues. 
1.11 Contributions of the Study 
This study on the adequacy of the SAC resolution is timely. Hence this study hopes to be 
able to contribute to the dearth of literature on the subject of the legality of commodity 
futures contract, principally from the aspect of the legal or regulatory perspective. 
Although the focus of this study is on the Malaysian experience, its findings would still be 
applicable to the experience of other jurisdictions as the nature of commodity futures 
contract is homogenous. Additionally, this critical and systematic investigation into the 
legal framework, which has not been encountered in the existing literature, breeds a fresh 
perspective on the subject. Finally, it is hoped that in the light of this finding, the SAC will 
perform its statutory duty to (i) re-visit and re-examine the application of Shartah 
principles on crude palm oil futures contract33 and (ii) advise the Securities Commission 
d· I 34 accor mg y. 
1.12 Limitations and Constraints of the Study 
This study critically analyses the adequacy of the SAC resolution with the aIm of 
unleashing any adequacy issues found. To do this exhaustively, this study is limited only to 
the SAC resolution on crude palm oil futures contract. It does not include SAC resolutions 
on composite index futures contract or single stock futures35 even though they fall under 
the category of futures contracts. Other instruments not examined and resolved by the 
SAC, such as the forward contract, options, and swap, will not even be touched in this 
study. This study did not aim to question the credibility of the learned members of the SAC 
. but only the width and depth of their scrutiny of crude palm oil futures contract. This study 
is not a Shari' ah-based study with the aim of formulating a fresh Sharir ah ruling of crude 
palm oil futures contracts, nor of formulating and proposing crude palm oil futures contract 
33 See Section 316B(a) of the 2007 Act. 
34 See section 316B(b) of the 2007 Act. 
35 In March 19, 1998 the SAC resolves that the mechanism for stock index futures contracts does not 
contradict the Shari'ah principles. This is manifested by the launch of the Shari'ah Index by the Bursa 
Malaysia that functions as a benchmark for the performance of Shari'ah-compliant securities. The SAC 
resolves that so long as the index component is made up of Shari'ah-compliant securities, the stock index 
trading is permissible (Securities Commission, 2006: 79). Later, in April, 2006, single stock futures of 
Shari'ah compliant underlying stocks was launched by the Bursa Malaysia to provide investors with Islamic 
investment alternatives as well as a risk management tool (Bursa Malaysia: April, 2009). 
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models free from Sharf' ah prohibitions, or even of revamping the current secular-based 
legal framework. Beyond that, this study is constrained by the inability of the researcher to 
produce some credible information gained from the interviews and discussions with the 
Shari'ah scholars in Malaysia on the basis that this information was requested to be held in 
confidence. 
1.13 Outline of the Study 
In order to address the research questions and to meet the research objectives, this thesis is 
divided into seven chapters. This introductory chapter will be followed by Chapter two 
which reviews the literature on the legality of commodity futures contracts. The literature 
includes the resolutions of the SAC, the IF AM, the IF AJ and the AAOIFI. Chapter three 
through until Chapter six form the backbone of this thesis. The SAC resolution and the 
crude palm oil futures contract legal framework are critically and systematically analysed 
in these chapters in order to find the answers to the research questions. 
Chapter three examines the element of gharar in crude palm oil futures contract. The 
analysis is based on the three Shari'ah issues identified as having a close relationship with 
the concept of gharar. These Shari'ah issues have been discussed by the SAC, the IF AM, 
the IF AJ and the AAOIFI as well as in other literature. The issues discussed involve the 
element of non-exchange or a deferment of both counter-values, the sale of non-existing, 
non-possessed, unowned crude palm oil, and the sale of an outstanding debt or obligation 
for a corresponding outstanding debt or obligation. The aim of this chapter is to ascertain 
whether, firstly, the elements of gharar exist and contaminate the crude palm oil futures 
contract, and, secondly, if they are so found, they have been eliminated by the crude palm 
oil futures contract legal framework. 
Chapter four extends this discussion on gharar, focusing mainly on the settlement of crude 
palm oil futures contract. This chapter analyses the elements of gharar in the following 
areas:- (i) the determination of the settlement price in the event of emergency; and (ii) the 
default by the seller to physically deliver the underlying commodity. The latter issue is 
further divided into two sections; namely, where the default is due to the unavailability of 
the supply of the commodity, and where the default is due to the non-fulfilment of the 
commodity's deliverable quality or grade. The driving force behind this chapter is to 
illuminate real case laws depicting the implication of gharar in crude palm oil futures 
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contract. Thus this chapter reaffirms the findings of Chapter three - that gharar elements 
have not been overcome by the crude palm oil futures legal framework. 
Chapter five examines the elements of maystr in crude palm oil futures contract. Like 
gharar, the issue of maystr is also studied by the SAC, the IF AM, the IF AJ and the 
AAOIFI. This chapter examines whether the elements of maysir~ namely, betting, the 
element of chance, the gain of one party at the loss of another party, the unlawful 
acquisition of wealth, and hatred and enmity are to be found in the futures margin system, 
offsetting transaction, and futures speculation. The discussion here is based on the notion 
that Shari'ah scholars are not against commodity futures contract being utilised as a risk 
management tool, rather only when it being utilised as a gambling tool. The method of this 
chapter is to show, firstly, whether the futures margin system, offsetting transaction, and 
futures specu!ation, are facilitating the betting on the future movement of crude palm oil 
futures prices, and, secondly, whether this betting would eventually cause the winner to 
gain at the loss of the loser. 
Chapter six is a substantiation of Chapter five. It traces the historical development of the 
conventional law on gaming or wagering. This chapter will show that the revolution of the 
law on gaming or wagering took place through the development of three legal tests: 
namely, mutual gain and loss, the subjective intention test, and the literal intention test. 
The implication of these legal tests is that it revolutionised the law on gaming or wagering 
to a point where the law finally validates and enforces a futures contract even though, by 
nature, this contract is formed and entered into for the purpose of betting or wagering. As a 
result, betting or wagering on the rise and fall of the price of crude palm oil futures 
contract is now legitimate and enforceable. In short, the purpose of this chapter is to 
establish that section 103 of the 2007 Act was based on the fact that wagering or betting is 
legitimate. 
Chapter seven concludes this thesis. It explains what has been investigated and suggests its 
implications. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Legality of Commodity Futures Contract: The Literature Review 
.--.,-.--.-----.-.----.---.-~.-... ,.--.. -... --.----.. -._."-_ ... _.--_ .. _----_ ...... _,-,_ ..... _ .. _--_.-... _., 
The legality of the commodity futures contract has been a contentious subject for decades 
in the Islamic capital market, banking, and finance industry. It was made more pronounced 
by the presence of the two current opposing Sharf'ah resolutions. That is, one side 
pronounces its legality while the other side abhors it. This was shown quite explicitly when 
in 1985 the IF AM pronounced that the commodity futures contract was not in line with 
Sharf'ah principles. Seven years later, in 1992, the IF AJ issued a similar ruling which was 
echoed by the AAOIFFI in 2004.36 However in 1997 the SAC ruled otherwise. Although 
the findings of the SAC were not synchronised with these three internationally represented 
bodies of Sharirah scholars, they were in agreement in terms of the Sharf'ah issues 
affecting commodity futures contract. These issues relate to maysir, gharar, the non-
exchange or deferment of both counter-values, the sale of non-existing or non-possessed or 
unowned commodity, and the sale of an outstanding debt or obligation for a corresponding 
outstanding debt or obligation. 
This chapter will commence by reviewing the resolutions issued by these bodies. The 
purpose is to show that though the SAC resolution conflicts with the three international 
bodies of Sharf'ah scholars, all these resolutions discuss common Sharrah issues. 
Nonetheless, in line with the theme of this thesis, the SAC resolution will be the focus of 
the review. The analysis of the SAC resolution will be followed by a review of the main 
literature on this subject. The review of this literature, will unleash the gap in this subject, 
and hence to address this gap, this research is being undertaken. 
36 The IFAM, IFAJ and AAOIFFI resolved that the commodity futures contract is not Sharf'ah-compliant as 
it involves elements of maysir and gharar. Notwithstanding that their resolutions were on commodity futures 
contracts and not precisely crude palm oil futures contract, their resolutions are still applicable as crude palm 
oil futures fall squarely within the remit of commodity futures. Thus, it follows that by virtue of their 
resolutions, crude palm oil futures contract is not Shari' ah-compliant. 
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2.1 Islamic Fiqh Academy of Mecca (IFAM)~7 
The first institutional discussion on the legality of commodity futures contract was led by 
the IF AM. In 1985, the IF AM resolved that, despite commodity futures contract 
engendering benefits, viewed as public interest, its trading was accompanied by 
transactions forbidden in the SharI' ah. The commodity futures contract was forbidden as 
(as cited in aI-Amine, 2008: 14): 
1- they contain the element of gambling, exploitation and unlawful devouring of the 
property of others; 
11- they are deferred contracts which conclude on the basis of the description of the 
asset, which asset the seller does not own; 
111- they are by and large paper transactions and not genuine purchase and sale as they 
do not involve real delivery or taking possession of the underlying commodities; 
and 
IV- they do not qualify as salam38 sale which is validated by the Sharf'ah. The buyer, 
in the futures contract, does not pay the price of the underlying commodity at the 
time of entering into the futures contract. The commodity is also not delivered at 
the time of making the contract as well as in the later transactions, entered 
throughout the life of the futures contract. In this circumstance, the parties are 
deemed to gamble by giving and taking the price difference. 
Apart from the reasons stated above, the IF AM ruled that the commodity futures contract 
was prohibited as it is detrimental to the economy by means of (i) oppressive monopoly 
practices - making large sales and purchases which result in small traders incurring loss 
and hardship; (ii) price distortion - the price is no longer dictated by real supply and 
demand or genuine sale and purchase but by unscrupulous acts such as cornering, 
37 The resolution was issued in its seventh session which took place from 11 th till 16 Rabial Akhir 1404. The 
IF AM was established in July 1983 in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, after the idea of setting up such a body was 
mooted by King Khalid in one of the Ole meetings in 1981. The IF AM consists of renowned scholars and 
jurists from the Muslim world that deliberate on contemporary issues or problems arising in Muslim society 
and answer these problems accordingly (as cited in Usmani, 1997). 
38Salam is the sale and purchase of items known only by specification or description. Delivery of such items 
will take effect at a later specified time while the price for such items is paid in full at the time of the contract 
(Securities Commission, 2006: 174). 
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profiteering, or false rumours; and (iii) massive losses incurred from global financial crises 
(as cited in aI-Amine, 2008: 15). 
Nonetheless, Kamali VIews that the IF AM resolution was inadequate as it does not 
consider the commodity futures contract as a new phenomenon which requires a fresh 
interpretation. He states: 
" ... in the light of the SharI' ah principle of permissibility (' iba~ah) that renders all 
commercial transactions permissible in the absence of a clear prohibition, the 
verdict of not only the Mecca-based Fiqh Academy but also many Muslim scholars 
who have proscribed futures trading and declared it totally forbidden is a most 
discouraging form of imitation (taqlld). This body of opinion is mainly founded on 
the analysis that futures trading does not fulfil the requirements of the conventional 
Islamic law of sale - and turns a blind eye to the fact that futures trading is a new 
phenomenon which has no parallel in the conventional law of mu (timaitit, 39 and 
should therefore be governed by a different set of rules." (2002: xii) 
However, the thesis of Ibrahim (2000) contradicts Kamali's view that the commodity 
futures contract needs a different set of rules outside of the classic laws of mu (amalat. By 
examining the structure of the commodity futures contract and analysing its legality from 
the perspective of the orthodox rules and law of mu r limalat, she concludes that the current 
trading of the commodity futures contract is generally permissible. 
Kamali (1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2002b, 2005) studies the legality of the 
commodity futures contract by analysing its Sharf(ah issues. By advancing a fresh 
perspective in examining its Sharrah issues and predicated primarily on the principle of 
ma~la~ah, Kamali suggests that the legality of the commodity futures contract should be 
considered from the context of its governing regulatory framework. According to him, the 
trading regulatory safeguard overcomes the justification ( Wah) for SharI' ah prohibitions, 
namely, the deference of sale, the sale of non-existinglowned/possessed items and the sale 
of debt for another debt. Kamali's approach resonates with the later literature: namely, 
Alamad (2006), AI-Amine (2001, 2005, 2008), Hajar (2009) and Kunhibava (2008, 2010, 
20 lOa). 
AI-Amine's analysis of the Sharf'ah issues in commodity futures contract and his 
argument for a fresh interpretation of the Sharf'ah is comparable to Kamali. AI-Amine 
(2008: 16) contends that the IF AM has not examined the different views of the classical 
39 It means Islamic commercial law. 
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schools of thought. He also argues that the IF AM has also not considered new alternatives 
which would recognise the benefits of futures contract. Despite his critical comment on 
the inadequacy of the IF AM resolution, he admits that he had not examined the papers 
delivered during the IF AM's resolution hearing. AI-Amine and Kamalis's contentions 
against the IF AM resolution are also found to be inadequate. Relative to their arguments 
and their supporting evidence against the element of gharar in commodity futures contract, 
their works, on the other hand, have not shown that they have exhaustively argued and 
proved against the element of maysir in commodity futures contract and that, like gharar, 
this maysir element has been overcome by the trading regulatory safeguard. 
2.2 Islamic Fiq/1 Academy oLJeddah (I F A.J)40 
Similar·to IF AM, in 1992, the IFAJ41 resolved that the commodity futures contract traded 
in the organised market was not permissible (Islamic Research and Training Institute, 
2000: 131). The IF AJ explicates two out of four methods of futures trading which 
transgresses Shari' ah principles. The methods and grounds are as follows: 
1- a type of commodity futures contract which provides for the delivery of the 
described and secured merchandise at some future date. This type of contract also 
provides for the contract to end at that particular future date with the exchange of 
the actual physical delivery and its purchase payment. The IF AJ resolves that this 
type of contract is not permitted as two elements of exchange, namely, the delivery 
of the merchandise and its payment, are deferred to sometime in the future. The 
IF AJ further resolves that if such a contract is amended to meet the well-known 
conditions of the salam contract, in which payment for the merchandise is paid in 
advance, the contract is then permissible in Shari'ah. 
11- Another type of commodity futures contract is where it provides for the delivery of 
described and secured merchandise at some future date and also the payment for 
this merchandise is to be paid upon its delivery. The contract however does not 
stipulate that it can only end with actual physical delivery but could also be 
40 The Jeddah-based Islamic Fiqh Academy is formed in July 1983 under the auspices of the Organisation of 
Islamic Conference. This body consists of Shari'ah scholars and jurists from all around the world that would 
discuss new issues presented by the contemporary world and resolutions are then produced on these issues 
(Usmani, December 12 2010). 
41 . ' 
The resolutton on financial markets (which includes its ruling on commodity futures contract/trading) is 
issued during its seventh session from 9-12 May, 199217-12 Dhul Qi'da 1412H. 
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terminated by an opposite contract. The IF AJ resolved that this type of contract was 
the most prevalent in the commodity market and it is not at all permissible in the 
Sharirah (Islamic Research and Training Institute, 2000: 131-133). Although the 
reason for the prohibition of this type of contract is not explicitly spelt out, it is 
assumed that the reason may be similar to the IF AM's - paper transactions and not 
a genuine purchase and sale as they do not involve the delivery or taking possession 
of their underlying commodities. 
AI-Amine (2008: 21) refutes the IFAJ resolution. He argues that it inadequately considers 
the basis for Sharir ah prohibition on the deferred sale. He based his argument on the basis 
that the IFAJ has relied on a weak lzadith (on bayr al-kiili' bi al-kiili,).42 The IF AJ should, 
instead, examine the authenticity of this lzadith before accepting it. Nonetheless, Zarqa 
(2005: 44) maintains that all the four major fiqh schools and all well-known classical 
Muslim jurists have upheld the prohibition of selling debt for debt differing only in its 
interpretation. Similarly, AI-Sallami (cited in Zarqa, 2005: 44) argues that, despite the 
weakness of the lzadith, the jurists have justified the prohibition of selling debt for debt 
with the following four C illah: (i) it leads to disputes; (ii) it increases the gharar level; (iii) 
it is a useless contract as neither party gets a counter-value that it could benefit from; (iv) it 
is similar to the prohibition of selling one currency for another on a deferred basis; and (v) 
it is similar to gambling for the seller has given nothing and is betting on the future price 
movement. 
In addition to the above argument, AI-Amine (2008: 21) contends that the IFAJ fails to 
adequately ascertain the C illah behind the prohibition of sale prior to the taking of 
possession, or as is stated by the badith "do not sell what is not with you". Though the 
IF AJ has not explicitly prescribed the C illah, its predecessor, the IFM (as cited in Kamali, 
2000: 120) resolved that the basic rationale of the ruling in the above lzadith is gharar, 
which consists of possible failures with respect to delivery. The buyer stands the risk of not 
receiving the goods as it is possible that the seller may delay the delivery or wish to revoke 
the contract. The resolution further states that while gharar of this kind tends to be of a 
general application, there may be an additional element of gharar in the sale of food grains 
421n the IFAJ's resolution hearings, Mohamed Ali Elgari and Taqi al-Usmani (cited in AI-Amine, 2008: 17 
and 20) presented their papers. Both of them argued that the futures contract is a kind of bayr al-kali' bi al-
kali' and relying on the /ladfth of bay' al-kali' bi al-kali', the transaction is prohibited. However, AI-Amine 
(2008: 21) rebuts the authenticity of this ~adfth and argues that the IF AM has accepted this ~adifh without 
examining its authenticity. 
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and agricultural crops as they may be perished or destroyed due to ja'ilwh (climate 
disasters and disease). 
Echoing Kamali, AI-Amine argues that the organised system of the commodity futures 
market would address this prohibition with its in-built guarantee system. However, 
Rahman (2011: 112) maintains that, irrespective of the clearing house guaranteeing the 
delivery of the underlying commodity, gharar still exists. This is because, in derivatives 
transactions, delivery is not a significant matter. In this respect, neither the clearing house 
nor the exchange will be responsible for locating the underlying commodity. Therefore, in 
the event of a default by the seller to deliver, the exchange will automatically pay the 
margin to the buyer, the payment is being taken from the seller's deposit account. 
Nonetheless, Rahman seems not to be aware that apart from the non-delivery of the 
underlying commodity, under the actual futures regulatory framework, when there is a 
default, the exchange will first determine a cash settlement price for the seller to pay to the 
buyer (and not just taken from the margin account). The determination of the cash 
settlement price is an issue as its method of calculation is not explicitly mentioned in the 
trading regulation. 
2.3 The Malaysian Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) 
In its eleventh meeting, on November 26, 1997, the SAC resolved that the crude palm oil 
futures contract was in accordance with Sharifah principles. The SAC ruled that the crude 
palm oil futures contract was free from Sharifah issues: namely, rnaysir, gharar, buying 
something that does not exist (bayf rna fdiim) , speculation, and the non-exchange of 
counter-values ('iwadh). The SAC also ruled that the crude palm oil futures contract is 
permissible on the basis of public interest (rna#a!lQh) and on the notion that trading 
regulations have overcome Shartah prohibitions: namely, that of gharar and rnaysir 
(Securities Commission, 2006: 75). 
Investigating the permissibility of crude palm oil futures contract from the principle of 
masdlih rnursalah (unrestricted public interest or public benefit),43 Mohammed (2011) 
however finds that crude palm oil futures contract cannot be approved as it involves 
Sharffah issues, which are clearly prohibited by the Sharifah. Apart from this 
43 Unrestricted in the sense that it has not been regulated by the Law Giver and no textual authority can be 
found on its validity or otherwise (Obaidullah, 200 I: 190). 
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contravention, the contract also contravenes the objectives (maqiisid)44 of Sharz'ah. In 
examining the method of the SAC in approving the contract, Mohammed states that: 
" ... in order to achieve its goal (to becoming the hub for Islamic finance in the 
Asian region) sometimes it goes out of the bounds and renders a conventional 
transaction Islamic, without factoring the ethos and objectives of Sharl'ah in. 
Acting upon pick and choose policy it justifies the structure of that particular 
transaction, finding legitimacy of different components of a single transaction from 
wherever it could be found in the classicalfiqh literature, going not only against the 
majority view but overlooking or uprooting whatever comes in its way. Legitimacy 
of palm oil futures trading is one of the instances of this kind." (2011: 11) 
On the other hand, Bacha (2007: 331) agrees with the SAC. By doing so, the SAC has 
accommodated the market's need for modem financial instruments. Instead, Bacha laments 
the majority of jurists who objected to derivatives by examining them within the confines 
of a contractual arrangement, missing the broader picture of the market's need. 
Nevertheless, the drive to accommodate the needs of the market must be supported by a 
resolution that is adequate and coherent with the real trading of such modem financial 
instruments. The following discussion analyses the adequacy of the SAC resolution. 
2.3.1 Definition of Commodity Futures Contract 
The SAC defines commodity futures contract as: 
"an exchanged-traded agreement to buy and sell a commodity in an actual market (cash 
market) in a standard quantity, at a future date and at a determined place of delivery" 
(Securities Commission, 2006: 75). 
However, this definition does not accurately describe an exc~ange-traded commodity 
futures contract. This is based on, first, the actual selling/making delivery and actual 
buying/taking delivery transpires on an exchange and not in a cash market. Its delivery 
process entails delivery of crude palm oil by the seller to a port tank installation located at 
one of the delivery points. The payment for this delivery is not made at this delivery point 
but at the Clearing House, after the oil has been appraised and issued with a negotiable 
storage receipt (Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad, n.d.: 9). 
44 The primary objective of the Shari'ah is the realisation of benefit (masla~ah) to the people, both in this 
world and in the hereafter. It is generally held that the Shari'ah in all of its parts aims at securing a benefit for 
the people or protecting them against corruption and evil. The objectives of Shari'ah are closely related to the 
concept of masla/lah (Laldin, 2009: 26). 
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Second, most commodity futures contracts do not end with actual delivery. Kunhibava 
spotted the inadequacy in the SAC resolution. Her thesis explored the potential of the 
conventional derivatives law in overcoming Shari(ah objections in derivatives. 
Commenting on the inadequacy of the SAC resolution, she said: 
" ... the SAC had not discussed the reality of futures trading. Even though it involved 
trading in commodity futures most of the players do not take possession. This pertinent 
feature was not dealt with." (2009: 56). 
2.3.2 Free from Gambling 
According to the SAC, gambling refers to: 
"any activities which involve betting, whereby the winner will take the entire bet and 
the loser will lose his bet" (Securities Commission, 2006: 104). 
Hence, the SAC (2006: 76) contends that the placement of a deposit as margin payment at 
the start of the trading is neither a bet nor gambling. Though the amount of the deposit 
fluctuates, they argue that the fluctuation is not based on luck but due to the change in the 
demand of crude palm oil, which is a common phenomenon in the trading world. Based on 
this, the deposit payment is not a prohibited bet, as betting or gambling depend solely on 
luck and are not related to demand and offer. 
However, in reality, the futures margin system comprises not only the initial margin, which 
is paid at the start of trading, but a set of other margin mechanisms: namely, maintenance 
margin, variation margin, margin call, as well as marking to market. However, these 
mechanisms are not analysed in the SAC resolution. The discernment of the whole 
structure of the futures margin system is fundamental, as the futures margin system is 
alleged by the opponents of the commodity futures contract to be contaminated with 
maysir element. 
2.3.3 Free from Gharar 
The SAC defines gharar as: 
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"something that is not certain ... relates to uncertainty in obtaining goods that have 
been bought and in receiving potential profits." (Securities Commission, 2006: 100) 
Gharar is also referred to as "elements of uncertainty that can expose someone to danger" 
(Securities Commission, 2006: 100). According to the SAC, the question which needs to 
be asked is whether gharar really exists in crude palm oil futures contract. In answering 
this question, the SAC contends that there is no element of gharar in the crude palm oil 
futures contract as when the contract is offered, specifications such as its quantity, type, 
price and delivery date are made known to market players. The SAC also argues that there 
is no element of gharar as the contract can be settled in cash before the due date or 
settlement by delivery on the due date. This argument is supported by the existence of the 
Clearing House which ensures the delivery and settlement of crude palm oil futures 
contract. Even if there is gharar, it is eliminated by the provision of the Futures Industry 
Act 1993 and the Business Rules (Exchange and Clearing House) which provides 
surveillance and insurance against any cheating (Securities Commission, 2006: 77). 
In reality, however, the legal framework of crude palm oil futures contract does not 
sufficiently describe the grade or quality of the oil. The phrase "crude unbleached palm oil 
of good merchantable quality" is not sufficiently described to enable the seller to be 
informed of the required constituents of crude palm oil. It even fails to stipulate the actual 
delivery date. What is stipulated is only the month of delivery. Since no actual delivery 
date is fixed in the contract, the exact date for the buyer to remit the oil's purchase price is 
also vague. These issues involve gharar elements yet they have not been shown to be 
raised and/or analysed in the SAC resolution. 
2.3.4 Free From Buying Something That Does Not Exist (Bay' Ma'dumt5 
In resolving the issue of bai' ma'dum, the SAC adopts the opinion of Ibn Qayyim. Ibn 
Qayyim views that the prohibition of bai' ma' dum is due to the element of uncertainty in 
handing over the sold goods and not due to the non-existence of the object at the time 
when the contract is being made. Hence, bai' ma' dum is prohibited because of the element 
of gharar rather than the element of ma'dum. In support of this proposition, the SAC refers 
to salam and istisnii' (contract of manufacturer) as, in these contracts, the real delivery 
45 In the Islamic law of contract, one of the conditions for the object of trade to be legitimate is that the object 
must exist when the trade or contract is being made. Hence, the purchase of an object that does not exist 
when the contract is being made is termed as bai' ma'dum (Securities Commission, 2006: 23). 
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takes effect in the future. Hence such commodities or products mayor may not exist at the 
time of forming the contract (Securities Commission, 2006: 77). 
In reality, the commodity futures contract is seldom settled with delivery. Even its legal 
framework provides that the contract can be settled by way of physical delivery or cash 
settlement, in lieu of such delivery. However in cases where it is intended to be settled by 
physical delivery, the history of commodity futures has often witnessed massive defaults in 
. the physical delivery of the underlying commodities. In such an event, the exchange is 
empowered to coerce parties to settle by cash instead of by physical delivery, and 
henceforth determine and impose a cash settlement amount. Though the regulation is 
explicit in providing such power to the exchange, the regulation is silent in providing a 
clear method on how the exchange arrives at the cash settlement amount. This scenario is 
not attended to in the SAC resolution. 
2.3.5 Speculation is Permissible 
The SAC (Securities Commission, 2006: 109) refers to speculation as "making profits out 
of the price movements of goods.,,46 On this basis, the SAC views that speculation exists in 
all forms of business, including the commodity futures market. The question is whether 
such acts of speculation are conducted excessively or under normal circumstances 
(Securities Commission, 2006: 78). The SAC substantiates its argument by making 
reference to the fact that Islam allows sale and purchase transactions, examples of these 
being bay' muzdyadah47 and murdbabah48 - transactions which involve making profit from 
the difference in the price. In this circumstance, what matters is that the transaction must 
be monitored and supervised in ensuring fairness to market players and to avoid forbidden 
practices like fraud and manipulation (Securities Commission, 2006: 109). Apart from the 
above contention, the SAC also argues that speculation is different from gambling. The 
difference lies in the motives and conduct of the investors. To the SAC, speculators are 
46 Taking the definition from the Dewan Bahasa and Pustaka, the SAC defines speculation as "the act of 
buying and selling something (shares and others) in anticipation of making a big profit but at a great risk" 
(Securities Commission, 2006: 109). The SAC also refers to the Kamus Ekonomi which defines speculation 
as "the taking of risks by investors or businessmen in the hope of making profits through financial or 
business trades. Speculators usually buy securities for capital gains and not for dividends" (taken from 
Securities Commission, 2006: 109). The Dictionary of Business Terms is also cited by the SAC where it 
defines speculation as the "purchase of any property or securities with the expectation of obtaining a quick 
profit as a result of price change, possibly without adequate research. Compare with gambling, which is 
based on random chance; contrast with investment" (taken from Securities Commission, 2006: 109). 
47 
Bay'muzayadah is a sale by auction (Securities Commission, 2006: 171). 
48 Muraba~ah is a cost plus profit sale (Securities Commission, 2006: 174). 
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investors who are well informed and invest with careful consideration while gamblers are 
investors who enter the market and invest solely based on luck. In this way, gamblers 
expose themselves to risk which conduct contradicts the teachings of Islam (Securities 
Commission, 2006: 111). 
In reality, however, futures speculation is different from speculation involved in a typical 
commercial sale and purchase transaction. Though both transactions involve parties 
profiting from price difference, futures speculation does not involve the intention or act of 
taking or making a delivery, nor any connection with the production or use of the 
commodity. Even though a commodity is not involved, the speculators could still make a 
profit if they bet on the future movement of the price correctly. What is being gained is the 
differential payment, taken from the account of the loser and given to the account of the 
winner. Yet this context of futures speculation is not captured in the SAC resolution. 
2.3.6 No Issue on r/wadh (Equal Counter-values) 
Though (iwadh forms the focal ground for objecting to commodity futures contract in the 
IF AM and IF AJ resolutions, this is the last issue addressed by the SAC. In addressing this 
fundamental issue, the SAC argues that the trading of crude palm oil futures contract has 
increased the value of economic activities. The SAC illustrates this notion by taking the 
example of hedging. By able to hedge, producers of crude palm oil are able to cut costs. In 
return, this will improve the profit of the producers and enable their products to be more 
competitive (Securities Commission, 2006: 78). To justify its stand and eschew the 
painstaking task of bringing order over doctrine, the SAC apply the principle of ma#a!wh. 
In the history of commodity futures contract, the deferment of physical delivery and its 
purchase payment have spawned a long list of legal disputes. The case laws evidenced the 
pecuniary loss suffered from the default in the physical delivery - due to the lack of supply 
of the underlying commodities or the inferior quality of the delivered commodities. 
Disputes were also triggered by parties feeling discontent about the fairness of the cash 
settlement amount (in lieu of delivery) determined by the exchange. The massive defaults, 
particularly through the vehicle of manipulation or comer, prove that societies were forced 
to pay the brunt of the failure of commodity futures markets. In this respect, Mohammed 
(2011: 42), Rahman (2011: 119) and Dean (2010: 35) maintain that the harm caused by the 
futures contract transgresses the very objectives (maqiisid) of Shari'ah. 
251 P age 
2.4 Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFl)49 
Seven years after the SAC resolution, in 2004, the AAOIFI issued a ruling which, opposite 
to the SAC, categorically prohibited commodity futures contract. 50 The AAOIFI's 
resolution, or commonly called as standard, defined commodity futures contract as: 
" ... contracts whose legal effects take place at a determined future date either 
through liquidation between the parties, or cash settlement or through counter-
contracts, but they rarely end in actual delivery and possession" (2010: 363). 
The AAOIFI resolves that futures commodity contracts are not, according to the Shari'ah, 
permissible either through their formation or by trading in them. The basis for prohibiting 
such a contract is as follows: 
1- The verse from the Quran in Chapter An-Nisa' verse 29 where Allah says, 
"Eat not up your property among yourselves with injustice, but let there be 
amongst you traffic and trade by mutual consent." 
11- Both counter-values are delayed hence creating two liabilities which equals the 
impermissibility of delaying capital in salam. 
It is interesting to note that, though the Shari'ah Board of the AAOIFI is comprised of 
Malaysian Shari'ah scholars who sat in the SAC when the resolution of crude palm oil 
futures contract was made, the SAC does not seem to have taken any steps to review its 
resolution in light of the opposing ruling of three distinguished international bodies of 
Shari' ah scholars.S 1 
49 The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions is the standard-setting 
organisation for Islamic financial institutions. It was registered on 27 March 1991 in the State of Bahrain as 
an international autonomous non-profit making corporate body. The standards that have been issued by the 
organisation comprise of mainly accounting, auditing, and governance, in addition to codes of ethics and 
Sharf'ah standards. The organisation has progressively issued new standards, redrafting current ones by 
taking into account all newly emergent requirements and needs of Islamic financial institutions from all 
around the world (The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions, 2008: vii). 
50 This resolution is the result of its Shari'ah board meeting held from 15-20 May 2004 (26-30 Rabi' al-
A wwal, 1425H) and issued under the title of "Sale of Commodities in Organised Markets". 
51 According to DeLorenzo (2011: 230), the Malaysian Securities Commission encourages its Shariah 
scholars to sit on international boards to deepen and broaden the experience of these scholars. The inclusive 
nature of the attitude of, and resolutions by, the SAC, keeping in mind the jurisdictional differences within 
the factions of the scholarship in the Shariah, has been a real strength for the Islamic capital market in Kuala 
Lumpur. 
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2.5 The Gap in the Existing Literature 
Ever since the subject of the legality of commodity futures contract was officially 
discussed in 1985 by the IF AM, not much literature has been written on the topic. 
Shahabudin (1994), the former Chief Executive of the Kuala Lumpur Commodity 
Exchange, extolled the benefits of the commodity futures contract and recommended it to 
be adopted by the Malaysian Islamic capital market. As the SAC had yet to issue its 
resolution then, the question remained whether such contract was permissible by the 
Shartah. In 1997, the SAC resolved that it was permissible. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of 
the commodity futures contract remains a contentious subject in Malaysia. Bakar (2007), 
being one of the SAC members involved in the issuance of the SAC resolution, presented a 
paper on this subject. In his presentation, he deliberated on the Shartah issues found in 
derivatives products: namely, margin payment, setting-off, cash settlement in lieu of 
physical delivery, hedging, arbitrage, short sale, and questioned its permissibility. 
Usmani (2000, n.d.) and Dean (2010) analyse the commodity futures contract purely from 
the fiqh (jurisprudence) perspective and maintain that it breaches the rules and principles of 
Shari'ah. Neither of their analyses, however, relates exhaustively to the trading regulatory 
framework which forms part and parcel of the commodity futures contract. On the other 
hand, Kamali (1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2002a, 2002b, 2005), Ibrahim (2000, 2002), Al-
Amine (2001, 2005, 2008), and Alamad (2006) argue that the commodity futures contract 
is permissible as its Shari'ah issues have been overcome by its legal framework. 
Spearheading this team, Kamali and Ibrahim contend that in exercising any fiqh analysis, 
one must take into account its trading regulations. Having done so, they find that the 
regulatory safeguards and surveillance mechanisms have eliminated the elements of gharar 
from the contract. Though Zarqa (2005), Khan (2005), Mohammed (2011), and Rahman 
(2011) agree to the relevance of the trading regulations, they opine that Kamali has 
misappropriated the methodology in adducing the fiqh ruling on the permissibility of the 
commodity futures contract. They argue that for Kamali to legitimise the commodity 
futures contract on the basis of permissibility (ibiibah) - to provide ease and avoid hardship 
.:... Kamali has to ensure that the contract is not in collision with any explicit prohibitive 
Shari'ah injunctions and that it does not cause any harm to the social welfare of the 
community. 
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Rahman (2011), and in particular, Mohammed (2011) examines the commodity futures 
contract in light of the principle of ma.~iilib mursalah - its benefit and harm to the society. 
Deliberating on past economic crises and market failures, they argue that the contract 
transgresses a fundamental Shartah principle, namely, devouring the wealth of others. 
This transgression is also in conflict with maqii#d of Sharirah. They further argue that 
though the commodity futures contract brings some benefits, its benefits are largely 
undermined by its harmful effects. Similarly, Khan (2005) analyses the contract from the 
basis of Islamic economic principles and economic reality. Based on his analysis, he 
concludes that the commodity futures contract is not permissible as it transgresses Islamic 
economic principles. Bacha (2008), meanwhile, evaluates the needs of the commodity 
futures contract and examines the technical part of its trading. Though he finds that there is 
a need for such an instrument, he concedes that there are a number of technical issues 
which require Shartah deliberation. For instance, the huge trading volume indicates 
extensive speculation in the futures market, the issue of non-delivery, and the cash 
settlement in lieu of delivery. 
On other hand, Ahmad (2009), who exammes the contract from the perspective of 
ma~labah, argues that by permitting derivatives instruments, the public could manage risk 
and hardship. Unlike Mohammed, her analysis is short of real evidence which could 
augment her claim on the applicability of the ma$labah principle. Her analysis on the 
futures contract is also inaccurate as it does not reflect real trading. For example, she 
viewed that the process of marking to market is not a transfer of money from a loser to a 
winner but is a process of securing parties from default. In reality, marking to market is 
indeed a method for the winner to receive his winnings from the loser as this gain is 
transferred directly into the account of the winner and the winner can enjoy this gain 
instantaneously. 
Jobst (2008), and Jobst and Sole (2012) review the literature which discuss the Sharirah 
issues and find that the prohibitive injunction against derivatives curtails the development 
of financial derivatives in the Islamic capital market. Similarly, Uberoi and Khadem (2011) 
analyse and evaluate the Shartah issues. According to them, the Sharf'ah restrictions 
could be overcome if Shartah scholars play their role and duty in enhancing the welfare 
(ma$Zabah) of the society and cater for the needs of the Islamic finance industry. Khan F. 
(1995), EI-Din (2001), and Ayyash (2008) realise the real market needs for an Islamic 
futures market which is to be devoid of any of the Sharfah issues. Based on the needs for 
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a Shari'ah-compliant derivatives market, Khan F., EI-Din and Ayyash explore the rich 
resources of Islamic jurisprudence and suggest Shari'ah-compliant derivatives modelled 
on the concept of salam, isti~nii' andju'iilah. 
As mentioned earlier, the proponents of the commodity futures contract contend that 
futures regulations have overcome the Shari'ah prohibitions. In support of this proposition, 
Kamali (2002a) and AI-Amine (2001, 2008) discuss the Malaysian futures market legal 
framework. Kamali (2002a: 49) describes the relevant provisions in the then Commodity 
Trading Act 1985 which relate to: the setting up of the Exchange and the Clearing House; 
the licensing of intermediaries in the futures market; the clients' protection against 
pecuniary loss caused by the default of any members of the Exchange; the trading, 
registration and settlement of contract; the trading limits; and trading offences like false 
trading, manipulation, cornering etcetera. Meanwhile, AI-Amine (2008: 177) refers to the 
then Futures Industry Act 1993.52 Apart from what was described by Kamali, AI-Amine 
went further in comparing the Securities Commission, being the supervisory authority of 
the futures market, with the institution of J:lisbah in Islam;s3 and comparing futures market 
offences with market offences in Islam. Although they have analysed the commodity 
futures legal framework, their analysis is superficial as they only studied a small portion of 
the trading regulations. Both seem to focus on these few provisions which they deem as 
safeguards, hence claiming to have sufficiently addressed Shari'ah concerns. 
On the other hand, Kunhibava (2009) explores the prospective of the conventional 
derivatives legal system in overcoming Shari'ah objections in derivatives. She studies how 
conventional law has evolved from invalidating the commodity futures contract on the 
basis of gambling to validating it by regulatory intervention. Her work involves the 
examination of the UK and American regulatory framework, which she argues is able to 
overcome Shari'ah objections. In support of her proposition, she explores provisions 
relating to restricting derivatives trading which include: limiting the number of days for 
futures delivery; trading limits and imposing taxes on each futures sale; the licensing of the 
Exchange as well as the traders; designating a regulating body to oversee the market; the 
training of those involved in derivatives trading; investor protection against rogue traders; 
prohibitions in trading; and the imposition of stiff penalties for violation of laws (2009: 
52 The Commodity Trading Act was repealed by the then Futures Industry Act 1993. 
53 The institution of bisbah originates from the concept of market supervision established during the period of 
the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). It developed from a small supervisory market institute into an 
institute comprising of various departments and dealing with almost everything that affects the Muslim 
community - their economy, health, security; environment and etcetera. 
291 P age 
185). Her study is significant as this is the only study on this subject which carries out 
surveys to test the hypothesis.54 Based on this research method, she finds that: 
"It is established that risk management tools are needed in Islamic finance. 
However, futures and options as they exist in their current form are considered not 
to be Islamically permissible. Nevertheless if all the objections imposed by Shariah 
could be overcome towards derivatives then they would be accepted in Islamic 
finance ... The conventional laws identified from the legal history usage of 
derivatives in conventional finance can be used to overcome excessive speculation 
and gambling. However to overcome other objections towards derivatives in 
Islamic finance, the solutions will have to be found within Shariah itself, to achieve 
complete acceptance of derivatives." (2009: 274) 
On this finding, she recommends that further research on the internal rules, regulations and 
guidelines of the current boards of trade and exchange be carried out in order to determine 
whether these legal frameworks could actually overcome the Shari'ah objections. 
This suggestion is timely and important and it is also concurrent with the view held by AI-
Basil (2005) regarding the novelty of commodity futures contract in which he said: 
"It is also necessary to analyse actual contracts in futures markets; it is obvious that 
this entails investigating all forms and circumstances of such contracts, and then we 
can make our judgements on a case-by-case basis. The same criticism applies to 
other studies which call for banning or allowing such contracts." (2005: 49). 
This literature highlights the areas that have been covered on this subject and at the same 
time accentuates the gap that needs to be addressed. A comprehensive and exhaustive 
study on the mechanics of the crude palm oil futures contract and its legal framework is 
wanting. Though Kamali, AI-Amine, and Kunhibava have examined this legal framework, 
their examination is restricted to a certain area of the framework, leaving other 
fundamental parts of the framework untouched. This study will examine the remaining 
fundamental parts of this legal framework. The selection of these legal provisions will be 
made using the criteria of Shari'ah prohibitions and issues as discussed by the SAC, the 
IFAM, the IFAJ, the AAOIFI and the existing literature. By critically examining this part 
of the legal framework, this study will be able to discern whether the SAC resolution is 
coherent with real trading and whether the crude palm oil futures legal regime has actually 
overcome the Shart ah prohibitions inherent within crude palm oil futures contract. 
54 In one of her surveys, it is shown that almost seventy per cent of her respondents agree to conventional law 
being used to regulate futures, but to do this, the conventional law must be within the principles of Shari'ah 
(2009: 210). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Reasons for Gharar in Eligible Delivery Agreement and Contract 
Specification 
-----,------
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to analyse the element of gharar55 in crude palm oil futures contract 
in particular the eligible delivery agreement and its contract specification. Gharar literally 
means deception (International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance, 2010: 
131). According to the SAC, the crude palm oil futures contract is Sharr ah-compliant. It 
claims that the contract is free from any gharar elements and even if there is gharar, it has 
been eliminated by the crude palm oil futures legal framework. This stand is taken in spite 
of the contrary resolutions of the IF AM, the IFAJ and the AAOIFI. Although the SAC, on 
the one hand, and the IFAM, IFAJ and AAOIFI on the other hand, came to opposing 
rulings on the legality of commodity futures, all these institutions have, in fact, adjudicated 
one common denominator issue - the non-exchange or deferment of both counter-values at 
the time of sale. 
This common denominator issue will be discussed in this chapter as it relates to the issue 
of gharar. In addition to this, this chapter will also analyse the element of gharar in other 
controversial issues related to crude palm oil futures contract: namely, the sale of non-
existent, non-possessed, or unowned crude palm oil, and the sale of an outstanding debt or 
obligation for a corresponding outstanding debt or obligation. The analysis of these issues 
and its affiliation with the doctrine of gharar will be framed based on the views expounded 
by the classical and contemporary Sharirah jurists including the institutions of Shartah 
scholars. 
The discussion on the technical aspect of crude palm oil futures contract will be drawn 
from the interpretation of Malaysia'S crude palm oil futures legal framework, namely the 
2007 Act, the Business Rules of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad, the Business Rule of 
Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad as well as local case laws. Data collected through 
interviews with a number of Malaysian futures market practitioners, as well as prominent 
55 Technically gharar refers to "sale of a thing that is not present at hand, or the sale of a thing whose 
consequence or outcome is not known; or a sale involving risk or hazard which one does not know whether it 
will come to be or not, such as fish in the water or a bird in the air." (Khan, 2003: 66). 
311 P age 
Shari(ah scholars, will be used to complement the analysis. Apart from the Malaysian legal 
framework, the commodity futures legal framework of the United States and other 
European countries will also be studied. This includes their case laws. The reference to 
these foreign jurisdictions is due to their commodity futures market being more mature, 
similarity in the trading process and the fact that case laws related to commodity futures 
contracts are more extensively reported in these jurisdictions. Finally, this chapter will seek 
to establish that, inconsistent with the stance of the SAC, the element of gharar does exist 
in crude palm futures contract. 
3.2 Gharar in Commodity Futures Contract: The Divergence in the Resolutions 
The resolutions of the SAC, the IF AM, the IF AJ and the AAOIFI have shown that gharar 
is conspicuous in commodity futures contract. The IFM resolves that commodity futures 
contract is not in accordance with the Shari(ah as it is a deferred contract; it involves the 
sale of a commodity which the seller does not own or possess; and it concludes over a 
thing which does not exist at the time of the contract (taken from Kamali, 2000: xviii and 
. aI-Amine, 2008: 15). Similarly, the IFAJ resolves that the commodity futures contract is 
not permissible as it defers the delivery as well as the payment (Islamic Research and 
Training Institute, 2000: 131). Likewise, the AAOIFI categorically prohibits the 
undertaking of futures transactions as: they it involve a sale without a real physical 
exchange or delivery of commodities; and by delaying the exchange of both counter-
values, two liabilities are created; and finally, lack of delivery negates the requirement of a 
sale (Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, 2010: 361). 
Nonetheless, despite the above arguments, the SAC resolves that the crude palm oil futures 
contract is permissible as it is free from gharar, it does not involve buying something that 
does not exist at the time of sale (bay( ma(diim), and it does not involve the non-exchange 
of counter-values (iwadh). Furthermore, it argues that even if there is gharar, the 
regulatory framework of the crude palm oil futures contract extinguishes the gharar 
element (Securities Commission, 2006: 75). Despite the divergence in the rulings between 
the IFAM, IFAJ and AAOIFFI on the one hand, and the SAC on the other hand, these 
rulings display that they have deliberated on one, common gharar issue. This issue is the 
non-exchange or deferment of both counter-values at the time of sale. This issue strikes at 
the core of the crude palm oil futures contract to the extent that the IF AJ has illegalised 
commodity futures contract solely on this ground. Apart from this issue, these resolutions 
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have also discussed other gharar issues related to commodity futures contract: namely, the 
sale of non-existing, non-possessed, or unowned crude palm oil; and the sale of an 
outstanding debt or obligation for a corresponding outstanding debt or obligation. 
These gharar issues will be analysed in this chapter. To commence the analytical process, 
the next section will briefly explain the prohibitive injunctions of gharar in a sale or an 
exchange transaction. 
3.3 The Prohibition of Gharar Transactions 
The prohibition of gharar transactions is sourced from the ~adith or the tradition of the 
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). According to Ibn Rushd (2000: 179), though the 
majority of jurists do not dispute these transactions, the meanings of the names of these 
sales are disputed. Amongst those transactions that have been expressly proscribed are as 
follows: 56 
1- Abu Hurairah reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) forbade the type of 
sale which involves gharar (risk or uncertainty) and bayral-~a$iih (a transaction 
determined by the throwing of a stone). According to al-Nawawi, this ~adith can be 
explained in various ways: first, for instance one says, I sell you one of these 
clothes on which the stone falls which I am throwing; secondly, I sell you this 
object on condition that you have the option till I throw this stone; thirdly, if I strike 
this cloth by throwing a stone to it, that is sold to you for such and such price (as 
cited in Hassan, 1988: 959). Sales completed in such a way may lead to injustice 
and hardship to one of the parties and hence is prohibited (Siddiqi, 1978: 796). 
11- Abu Sa'id al-Khudri reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) forbade two 
types of business, muliimasah and muniibadhah. Muliimasah is a sale where a man 
touches the other person's garment without unfolding or turning it over. The sale is 
binding when he touches that garment. Muniibadhah, on the other hand, is a sale 
where a man says to another, "If I throw this garment to you, the sale will be 
56 Other prohibited transactions are the sale ofa foetus in the womb of the conceiving animal (/:Iabi al-/:Iahla); 
the sale of that not yet created; the sale of fruits before they are ripe; bay' al-mulamasa; bay' al-munabadha; 
bay' al-ba~ah; the sale of fruit-bearing trees for several years (mu'awama); two sales in one; a sale linked to 
a loan; the sale of grain ears before they whiten; the sale of grapes before they are blackened; and the sale of 
foetuses and sperm of animals (mac;lamin and malaqih) (Ibn Rushd, 2000: 179). See also AI-Muwatta Imam 
Malik (1982: 301). 
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certain" (Hassan, 1988: 959). Both forms of transactions are prohibited as, in either 
case, the buyer is not given any opportunity to examine the things sold to him. The 
bargain is thus likely to prove unduly disadvantagous to one side (Siddiqi, 1978: 
795). 
111- Ibn 'Umar reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) forbade the transaction 
called ~abal al-~abalah. This is the sale of an offspring of another offspring. At the 
time of sale, the offspring is still in the womb of the mother, the she-camel. This 
term, ~abal al-~abalah, can be explained in various ways. Firstly, the sener says to 
the buyer: I sold this article for a price to be paid later when that she-camel delivers 
an offspring, a she-camel, and this she-camel becomes pregnant. This form of sale 
is prohibited as the period fixed for payment is obscure. Secondly, the seller says to 
the buyer, when that she-camel delivers an offspring, a she-camel, and this she-
camel becomes pregnant and delivers an offspring. I sell you this offspring now. 
This sale is forbidden as the object is unknown (Hassan, 1988: 960). 
The next section will further explain the meaning of gharar and its application in the 
contract of exchange. 
3.4 Ghartlr: Its Definition and Concept 
In a literal sense, gharar means deception (International Shari' ah Research Academy for 
Islamic Finance, 2010: 131). It also connotes risk, hazard, jeopardy, danger, and/or peril 
(Cowan, 1979: 781-782). Taghreer, being the verbal noun, refers to deception or 
misrepresentation in the context of which it includes exposing oneself (or his property) or 
others (or their properties) to jeopardy (AI-Saati, 2003:6). The noun of garra, ghurur has 
been mentioned in the Qur'tin in Chapter Al-i-'Imrtin (The Family of 'Imran), verse 185, 
which depicts the life in this world as mere deception, relative to real life in the Hereafter 
(Badawi and Haleem, 2008: 662). The verse says: 
"Every soul shall have a taste of death. And only on the Day of Judgement shall 
you be paid your full recompense. Only he who is saved far from the Fire and 
admitted to the Garden will have attained the object (of Life); for the life of this 
world is but goods and chattels of deception". 
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In Islamic jurisprudence, the term gharar has been given a variety of meanings by classical 
as well as contemporary jurists including the institution~ of Shari'ah scholars. AI-Zu1)ayli 
(2003: 83), for example, assembled the definitions of gharar, as given by classical jurists, 
illustrating how each school of thought (madhab) has its own interpretation of gharar. The 
myriad of interpretations is perhaps due to differences in the perception and 
comprehension of the gharar injunctions as well as distinctive prevailing market practices. 
AI-Sarak1)si from the Hanafi school describes gharar as that whose consequences are 
hidden. AI-Qanlfi, a scholar from the Maliki school views that gharar is what is not known 
to exist in the future, for example, birds in the air and fish in the water. According to AI-
~1)IrazI of the ~1)afi 'I school, gharar is that whose nature and consequences are hidden. 
While another scholar from the ~1)afi'i school, Al-'Isnawi, relates gharar to two 
possibilities, with the worse consequence being the more likely. Similarly, 'Ibn Hazm of 
the Ziihiri school defines gharar as a transaction where the buyer does not know what he 
has bought or the seller does not know what he has sold. 
Ibn Taymiyyah defines and explains gharar as: 
" ... things with unknown fate. Selling such things is maysir and gambling. This is 
because when a slave runaway, or a camel or a horse is lost, his owner would sell it 
conditional on risk, so the buyer pays much less than its worth. If he gets it, the 
seller would complain: you have "gambled me, and got the good with a low price. 
If not the buyer would complain: you've gambled me and got the price I paid for 
nothing. This will lead to undesired consequences of maysir, which is hatred and 
enmity, in addition to getting something for nothing which is a sort of injustice. So 
gharar exchange implies injustice, enmity and hatred." (as cited in AI-Suwailem, 
2000: 65). 
His disciple, Ibn al-Qayyim, shares a similar views7 but extends the meaning of gharar to 
(i) the failure by the seller to deliver the subject matter, regardless of the existence or non-
existence of the subject matter; (ii) the acquisition of its object being unknown or the 
object being incapable of delivery or the quantity of the object being undetermined; and 
(iii) t~ere being a state of doubt between its existence or non-existence (as cited in Zahraa 
and Mahmor, 2002: 386). 
57 Ibn al-Qayyim echoes IbnTaymiyyah's notion of gharar where he said, "Gharar is possibility of existence 
and non-existence. Its sale is forbidden because it is sort of gambling, which is maysir. Allah forbade it 
because it was likened to eating one's fortune wrongly, and this is injustice that Allah has forbidden. It 
becomes gambling when one party gets reward (benefit) while the other might or might not get it, so this 
becomes illegal, like the sale of runaway slave, lost camel, and bab! al-babalah" (as cited in Al-Suwailem, 
2000: 65). . 
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The variety of the classical interpretations of the term gharar is echoed in the writings of 
contemporary jurists. AI-Dhareer (1997: 10), for example, summarised the many 
definitions of gharar into three headings where: (i) gharar applies exclusively to cases of 
doubtfulness or uncertainty, as in the case of not knowing whether something will take 
place or not; (ii) gharar applies only to the unknown, to the exclusion of the doubtful; and 
(iii) a combination of the two above: uncertainty and the unknown.58 Likewise Al-Sanhuri 
(as cited in Mansuri, 2005: 96) views gharar as having a lack of knowledge of the material 
aspects of the contract. It occurs in the following circumstances: (i) when it is not known 
whether the subject matter exists; (ii) if it exists at all, whether it can be handed over to the 
buyer; (iii) when want of knowledge affects the identification of the genus of species of the 
subject matter; (iv) when it af~ects the quantum, identity or necessary conditions; and (v) 
when it relates to the date of future performance. 
Additional characteristics are given to the concept of gharar by the following 
contemporary jurists. AI-Zul).ayli (2003: 84) adds "risk,,59 to gharar where he views it as 
"risk in the sense of lack of certainty regarding the existence of an object". Hence, from the 
aspect of a sale contract, the object (i) is not known to exist, or (ii) its measures are not 
known to be large or small, or (iii) it is undeliverable. In concurrence with the definition 
given by Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, AI-Zarqa' adds the characteristic of gambling 
where he defines gharar as "the sale of probable items whose existence or characteristics 
are not certain, due to the risky nature that makes it similar to gambling" (as cited in Al-
ZuQ.ayli, 2003: 83). Similarly, Al-Suwailem (2000: 62) interprets the gharar transaction as 
"equivalent to a zero sum game with uncertain payoffs". In this sense, the zero sum game 
is not referred to as merely the gain of one party at the loss of the other party, but it strictly 
refers to the payoff of a player being unable to increase without also reducing the other 
player's payoff. EI-Gamal (2001: 4) defines gharar as the risk and danger of loss. Hence, 
bayr u al-gharar is risk-trading. According to him, risk-trading is inherently inefficient as 
it imbalances the cost-benefit equilibrium. 
58 This third view is the view most favoured by most jurists, and Al-Dareer too opted for this third view as it 
is the one with the most exhaustive coverage. 
59 Warde (200 l: 59) cautions the practice of using interchangeably the term gharar with the broad concept of 
risk. This is so as Islam does not advocate the avoidance of risk nor prohibit risk. In fact, incurring 
commercial risk is allowed and so encouraged provided that it is equitably shared. Similarly AI-Suwailem 
(2000: 64) cautions that risk becomes desirable only when it stimulates productive effort and value-adding 
activities and not otherwise. 
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Another perspective of gharar is propounded by other contemporary scholars.60 Shimizu 
(1989: 64), for example, describes gharar as "a possibility of risk where the equilibrium of 
countervalues is upset or an unjust or inequitable gain or loss is produced". Hence to 
maintain equilibrium in a contract, a fixed obligation or a definite subject matter is needed. 
Lacking this, the substance of a contract is not determinable.61 The importance of 
equivalence in a contract of exchange is emphasised further by Chehata where he views 
that the basis for prohibiting gharar transactions is to ensure equivalence in such 
transactions (as cited in Hassan, 2002: 292). In a similar context, Hassan (1994: 74) 
maintains that the purpose of the doctrine of gharar is to avoid risk building up excessively 
at the time when the contract is formed rather than at a later point. The hazard that this 
causes would eventually lead to inequitable, unfair, and unjust gains to either one of the 
parties. Nonetheless Warde (2001: 59) contends that gharar is more accurately defined as 
aleatory transactions, as they are conditioned on uncertain events. He observes that the 
~adfth on gharar are all against aleatory contracts where gain is the result of chance or 
undetermined causes.62 
A similar attempt is made by Vogel and Hayes (1998: 88) where they succinctly draw a 
spectrum of risk based on gharar ~adfth. This risk spectrum starts from where risk is at the 
core of the transaction, namely: (i) pure speculation63 - a sale, which is equivalent to 
gambling, as values obtained from such a sale are unknown, hence are entrenched with the 
highest level of risk;64 (ii) uncertain outcome - a sale whose countervalue is not only of an 
uncertain value but may not be realised at all (though the risk may be greater in this 
category compared to the pure speCUlation category, it is less essential as the transaction 
could be made to take effect upon the outcome becoming certain);65 (iii) unknowable 
future benefit - a sale in which valuable benefits are precisely known and defined but 
60 These contemporary scholars may not up the level of Shari'ah jurists or scholars but their views offer an 
excellent insight into the diverse nature of gharar. 
61 Islamic law emphasises the idea of balance of countervalues in a contract and provides a binding force only 
for contracts satisfying this requirement. Hence in the absence of equilibrium in countervalues, there will be 
difficulities in ascertaining the parties' proper expectation and the contract is susceptible to dissolution 
(Islam, 1998: 342). 
62Rodinson explicates that, "Any gain that may result from chance, from undetermined causes, is here 
prohibited. Thus, it would be wrong to get a workman to skin an animal by promising to give him half the 
skin as reward, or to get him to grind some grain by promising him the bran separated out by the grinding 
process, and so on. It is impossible to know for certain whether the skin may not be damaged and loses its 
value in the course of the work, or to know how much bran wi11 be produced" (1974: 16). 
63 According to Karim (2005: 77), speculation in a contract invokes uncertainty as it may lead to three 
resulting possibilities, namely, profit or loss or breakeven. 
64 For example, the sale of the stroke of the diver or whatever a stone lands upon or a fixed price for whatever 
~loth the buyer touches. This category of transaction incorporates within it the highest level of risk. 
F~r example, the sale of fish in the sea, or the runaway slave where these sales could be easily avoided by 
makmg the sales conditional upon the risk being eliminated, for example, the fish caught or the slave found. 
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whose future benefit to the buyer is unknown (though it contains less initial risk, the 
transaction may potentially be infected by the evil of gambling when the buyer has had 
false hopes or has paid too much);66 and (iv) inexactitude - a sale which involves 
measurement and weight (this category exhibits the least risk of the gambling element as it 
is only concerned with exactitude).67 
Gharar is also defined by the IF AJ, the AAOIFI and the SAC in their resolutions. It is 
observed that the definition of gharar is more uniform among these institutions where 
"uncertainty" is the common meaning used in all of them. For instance, the IFAJ (Islamic 
Research and Training Institute, 2000: 264) refers to gharar as uncertainty.68 Similarly, the 
AAOIFFI (Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, 2010: 
537) defines gharar as "a state of uncertainty that exists when the process of concluding a 
transaction involves an unknown aspect." In other words, gharar refers to the status of 
results that mayor may not materialize.,,69 Likewise, the SAC (Securities Commission, 
2006: 100) interprets ghara/o as "elements of uncertainty that can expose someone to 
danger". According to the SAC, when "the 'aqad has the element of gharar, it means that 
there is an element of uncertainty in the' aqad. ,,7} 
The difference of views by these jurists as to what constitutes gharar also affects their 
views on whether such transactions are contaminated with excessive gharar. The effect of 
excessive gharar is that it invalidates the sale transaction at its inception. Hence, the next 
section examines juristic views on what constitutes elements of excessive, or forbidden, 
levels of gharar. 
66 Such sales include the covering of the stallion and the stroke of the diver. 
67 This kind of sale may either involve one to deliberately exposing oneself to risk or alternatively it could be 
a thoroughly mundane and practical process, such as the sale of a heap of goods without parties measuring 
the goods or the sale by the pound. 
68 The IF AJ made this interpretation in their resolution prohibiting the instrument of indexation. The IF AJ 
ruled that the Shari'ah prohibits the repayment of a contract of debt to be linked to the price of a certain 
commodity or price of a basket of commodities. The reason for such a prohibition is due to the involvement 
of a great deal of gharar andjahtilah (uncertainty and lack of information), since both parties would not be in 
a position to know what the commitment would be at the end. If the indicator (the price of the commodity or 
basket of commodities) happens to show an increase, this will lead to a discrepancy between the original debt 
amount and the amount to be repaid. Hence this kind of arrangement could result in usury. 
69 The AAOIFI came up with Shari'ah No. 31. This standard deals with the controls of gharar in financial 
transactions. 
70 The definition of gharar is given in its resolution permitting the trading of the commodity futures contract. 
71 For example, a sale and purchase contract which does not state its price is said to possess an element of 
gharar as cheating in price can occur". 
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3.5 The Characteristics of F:xcessh'e Gllaral' 
AI-Baji AI-' Andalusi clearly describes the predicament faced by these jurists In 
determining elements of excessive gharar in a sale transaction. He states: 
"His (pbuh) prohibition of bay'u al-gharar renders such a sale defective. The 
meaning of bay'u al-gharar, and Allah knows best, refers to sales in which gharar 
was the major component (g!zalaba 'alayhi) until the sale is justifiable described as 
bay'u al-gharar. This is the type of sale which is unanimously forbidden. On the 
other hand, minor (yasir) gharar does not render a sales contract defective, since no 
contract can be entirely free of gharar. Thus, the [legal) scholars differ in 
determining which contracts are defective due to differences in opinion regarding 
the extent of gharar inherent in each: sic. whether it is substantial and invalidates 
the contract, or minor and retains the contract's validity" (as cited in EI-Gamal, 
2001: 3). 
This unanimity amongst the jurists applies only to the notion that excessive gharar renders 
a sale defective while minor gharar does not. The issue of whether gharar in such a sale is 
excessive remains outstanding. The difficulty in getting such a consensus is perhaps due to 
the differences in perception and market practices as well as the means and facilities of one 
society compared to another. Besides having to determine whether gharar in such a sale is 
excessive, gharar is also determined from the aspect of whether such a sale is not 
something which is necessitated by society. Taqiyuddin AI-Subki states that: 
"The scholars said that the criterion for invalidity of the contract based on gharar 
or its validity despite the existence of gharar is thus: if necessity dictates 
committing gharar which cannot be avoided without incurring an excessive cost, or 
if the gharar is trivial (!zaqir), the sale is rendered valid, otherwise it is rendered 
invalid ... " (as cited in EI-Gamal, 2001: 3). 
Hence, if people are in need of such exorbitant gharar transactions, the prohibition of 
gharar will not have any effect on such transactions. This is because the purpose of an 
exchange transaction is to alleviate hardship and to meet the needs of the people. In this 
context, Muslehuddin (1979: 180) opines that the Shari'ah recognises the genuine need of 
society and provides facilities to those who are confronted with hardship, hence 
promulgating the rule on necessity and need. However this rule of necessity and need 
ceases to be in operation once the urgency is over. Even while this rule is applied, people 
must seek measures to identify a proper solution in light of the Shari'ah. 72 
72 See also, the Accounting and Auditing Organisation For Islamic Financial Institutions (20 I 0: 539). In this 
regard it is important to note that to cater to the real need of society, Islam approves bay'salam and bay' 
isti$nii' where both transactions are structured on deferment of both counter values. 
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As mentioned earlier, excessive gharar invalidates a sale contract. The reason is that in 
Islam, an exchange is rooted in a concept of a consensual present transfer or conveyance of 
a property for a price (Othman, 2005: 129). Hence, the existence of excessive gharar 
would not only inhibit the mutual consent between contractual parties but also eliminate 
the very objective of the contract which is to gain benefit from the exchange. However, 
excessive gharar is overruled when there is clear necessity in the form of a clear economic 
benefit (EI-Gamal, 2001: 1). Apart from the condition that the excessive gharar transaction 
is not necessitated by society, the principal object, and not subsidiaries or derivatives to the 
object, is affected by the characteristic of excessive gharar (AI-Dareer, 1997: 48).73 
In discerning the characteristics of excessive gharar in a sale transaction, Ibn Juzay (as 
cited in Zahraa and Mahmor, 2002: 387) has succinctly described them as follO\ys: (1) 
difficulty in performing the delivery of the subject matter~ (2) lack of sufficient knowledge 
Uahl) regarding the type of price or subject matter; (3) lack of sufficient knowledge 
regarding the characteristic of the price or of the subject matter; (4) lack of sufficient 
knowledge regarding the quantum of the price or the quantity of the subject matter; (5) 
lack of sufficient knowledge regarding the date of future performance; (6) having two sales 
in one transaction (bay' atiin fi bay' atin); (7) sale of what is not expected to revive; (8) 
bay'al-~a~iih,.74 (9) bay' muniibadhah,.75 and (10) bay'al-muliimasa. 76 Similarly, Ibn Rushd 
(2000: 179) expounds a similar thread of characteristics; namely, lack of knowledge Uahl) 
(i) about the identity of the subject-matter or failure to determine the contract; (ii) about the 
attributes of the price, or the priced commodity, or about the quantity, or the deferred 
period (of delivery); (iii) about its existence or the impossibility of its acquisition which 
relates to the obstacles of delivery; and (iv) about its sound existence, that is its continued 
existence. 
After all this, the question now is whether any of the excessive gharar characteristics, as 
characterised by Ibn Juzay and Ibn Rushd, exist in the crude palm oil futures contract. If it 
does not exist, the contract is valid. Otherwise, the contract is invalid. The next question, if 
73 A classic example is the selling of the foetus in the womb of the mother. It is not permissible to sell the 
foetus as it entails excessive gharar but it is permissible to sell the mother, being the principle object of the 
sale as the foetus is only the subsidiary. 
74 Bay' al-ba$iih is a type of sale whose outcome is determined by the throwing of the stone. 
75 Bay' muniibadhah is a type of sale which is performed by the seller throwing a cloth at a buyer and 
concluding the sale transaction without giving the buyer an opportunity to properly examine the object of the 
sale. 
76 Bay'al-muliimasa is a type of sale where the bargain is concluded by touching the object of the sale 
without examining it. 
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it does exist, is whether the trading regulatory framework of crude palm oil futures contract 
has disabled the identified excessive gharar characteristic. If there is evidence to show that 
the excessive gharar characteristic has been eliminated from the crude palm oil futures 
contract, the contract is then valid. This method of examination is important as it addresses 
the contention of the SAC resolution. These questions will be addressed in the next section. 
For the sake of convenience and for the avoidance of doubt, the term "gharar" is used to 
represent "excessive gharar" throughout this thesis. 
3.6 Element of Gharar in Eligible Delivery Agreement and Contract Specitication 
This section exammes two important contracts in the crude palm oil futures legal 
framework. They are the eligible delivery agreement and its contract specification. 
However before analysing these contracts, it is worth noting the effect of the 2011 
amendment on eligible delivery agreement. On October 3, 2011, the 2007 Act was 
amended by the Capital Markets and Services (Amendment) Act 2011. As a result, the 
term "futures contract" is deleted and substituted with the word "derivatives".77 Section 2 
of the 2007 Act now defines futures contract as: 
"futures contract" means a derivatives78 that is traded on a derivatives exchange 
which creates an obligation for physical delivery or acceptance of physical delivery 
of the underlying instrument of such derivatives, the quantity and quality of which 
is determined by that derivatives exchange, at a fixed date in the future at a fixed 
price, and which may be cash settled in lieu of physical delivery." 
Due to this amendment, the term "eligible delivery agreement" is deleted from the 2007 
Act. The issue now is whether the newly defined futures contract and the deletion of the 
77 The reason for such amendments is to enable not only the on-exchange derivatives (futures contracts and 
options) but also the over-the-counter derivatives to be regulated by the 2007 Act. This is in line with the 
global regulatory reform towards improving the transparency and regulatory oversight of the over-the-
counter derivatives market. By inserting the word "derivatives" in the definition, an types of derivatives, 
other than derivatives which are excluded or exempted, is now officially regulated. Hence, reference to the 
"futures market" and "futures exchange" is now being referred to as the "derivatives market" and 
"derivatives exchange" (Securities Commission, 2011). 
78 Section 2 of the amended 2007 Act defines "derivatives" as "any contract, either for the purposes of 
creating an obligation or a right or any combination of both, of which its market value, delivery or payment 
obligations are derived from, referenced to or based on, but not limited to, underlying securities or 
commodities, assets, rates, indices or any of its combination, whether or not a standardised derivative or an 
over-the-counter derivatives, but does not include-(a) securities; (b) any derivative to which Bank Negara or 
the Government of Malaysia is a party; (c) any over-the-counter derivatives whose market price, value, 
delivery or payment obligations are solely derived from, referenced to or based on, exchange rates; or (d) any 
agreement, when entered into, is in a class of agreements prescribed not to be derivatives." 
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term "eligible delivery agreement" have any effect on this study. It is important to note that 
this study is on the SAC resolution issued in 1997 under the then prevailing statute, the 
Futures Industries Act 1993 (1993 Act). Under the 1993 Act and the 2007 Act, the futures 
contract referred to either the eligible delivery agreement or the adjustment agreement. The 
eligible delivery agreement is chosen by this study, as unlike the adjustment agreement, it 
envisages physical delivery which tallies with the description of crude palm oil futures 
contract in the SAC resolution. 
It is observed that the newly defined futures contract does not incorporate a number of 
constituents, which once formed part of the eligible delivery agreement. These constituents 
consist of the following: 
(i) The agreement is entered into, with or without the existence of the underlying 
commodity; 
(ii) The capability of the agreement to be varied or discharged before its expiration; 
(iii) The making and taking delivery of the underlying commodity is by the person who 
actually makes and takes the delivery at the time when the agreement matures; and 
(iv) The capability of any of the parties to offset his/her contractual obligations prior to 
its maturity. 
Though these constituents are no longer part of the newly defined futures contract, this 
study found that the constituents are still ingrained in other parts of the crude palm oil 
futures legal framework. Therefore these constituents, as contained in the eligible delivery 
agreement, are still relevant in the description of a crude palm oil futures contract. It 
follows that the eligible delivery agreement can still be referred to in this research. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, and to be in coherence with the SAC resolution, 
the term and conception of "futures contract" and "eligible delivery agreement" as defined 
in the 2007 Act, prior to the 2011 amendment, are maintained and referred to throughout 
this thesis. 
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3.6.1 Eligible Delivery Agreement 
In the Exchange, the selling and buying of crude palm oil futures is essentially the selling 
and buying of a contract called the "eligible delivery agreement".79 The eligible delivery 
agreement is defined in section 2 of the 2007 Act as: 
"An agreement that is one of two or more standardised agreements the effect of 
which is that a person is under an obligation to make or accept delivery at a 
particular future time of a particular quantity of a particular instrument _ 80 
(a) for a particular price; or 
(b) for a price to be calculated in a particular manner, 
whether or not-
(i) the subject matter of the agreement is in existence; or 
(ii) the agreement is capable of being varied or discharged before that future 
time, 
and in respect of which it appears likely at the relevant time8l , having regard to all 
relevant circumstances,82 that-
(A)the obligation of the person in the short position to make delivery will be 
discharged except by the person making the delivery; 
(B) the obligation of the person in the long position to accept delivery will be 
discharged except by the person accepting the delivery; or 
(C) the person in the short position or long position will assume an offsetting long 
position or offsetting short position, as the case may be, under another 
agreement of the same kind." 
The definition of the eligible delivery agreement above draws on the following facts: 
(i) The selling of crude palm oil is by selling the eligible delivery agreement and the 
buying of crude palm oil is by buying the eligible delivery agreement. By selling, 
the seller is under the obligation to deliver a certain quantity and quality of crude 
79 Section 2 of the 2007 Act prescribes that the futures contract can be "eligible delivery agreement" or 
"adjustment agreement" or options or any other class of agreements prescribed as a futures contract. 
However for the purpose of this chapter, the relevant futures contract for crude palm oil is the eligible 
delivery agreement as it envisages the making and taking of physical delivery of the oil at the point when the 
contract matures. 
80 Instrument means "anything that is capable of delivery under an agreement for its delivery, including a 
commodity, or a document creating or evidencing a thing in action". See section 2 of the 2007 Act. 
81 Relevant time means the time when the eligible delivery agreement is entered into. See section 2 of the 
2007 Act. 
82 Relevant circumstances include (a) the provisions of any agreement; (b) the rules and practices of any 
market; and (c) the manner in which the respective obligations of persons in short positions and persons in 
long positions under agreements of the same kind as the agreement concerned are generally discharged, but 
does not include the respective intentions of the person in the short position and the person in the long 
position under the agreement concerned". See section 2 of the 2007 Act. 
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palm oil at a certain time in future. By buying, the buyer is under the obligation to 
pay for such delivery at an agreed purchase price. 
(ii) Hence the delivery of the oil and the payment of its purchase price do not take 
place at the inception of the eligible delivery agreement. Instead the delivery and 
the payment take place at a future time agreed to in the agreement. 
(iii) At the time when the seller sells his eligible delivery agreement, the crude palm oil 
mayor may not be in existence. 
(iv) The seller and the buyer are not bound to remain in their position throughout the 
tenure of the eligible delivery agreement. In fact, the parties are allowed to 
discharge or offset their positions before the agreement matures. 
(v) Therefore, if the seller wants to discharge his selling position, the seller will have 
to sell off his short (selling) futures position. He can do so by entering into a new 
eligible delivery agreement with a new party who is interested to taking over his 
short position. Under this new eligible delivery agreement, the seller sells and the 
new buyer purchases his short futures position. Physical delivery of the crude palm 
oil does not take place at the inception of this new eligible delivery agreement. 
From the sale of his short futures position, the seller would either gain or remit a 
certain sum of money depending on the price that the new buyer is purchasing his 
short futures position at. 
(vi) The buyer will go through a similar procedure. In order to discharge or off-set his 
buying position, the buyer will have to sell off his long (buying) futures position. 
He can do so by entering into a new eligible delivery agreement with a new party 
who is interested in taking over his long position. Under this new eligible delivery 
agreement, the buyer sells and the new buyer purchases his long futures position. 
Remittance of the purchase price of the crude palm oil does not take place at the 
inception of this new eligible delivery agreement. From the sale of his long futures 
position, the buyer would either gain or remit a certain sum of money depending on 
the price that the new buyer is purchasing his long futures position at. 
(vii) The discharge or offset does not terminate the eligible delivery agreement. The 
seller or the buyer who does not discharge or off-set his position will continue with 
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his obligations to sell or to purchase as the case may be. This will remain so until 
he plans to discharge or off-set his obligation or until the expiry of this agreement, 
in which case he will deliver the oil or remit the purchase price, as the case may be. 
(viii) The effect of the discharge or offset is that the seller who actually delivers the 
crude palm oil and the buyer who actually pays for the oil's purchase price may not 
be the original seller or the original buyer but anyone who holds the selling and 
buying position at the time when the delivery is materialised. 
3.6.1.1 Ghurar in Eligible Delivery Agreement 
From the examination of the facts above, gharar could be located in the following areas: 
(i) At the time of entering into the eligible delivery agreement, the seller and the buyer 
do not exchange between themselves any counter values, namely, the crude palm 
oil and its payment. Instead, these counter-values are deferred to some time in the 
future. 
(ii) At the time when the seller enters into the eligible delivery agreement to sell the 
crude palm oil to the buyer, the oil may not be in existence. Hence the seller is 
selling what he does not own or possess at the time of sale. 
(iii) At the time when the seller or the buyer sells his/her futures position for the 
purpose of discharging or offsetting, this futures obligation is still outstanding. The 
new buyer who purchases this futures position is also purchasing it without making 
any payment for this futures obligation.s3 Hence what occurs at the inception of the 
new eligible delivery agreement is essentially the sale of an outstanding debt or an 
obligation for another corresponding outstanding debt or obligation. 
3.6.2 Contract Specification 
83 The payment, ifthere is any, is merely a margin payment which is being transferred either from the seller 
or from the buyer to the new buyer, or vice versa. This money is actually paid depending on who is gaining 
from the sale. In relation to this margin payment, it is submitted that it does not account for the actual 
payment for the purchase price of the crude palm oil. 
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Contract specification is part of the eligible delivery agreement. Though the term "contract 
specification" is not defined in the crude palm oil futures legal framework, Schedule 13 of 
the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules provides for the specification of 
crude palm oil. In general, contract specification stipulates the quantity, quality, delivery 
process and the price trading limit of crude palm oil. A specimen of contract specification 
can be viewed in Appendix I. However this chapter will only analyse provisions relevant to 
the examination of gharar: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
"Final Trading Day and Maturity Date 
Contract expires at noon on the 15th day of the delivery month. If the 15th is a non-
market day, the preceding Business Day."s4 
"Tender period 
First business day to the 20th Business Day of the delivery month, or if the 20th is a 
non-market day, the preceding Business Day." 
"Contract Grade and Delivery Point 
Crude Palm Oil of good merchantable quality, in bulk, unbleached, in Port Tank 
Installations located at the option of the seller at Port Kelang, Penang/Butterworth 
and Pasir Gudang (Johor) ... (palm oil delivered shall contain prescribed percentage 
of) Free Fatty Acids (FFA), ... Moisture and impurities (M&I) ... deterioration of 
bleachability index (DOBI) ... " 
These relevant provisions indicate that: 
(i) the crude palm oil is delivered by tendering it in the delivery month. This period is 
known as the tender period. The tender period commences from the first business 
day till the twentieth business day of such delivery month. 
(ii) the crude palm oil is to be delivered in a good merchantable quality, in bulk, 
unbleached. In addition to that, the oil must also contain a certain level of FF A, 
M&I and DOB!. 
3.6.2.2 Gharar in Contract Specification 
From the examination of the above provisions, gharar could be located in the following 
areas: 
84 According to Rule 201 ofthe Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules, "Business Day" is 
defined as any day on which the Exchange is open for trading. 
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(i) With regards to the delivery date of the crude palm oil, the contract specification 
stipulates only the delivery month. Although a range of dates is given, namely, the 
first business day till the twentieth business day of the said delivery month, it does 
not eliminate the lack of knowledge and uncertainty pertaining to the actual date of 
delivery as well as to the date of payment for the said delivery. 
(iii) With regards to the quality of the crude palm oil, the contract specification does not 
define the phrase "good merchantable quality, in bulk, unbleached". Though the 
contract specification stipulates that the oil must contain certain components; 
namely, the FF A, the M&I and the DOBI, these components do not sufficiently 
describe the phrase "good merchantable quality, in bulk, unbleached". Instead, the 
description of this phrase should include other inherent fundamental components: 
namely, the Iodine Value (IV) and the Slip Melting Point (SMP). Hence, the 
insufficient description of the oil fails to eliminate the lack of knowledge and 
uncertainty in the constitution of crude palm oil's good merchantable quality. 
The pursuing section will articulate why gharar is found in these identified areas. This 
discussion will be divided into three parts; namely, the sale with the deferment of both 
counter values, the sale of a non-existing or non-possessed or unowned crude palm oil, and 
the sale of an outstanding debt or obligation for a corresponding outstanding debt or 
obligation. 
3.7 The Sale with the Deferment of Both Counter Values 
The legality of the sale with the deferment of both counter values has been the subject of 
dispute amongst both classical and contemporary Sharfrah jurists. This is because this sale 
is not expressly covered in the primary sources of the Sharfrah, namely the Qurriin and the 
Jfadfth or the Sunnah (the actions of the Prophet Muhammad's (peace be upon him) (Ibn 
Rushd, 2003: 187-189). The non-exchange or deferment of both counter-values, namely 
the crude palm oil and its payment, at the time of entering into the eligible delivery 
agreement is identical to the type of sale known in the Sharrah as bayral-dayn bi-al-dayn 
(the sale of debt for another debt) (International Shari 'ah Research Academy for Islamic 
Finance, 2011: 600). 
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Although a direct injunction prohibiting bayr al-dayn bi-al-dayn is not explicitly stipulated 
in the Sharirah, a similar structure of sale, namely, ai-hili' bi-al-kali' is prohibited. The 
sale of al-kiili' bi-al-kiili' literally means the exchange of two things both delayed or the 
exchange of a delayed (nasi 'a) counter-value for another delayed counter-value (Vogel and 
Hayes, 1998: 115). The prohibition is made by virtue of a bad~th of the Prophet 
Muhammad (peace be upon him), who forbids the sale of al-kiili' bi-al-kiili '. 
Notwithstanding the authenticity of this bad~th being disputed by some jurists85 as it is 
narrated by a single narrator, Miisa Ibn 'Ubayda AI-RabC;ihI, the majority of the jurists 
unanimously agree on the invalidity of a sale of one debt for another (al-Zul).aylI, 2003: 
79). 
In connection with this ruling on prohibiting the sale of one debt for another, jurists have 
derived two additional rules from the said bad~th, al-kiili' bi-al-kiili' (the second rule will 
be dealt with later in the section dealing with the selling of outstanding debt for a 
corresponding outstanding debt). The first rule is that the said bad~th prohibits any 
exchange or sale contract which stipulates delay terms, not just for the transfer of title but 
also for the actual payment or delivery of two counter-values. This is termed as ai-nasi 'a 
bi-al-nasi'a (delay for delay), or as the Maliki termed it as ibtidii dayn bi-dayn (initial dayn 
for dayn). This rule prohibits doubly delayed exchanges, not only if one or both of the 
goods are dayn but also when they are 'ayn. For example, it forbids the exchange of a 
clock later for a horse later or a clock later for money later (Vogel and Hayes, 1998: 116). 
Nonetheless Kamali (1999: 539) argues that the transaction involving the deferment of 
both counter-values is allowed as it is mentioned in the Qurriin, verse 282 of Chapter AI-
Baqarah. The first part of the verse stipulates that: 
"0 you who believe! When you deal with each other in transactions involving 
future obligations in a fixed period of time reduce them to writing." 
Conversely, Ismail (2002: 48 and 2008: 356) contends that the word "tadayantum" in this 
verse does not permit deferment of both counter-values. Instead it conveys the meaning of 
entering into transactions giving rise to al-dayn or future obligation. To augment his view, 
he refers to AI-Qurtubi who maintains that the word "al-dayn" in the Arabic language is 
85 Kamali and AI-Amine vehemently argue that due to the weakness of this ~ad~th, it should not be the basis 
for the prohibition of futures contract. 
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essentially referring to a future obligation or a deferred settlement of either one of the two 
commodities exchanged in a contract of exchange.86 
3.7.1 Why is the Sale with Deferment of Both Counter Values Prohibited? 
According to Ibn Rushd (2003: 189), a majority of jurists agree that the underlying cause 
for the prohibition of the exchange of a debt for another debt is due to "gharar, owing to 
the lack of delivery from both parties, not to a case of riba". Similarly, Vogel and Hayes 
maintain that: 
"It seems that the more basic objection to sales of debt for debt is not riba but 
gharar. For example, gharar easily accounts for the ban on the bilateral delayed 
sale. First such contracts encouraged speculation, since with little or no capital 
investment one takes a position as to future prices. With immediate delivery, in 
contrast, at least one counter-value is delivered on terms that are acceptable to both 
parties and those goods are moved from further market risks ... Lacking these 
factors, sales with simultaneous delays are likely to leave one party feeling the 
loser, creating the "enmity" which Qur'an associates with gambling. Second, the 
purchase of generic goods that may not exist or be owned introduces gharar on one 
side of the transaction. If a similar risk were allowed on the other side, the 
transaction arguably becomes too unstable"(1998: 123). 
Likewise, AI-Dhareer argues that the structure of a future contract with deferred counter-
values affects the real consent of the parties to the contract. 87 He finds that gharar: 
" ... lies in the possible lapse of the interest of either party and to his consent with 
the contract when the time set therein comes. If someone buys something by a 
mudhaf (future) contract and his circumstances change or the market changes 
bringing its price down at the time set for fulfilment of contract, he will 
undoubtedly be adverse to its fulfilment and will regret entering into it. The object 
may change and the parties may dispute over it. (1997: 15)" 
86 To the Arabs, the commodity which is paid immediately or on the spot is known as 01- 'ayn while al-dayn 
refers to the commodity which is absent at the time of forming the contract of exchange and its settlement is 
deferred to sometime in the future. At this juncture, it is important to note that in Islamic law of contract, 
property (mal) is owned (milk) either as tayn or dayn. tAyn is a specific existing thing, considered as a unique 
object and not merely as a member of a category, for example this horse, not a thoroughbred mare". Day» is 
any property, not an tayn that a debtor owes, either now or in future; or it can refer to such property only 
when it is due in the future. Property owned as dayn is usually fungible, such as gold or wheat. Sometimes 
non-fungible manufactured goods defined by specification are treated as dayn. Although dayn literally means 
"debt", infiqh it refers not to the "obligation" per se, but rather to the property the subject of the obligation, 
which is considered to be already owned by the creditor (Vogel and Hayes, 1998: 94). 
87 Landa expressed similar view where she states, "The problem of contract uncertainty, however cannot be 
neglected if one takes account of the dynamics of trading, the limited foresight of traders, and the absence of 
rules of contract behaviour. In any contract that requires performance in the future, objective circumstances 
may have changed so that a contract, which initially was mutually advantageous, may become unfavourable 
to one of the parties. Because traders are not omniscient, there is always the possibility that some previous 
contracts will tum out to be costly mistakes." (1976: 911) 
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Sheikh Muhammad al-Mukthar AI-Salami (as cited in Zarqa, 2005: 45) expressed a similar 
view where he found four' illah Gustifications), based on the arguments of the jurists, for 
prohibiting the sale of one debt for another debt. Hence the sale is prohibited as: (i) it leads 
to disputes or litigations; (ii) it increases gharar; (iii) they are useless contracts as neither 
party gets the counter-value that they could benefit from; and (iv) it is similar to the 
prohibited sale of one currency for another on a deferred basis. Kamali (2000: 134) also 
views that a deferred sale, unless the deferment is specified and carefully regulated, tends 
to give rise to the possibility of uncertainty, gharar and ribii (unlawful gain). Gharar 
which is apprehended here relates to "the price changes over the course of time, changes 
that might affect the subject-matter of sale and parties disputes the terms". 
3.7.2 Salam, Isti~na'and Crude Palm Oil Futures Contract: A Level Playing Field? 
The question now is, if a sale with deferment of both counter-values is prohibited, why are 
deferred sales; namely, salam88 and isti.Jnii', allowed. 89 Salam and isti.Jnii', though are 
anomalous to the basic tenet of the rule of immediate exchange, and are approved by the 
Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), the ijmii' and the rules of 
necessity, where society is facing hardship without the permissibility of this kind of 
transaction (Mohammed, 1988, 124). On the other hand, the commodity futures contract is 
prohibited by three international bodies of Shari'ah scholars. This contract is ruled to 
contain the prohibited maysir and gharar elements.9o Unlike gharar, the prohibition of 
maysir is not overruled by the rules of necessity. Though salam and isti~nii' are formed 
when their subject matter are not in existence, these transactions will eventually end with 
physical delivery.91 Nonetheless, in crude palm futures contract, physical delivery only 
transpires in five per cent of its total trading while the rest are offset prior to the delivery 
month (Bacha, 2007: 44). On this basis, it is submitted that crude palm oil futures contract 
could hardly match the establishment and validity of salam and isti~niir. 
88 Salam is a sale of goods known by specification or description for delivery at a later specified time, with 
gayment for its price paid in full at the time of the contract. 
9 /Sli$nii' is a manufacturing contract where delivery takes place in the future, upon completion of the 
manufactured goods and payment are made progressively or upon its completion. 
90 Chapter five will investigate the element of gambling (maysir) in crude palm oil futures contract. 
91 AI-Amine (2001b: 25) argues that isti$nii' is different from a typical sale as in a sale, there is no labour but 
in isti$nii', it represents the cornerstone of the contract. 
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3.7.3 Is Gharar Eliminated from the Deferment of Both Counter Values? 
The question now 1S whether the element of gharar - default in the contractual 
performance by the seller or purchaser, disputes arising from the discontentment of the 
actual value of object of sale, or mismatch of one's expectation - has been effectively 
disabled by the crude palm oil futures legal framework? 
Kamali (2000: 94) acknowledges the fact that deferment of both counter values in 
commodity futures contract does involves gharar - which is normally unacceptable and 
excessive, yet he opines that the operational methods of futures contract are such that they 
virtually eliminate the prospect of non-delivery or failure of the parties to fulfil their 
obligations. This is because the Clearing House provides a guarantee system -
guaranteeing the payment and delivery of the underlying commodity - without which 
exorbitant risk and gharar permeates the futures contract. 92 The same position is taken by 
the SAC (2006, 77) where it resolves that that the element of gharar is eliminated by the 
incorporation of the guarantee safeguards in the structure of the futures contract. 
Notwithstanding the above learned arguments, it is submitted that the operational methods 
of the futures contract, or even the guarantee system, have not been able to effectively 
eliminate the prospects of non-delivery or the failure of parties to fulfil their obligations. 
The following are attestations of this failure: 
1- A number of court cases have shown that, despite the incorporation of the 
guarantee mechanism, the sellers still default in delivering the underlying 
commodities.93 The seller's default to deliver is caused by two factors: first, the 
default in delivering the required quality of the commodity, and secondly, the 
92 The clearing house's guarantee does not extend to those non-defaulting customers. The 1985 failure of the 
Volume Investors (VI), a futures broker and a clearing member of the Commodities Exchange Inc. 
(COMEX) illuminates the actual relationship between the clearing house and the contractual parties. Some 
customers of VI defaulted on a margin call, causing VI to default on the clearing house margin call that 
exceeded the firm's assets. The clearing house seized the entire accumulated margin previously posted by the 
broker on behalf of its customer in order to pay to the other futures brokers. This left the non-defaulting 
customer of VI with no margin at the clearing house and no timely means of obtaining margin and payment 
on any gains from the failed broker. To the clearing house, the non-defaulting customers' exposure was the 
froblem of their futures brokers and not theirs (Jordan and Morgan, 1990: 909). 
3 Legal remedies have not always compensated innocent parties fully. In the Hunt brothers' episode, some 
creditors were obliged to settle for oil and gas properties, rather than the cash they were owed. In the London 
tin case, a UK court upheld the exchange's decision to settle outstanding contracts at prices considerably 
lower than the transacted price. In the Maine potatoes case, a delivery default was settled in cash almost a 
year after the incident. While instances of commodity futures market failure are uncommon, the potential for 
non-performance exists in all commodity exchanges (Bailey and Ng, 1990: 1072). 
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unavailability of the commodity supply at the time of delivery. These cases will be 
referred to here briefly as they will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
A. Cases which involve default in delivering the required quality of commodity: 
(aa) Federal Flour Mills Bhd v Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd & Another 
Appeal. 94 This case involves a buyer who was not satisfied with the quality of 
the delivered crude palm oil. In accordance with the trading rules, the buyer 
would have to make the full payment of the oil before taking delivery of the 
crude palm oil. Upon making such a payment, the buyer would be given 
receipts evidencing his ownership of the duly paid oil. In this case, after making 
such a payment but before physically taking delivery of the oil, the buyer 
conducted an appraisal of the oil. The result of the appraisal indicated that the 
oil was not up to the prescribed grade. For this reason, the buyer refused to take 
delivery of the oil and went on to claim damages for the losses he suffered. The 
court held that the crude palm oil delivered to him was not up to the "crude 
unbleached palm oil of good merchantable quality, in bulk" standard as 
required by the crude palm oil futures' contract specification as well as its 
governing regulations. This is because the delivered oil lacked certain levels of 
IV and SMP which resulted in the oil not being "crude unbleached palm oil of 
good merchantable quality, in bulk". 
(bb) White v Barber; Same v Same. 95 Although this case and the following cases 
are American cases and do not involve crude palm oil, they are still relevant as 
they share similar operational methods and guarantee systems. This case 
involves the default of the seller to deliver his No. 2 red winter wheat to his 
buyers. The wheat which he delivered was rejected by the buyers as the wheat 
was not of the quality to be delivered under the wheat futures contract as well 
as its governing law. Although the dispute was settled by the buyers being paid 
cash in substitution of such a default, the buyers were not fully compensated. 
This is because at that particular time, the wheat market was cornered and in 
order for the buyers to get the supply of wheat from the wheat cash market, the 
buyers had to pay excessive inflated wheat prices. 
94 [2005] 4 CU. 
95 
123 U.S. 392; 8 S. Ct. 221; 311. Ed. 243; 1887 U.S. LEXIS 2184. 
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(cc) John A. Dussault v Geldermann & Co., Inc., Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
et. al.96 This case involves a buyer who was not satisfied with the quality of the 
feeder cattle delivered to him under the feeder cattle futures contract. Though at 
the time of delivery the buyer claimed that the cattle were inferior and not of a 
merchantable quality, the buyer accepted several lots of cattle but later refused 
to accept delivery of the rest. As a result, the buyer sued his broker as well as 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for negligence, intentional misrepresentation 
and fraudulent misconduct.97 
B. The following cases deal with the disputes arising from the default in delivery 
caused by the lack in the commodity supply.98 
(aa) Peto v Howell. 99 This case involves a buyer who purchased on the 
Chicago Board of Trade, com futures contracts, to be delivered on July, 
1931. However at the time of the delivery, he, together with other sellers, 
were not able to procure any com in Chicago. Due to the limited time, they 
were also not able to procure com from any areas outside Chicago. Due to 
their default in delivering com to their buyer, they had to pay an excessive 
amount of settlement to the buyer. However, the court in this case held that 
the unavailability of the supply of com was due to the monopoly and 
unlawful cornering of the July com market by the buyer. In fact, the 
unlawful cornering was intended to force all the sellers, who were 
contracted to deliver the com, to pay the buyer an excessive amount in 
substitution of such default. 
96 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16358; 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P60, 502. 
97 Unfortunately, the court did not dwell on the default issue. Instead, the court dismissed the claim of the 
buyer on the technical reason that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange was not responsible for the loss suffered 
bl the buyer as the buyer was not their registered member. 
9 Attempts have been made to locate cases involving default in the delivery of crude palm oil futures in 
Malaysia in view of the crude palm oil futures crisis in 1984. Despite discovering a list of case laws related to 
the crisis (via case Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdl1 Bhd v Cecil Abraham [1998] 4 CLJ 812), the inquiry made 
at the Registry of the Kuala Lumpur High Court on the 5th December, 2011 confirmed that the court papers 
of these respective cases were no longer kept in the Registry. These cases are Palm co Holdings Sdn Bhd v 
Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House (KL High Court Civil No. C2324 of 1984), Kuala Lumpur 
Commodity Clearing House v M&P (KL High Court Civil No. 1139 of 1984), Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn 
Bhd v Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House (KL High Court Civil No. CS09 of 1984; C3774 of 1984; 
and C2400 of 1984), SUN v Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing House (KL High Court Civil No. C2420 of 
1984 and C1890 of 1984) and Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange v BP «KL High Court Civil No. D2-22-
1338-89. 
99 (101 F. 2d 353; 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 2532). 
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100 
(bb) The following cases encountered similar dispute. For example, 
Volkart Brothers, Inc., Volkart Brothers, Company, Alfred Boedtker and 
Kurt Muller v Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, and Thomas J. 
Flavin, Judicial Officer by Appointment of the Secretary of AgriculturelOO 
deals with a default in delivering cotton on the New Yark Cotton Exchange 
and the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. 101 
(cc) Cargill, Incorporated, et. al., v Clifford M Hardin, Secretary of 
Agriculture, Thomas 1. Flavin, Judicial Officer by Appointment of the 
Secretary of Agriculture, and the United States Department of 
Agricuiturel02 deals with a default in delivering wheat on the Chicago 
Board of Trade. 
(dd) Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v Brannan 103 deals with a 
default in delivering eggs on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
(ee) Joseph Strobl, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant v New York 
Mercantile Exchange, Clayton Brokerage Co. of St Louis, Inc., Heinold 
Commodities, Inc., Thomson and McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc., 
Ben Pressner, Pressner Trading Corp., John Richard Simplot a/k/a Jack 
Richard Simplot, a/k/a J.R. Simplot, 1.R. Company, Simplot Industries, Inc., 
Simplot Products Company, Inc., Peter 1. Taggares a/k/a Peter J. Taggares, 
P.l. Taggares Company, C.L .. Otter, Simtag Farms, Kenneth Ramm, A & B 
Farms, Inc., Hugh D. Glenn, Gearheart Farming, Inc., Ed McKay, Harvey 
Pollak, Henry Pollak, Hnery Pollak Inc., Henry A. Pollak & Company, Inc., 
Robert Reardon a/k/a Bobby Reardon, F.J. Reardon, Inc., Alex Sinclair, 
Sinclair & Company, Stephen Sundheimer, Charles Edelstein, James 
Landry a/k/a Jim Landry and Jerry Rafferty, jointly and severally, 
Defendants, John R. Simplot, J.R. Simplot Co., Simplot Industries, Inc., 
P.l.Taggares, P.1. Taggares Company and Simtag Farms, Defendants-
311 F. 2d 52; 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 3405. 
101 The court in this case held that the default of the cotton delivery was not caused by any unlawful 
manipUlation. However, this judgement was overruled in a later case, Cargill, Incorporated, et. al., v Clifford 
M Hardin, Secretary of Agriculture, Thomas J. Flavin, Judicial Officer by Appointment of the Secretary of 
A~riculture, and the United States Department of Agriculture. 
10 452 F. 2d 1154; 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 6737. 
103 201 F. 2d476; 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2315. 
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Appellants Cross Appellees. 104 These cases deal with the default in 
delivering potatoes on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The huge 
number of litigating parties involved in these cases as well as other similar 
cases demonstrates the gharar element in the deferred transaction of the 
commodity futures contract. 
11- The failure of the crude palm oil futures guarantee system in eliminating gharar is 
replicated in the crude palm oil contract specification. Schedule 13 of the Bursa 
Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules stipulates that the oil must be 
delivered in the prescribed delivery month. Based on an e-interview with the 
Malaysian Derivatives Clearing House Bhd (MDCH), Ibrahim transcribes the 
following delivery procedure for the crude palm oil futures contract: 
"The CPO (crude palm oil) contracts are settled by the clearing members 
making or taking delivery of the underlying commodity in exchange of 
receiving or paying, as the case may be, the delivery amount. A selling 
clearing member who intends to make delivery shall tender to MDCH a 
signed and completed Notice of Tender together with the Negotiable 
Storage Receipt on any business day beginning from the first up to the 
twentieth day of the delivery month. On the day of tender, a random 
selection process is performed to allocate the obligation to take delivery to 
the buying clearing members having long positions. The buying clearing 
members who have been allocated the tender are notified by MDCH 
through a Tender Advice. The buying clearing member must then make 
payment of the delivery amount 2 business days following the day of 
tender" (2000: 215). 
Here, the question is whether the stipulation of the delivery month rather than the 
exact delivery and payment date taints the contract with gharar? 
On this issue, Kamali (2000: 134) argues that a deferred sale (bayral-mu 'ajjal) is 
validated if it fulfils two conditions: (1) that the counter values must not include 
usurable items wherein deferment could lead to usury, and (2) that the counter 
values should be clearly identified and described to the extent that there remains no 
ambiguity about the delivery period or other material aspects of the transaction. 
With regard to the second condition, Kamali maintains that a deferment period 
(ajal) is clearly determined if it is for specific dates, counted either by the number 
of days and months, or specified by other indicators such as the New Year's Day. 
104 768 F. 2d. 22; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 20438; 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P66, 692. 
55 I P age 
However, ajal is void if its beginning is either undetermined or uncertain; for 
instance, if it is designated "whenever the rain falls". If the deferment is somewhat 
vague, such as "the month of Ramar;flzan" or "the harvesting time", it pertains to the 
first of that month or period, and if it stipulates a term such as "three months", this 
signifies the end of that period. 
However, AI-Dareer (1997: 30) contends that the majority of the jurists have 
agreed that making knowledge of the time of payment is a condition for the validity 
of the sale where the price is deferred. These jurists have. also agreed that, 
ignorance of the time is a kind of gharar that is forbidden in such transactions. 
Similarly, AI-Kasani (as cited in Kamali, 2000: 85) views that gharar in a contract 
of sale may consist of doubt about the attributes of an object, matters related to 
timing, and other specifications of its delivery and payment. 
On a similar note, Ibn Rushd (as cited from Kamali, 2000: 87) characterises 
excessive gharar as including lack of knowledge as to the time of payment, 
especially in sales where payment or delivery is postponed to a future date. 
Likewise, Ibn Juzay (as cited in Zahraa and Mahmor, 2002: 387) stipulates that a 
sale is forbidden if there is a lack of sufficient knowledge with regards to the date 
of future performance. Similarly, in an interview between the researcher and one 
prominent S~arra scholar in Malaysia on 2nd December, 2011, the S~arra scholar 
viewed that the unavailability of the exact delivery date for crude palm oil futures 
contract contributes to gharar. 
The implication of uncertainty in the actual delivery date and payment date is 
clearly explained by Stevens, the Assistant Chief Economist, U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission where he said: 105 
"The seller has the option as to the day of the delivery month on which he 
will make delivery, so that the buyer is uncertain as to the exact time during 
the month when he will be obliged to accept and pay for the commodity." 
(n.d., 87) 
105 The buyer of futures will desire delivery even less, since according to the terms of the contract, a range of 
qualities can be delivered on any day during the delivery month - a situation which makes purchase of actual 
commodities on the futures exchange highly unattractive to a merchant with specific needs at specific times 
(n.n.( d), 1963: 173). 
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In view of this reality, Kamara (1990: 63) aptly argues that all futures contracts 
contain uncertainty, in terms of the quality of their underlying commodities, 
location or timing for the physical delivery. 
3.8 The Sale of a Non-existing 01' Non-possessed or llnowned Crude Palm Oil 
This is another contentious area in commodity futures contract. The discussion here will be 
divided into two. It will commence with the seller selling a thing which is not yet in 
existence and will be later followed with the seller selling a thing which he does not own 
or possess. 
3.8.1 The Sale (~rll NOll-existing Object 
In principle, the majority of jurists have agreed that the sale of an object which is not in 
existence at the time of sale cannot be concluded. These jurists make an analogy to the 
explicit proscription of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) on the sale of the 
offspring of the offspring, the sale of the unborn animal in the womb, the sale of fruits and 
plants before they appear, and the sale of milk in the udder (al-Zul}.ayli, 2003: 75). 
3.8.2 Why is the Sale (~lNol1-existel1t O~iect Prohibited? 
According to al-ShMi'i and Hanbalis, the reason for prohibiting the above mentioned sales 
is because the object of sale does not exist with certainty (gharar). The jurists have also 
agreed that the prohibition of selling milk in the udder is due to the ignorance regarding the 
quality and volume of the milk in the udder. Another reason for the prohibition is that the 
milk is not deliverable at the time of sale as the milk does not collect in the udder all at 
once, but rather gradually. Similarly, the Hanafis stipulate that the sale of milk in the udder 
is defective as it is based on ignorance. However, 'Imam Malik permits the sale of milk in 
the udder for a specified number of days in the udder of a herd of sheep whose milk is 
homogeneous and whose productivity is known, but not that which is in the udder of one 
sheep (al-Zul}.ayli, 2003: 75-76). 
Holding a similar position to 'Imam Malik, 'Ibn Taymiya has permitted the sale of an 
object which does not exist at the time of contract if its future existence is known 
571 P age 
according to the custom. They opined that this kind of sale is not mentioned in the primary 
sources of the S~arf(a or the talk of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be 
upon him). According to them, what was narrated in the ~ad~th were the prohibition of 
sales which involve excessive risk, uncertainty, and the issue of the non-deliverability of 
the object and not the non-existence of such an object. They hold this view as the S~arf(a 
explicitly permits the sale of non-existence; for example, in the case of the sale of fruit 
when their quality is beginning to appear and seeds after they start to sprout. Hence, the 
sale of a non-existent object is forbidden if there is ignorance about its future existence, 
which constitutes excessive risk and uncertainty (gharar) and is not based on a lack of its 
existence (al-Zu1).ayU, 2003: 76). 
The same stance is followed by AI-Qaradawi (2003: 233-234) where he states that not 
every sale involving what is unknown or uncertain is prohibited; for example, a person 
may buy a house without knowing the condition of its foundation or what is inside the 
walls. What is prohibited is the selling of something about which there is an obvious 
element of uncertainty which may lead to dispute and conflict or may result in an unjust 
appropriation of another person's money. Hence, if the risk of uncertainty is small - and 
this is determined by experience and custom - the sale is not prohibited. For example, the 
sale of root vegetables like carrots, onions, and radishes while they are still in the ground. 
He substantiates his stance with the opinion of Imam Malik, who opined that the sale of 
needed items in which the margin of risk is bearable, is permissible.106 
AI-Sanhuri (as cited in Zahraa and Mahmor, 2002: 389-390) is also in favour of the view 
that non-existence cannot be a reason for the prohibitive injunction. Hence, he divides the 
sale of non-existence into three categories: (i) an object that is permanently not in 
existence; (ii) an object that, though is non-existent at the time of contract, will necessarily 
occur in the future; and (iii) an object that, though is non-existent at the time of contract, 
may possibly exist in the future. According to him, the first category of sale - objects that 
are permanently non-existent - is absolutely prohibited as it renders the contract of sale 
invalid. The sale of the second and third category is valid so long as the availability of the 
object is highly probable and inevitable. Though he advocates the sale of non-existent 
106 This view, according to Ibn Taymiyyah, is the most superior to other views concerning sales as this view 
originates from Sa'id ibn al-Musayyab, who is the best authority in the fiqh (jurisprudence) of sales (as cited 
in AI-Qaradawi (2003: 341). 
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objects so long as the future existence of the object is possible, the validity of this sale is 
conditioned upon a sufficient description of the quality and quantity of the object of sale. 
3.8.3 Is Ghul'ul' Extingu;"'ihed from tile Sale of a IVon-existing Crude Palm Oil? 
The question now is how assured is the future existence of crude palm oil. The next 
question is how assured is the quality of the delivered crude palm oil. The cases shown in 
the earlier section establish the emergence of disputes from the deferment of both counter 
values where sellers default in delivering the required quality of the commodities or in 
obtaining the commodity supply at the time of delivery. On this basis, it is submitted that 
the crude palm oil futures legal framework has not been able to eliminate the gharar 
element contained in the contract. The next section will discuss the issue of seller selling 
an unowned or unpossessed thing. Hence, this section will focus on the related concept of 
possession (qabd). 
3.9 The Sale of Non-possessed or Unowned Crude Palm Oil 
Possession or qabd stands as one of the requirements of a valid sale in Islamic commercial 
law. The word qabd indicates not only mere possession but juristically, it refers to legal 
custody and possession in a proprietary capacity, even if it does not involve the physical 
act of holding (Kamali, 2000: 117). Therefore for the sale to be a valid one, the seller must 
ensure that, amongst other valid conditions, he is in possession of the goods he is selling. 
The legality for the requirement of qabd is derived from the following bad~th (as cited in 
Kamali, 2000: 119): 
"'Abd Allah ibn 'Vmar reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: He who 
buys foodstuffs should not sell it unless he is satisfied with the measure with which 
he bought it". 
In another report transmitted by '''Abd Allah ibn 'Vmar reported that the Prophet 
(peace be upon him) said: He who buys foodstuffs should not sell it till he has 
received it". 
Ibn 'Abbas has also reported that the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: He who 
buys foodstuffs should not sell it until he has taken possession of it. Ibn 'Abbas 
said: I think it applies to all other things as well". 
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With regards to the third had~th, Kamali opines that the added element denotes the 
personal statement of Ibn 'Abbas; namely, he says "I think it applies to all other things as 
well", and thus does not fonn part of the original had~th. 
3.9.1 Wiry is Sule o/Non-possessed or Unowned Crude Pulm Oil Prohibited? 
The IFM (as cited in Kamali, 2000: 120) resolves that the basic rationale for the ruling of 
the above had~th is gharar, which relates to possible delivery failures. In this instance, the 
buyer stands the risk of not receiving the goods as it is possible that the seller may delay 
the delivery or wish to revoke the contract. The resolution further states that, while gharar 
of this kind tends to be of general application, there is an additional element of gharar in 
the sale of food grains and agricultural crops, which is that they may perish or be destroyed 
due to jii 'ihah, that is, climate disasters and or disease. 
Therefore qabd plays a pivotal role in avoiding the effects of gharar in a contract of sale. 
Qabd is required for all fungible goods that are sold by weight, measurement, or number. 
The responsibility for loss will be held by the buyer upon the qabd being transferred to the 
buyer. I07 Notwithstanding the importance of qabd in a sale contract, jurists are not 
unanimous in its method of implementation. Ibn Taymiyyah, for example, argues that the 
society's prevailing custom should be the determinant factor in the implementation of 
qabd. Hence he criticises the majority of jurists who confine the meaning of qabd to 
holding and retention Chabs) or evacuation (takhliya) and the like. Instead he argues that 
there exists no specific meaning to the word "qabd" in either the Arabic language or in the 
Shari'a. Ibn Qudamah holds similar view where qabd, should be detennined by custom (as 
cited in Kamali, 2000: 121). 
The question, therefore, is whether qabd, as determined by the crude palm oil futures legal 
framework has overcome the element of gharar; namely the default in delivering the 
required quantity and quality of crude palm oil? 
107 Thus, some jurists argue that the physical inability to deliver when the object is already owned by the 
seller does not make the contract void. The contract is void when the object is not yet owned by the seller. 
The reason is that the subject matter is owned by the seller and its kind and species are fully known (Buang, 
2000: 124). 
60 I P age 
3.9.2 Is Gharllr [:,::xtinguishedfrom the Sale of NOll-possessed or Unowned Crude Palm 
Oil? 
Applying the method of qabd in the commodity futures contract, Kamali (2000: 123) 
argues that standardised quantities and packages that are weighed and measured once, and 
are later sealed and labelled, do not necessarily require the commodity to be measured and 
weighed again each time they are sold. The warehouse receipt, which is issued once upon 
completion of such weight and measurement, is sufficient to evidence qabd. 108 Due to this, 
qabd in the case of subsequent transactions ("the chain" of sale and purchase of 
commodity futures contracts) is evidenced by the issued warehouse receipt. Hence, the 
weighing and measuring of the commodity at the time of entering into these subsequent 
. . I d d 109 transactions IS no onger nee e . 
It is submitted that this learned VIew could only be applied if the eligible delivery 
agreement is formed together with a warehouse receipt. Briefly, the procedure of issuing 
the warehouse receipt is as follows: according to Rule 1305 and 1306 of the Bursa 
Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules, the warehouse receipt, or usually referred to 
as the negotiable storage receipt (NSR), will be issued after an appraisal 110 of the crude 
palm oil has been conducted. This appraisal takes place when a seller wishes to deliver his 
crude palm oil to the buyer via the Clearing House on any business day between the first 
till the twentieth day of the delivery month. The NSR will be issued together with a 
certificate of quality. The certificate of quality is a declaration of guarantee with respect to 
the quality of the crude palm oi1. 111 Rule 1307 stipulates that the validity of the certificate 
expires at midnight on the last day of the month of which the appraisal was conducted. 
Based on this legal procedure, any eligible delivery agreement formed with a valid NSR 
would then escape the taint of gharar. This is because NSR evidenced the existence, 
quantity, and quality of the crude palm oil. However in practice, the eligible delivery 
agreement is formed or initiated before the issuance of NSR. The reason is that NSR is 
108 See Para 3/5 of the AAOIFI Shariah Standard No. (18) on Qabd (2010: 330). 
109 On the other hand, AI-Amine (2008: 171) contends for qabd in futures commodity trading to be in the 
form of the registration of a commodity futures contract' by the Clearing House and the transfer of documents 
between the seller and the buyer in the commodity futures market. This is rightly criticised by Elgari (2005: 
87) where he states that the commodity futures contract constitutes only the evidence of liability ofthe seller 
to deliver the underlying commodity in the future, thus, it is not an evidence to prove the ownership and 
existence of the underlying commodity. 
110 According to Rule 201 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules, "appraisal" means 
weighing, sampling and analysis of crude palm oil. 
III See Rule 201 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
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issued "on any business day between the first till the twentieth day of the delivery month". 
Therefore, beyond this period, without NSR, the seller would not be able to guarantee the 
existence, quality, or quantity of the oil. This condition is exacerbated by the fact that 
crude palm oil is a perishable product and cannot be stored for indefinitely long periods of 
time (Securities Industry Development: 2005: 2_17).112 
The case of Sam Wong & Son, Inc., a Corporation on behalf of itself and all others 
similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants v New York Mercantile Exchange, Richard B. 
Levine, Howard Gabler, Melvyn Farlis, Jayne Ball, Alfred S. Pennisi, Peter Johnston, 
Michel Marks, Victor Buccellato, Salvatore Calcaterra, Horace De Podwin. Sam 
Fis h berg, Richard Jarecki, Stanley Meierfeld, Charles Miller, Henry Polan, Jack 
Schwaget:, Ira Shein, Jacob Stern, Dennis Suskind, Sol Tanne, Harvey Wachman, Norton 
Waltuck, Joe Doe, Jane Roe, Richard Coe, Mary Smith, ABC, Inc., DEF, Inc., GHI Inc., 
JKL Inc., MNO Inc., and PQR, Inc. (the last ten names being fictitious), Defendants-
Appellees; Anthony Spinale, Plaintiff-Appellant, v Sal Calcaterra, Norton Waltuck, George 
Gero, Stanley Meierfeld, Horace De Podwin, Jack Schwager, Sam Fis h berg, Ira Shein, 
Jack Place, Harvey Wachman, and Charles Miller, Defendants-Appellees1l3, proves how 
the quality of agricultural crops can easily deteriorate due to the transportation process and 
the weather. In this case, twenty nine out of thirty two loads of potatoes failed to meet the 
New York Mercantile Exchange contract specification; hence these potatoes could not be 
delivered. 114 The quality of these potatoes deteriorated as they suffered from pressure 
bruises and discolouration. An investigation was carried out and it was revealed that such 
defects were the result of conditions during the growing, harvesting, subsequent storage 
and transportation of the potatoes. 
Ayubon rightly cautioned that: 
" ... ignorance (Jah/) is also part of Gharar that has to be avoided. The purchaser 
should know about the existence and conditions of the goods and the vendor should 
be able to deliver them on the agreed terms and at the agreed time. In other words, 
one should not undertake anything or any act blindly without sufficient knowledge, 
or risk oneself in adventure without knowing the outcome or the consequences." 
(2010: 144) 
112 The characteristic of perishability is the antithesis of storability. Hence, in the trading of potatoes futures 
in Chicago, an inspection certificate for quality or weights of potatoes on track is good for four days after the 
potatoes have been inspected, if they received adequate care during that period (Hoos, 1942: 362). 
13 (735 F. 2d 653; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22544). 
114 One truckload of potatoes consists of 50,000 pounds of potatoes. 
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It is further submitted that even with the warehouse receipt, there will still be disputes with 
regards to the quality of oil, for example, the case of Federal Flour Mills Bhd v Fima 
Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal. 115 This case demonstrates the lack of 
knowledge or certainty due to an insufficient description of the quality of crude palm oil in 
Schedule 13 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. In this case, the 
court held that the delivered crude palm oil was not of good merchantable quality as it 
lacked two characteristics inherent in crude palm oil; namely, the IV and the SMP. The 
court based its judgement on the evidence tendered by the experts and practitioners of the 
crude palm oil futures market. According to Wilson and Dahl (1999: 220), the process of 
buying and selling a commodity subject to quality uncertainty puts parties in several forms 
of risk. One is the risk of not meeting the contract specification, with the effect of selling 
the commodity into the cash market with a greater discount. A second risk is paying a 
higher purchase price based on false or optimistic expectations. I 16 
The above arguments and evidence augment the submission that qabd, in the nature of a 
warehouse receipt or NSR, has not overcome the element of gharar, in the case where the 
eligible delivery agreement is formed without a valid NSR. Otherwise, the element of 
gharar has been eliminated. This view is parallel with the AAOIFI Shariah Standard on 
qabd where it states: 
"The possession of documents, like bill of lading and warehouse receipts, issued in 
the name of the possessor or acknowledging his interest therein is deemed legal 
possession of what the documents represent if the ascertainment of commodities, 
goods and appliances is attained through them along with the ability of the 
possessor to undertake transactions in them." (own emphasis) (2010: 330) 
3.10 The Sale of an Outstanding Futures Obligation for a Corresponding 
Outstanding Futures Obligation 
Although the eligible delivery agreement contains an expiration period, the buyer or the 
seller is entitled to discharge hislher contractual obligation before its expiration. By far, 
115 [2005] 4 CU. 
116 The fact that the purchaser cannot be certain of the grade or quality of the commodity he would receive 
makes delivery impractical (n.n.(d), 1963: PI82). Although the contract specifies the quality, it also provides 
for discounts or premiums for delivering one with non-par quality. However the realised price differences can 
be significantly different. In reality, the futures price on a delivery date converges to the spot price of the 
quality that is cheapest to deliver rather than the spot price of the par delivery quality. Since it is uncertain 
which quality will be the cheapest to deliver, this introduces a delivery risk to every hedger in the market 
(Kamara and Siegel, 1987: 1007). 
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most futures contracts are completed through offset or via a reversing trade. To discharge a 
futures contract obligation through offset, the seller or the buyer enters into the futures 
exchange to make the offsetting or reversing trade. The party will take the opposite 
position to the position that he or she is currently holding and this time the party will 
transact with a new entrant to the market. After this reversing trade, the buyer or the 
seller's net position is zero. The clearing house recognises this and the buyer or the seller is 
absolved from any further obligation (Dubofsky: 2003: 20). In this offsetting transaction, 
the parties do not exchange the crude palm oil and its purchase price, but what actually 
transpires is that the party exchanges his/her futures obligation, or debt, with another 
corresponding futures obligation or debt. 
3. J O. J Why the Sale of Outstanding Futures Obligation for a C orre,,,,pol1ding 
Outstanding Futures Obligation is Prohibitetl? 
According to Kamali (2000: 129), the offsetting transaction which enables parties in 
commodity futures contract to close out their positions, resembles that of a debt clearance 
sale. A debt clearance sale is referred to as bay' al-dayn bi-al-dayn. Based on the fact that 
a debt clearance sale is bay' al-dayn bi-al-dayn, this section reiterates the earlier argument 
pertaining to the prohibition of the deferment of both counter values based on the bad~th, 
al-kdli' bi-al-kiili '. Based on the views of the jurists on the prohibition of the sale of one 
debt for another, Vogel and Hayes (1998: 116) propound two additional rules. The first 
rule has been mentioned in the deferment of both counter values 117 and the second rule is 
to be dealt with here. 
The second rule from the aforementioned ~ad~th prohibits the exchange of abstract 
property for abstract property (al-dayn bi-al-dayn). In the case of crude palm oil futures 
contract, the word "dayn" refers to the buyer's future obligation to pay the price of the oil 
or the seller's future obligation to deliver the oil. This future obligation will be exchanged 
with another future obligation at the time of discharge or offsetting one's position in the 
contract. The offsetting process creates a chain of sale and purchase of an outstanding 
futures obligation or debt in return for another outstanding futures obligation or debt. This 
chain continues to grow by the creation of the additional sale and purchase of outstanding 
futures obligations or debt till the contract matures. The exchange of the outstanding 
futures obligation or debt in return for another outstanding futures obligation or debt is 
117 Refer to page 69 above. 
641Page 
unlawful. To make this lawful, according to Vogel and Hayes (1998: 116), "one must 
produce the actual goods owed at least one side of the transaction. For example, the 
Hanbalis hold that if X owes Y so many bushels of a type of wheat, then Y cannot sell that 
obligation back to X for so much of money, unless the money is actually paid over when 
the resale agreement is concluded; or X can produce the actual wheat and then rebuy it. In 
either case, when produced in concrete form the obligation becomes no longer dayn but 
'ayn (ta'yfn) and thus lawful." 
On the issue of selling one debt for another debt, jurists differ in their ruling as to the 
selling of the debt to the debtor himself or to a third party. The majority of jurists have 
ruled this as valid due to the sale of debt to the debtor or by forgiving it as a gift. They base 
their reason on the basis that the prohibition of sale of debt for debt is due to the 
uncertainty involved in the inability to deliver. Hence, in the context of the sale of debt to 
the debtor, the delivery is not needed as the liability of the debtor is sold back to himself. 
However, jurists are not unanimous in selling the debt to a third party. The Hanafis, 
Hanbalis and Zahiris ruled that, since it is not valid to sell an undeliverable item, the sale 
of a debt to a person other than the debtor is not concluded. On the other hand, some of the 
Shati'i ruled that it is valid to sell a confirmed debt at maturity (al-dayn al-mustaqirr)118 to 
the debtor or a third party before receipt of the debt payment. Examples of such confirmed 
and matured debts are compensation for destroyed property and monies in the possession 
of the borrower. Though the Hanbalis ruled this as invalid for selling a debt to any party 
other than the debtor, Ibn al-Qayyim allowed for the sale of debt both to the debtor and a 
third party (AI-Zul)ayli, 2003: 80). 
Similarly, the Malikis rule that it is valid to sell a debt to a party other than the debtor 
under the following conditions. Those conditions can be summarised under two headings: 
1. Subject-matter of sale: the debt as the object of sale must not violate a legal prohibition 
such as gharar. rib a and etcetera. Hence, (i) the debt must be an item that may be 
resold prior to receipt (for example in the case of loans) and the object of the debt must 
not be food; (ii) the price of the sale must be paid currently to avoid selling a debt for 
another debt; (iii) the price must either be of a different genus than the debt, or if it is of 
118 Technically, it is a debt in which the liability of the debtor is established and he has no means of 
extinguishing it except by a new contract, for example the price of a purchased item and compensation for a 
destroyed property (International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance, 2010: 62). 
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the same genus, equal to avoid ribii; and (iv) the price must not be gold if the debt is 
silver to avoid selling money for deferred money (ribii). 
2. The condition of the debtor: (i) the repayment of the debt must be most likely (for 
example, the debtor must be present in the city where the contract is concluded so that 
his financial condition is known); (ii) the debtor must acknowledge the debt so that he 
may not deny it later (thus it is not valid to sell a right under dispute); (iii) the debtor 
must be eligible to take responsibility for the debt and its delivery (he must not be 
underage or under legal supervision); and (iv) there should be no enmity between the 
debtor and the buyer of the debt so that the buyer will not be exposed to additional risk 
and the debtor is not subjugated to any adversaries (al-Zu~ayli, 2003: 81). 
3.10.2 Is Glzal'al' Eliminated from the Sale of an Outstanding Futures Obligation for tI 
Corre.'tJ)(}ndillg Ollt.\'tamling Futures Obligation? 
According to MalIki, for the sale of an outstanding debt for another outstanding debt to a 
third party to be free from gharar, the transaction must comply with the conditions 
stipulated. It is submitted that the offsetting transaction, an equivalence to a sale of an 
outstanding debt for another outstanding debt to a third party, transgresses the following 
conditions: (1) the future debt is a confirmed debt at maturity; (2) the object of debt must 
not be food; (3) the price of the debt must be paid on the spot; (4) the price of the debt 
must be paid equal to the amount of the debt to avoid ribii; and (5) the repayment of debt 
must be most likely and the debtor must not deny the debt. 
Firstly, the futures obligation or debt which is sold in an offsetting transaction arises not 
from a matured futures contract but from an immatured futures contract. The Shtifi'is view 
that the dayn ghayr mustaqirr (an unconfirmed and immatured debt), like the obligation to 
deliver the subject matter of a salam sale, cannot be a valid object of sale as the delivery is 
not yet due. This is based on a clear provision prohibiting the sale prior to taking delivery 
(as cited in Zahraa and Mahmor, 2001: 226).119 In reality, the future obligation or debt in a 
futures contract will mature in the prescribed delivery month, as the making and taking of 
delivery transpires in any business days between the first till the twentieth day of the 
delivery month. However, in practice, offsetting normally takes place before the contract 
119 The obligation to deliver the subject matter of a salam sale is based on a contractual or consensual legal 
basis. Hence in terms of the legal basis and stability of the obligation - it is a debt that has the potential of 
termination or lapse. Unlike dayn mustaqirr, it is "a final and conclusive liability over which the creditor has 
an indisputable ownership and which is capable of unilateral termination." 
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matures. At this period, the outstanding debt is still not certain and is tainted with the 
possibility of default. Secondly, the condition that the object of debt must not be of food is 
not applicable in the case of crude palm oil futures contract. This is because crude palm oil 
falls under the category of edible oils and fats (Malaysian Palm Oil Board, 2011: 41). 
Thirdly, the price of the debt must be paid on the spot. l2O In offsetting, the sale of a futures 
obligation or debt to another third party is not reciprocated with any cash but instead is met 
with another future obligation or debt. Even though there is a transfer of a certain amount 
of money from one party to the other, this payment is not part of the purchase price of the 
crude palm oil. It is submitted that this payment is a margin payment paid to one of the 
parties, depending on the parties' positions and the oil settlement price at the time of 
offsetting. Even without the offsetting transaction, one of the parties in the eligible delivery 
agreement would still have to make this payment solely for the reason of the change in the 
price of the crude palm oil futures. Fourthly, the condition that the price paid for the debt is 
equal to the amount of the debt, for the avoidance of ribii, does not materialise in an 
offsetting transaction. As mentioned before, payment for the purchase price of crude palm 
oil is not made at the time of offsetting. 
Finally, the repayment of debt must be most likely and the debtor must not deny the debt. 
In this regard, Kamali (2000: 130) argues that delivery and payment for the delivery, under 
a commodity futures contract, is guaranteed by the incorporation of the Clearing House as 
counter-party to each and every futures contract. Hence, the question of the buyer or 
seller's creditworthiness and ability to deliver is immaterial. 121 In other words, there is no 
uncertainty and risk-taking in this transaction, as the Clearing House guarantees the 
delivery and payment of the price. Though Kamali has raised a significant point, his view 
can be rebutted from two sides. Firstly, in reality, when a seller defaults in delivering the 
oil, the Exchange will intervene by stipulating an emergency settlement price. The cases 
have shown that parties have disputed the amount of settlement imposed by the Exchange. 
This condition is exacerbated by the absence of a clear method of calculation in the crude 
palm oil futures legal framework. Secondly, the financial source of the Clearing House's 
guarantee system is, in reality, co-funded by contractual parties. The failure of the 
120 See also al-Sheahabi (2003: 70) on trading in debts. 
121 However, Kamali's contention can be dismissed by the views of two practitioners in the crude palm oil 
futures market. Based on an interview held in Malaysia on the 6th and 8th December, 2011, these practitioners 
opine that the identity of the parties in crude palm oil futures contract is still material. This is because the 
buyers are keener to buy crude palm oil from the sellers whom the market have recognised or has a good 
record in selling a good merchantable quality of crude palm oil. The same applies to the sellers selling their 
crude palm oil to creditworthy buyers. 
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contractual parties to maintain their contribution would inevitably affect the Clearing 
House guaranteeing the payment and delivery of the contract. The 1987 Hong Kong 
futures' market crash aptly illustrates this precarious situation, which will be discussed 
later in the chapter. 
3.10.2.1 Emergency Settlement Price for a Defaulted Eligible Delivery Agreement 
In accordance with Rule 1102 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business 
Rules, when a seller defaults in making the delivery of crude palm oil, or the buyer defaults 
in paying for the delivery, upon the advice of the Clearing House, the Exchange will 
determine a settlement price called the emergency settlement price. This emergency 
settlement price is the price which the defaulting party must pay to the injured party. 122 
Upon close scrutiny of the crude palm oil futures legal framework, however, it is 
discovered that there is no provision providing for a method of calculating the emergency 
settlement price. This is unlike other provisions which stipulate a certain method of 
calculation for the Exchange to base its calculations on when determining a settlement 
price for the eligible delivery agreement. 
Hence, it is submitted that in the absence of a clear method of calculation, the parties' 
rights and obligations cannot be determined with an acceptable degree of exactitude and 
certainty (Omar, 1999: 278). The absence of such a material ingredient would inevitably 
lead to disputes. In support of this proposition, reference is made to the following cases: 
1- Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v The Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange & 
Anor. 123 This case involves a number of crude palm oil futures buyers who were 
not satisfied with the emergency settlement price fixed by the Exchange (in this 
case, the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange (KLCE)) on March 14 and 15, 
1984. The emergency settlement price was fixed as there were 761 March 1984 
defaulted crude palm oil futures contracts. Hence, these buyers applied to the court 
to quash the decision of the Exchange on the ground that it acted in bad faith and in 
excess of its jurisdiction. The court ruled in favour of the Exchange as it found that 
the Exchange had acted legally and properly. 
122 A similar provision is provided by· Rule 1101 of the same Business Rules which stipulates that if the 
Exchange, upon the advice of the Clearing House finds that a fair and orderly market is not available or is not 
likely to be available, the Exchange will determine an emergency price for the eligible delivery agreement. 
123 [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 56. 
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11- Palm co Holdings Bhd v Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors 124 , In this case, 
the buyers of the crude palm oil futures contracts challenged the emergency 
settlement price fixed by the KLCE on March 13 and 14, 1984. This price was 
fixed for 5,150 defaulted crude palm oil futures contracts. The buyers in this case 
alleged that the emergency settlement price was made without taking into 
consideration the compensation amount, payable to them due to these defaults.125 
These two cases were significant as they showed how the price on 14 March 1984 
was fixed differently by the Exchange; namely, RM 1 ,520 in the case of Palmco 
Holdings v Sakapp Commodities and RM1,350 in Ganda Oil v KLCE. 
111- The validity of the exchange's emergency settlement price was also challenged in 
the United States. The case of Crowley, Alien Property Custodian v Commodity 
Exchange, Inc. et al. involves a dissatisfied company which held 418 short raw silk 
futures contracts. By virtue of the exchange'S board resolution on October 15, 
1941, the settlement price for the raw silk futures was pegged at $3.08 per pound 
and this price was challenged by the company. The court in this case referred to the 
relevant minutes of the exchange's board. The minutes showed that the dispute in 
the board was not whether liquidation should be ordered but which of the two 
prices should be made the settlement price. Despite the board having accepted the 
suggestion by an investigation committee to peg at a certain settlement price, the 
board went ahead with pegging at a different settlement price which was based on 
the government's ceiling price. 
The submission on the existence of gharar is supported further by an interview with a 
prominent Sbari'a scholar in Malaysia on December 2,2011. In this interview, the scholar 
agreed that the non-stipulation of a method of calculation for the emergency settlement 
price amounts to gharar. This echoes the view of Imam Hanbal who maintains that the 
price needs to be expressly stated in the contract. If the price is not stated in absolute 
monetary tenns, as is required by the other main classical jurists, the price must be defined 
124 Suit No. C2324 of 1984 
125 Under Rule 1102 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules, upon such a default, 
the Exchange, besides exercising its power to determine the emergency settlement price, must also determine 
the compensation sum payable by the defaulted party to the party who was disadvantaged by the failure to 
deliver. 
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in a manner mutually agreed to by the contractual parties in order to avoid any disputes (as 
cited in El-Diwany, 2010: 119). 
Similarly, the AAOIFFI (2010: 540) resolves that gharar could arise if the commodity is 
sold without mentioning the price, or if the price is determined by one of the contractual 
parties or a third party. In this case, gharar arises when the emergency settlement price is 
determined solely by the Exchange, being a third party, without the involvement of the 
contractual parties. 126 It is therefore fundamental in the Sbari'a that the contracting parties 
accept their contractual rights and obligations with full knowledge of the extent of their 
commitment (Coulson, 1984: 45). If the end result of a contract is uncertain or 
unambiguous, the contract is tainted with gharar (Ayub, 2008: 58). 
3.10.2.1 The Cost of the Clearing House's Guarantee System 
Although the Clearing House ostensibly guarantees futures contractual performance, it is 
submitted that the sellers and the buyers are actually bearing the guarantee cost. This is 
predicated on the payments that these parties have to pay, on top of the margins payable at 
the beginning and throughout the trading of the crude palm oil futures contract (Bemanke, 
1990: 136): 
(1) The guarantee fees with respect to each and every contract that the party trades. The 
guarantees fees are calculated each day and are calculated on an annual percentage, 
determined by the Clearing House, based on the margin ofthe seller and the buyer; 127 
(2) The security deposit in the amount of at least Ringgit Malaysia One Million. This 
amount may be increased by the Clearing House, taking into consideration the 
obligations of, and the performance risk undertaken by, the Clearing House; 128 and 
(3) The clearing fund contribution of a fixed amount of Ringgit Malaysia One Million plus 
a variable amount calculated in accordance with the formula determined by the 
Clearing House. The purpose of this contribution is to indemnify the Clearing House 
1213y not knowing the completion or implication of the contract, the voluntary consent of the contractual 
r:arties has, in principle, been vitiated (Iqbal and Khan, 2005: 7). 
27 Rule 619 of Rules of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad. 
128 Rule 206A of Rules of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad. 
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against losses arising from the failure of the buyer or the seller in discharging hislher 
obligations to the Clearing House. 129 
Therefore it is reasonably foreseeable that the Clearing House might find it difficult to 
withstand the demands to perform the outstanding contracts if these parties default in their 
margin payments as well as the payments above. The 1987 Hong Kong futures' market 
crash is a good illustration. The run on the Hong Kong's clearing house, Guarantee 
, Corporation, left the clearing house without adequate resources to meet the demands to 
perform a substantial number of defaulted futures contract. Not only that, the crash almost 
left the clearing house on the brink of being wound-up and smeared with a multitude of 
legal actions (Cooper, n.d: 188 and 205). 
3.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the element of gharar in the eligible delivery agreement and its 
contract specification. The analysis has revealed that the agreement and the contract 
specification embody the gharar related issues; namely, the non-exchange and deferment 
of both counter-values; the selling of non-existent, non-possessed or unowned crude palm 
oil; and the exchange of an outstanding futures obligation with another corresponding 
outstanding futures obligation. Although the SAC concedes that the crude palm oil futures 
contract is contained within these issues, it argues that the crude palm oil futures legal 
framework has eliminated the gharar element contained therein. Nonetheless, this chapter 
has shown that the legal framework has not effectively overcome the Sbarra prohibition. 
In summation, this chapter has established that, inconsistent with the stance of the SAC, 
the crude palm oil futures contract is not free from the prohibited gharar. 
129 The Clearing House is entitled to review the amount of the contribution with regard to the obligation and 
the performance risk undertaken by the Clearing House in the contract. See Rule 400, 401, 402 and 405 of 
Rules of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Contract Settlement: The Element of Uncertainty in Crude Palm Oil 
Futures Contract 
4.1 Introduction 
Analysing the issue purely from the perspective of contract settlement, this chapter extends 
the discussion on gharar. It endeavours to establish that the element of uncertainty, or 
gharar, is ingrained in the contract settlement's legal framework. This chapter will prove 
that, in reality, this element of uncertainty is central to the disputes or litigations of the 
contractual parties. This element of uncertainty, as discussed in the earlier chapter, is found 
to be comprised of the following: 
(a) when there is a lack of knowledge in the attributes of the emergency settlement price 
(in line with the opinion of Ibn Rushd 130); 
(b) when the seller fails to deliver the underlying commodity (as per the view of Ibn 
QayyimI31); 
(c) when the underlying commodity is incapable of delivery (as per the view of Ibn 
Qayyim 132); and 
(d) when the quality of the underlying commodity IS insufficiently described (as 
maintained by Zahraa and MahmorI33). 
This chapter will also establish that the brunt of the factors above affects not only the 
parties to the contract but more importantly the public's social welfare. 
These elements of uncertainty will be examined under two broad issues: firstly the issue 
on the determination of the emergency settlement price; and secondly, the default of 
physical delivery. This latter issue will be further divided into two sections: namely, where 
the default is due to the non-availability of the supply of the commodity; and, later, where 
the default is due to the non-fulfilment of the commodity's deliverable quality or grade. 
130 Ibn Rushd (2009: 179). 
131 As cited in Zahraa and Mahmor (2002: 386). 
132 Ibid. 
133 Zahraa and Mahmor (2002: 384). 
72I P age 
4.2 \Vhat is Contract Settlement? 
Contract settlement generally refers to the discharge of the rights and liabilities of parties 
under a crude palm oil futures contract, whether by means of performance, compromise, or 
otherwise. 134 Simply put, it is how the contractual parties settle their contractual 
obligations. The manner of settlement is heavily regulated by the crude palm oil futures 
legal framework. Rule 1303A.I of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules 
describes the settlement of crude palm oil futures contracts as follows: 
"Settlement of Crude Palm Oil Futures Contracts may either be by cash or physical 
. d . db h E h fi . . ,,135 delIvery, as etermme y t e xc ange rom tIme to tIme. 
Hence, a crude palm oil futures contract could be cash settledl36 in three ways, namely, (i) 
when the contract is closed out,137 (ii) when the contract expires, and (iii) when the 
contract is being exercised. 138 Settlement by way of closed out or setting off has been 
touched upon in the earlier chapter and will be further discussed in Chapters five and six. 
Settlement by way of contract exercise will not be covered in this chapter as it relates to 
options. However, this chapter will examine the settlement of the crude palm oil futures 
contract at the point of its expiry - either by cash or physical delivery. 
Settlement by way of physical delivery139 is defined in Rule 1 of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules as: 
\34 See section 2 of the 2007 Act. The contract settlement also includes partial settlements effected in 
accordance with the Business Rules of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad. 
135 Prior to November 18, 2009, Schedule 13 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules 
stipulates that crude palm oil futures contract could be settled either by cash or physical delivery. This was 
the prevailing legal position taken when the SAC issued its resolution on crude palm oil futures contract. 
However. due to the amendment made to the Business Rules, by November 18, 2009, this position has now 
been amended and Schedule 13 now states that the "settlement of the contract shall be via physical 
delivery." Despite the phrase "either by cash" was deleted from Schedule 13, Rule 1303A.I still maintains 
that crude palm oil futures contract may be settled by way of cash or physical delivery. Based on this legal 
position and the fact that the SAC resolution was issued at the time when Schedule 13 provided for 
settlement by cash, it is submitted that, for the purpose of this study, the analysis of the settlement of crude 
ralm oil futures contract by cash is deemed relevant. 
36 See Rule 201 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
137 The term "closed-out" is defined in Rule 2 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules as 
"to discharge the obligations of a person in the Long Position or Short Position under a Contract and shall 
include the discharge of these obligations as it result of the matching up ofthe Contract with a Contract of the 
same kind under which the person has assumed an offsetting Short Position or offsetting Long Position, as 
the case may be." 
138 This mode of settlement refers to the case of an option where the holder of the option invokes the right 
granted under it. 
139 The irony of settlement by delivery in the futures market is that it is aimed to test the futures price, rather 
than being a widespread incentive for actually making or taking delivery. For this reason, delivery is rarely 
made or taken as futures contract are entered into for reasons other than the exchange of title. Nonetheless, 
the incentive to deliver derives primarily from the relationship between the cash and futures prices during the 
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"Settlement by delivery of an Instrument 140 in accordance with Chapter 8 of the 
141 h' h . EI' 'bl Rules and pursuant to the terms of an Open Contract w lC IS an Igl e 
Delivery Agreement or an Eligible Option." 
Chapter 8 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules encompasses the 
method for the settlement of crude palm oil futures contract by way of physical delivery. 
For the purpose of this discussion, Rules 800, 801, 803, 805 and 807 will be examined. In 
brief, Rules 800, 801 and 803 enumerate how the delivery of crude palm oil and payment 
for said delivery is to be made between the seller and purchaser: specifically, the Clearing 
Participants and the Clearing House or vice versa. Rules 805 and 807, meanwhile, stipulate 
the effects of default either in the delivery of the crude palm oil or the payment of the 
settlement amount. 
4.3 Uncertainty in the Contract Settlement of Crude Palm Oil Futures Contract 
From a careful study of the contract settlement's legal provisions, two uncertainty issues 
have been identified: firstly is the issue on the determination of the emergency settlement 
price; and, secondly, the default in delivering the underlying commodity. This later issue is 
further divided into two sections: these are, where the default is due to the non-availability 
of the supply of the commodity; and where the default is due to the non-fulfilment of the 
commodity'S deliverable quality or grade. The following section will examine the first 
uncertainty issue - determination of the emergency settlement price. 
4.3.1. The Determination of Emergency Settlement Price 
The price of crude palm oil futures contract is determined in a number of ways: 
(i) by the seller and the purchaser at the time of forming the crude palm oil futures 
contract. 142 , 
delivery month: namely, the cash-future basis, that is the difference between the spot price and the futures 
price (Hudson et aI, 1988: 156). 
140 Section 2( 1) of the 2007 Act defines the word "Instrument" as " ... anything that is capable of delivery 
under an agreement (the futures contract) for its delivery, including a commodity, or a document creating or 
evidencing a thing in action ... " 
141 Rule 1 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules defines the word "Open 
Contract" as "a Futures Contract or Option between a Clearing Participant and the Clearing House which has 
not been extinguished or terminated in accordance with the Rules." 
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(ii) by the Exchange when it determines that crude palm oil futures contract, which 
remain outstanding on the final settlement day, be settled by cash. The Exchange 
will determine a value for this contract called the final settlement value; 143 
(iii) by the Exchange after being consulted by the Clearing House that the performance 
or delivery of the crude palm oil is impossible. The Exchange will then determine a 
settlement price for this crude palm oil futures contract; 144 
(iv) by the Exchange upon the advice of the Clearing House following a default by the 
seller or the buyer in the making or taking of delivery of the crude palm oil. The 
Exchange will determine a settlement price for this contract called the emergency 
settlement price; 145 and 
(v) by the Exchange upon the advice of the Clearing House when the Clearing House 
considers that a fair and orderly market is not available or when it is not likely to be 
available. The Exchange will then determine an emergency settlement price for 
settlement of the open crude palm oil futures contracts. 146 
It is important to note that, except for category (i) above, the crude palm oil futures 
contract is not settled based on the price originally agreed to by the seller and the buyer. 
142 Rule 1301.2 (a) of the Rules of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules states tnat, "The 
value of the Contract at the time of making the Contract (hereinafter referred to as "the contract value") shall 
be the price agreed to by the parties at the time multiplied by the contract multiplier of twenty five (25) 
metric tons and expressed in Ringgit Malaysia or such other currency as may be determined by the Exchange 
from time to time." 
143 Rule 1301.2 (b) of the Rules of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules stipulates that, 
"Where a Contract has been determined by the Exchange to be settled by cash, the value of the Contract on 
the Final Settlement Day shall be the final settlement value of the underlying Crude Palm Oil Futures 
Contract quoted by the Exchange in respect of such Contract, multiplied by a contract multiplier of twenty-
five (25) metric tons and expressed in such currency as may be determined by the Exchange from time to 
time." The phrase "Final Settlement Day" refers to "the Business day following the Final Trading Day when 
all Open Position are cash settled or settled by delivery in accordance with the rules of the Clearing House". 
While the phrase "Final Trading Day" relates to "the last Business Day designated for the trading of a 
Contract." See Rule 201 of the Rules of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
144 See Rule 708 of the Rules of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
145 See Rule 1102 of the Rules of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules. 
146 See Rule 1101 of the Rules of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules. To be 
read with Rule 707.4 of the Rules of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. Rule 707.4 
enumerates circumstances which could bring about an emergency state in the market. It follows: (i) a 
situation which threatens the integrity, liquidity or orderly liquidation of any contract; (ii) a situation which 
threatens the financial integrity of the market or its participants; iii) a manipUlation, manipulative activity, 
attempted manipulation, comer or squeeze is threatening or is occurring; (iv) the liquidity of a contract or its 
orderly liquidation is threatened by the concentration of positions in the hands of individuals who are, or 
appear to be, unable or unwilling to make or take delivery in the ordinary course; or (v) an action of the 
Malaysian or any foreign government or authority being likely to have a direct and adverse impact on the 
integrity, liquidity, and orderly liquidation of any contract. 
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Instead, the price is based on a new price determined by the Exchange. In addition to this, 
for category (iv) and (v), the regulatory provisions do not provide a method for calculating 
the emergency settlement price. The following analyses the difference between the legal 
provisions for category (ii) and (iii) on the one hand and category (iv) and (v) on the other 
hand. 
1- In relation to category (ii) above, Rule 707.1(a) and (b) of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad Business Rules provide that the bids, offers, and traded prices 
agreed to by the parties must be within the prescribed price limits; namely: 
"(a) The Exchange may stipulate in these Rules and/or in the Trading 
Procedures the maximum price ("upper limit") and the minimum price 
("lower limit") at which an order in respect of a Contract may be entered; 
(b) No order of a Contract shall be entered above the upper limit or 
below the lower limit." 
The control of the price limit is governed by Schedule 13 of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad Business Rules which stipulates that: 
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"With the exception of trades in the current delivery month, trades for 
future delivery of Crude Palm Oil in any month, shall not be made, during 
anyone Business Day, at prices varying more than 10% above or below the 
settlement prices of the preceding Business Day ("the 10% limit") except as 
provided in this Rule. 
When the 10% limit is triggered (except for the current month), the 
Exchange shall announce a 10-minute cooling off period ("the Cooling Off 
Period") for all Contracts of quoted months (except the current month) 
during which trading shall only take place within the 10% Limit. Following 
the Cooling Off Period, Contracts of all quoted months shall be specified as 
interrupted pursuant to Rule 702B.2(a)(ii) for a period of 5 minutes, after 
which the prices traded for all quoted months (except the current month) 
shall not vary more than 15% above or below the settlement prices' of the 
preceding Business Day ("the 15% Limit"). 
If the 10% Limit is triggered less than 30 minutes before the end of the first 
trading session, the following shall apply:-
(a) The quoted months shall not be specified as interrupted; 
(b) The 10% Limit shall be applied to all quoted months (except the current 
month) for the rest of the first trading session; and 
(c) The 15% Limit shall be applied for all quoted months (except the 
current month) for the rest of the Business Day. 
For the purposes of this Rule, the 10% Limit shall be considered triggered 
in the manner as may be prescribed by the Exchange." 
11- In relation to category (iii) above, Rule 708 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad 
Business Rules states that: 
"If the Clearing House in consultation with the Exchange determines that 
the performance under a Contract or delivery of Instruments shall become 
impossible through the suspension of trading in the Instrument on the 
Underlying Market or for any reason that may be deemed appropriate by the 
Clearing House in consultation with the Exchange, the Contract may be 
cash settled according to a settlement price which shall be determined 
according to the procedures agreed upon by both the Exchange and the 
Clearing House. The Exchange shall calculate the average of the 
transactions taken above, after disregarding the highest and lowest price 
transacted. The average of the remaining prices rounded to the nearest 
whole sen shall be the settlement price. When the weighted average ends in 
0.5, it shall be rounded upwards to the next whole sen." 
the clarity in the range of prices as well as the method of calculating the settlement price 
prescribed in Schedule 13 and Rule 708 is not evidenced in the legal provisions under 
category (iv) and (v). Rule 1102 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Business Rules 
provides for the emergency settlement procedure for category (iv) above. However, it is 
silent on the method of arriving at the emergency settlement price. 147 It states that: 
"1102 Substitute for Delivery 
(a) If a Seller or a Buyer, as the case may be, to an Open Contract has failed to 
Deliver, pursuant to Rule 805(c) the Clearing House must: 
(i) request the relevant Exchange to provide an emergency settlement 
prIce; 
(ii) liquidate, by cash settlement pursuant to Rule 807 such Open 
Contract with reference to the emergency settlement prIce 
determined in accordance with Rule 1102(a). 
(b) Pursuant to Rule" 11 02( a) the Seller or Buyer, as the case may be, to such 
Open Contract is also liable to pay to the Clearing House such sum as may 
be determined by the Clearing House as compensation and upon receipt of 
such sum the Clearing House must pay that sum to the Clearing Participant 
who was disadvantage by such failure to Deliver." 
147 Instead of providing for a clear method of calculating the settlement price in the case of emergency, rule 
707.4(b)(x) of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules, merely provides for the Exchange to 
exercise its emergency power which includes, amongst others, recommending the emergency settlement price 
for the crude palm oil futures contracts. Even in Para 10 of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Trading 
Manual, which provides for the market emergency, is silent on the manner of calculating the emergency 
settlement price. 
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An equal treatment is found in rule 1101 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Business 
Rules, which stipulates only the emergency settlement procedure for category (v) above. It 
states: 
"Rule 1101 Emergency Settlement 
Pursuant to Rule 1 002( c) and if the Clearing House in its absolute discretion 
considers that a fair and orderly market is not available or is not likely to be 
available, the Clearing House may: 
(a) Request the relevant Exchange to provide an emergency settlement price; 
(b) Liquidate, by cash settlement pursuant to Rule 807 all or any Open Contracts as 
may be determined by the Clearing House with reference to the emergency 
settlement price determined in accordance with Rule 1101(a)." 
Notwithstanding the fact that these legal provisions fail to incorporate a clear method of 
calculation, legal frameworks from other jurisdiction are found to contain explicit methods 
of calculation. This disparity is conspicuously shown in the following legal provisions: 148 
1) Rule 6.04 of ICE Futures U.S., Inc. 149 Regulation provides for the determination of 
the settlement price in the case of physical emergencies. When a Physical 
Emergency is declared in accordance with rule 6.02,150 the following shall apply 
with respect to the determination of the settlement price: 151 
148It is worthy mentioning Rule 6.52 of the NYMEX (New York Mercantile Exchange) Rule Guide which 
guides the method of fixing the settlement price of the crude oil futures contract. It is interesting to note that 
it provides for circumstances (i) if the settlement price, determined by its trading rules, is inconsistent with 
transactions that have occurred during the close range in other delivery months; or (ii) if the settlement price 
is inconsistent with the market information known to the committee. It follows that in either of these two 
circumstances, the committee may establish the settlement price at a level consistent with other transactions 
or market information. In such an event, the committee is required to prepare a written record of the basis for 
any settlement price so established. Given that the decisions of the committee have serious financial 
implications for traders and other users of the futures market, the settlement price determined must invariably 
reflect a consensus view of not only the committee members but also the majority traders. See also Kumar 
(1992: 459). 
149 ICE Futures U.S. is a futures exchange which offers futures trading in soft commodities like sugar, cotton, 
coffee, cocoa and orange juice. It is also a trading venue for trading Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 index 
futures and options contracts as well as contracts based on the ICE U.S. Dollar Index (ICE U.S.) 
150 "Physical Emergency" is referred to as fire or other casualty, bomb threat, substantial inclement weather, 
power failure, communication or transportation breakdown, computer malfunction, screen-based trading 
system break-down, malfunction of plumbing, heating, ventilation and air conditioning system, backlog or 
delay in clearing or in the processing of data related to clearing trades, floor occurrence which threatens an 
orderly market or other similar events. 
151 Though Rule 707.5 of the Rules of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules provides for 
the physical emergency, it merely stipulates the power of the Exchange to take any action it deems fit. It is 
silent in providing any method of calculating the emergency settlement price. 
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(a) with respect to the on-exchange futures contracts that are listed for trading 
solely on the trading floor, if the market does not reopen, the settlement price 
will be calculated in accordance with Rule 4.28 using the prices traded during 
the last one (1) or two (2) minutes of trading, depending on the closing period 
specified in rule 4.06 for the contract. 
(b) with respect to the on-exchange futures contracts that are solely listed for 
trading on the electronic trading platform, 
(i) if the trading hours have been extended, the settlement price will be 
determined in accordance with Rule 4.28 using prices from the last one 
(1) or two (2) minutes of the extended trading hours, depending on the 
convention specified in rule 27 .18(b) for the contract; or 
(ii) if electronic trading does not resume, the settlement pnce will be 
determined in accordance with rule 4.28 using prices from the last one 
(1) or two (2) minutes, depending on the convention specified in rule 
27 .18(b) for the contract. 
(2) Rule 4.16.4 of the LIFFE 152 Rules provides for emergenci 53 settlement procedure 
which includes settlement through invoicing a back price. It prescribes that: 
"the price determined shall (in the absence of special reasons to the contrary) be 
within the Daily Settlement Prices established by the Exchange in respect of Six 
Business Days immediately preceding the date of determination. The Board may 
invite the CSP to be represented at any meeting of the Board at which an invoicing 
back price is to be determined under this LIFFE Rule and may consult the CSP 
before making its determination." 
(3) Rule 1.2 of the ICE Futures Europe154 (ICE Circular) provides for the emergency 
settlement procedure in the event of a system outage. This rule provides that, in the 
152 This Rule took effect in November, 2011. NYSE Liffe comprises of five European derivatives markets, 
that of Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, London and Paris. Hence, it is Europe's largest exchange by value of 
business traded and the second largest globally (NYSE Liffe). 
153 Emergency circumstances include excessive trading positions or unwarranted speculation; circumstances 
affecting the orderly conduct of business; a state of war or threatened hostility; the introduction of official 
control affecting the market or the performance of contracts or any change in such controls; any change in the 
legal provisions, administrative or financial practices affecting the market; the breakdown or failure of 
communications or equipment or facilities or the ATS central processing systems; the failure of any 
significant market infrastructure or service provider; or any other undesirable situation or practice. 
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event of a business interruption which leads to the market suspension, the 
exchange's preferred approach is to determine prices by consulting market 
practitioners. In doing so, the exchange will conduct a poll of a representative 
sample of its members and will make an assessment of relevant values for the 
designated settlement period; namely, the value for the closing minute of the 
settlement period. In reaching this assessment, the exchange may consider other 
sources of price information: for example, the price assessors or reporters or values 
between other closely correlated contracts. Generally, an average of the assessment 
will be used, although the exchange may disregard trades which are at significant 
variance from the mean. Where the exchange is unable to obtain credible prices 
from the market, then it may take other courses of action to ensure that a viable 
settlement price is obtained. 155These other courses of action for deriving settlement 
prices might include, on a non-exclusive basis, the following: 
(i) Using a previous day's settlement price; 
(ii) Using values obtained prior to the suspension of the ICE platform; 
(iii) Using values obtained by restarting the ICE platform and settling the market 
from trades on the ICE platform albeit at a later time; and 
(iv) Using values obtained by reference to over-the-counter markets or other 
markets which are not affected. 
A clear provision in formulating an emergency settlement price is notably a fundamental 
aspect of commodity futures contract. The United States futures market legal framework 
enshrines its importance in Core Principle 6 of section 5( d) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act. It stipulates that a designated contract market or an exchange should have clear 
procedures and guidelines for the exchange's decision-making during a period of 
emergency. This includes emergency intervention in the market as well as procedures and 
guidelines in avoiding conflicts of interest while carrying out such decision making. l56 
Nonetheless, from a careful study of the regulatory framework of Malaysia as well as that 
of the United States, a clear criterion of arriving at the emergency settlement price is 
154 Relying on a circular (051110) dated October 4, 2005. ICE Futures Europe (ICE Europe) is a regulated 
futures exchange for global energy market. It lists the leading global crude oil benchmarks and sees half of 
the trade in the world's crude oil and refined product futures. 
155 However it must be noted here that the exchange reserves the absolute discretion to determine settlement 
and market prices. 
156 Procedures and guidelines should include notifying the Commission of the exercise ofa contract market's 
regulatory emergency authority, explaining how conflicts of interest are minimised, and documenting the 
contract market's decision-making process and the reasons for using its emergency action authority. 
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absent. 157 Due to the uncertainty and lack of knowledge in the method of calculation, it is 
not surprising that discontentment and disputes occur amongst the contractual parties. The 
following cases evidenced such scenarios. 
Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v The Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange & 
Anor.158 This case involves an application made by a number of purchasers of the crude 
palm oil futures contract (Appellants) to cancel an emergency settlement price fixed by the 
Exchange; in this case, the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange (KLCE). These 
Appellants were members of the Kuala Lumpur Commodities Clearing House (KLCCH) 
and KLCE, who at the same time, carried out business in palm oil processing and refining. 
This dispute arises from the default of one Matthes & Porton (M) Sdn. Bhd. (M&P). By 
the close of the trading on February 28, 1984, M&P (also a member of the KLCE and the 
KLCCH), purported to sell 761 March 1984 crude palm oil futures contracts on behalf of 
one Sun Edible Oil Industries (M) Sdn. Bhd (SEOI). SEOI was also a member of the 
KLCE and the KLCCH. However, the next morning on February 29th , the SEOI notified 
the KLCCH by telex that they had denied and rejected the said trades. In view of such a 
rejection, the KLCCH contacted the M&P on the fact that they would be required to pay 
the deposits in respect of the said contracts amounting to a total of RM7 ,610,000-00. 
However, the deposit was not forthcoming and the KLCCH decided not to register the said 
contracts. 
Nonetheless, after receiving and considering vanous representations from relevant 
government agencies and other members of the palm oil industries, the KLCCH agreed to 
register the contracts for the purpose of protecting and maintaining the market and 
restoring confidence in the industry. The contracts were then registered on March 12, 1984 
but the M&P still refused to pay the required deposit. In view of such a default, the 
KLCCH decided to liquidate all the aforementioned contracts at the price fixed by the 
KLCE. Therefore on March 16, 1984, the KLCCH was advised by KLCE that the price of 
the said contracts for the purpose of invoicing by way of a compulsory settlement was set 
at RM 1,350-00 per tonne. 
The Appellants, Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd and others who purchased the defaulted 761 
March 1984 crude palm oil futures contracts were not satisfied with the emergency 
157 The regulatory framework governing the Chicago Board of Trade and the Commodity Mercantile 
Exchange were examined in deciphering any explicit method of calculating the emergency settlement price. 
ISS [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 56. 
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settlement price quoted by the Exchange. They applied to the High Court, and later 
appealed to the Supreme Court, for an order of certiorari. 159 The purpose of this 
application was to quash the decision of the KLCE made on March 15, 1984 which fixed 
the price of the crude palm oil futures contract at RMl,350-00 per metric ton. The 
Appellants cited two grounds for the said application; namely that the KLCE were in 
excess of jurisdiction and that it acted in bad faith. The Appellants compared the price 
fixed by the KLCE on the 14th and 15th March at RM1,520-00 per metric ton with that of 
other contracts and argued that KLCE had fixed a lower price for their contracts. 
The KLCE on the other hand argued that they were empowered to declare the existence of 
a state of emergency by virtue of rule 300(2) of its emergency rule; namely, to take "such 
one or more steps as it sees fit and proper". The KLCE also argued that regulation 11 of 
the General Regulation gives a wider discretion to the KLCE to fix a settlement price. 
Hence, by virtue of this regulation 11, the KLCE argued that the fixed price was based on 
the price as of February 28, being the actual trading date, and was included in the price of 
the element of compensation. 160 Despite the KLCE's frail argument, the court gave a 
judgement in favour of the KLCE. 
Similar facts transpired in the case of Palm co Holdings Bhd v Sakapp Commodities (M) 
Sdn Bhd & Ors.161 The purchasers of the crude palm oil futures contracts challenged the 
emergency settlement price fixed by the KLCE. These purchasers, Palmco Holdings Bhd 
and other purchasers, sued seven sellers who defaulted on their crude palm oil futures 
contracts, as well as the KLCCH and the KLCE. The purchasers and the seven defendants 
were all members of the KLCCH and KLCE. The purchasers were injured by KLCCH and 
KLCE's default declaration of the March 13 and March 14 crude palm oil futures 
contracts. The total amount of the crude palm oil futures contracts which were owned and 
defaulted by the Defendants was 5,150. The facts of the default are as follows: 
159 Certiorari is a prerogative order obtained by an application for a judicial review in which the High Court 
orders decisions of inferior courts, tribunals and administrative authorities to be brought before it and 
quashes them if they are ultra vires or show an error oflaw (Law and Martin, 2009: 446). 
160 In this case, the issue was whether the decision of the KLCE is subject to a judicial review. The Supreme 
Court of Kuala Lumpur held that the act of KLCE was not amenable to judicial review. This is because the 
relationship between the parties, namely, the members of the Exchange, is governed by contracts. It follows 
that the power exercised by the KLCE under regulation 11 also derived from the contract between KLCE and 
the members of the Exchange and as such, action taken by the Exchange based on these contracts is to be 
adhered to and honoured by the members of the Exchange. 
161 Suit No. C2324 of 1984 
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On March 13, 1984, a total of 5,150 futures contracts, valued at approximately 
RM 160,000,000-00, registered under the name of the first, second, third, fourth and fifth 
defendants, were declared to be in default by the KLCCH. On March 14, 1984, the 
remaining contracts which were registered under the name of the sixth defendant were also 
declared to be in default by the KLCCH. Due to this default the KLCCH, in exercising its 
powers under KLCCH regulations, decided to liquidate all these contracts by invoicing 
back and accordingly requested the KLCE to fix the price for the compulsory settlement 
for all these contracts. 
By its letter dated March 14, 1984, the KLCE was purported to have fixed the following 
prices for the compulsory settlement of the contracts declared to be in default on March 13, 
1984 as follows: 
March - RM1,520; April- RMl,410; May - RMl,305; June - RMl,160; and 
July - RM 1 ,030. 
The KLCE also fixed the following prices for the compulsory settlement of the contracts 
declared to be in default on March 14, 1984 as follows: 
March - RM1,520; April- RMl,500; May- RMl,405; June - RMl,268; and 
July - RM 1 ,030. 
The purchasers alleged that, in so fixing the compulsory settlement price, the KLCE failed 
to comply with the KLCE rules when it neglected to take into account a sum reasonably 
sufficient to compensate the purchasers for their losses suffered from the default. 162 Hence, 
the KLCE revised its compulsory settlement price to also include the compensation,163 in 
which a new list of settlement prices was then issued as follows: 
"(a) In respect of the contracts declared to have been in default on the 13th day of 
March 1984 - $ March Invoice Back Price 1,520.00 Compensation 104.50 
Settlement Price 1,624.50 April Invoice Back Price 1,410.00 Compensation 139.50 
Settlement Price 1,549.50 May Invoice Back Price 1,305.00 Compensation 176.50 
162 Under Rule 1102 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules, upon such a default, the 
Exchange, besides exercising its power to determine the emergency settlement price, must also determine the 
compensation sum payable by the defaulted party to the party who was disadvantaged by the failure to 
deliver. 
163 According to one of the witnesses, Ahmad Habib who testified for the KLCE, the compensation element 
is the difference between the full settlement price and the invoice back price. 
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Settlement Price 1,481.50 June Invoice Back Price 1,160.00 Compensation 190.00 
Settlement Price 1,350.00 July Invoice Back Price 1,030.00 Compensation 100.00 
Settlement Price 1,130.00. 
(b) In respect of the contracts declared to have been in default on the 14th day of 
March 1984 - $ March Invoice Back Price 1,520.00 Compensation 185.00 
Settlement Price 1,705.00 April Invoice Back Price 1,500.00 Compensation 185.00 
Settlement Price 1,665.50 May Invoice Back Price 1,405.00 Compensation 132.50 
Settlement Price 1,537.50." 
Based on the revised settlement price, the purchasers claimed that the KLCCH had only 
paid them the invoice back price excluding the compensation price. Hence, they argued 
that, until the purchasers received the full payment of the settlement price, including the 
compensation, the crude palm oil futures contracts remained unliquidated and all the 
defendants, including KLCE and KLCCH, were to continue remaining liable for these 
contracts. 
These two cases show the repercussion of the absence in the trading regulation of a clear 
method of calculation of an emergency settlement price. The facts in Ganda Oil v KLCE 
demonstrate that the purchasers were discontent with the emergency settlement price 
determined for March 14, 1984 contract. While in Palmeo Holdings v Sakapp 
Commodities, the emergency settlement price for March 14, 1984 was fixed at RM 1 ,520 
(excluding the compensation price), in Ganda Oil v KLCE, the price for March 14 and 
March 15, 1984 was fixed at only RM 1,350.164 The discontentment is sensible as these two 
prices were fixed by the same Exchange on the same default date, namely March 14. The 
wide gap between the price fixed at RMl,520 and RM1,350 accentuates the risk of not 
having a clear method of determining an emergency settlement price. In fact, these law 
suits and recriminations have undermined confidence in the market. The reputation of the 
Exchange, the world's only palm oil futures trading market, was perniciously tarnished. 
The Malaysian government and exchange officials spent much of the year looking for 
ways to rebuild market confidence and lure traders back (Rieger, 1986: 16). 
Similar quandary is shown in an American case, In Crowley, Alien Property Custodian v 
Commodity Exchange, Inc. et. al. 165 This case involved a Plaintiff, a Japanese company 
named Mitsui & Co. Ltd. disputing the U.S. Commodity Exchange's emergency settlement 
164 It is not reported whether the amount ofRMl,350 is to include compensation. 
165 141 F. 2d 182; 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 3625. This action was first commenced by Mitsui & Co, Ltd., a 
Japanese corporation and later due to the war, Mitsui became an alien company. By an order issued on 
August, 17, 1942, all its properties and assets in the United States were vested in the Alien Property 
Custodian, who was thereupon substituted as the plaintiff in this action. 
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price. The facts are as follows: On July 25, 1941, the Plaintiff was short (selling) 418 raw 
silk contracts. On July 26, 1941 (on Saturday), the exchange received a request from the 
Price Administrator in Washington to suspend all trading in silk. Hence, on July 28, the 
exchange'S Board of Governors (the Board) voted unanimously for the suspension of the 
trading of raw silk futures and their following deliveries. 
On August 2, the Office of Price Administrator and Civilian Supply issued Price Schedule 
14, fixing the ceiling price for raw silk at $3.08 per pound. This price reflects a 
considerable drop from the last trading price on the exchange; namely, $3.55 to $3.65 on 
25 July, depending on the month of delivery. On August 11, an investigation was ordered 
to investigate the open position and to hold hearings with interested members. This 
investigation came back with a report that liquidation should be based on the closing prices 
of July 25. However, on October IS, 1941, the Board met again and decided, by a vote of 
thirteen to four, that the settlement price should be pegged at $3.08 per pound. 
The Board's decision caused huge financial damage to the Plaintiff. This is because its 
short raw silk futures contracts were originally purchased at an average price of $2.88 per 
pound and had to be liquidated at prices between the ranges of $3.55 to $3.65 per pound. 
The plaintiff was also left with physical raw silk which could only be sold to the 
Government at the ceiling price of $3.08. Though the Plaintiff was able to eventually 
liquidate by private settlement, it was still left with 180 outstanding short contracts. Due to 
this, the Plaintiff sued the exchange and the Commodity Exchange Silk Clearing 
Association, challenging the validity of the Board's resolution on October, 15, 1941. 
In deciding this issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit referred to 
the relevant minutes of the Board. The minutes on October 15 showed that the only dispute 
was not whether liquidation should be ordered but as to which of the two prices in dispute 
should be made the settlement price. 166 In dismissing the Plaintiffs claim, the court held 
that the decision of the Board to choose either one of the prices was justified under the 
rules. The court viewed that, under the rules, the Board is empowered to take any step, or 
166 It was also shown that the Board accepted the suggestion by the investigation committee to peg the 
settlement price as of the closing price of July 25. Despite that acceptance, the Board resolved to peg the 
settlement price based on the Government's ceiling price. 
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fix any terms as the Board may deem necessary and desirable whenever there exists a 
situation which may endanger or jeopardise the normal functioning of the market. 167 
However in Elmer A. Kent et. al., Respondents v E.B. Miltenberger, Appellant, 168 the issue 
was whether the quoted market price in the St. Louis market (the exchange) for No.2 red 
winter wheat for August delivery was artificial 169 hence was in far excess of its true value. 
The purchasers of the wheat futures contracts questioned the contract value fixed by the 
exchange for No.2 red wheat and alleged that it was not based on its real value. The St 
Louis Circuit Court found that, though the price was based on the ruling market at the end 
of that month, the evidence showed that this wheat market was forced up to a fictitious 
point by a combination of dealers in what is called a "comer". Hence, the deal which was 
settled by the purchasers was not upon a legitimate market, as required by the above rules, 
but upon a fictitious and manipulated market. 
However, the Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis dismissed this part of the ruling. The 
question adjudicated by the court was "whether the price of No.2 red winter wheat, which 
had, during the last days of August, been forced up some eight or nine cents beyond its 
natural value, had been so forced by 'manipulation' and that it was a 'fictitious market"'. 
In addressing this question, the court referred to the recorded evidence which showed that 
during the month of August, 1880, the price of No. 2 red winter wheat rose from about 90 
cents a bushel on the first day of the month to 99 cents a bushel on the last day of the 
month. The evidence also showed that the price of No.2 red winter wheat and No.3 red 
winter wheat on the exchange would differ by about 7 cents, though, on the last day of 
August, the difference expanded to about 16 cents. It also appeared that on the last day of 
167 In this case, the court explicates the condition of the market which led to the two conflicting Board 
decisions. It states, 
"the final vote as to just what the correctional measure should be, should not be rendered difficult, if 
not impossible, by a requirement hard to meet in the light of naturally opposing interests of the 
members .. .It was but natural that the shorts would press for settlement at the figure finally reached 
(by government compUlsion, it is true) as the price of raw silk when liquidation was being debated; 
but it was logical for the longs to press for the figures reached on the last occasion of free trading 
and found by the District Court on appropriate evidence to represent fair market value of that time." 
(Ibid., at 187). 
168 15 Mo. App. 480; 1884 Mo. App. LEXIS 74. 
169 To discern whether an act of a trader would lead to artificial price for the commodity, Friedman (1990 
:56) argued that this could be done by inferring the trader's true motivation from the circumstances. In 
making that inference, a historically unusual price pattern can be relied on. In doing so, one could ask 
whether the price of the commodity futures was abnormally high either absolutely or in comparison to other 
prices - of other contract months or commodities. See also Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices: The 
Great Western Case (n.n.(f), 1953). 
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August, No.2 red winter wheat rose to 99 cents and dropped to 90 cents on the following 
d 170 ay. 
The abnormal and temporary movement of the wheat price was held not to be necessarily 
fictitious. The court argued that there was no evidence to show that this price movement 
was the result of manipulation. l7l Instead, the evidence found that there were lesser 
supplies of No.2 red winter wheat for delivery in the elevators in the exchange during the 
month of August, 1880 than the sellers had to deliver. The sellers were forced to buy such 
wheat for delivery and those who had it to sell, aware of the necessities of these sellers 
who were obliged to buy, charged as much as they could. Thus, by ordinary competition, 
the market rose to an abnormal point. Relying on the general rule that there is nothing 
unlawful in a person having a commodity to sell and charging as much for it as he can get, 
whatever he can get and does get for his commodity. Hence, the court held that the value 
of the No.2 red winter wheat was its real value and not a fictitious value. 
This case raises an important point as to the issue of price artificiality. The question now is 
how assuring is the emergency settlement price, fixed by the Exchange, not an artificial or 
fictitious price, but a legitimate price, relying on a legitimate force of supply and 
demand. l72 This expectation is emboldened by section 11 of the Capital Market Services 
Act 2007 which imposes a duty on the Exchange to: 
170 The record also showed that millers could sell their No.2 red winter wheat in sacks, on the exchange, on 
the last day of August at 90 to 94 cents but due to the inspection and elevator process, an extra 1 V2 cents to 2 
cents would have to be incurred. 
171 Manipulation in a way that: 
"certain powerful dealers, having purchased largely of No. 2 red winter wheat for August delivery in 
St. Louis, had then combined for the purpose of depleting the market by exportation, or by 
preventing importations from the country, and by this means, has forced the market to an unnatural 
price, we suppose that such a market would be what the merchants of the exchange meant by 
manipulated or fictitious market when they framed the rules above quoted." (Ibid., at 86) 
172 It is basic economics that where markets are manipulated, supply and demand are distorted. And one 
distortion creates the needs for a further distortion and so on. The longer the distortions continue the greater 
the possibility of total market failure (Robins, 2010: n.p.). Similarly, Newman (n.d.:24) argues that corner 
and squeeze violates the basic force of supply and demand in a commodity futures market. According to Kyle 
and Viswanathan (2008: 277), due to corner and manipulation, a price becomes artificial hence making prices 
inaccurate and reducing market liquidity. To establish price artificiality, it is necessary to accumulate 
evidence that prices do not follow legitimate economic forces. One way to do this is to establish what the 
level of price or price relationships would or should have been had the suspected manipulator not 
illegitimately interfered with the normal process of price formation. In the cash market for commodity assets, 
for example, one must consider supply factors such as the deliverable supply of a commodity as specified in 
the derivatives market; any "seasonality" that may factor in its supply; all relevant production and marketing 
trends; and owners of deliverable supply. Likewise, one has to identify demand factors such as the major 
users of a commodity; the location of the users relative to the delivery points of the commodity; changes in 
economic factors affecting the demand; and demand at the delivery points. On the derivatives side, one must 
examine all aspects of open contracts, such as the group composition of the market (market shares of largest 
traders); those who have held derivatives positions of a size sufficient enough to affect prices; and those who 
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"ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, an orderly and fair market III the 
securities and futures contracts that are traded through its facilities." 
The phrase "fair market" is defined in section 27 of the same Act as "a market that reflects 
the forces of supply and demand.,,173 However the artificiality of the price detaches it from 
the legitimate force of supply and demand (International Organisation of Securities 
Commission, 2000: 13). 
The question on price artificiality is vital as manipulations or comers tend to erupt in the 
delivery month, and when this occurs, the underlying commodity is priced at an artificial 
value, as opposed to its real value.174 This condition is exacerbated by Schedule 13 of 
Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules exempting the current delivery month 
from any price limit. The impact of the artificial commodity price on the futures market is 
precarious. According to Easterbrook (1986: S 1 07), manipulation causes economic loss as 
it creates a wedge between the futures price and the anticipated price of the cash 
commodity. This gap - needed to compensate the participants for risk - also makes futures 
contracts less valuable as a tool of hedging. The divergence between the closing price of a 
futures contract and the price of the cash commodity immediately before and after results 
in the futures price becoming inaccurate. Hence a decrease in price accuracy is an 
economic IOSS.175 Although the market has a corrective mechanism, this disruption impairs 
the success of the market operation. 
held large positions on the other side of the market. Finally one must consider delivery factors such as those 
who have owned or controlled deliverable supplies; those who have made deliveries; those who have 
received deliveries; and what grade of the asset was delivered and where it was located (International 
Organisation of Securities Commission, 2000: 13). 
173 According to Gorton and Rouwenhorst, (2006: 48), in order to determine a fair futures price, the market 
participants compare the current futures price with the spot price that can be expected to prevail at the 
maturity of the futures contract. If the spot prices are expected to be much higher at the maturity of the 
futures than they are today, the current futures price will be set at a high level relative to the current spot 
price. Lower expected spot prices in the future will be reflected in a low current futures price. Peck (1976: 
409) views that these futures prices are, in actual fact, determined directly by the hedgers and speculators 
demand for, and supply of, futures contracts. 
174 Netz (1995: 190) carried out a study on the 38 comers or attempted comers identified through historical 
accounts in CBOT during the period September 1865-September 1888. It discovered that from the 38 
comers, 7 had significant impacts on spot prices and 7 had significant impacts on storage. It is also found that 
during the two weeks at the end of the comer month, the comer would increase the spot price by an average 
of 9.7% of the mean price. During the two weeks following the corner or attempted corner, the spot price 
would fall an average of 7.3% of the mean spot price. Thus manipulation contributes to price volatility on 
both the up and down side. The spot price not falling significantly afterwards can be explained by either the 
manipulator managing to slowly sell off the inventory over time or, in the case of a squeeze, there simply 
being a low deliverable supply. 
175 When the futures market in wheat and other grains was developed at the Chicago Board of Trade in the 
1860s, many people especially farmers, complained that the futures market, facilitated by speculative trading, 
increased the volatility of the cash market. Studies have shown that it was not the futures market per se which 
led to the volatility but manipulation. Manipulation and comer may have discouraged potential hedgers. 
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The impact on society is also colossal. Whether intentionally or unintentionally caused, 
price fluctuations can cause considerable harm to society as hedgers will pass the burden 
on to consumers in the form of higher prices (n.n.( d), 1963: 176). Pirrong (1993 :363) posits 
that manipulation distorts not only the price by the shorts utilising real resources to make 
excessive deliveries,176 but also consumption,l77 which forces shorts to pay high prices to 
acquire the commodity. He appositely describes the loss suffered from futures market 
manipulation as "deadweight losses". These "dead weight losses,,178 include temporal and 
spatial distortion in consumption, production, storage, and transportation; and a reduction 
in hedging effectiveness, increase in futures prices volatility, reduction in the 
informativeness of futures prices, and a decline in market liquidity (Pirrong, 2001: 222). 
The Technical Committee of the International Organisation of Securities Commission 
reports that: 
"Market manipulation179 harms the integrity and undermines public confidence in 
derivatives markets by distorting prices, harming the hedging functions of these 
markets and creating an artificial appearance of market activity." (2000: 1) 
Some storers may have decided to bear the price risk rather than risk being caught in a comer (Netz, 1995: 
183). 
176 By demanding excessive deliveries, a long induces distortions in the distribution of consumption, 
transportation, and storage. Shorts must pay current owners of the commodity increasingly higher prices in 
order to compensate current owners of the commodity for the surplus forgone as a result of this distortion. 
This causes the marginal cost of delivery to increase with the number of deliveries. The shorts must pay a 
higher transport charge when they go to more distant markets to obtain the commodity. Finally due to the 
transportation costs, prices are higher in some markets and shorts must purchase in these more expensive 
locations when supplies in cheaper markets are exhausted. These factors cause the marginal cost of delivery 
to rise (Pirrong, 1993: 345). 
177 As it is inefficient to return all units delivered to their original owners, the shorts must pay super-
competitive and rising prices for the commodities. When the shorts exhaust supplies at low price locations, 
they must travel to higher price locations to obtain the commodity. Thus transport cost contributes to an 
increasing marginal cost of delivery (Pirrong, 1993: 347). 
178 The dead weight losses further includes traditional monopoly-power welfare losses - huge gains for those 
on the right side of the market and imposes potential ruinous losses on those on the wrong side (Pirrong, 
1995: 254). 
179 Although manipulation and corner are a statutory offence in most commodity futures markets, the court 
litig!ltions and literature have shown that they have not been able to deter manipulation and corner absolutely 
from the market. See International Organisation of Securities Commission (2000) which enumerates the 
manipulation statutory provisions for a number of global commodity futures exchanges. See also Hatch and 
Mahlum (2011) on the investigation by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on 
numerous manipulation and corner incidents in the American commodity futures market. Also Brimmer 
(1989) depicts in detail the Hunt silver manipulation in 1979 where, at that time, he was the appointed 
Chairman of the Special Silver Committee, established under the COMEX Board of Governors. See also the 
latest civil enforcement action filed in 2011 by the CFTC against Pamon Energy Inc. of California, Arcadia 
Petroleum Ltd. of the United Kingdom, Arcadia Energy (Suisse) SA of Switzerland, James T. Dyer of 
Australia and Nicholas J. Wildgoose of California for manipulating and attempting to manipUlate the New 
York Mercantile Exchange's crude oil futures prices from January 2008 to April, 2008 (Commodity Online, 
2011 ). 
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The court in Kohen v Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC (quoted in In Re: Dairy Farmers of 
America, Inc. Cheese Antitrust Litigation18o) aptly states: 
"A person who owns a substantial portion of the long interest near the contract's 
expiration date also obtains control over the supply that the shorts need to meet 
their obligations. Then the long demands delivery, and the price of the commodity 
skyrockets. It takes time and money to bring additional supplies to the delivery 
point, and the long can exploit these costs to force the shorts to pay through the 
nose." 
The next section deals with the remaining issue of contract settlement, namely the default 
of the physical delivery of the underlying commodity. This issue will be discussed in two 
separate scenarios: namely, when the supply of the underlying commodity is unavailable, 
and when the delivered underlying commodity is not of the deliverable grade. 
4.3.2 The Default in the Delivery 
The failure of the seller to deliver or the purchaser to take delivery of crude palm oil is a 
breach or a default of the crude palm oil futures contract. Rule 805 of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules provides that: 
"805 Failure to Deliver or Pay Settlement Amount 
(a) A Clearing Participant, directed to Deliver in accordance with Rule 801 or 802 
who fails to make such Delivery within the time prescribed by the Clearing 
House is in default of its obligations. 
(b) A Clearing Participant who fails to accept Delivery or pay a settlement amount 
in accordance with Rule 801 or 802 is in default of its obligations. 
(c) If the Clearing House is unable to Deliver or effect Delivery due to the failure 
of a Clearing Participant to meet its obligations under an Open Contract the 
Clearing House will be under no obligation to Deliver or to effect Delivery but 
may effect settlement in accordance with Rule 1102." 
Based on a careful study of the case laws, the failure of the delivery of the underlying 
commodity hinges on the following two scenarios: (i) the non-availability of the supply of 
the commodity; and (ii) the non-fulfilment of the commodity's deliverable grade. 
180 767 F. Supp. 2d 880; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS l3307 
901Pag~ 
This section will be divided into two parts. The first part will analyse the issues 
surrounding the lack or the non-availability of supply of the underlying commodities. This 
section will show that, despite the modem and sophisticated agriculture industry, sellers 
are still faced with a supply problem. This section will also exhibit that despite the fact that 
manipulation is a statutory offence meted with heavy punishment, unscrupulous members 
of futures markets continue to find ways to gain windfall profits by manipulating the 
commodity futures market at the expense of others. The second part will deal with the 
issues relating to the default in complying with the regulated contract grade of crude palm 
oil. This section will highlight the insufficient description of the "good merchantable 
quality" of crude palm oil in its contract specification. 
4.3.2.1 The Non-availability of the Supply of the Underlying Commodity 
Sufficient supply of underlying commodities projects an image of an efficient commodity 
futures market. Hence, a lack in the supply of underlying commodities impinges not only 
the reliability and worthiness of this market but also the welfare of its society. Its 
ramification is exacerbated when a manipulation or comer is the cause. The following 
cases depict manipulation in world's important commodities. 
In Peto v Howell, a grain dealer living in Kansas City bought on the Chicago Board of 
Trade com futures contracts to be delivered in July, 1931. The grain dealer alleged that the 
defendant, a grain trader who was also a member of the Chicago Board of Trade, 
monopolised the com market in Chicago by purchasing a large amount of July com futures 
contracts. The grain trader began his large purchase of July com futures contract in April, 
1931, and progressively purchased additional large amounts of the July com futures 
contracts in May and June, 1931. In April, 1931, the price of com fell to the lowest it had 
been in the past eight years. The price continued to fall, and by end of May, the price had 
declined to 54 Y4 cents. Hence, on July 1, 1931, the trader owned a total amount of 
8,500,000 bushels of July com. This amount exceeded the supply of com available for 
delivery in Chicago in July. Based on these facts, the grain dealer claimed that these 
purchases were made by the grain trader with the intent to withhold the commodity from 
the market. By doing so, he had caused a sharp increase in the price of the com. 
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As part of the trading procedure, the corn would be delivered to the purchasers of corn 
futures contracts by way of delivering the warehouse receipts. 181 Hence, on July 30, 1931, 
in performance of his long July corn futures contract, the grain trader received warehouse 
receipts which covered all deliverable July corn held in public warehouses in Chicago. 
There were, in storage, 5,650,000 bushels of deliverable corn in Chicago, all of which have 
been delivered to the grain trader. The grain trader also received an additional 1,500,000 
bushels of corn which he thereafter sold and delivered to countries outside the United 
States. By removing this supply of corn from the United States, he reduced the availability 
of corn from the July com market. Hence, the total amount of corn delivered to the grain 
trader under his July corn futures contract was around 7,000,000 bushels. 
By July 30, 1931, he was still owed contracts for a delivery of about 1,500,000 bushels of 
July com. However, there was no com of a deliverable grade in Chicago to be delivered to 
the grain trader. Therefore, those who were contracted to deliver July com were not able to 
procure corn in Chicago or elsewhere due to the lack of time. As a result these parties 
defaulted in performing the delivery of July corn to the grain trader. In default of 
delivering the July contract, these parties had to pay an excessive settlement price to the 
grain trader. This was because the corn price was raised artificially to about 25 Y2 cents per 
bushel. The grain dealer was among those who were forced to pay a large amount of 
settlement money for such a default. 182 As a result, the grain dealer took legal action 
against the grain trader for the injury and damages caused by the grain trader's monopoly 
of the July corn market. 
The grain dealer relied on the Grain Futures Act, Title 7, Chapter 1, Section 5, U.S.C.A., 
which stipulates that: 
"Transactions in grain involving the sale thereof for future delivery as commonly 
conducted on boards of trade and known as "futures" are affected with a national 
public interest; that such transactions are carried on in large volume by the public 
generally ... ; that the transactions and prices of grain on such boards of trade are 
susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control, and sudden or unreasonable 
fluctuations in the prices thereof frequently occur as a result of such speculation, 
manipUlation, or control, which are detrimental to the producer or the consumer and 
181 Com which is deliverable on futures contracts is kept in public warehouses in the Chicago district in 
which warehouses are designated as "regular". 
182 The cash settlement is in effect purchasing the commodity from the long (buyer). Hence if the long 
acquires substantial long positions relative to the deliverable supply held by others, the shorts (sellers) will 
probably have to pay more than the competitive price for the commodity to satisfy their obligations to the 
long (or pay more than the competitive price for long's futures contracts to offset their short positions) 
(Fischel and Ross, 1991: 543). 
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the persons handling grain and products and by products thereof in interstate 
commerce,183 and that such fluctuations in the prices are an obstruction to and a 
burden upon interstate commerce in grain and the products and by-products thereof 
and render regulation imperative for the protection of such commerce and the 
national public interest.,,18 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the grain dealer had 
proved that the grain trader had monopolised and controlled, by way of a comer, all July 
com futures contracts - waiting to be delivered in July, 1913. Not only had he acquired 
almost all of the July com futures contracts but he had also purchased, in the Chicago cash 
com market, over 300,000 bushels. The court referred to the case of United States v Patten 
where the court in this case commented that: 
"The comer was to be conducted on the Cotton Exchange in New York city, but by 
means which would enable the conspirators to obtain control of the available 
supply and to enhance the price to all buyers in every market of the country. This 
control and the enhancement of the price were features of the conspiracy upon the 
attainment of which it is conceded its success depended. Upon the comer become 
effective, there could be no trading in the commodity save at the will of the 
conspirators and at such price as their interests might prompt them to exact. And so, 
the conspiracy was to reach and to bring within its dominating influence the entire 
cotton trade of the country ... It well may be that running a comer tends for a time to 
stimulate competition; but this does not prevent it from being a forbidden restraint, 
for it also operates to thwart the usual operation of the laws of supply and demand, 
to withdraw the commodity from the normal current of trade, to enhance the price 
artificially, to hamper users and consumers in satisfying their needs, and to produce 
practically the same evils as does the suppression of competition." I 85 
This decision is in contrast with Volkart Brothers, Inc., Volkart Brothers, Company, Alfred 
Boedtker and Kurt Muller v Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, and Thomas J. 
Flavin, Judicial Officer by Appointment of the Secretary of Agriculture. 186 In this case, the 
petitioners, who were members of the New York Cotton Exchange (NYCE) and the New 
Orleans Cotton Exchange (NOCE), were suspended from trading on these Exchanges by 
the order of the respondent, the Secretary of Agriculture. 187 The Judicial Officer, acting on 
behalf of the Secretary of Agriculture found that the petitioners were guilty of 
183 Ibid., at 355. The word "interstate commerce" in this regulation is interpreted as "a transaction in respect 
of any article shall be considered to be in interstate commerce if such article is part of that current of 
commerce usual in grain trade whereby grain and grain products and by products thereof are sent from one 
state with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another ... " 
184 Ibid. at 355. 
\1\5 Ibid., at 359. 
186 311 F. 2d 52; 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 3405. 
187 Trading of commodities futures contracts on exchange markets were then regulated by the Secretary of 
Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. 
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manipulating and attempting to manipulate the price of the October 1957 cotton futures 
contract on the NYCE and the NOCE. The petitioners were found to be in violation of 
Sections 6(b) and 9 of the CEA based on the following facts: 
On October, 1957, at the opening of the trading session, there were a total of 13,400 open 
interests on both exchanges. The records shows that on the long (purchaser) side, the 
petitioners had 12,100 bales and the other longs had 1,300 bales. Accordingly, there were a 
total of 13,400 bales on the short (seller) side that needed to be covered before the end of 
the October 15, 1957 trading. Out of these 13,400 bales, there were only about 5,000 bales 
of certificated cotton owned by persons other than the petitioners. To meet the demand of 
the 13,400 cotton bales, 7,100 ~ere met out of the petitioners' supply oflong contracts and 
out of whatever cotton was still in the process of certification. I ISIS 
In challenging the award of the Secretary of Agriculture which suspended them from 
trading, the petitioners argued that there was no artificiality in the October cotton futures 
prices on the last day of trading, namely, October 15, 1957 as there were large stocks of 
non-certificated cotton. On the other hand, the respondents argued that though there were 
large stocks of non-certificated cotton, these were not deliverable under the trading rules 
nor were readily available to the shorts, particularly the non-merchants shorts, on the last 
day of trading. Therefore, there was no practical alternative available for a short on the last 
day of trading, who did not have the cotton to deliver to the party with whom he had made 
the futures contract, other than to default on delivery or pay the price to get out. 
On this basis, the respondents claimed that the alleged manipulation or attempt to 
manipulate occurred solely on the last day of the trading on these two exchanges. They 
alleged that the petitioners had manipulated the market price of the October 1957 cotton 
futures contract by means of (i) their controlling of long positions in these exchanges; (ii) 
the insufficient and non-available supply of eligible cotton for the shorts to deliver during 
the period of manipulation; and (iii) the establishment of an abnormal or artificially high 
price when liquidating the futures contract. 
The petitioners counter-argued these claims by stating that, in response to (i), though they 
admitted that their long position on these two cotton exchanges on the last day of trading 
188 It is important to note that the cotton deliverable under these cotton futures contracts must be of the duly 
certificated cotton or cotton which was still under the process of certification. 
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was a dominant position, they denied that their dominant position was "controlling", 
meaning capable of being used for manipulative purposes. In response to (ii), the 
petitioners disputed the date of 15 th October as the proper time factor to be considered on 
this issue. The petitioners contended that there were millions of bales of cotton available in 
the country, of which 1,250,000 bales were stored in port warehouses designated as the 
delivery points for certified cotton. Therefore, the shorts, through their brokers, would still 
be able to procure the cotton there and place this cotton for certification on October 13 th 
and 14th. In allegation (iii), they denied that they had established abnormal or artificially 
high prices. If this was so, they argued that the Control Committee of the New York 
Exchange would be able to detect and advise their members of the price abnormality when 
the October cotton futures contract was liquidated. 
After considering the arguments of both parties, the United States' Court of Appeal of 
Fifth Circuit dismissed the respondents' argument of manipulation. Instead, the court 
argued that the conduct of the petitioners amounted to an unplanned or unintentional 
squeeze. The court referred to the Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Grain 
Trade (1926) which recognises that a squeeze from which a long purchaser profits is not 
necessarily illegal. The report states that: 
"A 'squeeze' suggests a much milder situation than a comer. It means that there is 
too large a line of short sales out and that the short sellers have been somewhat 
obstinate in carrying their trades into the delivery month, or possibly that the 
various long interests are unduly or unexpectedly obstinate in reducing their lines 
during the delivery month. A squeeze does not imply one long holder nor 
conspiracy among the long interests to enhance the price. A large long interest may 
exist which has not been built up for manipUlative or even speculative purposes, but 
as a hedge, and maybe a hedge on which the buyer expects to take delivery to meet 
cash grain commitment.,,189 
On this basis, the court found that the petitioners did not manipulate, or attempt to 
manipulate, as was charged by the State of Secretary. Hence the order of the Secretary of 
State against the petitioners was set aside. 
However, this case was overruled by a later case, Cargill, Incorporated, et. al. J v Clifford 
M Hardin, Secretary of Agriculture, Thomas J. Flavin, Judicial Officer by Appointment of 
189 Ibid, at 59. 
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the Secretary of Agriculture, and the United States Department of Agriculture. 190 This case 
involved an application by the petitioners, Cargill and others, to set aside the order of the 
respondent, the Secretary of Agriculture. 191 The Secretary of Agriculture has found that the 
petitioners were guilty of manipulating the market price of May 1963 wheat futures 
contracts on the CBOT, hence violating the CEA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 13. The facts of this 
case are as follows: 
In early 1963, the petitioners forecasted that there would be an ample supply of soft red 
winter wheat 192 at the end of the crop year, May 1963. It therefore hedged its inventory by 
selling May 1963 wheat futures contract on the CBOT. By early March, 1963 it held 
8,000,000 May wheat short positions. In the same month, the petitioners learnt that the 
Spanish government was interested in purchasing large quantities of soft red winter wheat 
and that the petitioners wanted to get some of this business. Based on this development, the 
petitioners decided that the wheat supplies would be tight in May and the wheat price 
might rise instead of fall. Therefore, the petitioners began to liquidate its short hedges and 
then established a long position in March 1963 wheat futures. By May, 15, Cargill had 
accumulated 1,930,000 speculative May wheat long positions. 
On April 12, 1963, the United States Department of Agriculture published figures showing 
that there were 2,804,000 bushels of deliverable grade wheat. stored in the Chicago 
warehouses. 193 From this amount, the petitioners owned 2,471,000 bushels. On May, 11 
the Spanish government offered to purchase 50 tons (40 bushels to a ton) of soft red winter 
wheat to be delivered by June 10. The petitioner managed to get t~e Spainish government 
to buy its wheat. Hence, by May 18, the Spanish government purchased 770,000 bushels of 
190 452 F. 2d 1154; 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 6737. 
191 Cargill is one of the largest grain merchandisers and exporters in the United States. It owns an elevator 
and warehouse in Chicago which is a designated regular for the delivery of grain on the Chicago Board of 
Trade. When a wheat futures contract is settled by way of physical delivery, the delivery is effectuated by the 
tender on the part of the seller and the acceptance on the part of the buyer of a warehouse receipt or receipts. 
The warehouse receipt or receipts cover a specified quantity of deliverable grade wheat stored in a designated 
warehouse in Chicago area as approved by the Chicago Board of Trade as a regular for delivery. There is no 
delivery point outside of the Chicago area. Under the rules of the Board of Trade, during the last three 
business days of a delivery month, the seller may also affect delivery by tendering deliverable grade wheat 
loaded in railroad cars on track in the Chicago switching district. These cars are consigned to an approved 
Chicago warehouse or elevator. 
192 Soft red winter wheat is one of the various classes of wheat produced in the United States and Chicago is 
one of the principal markets of such wheat. The Chicago wheat futures contract is essentially a soft red 
winter wheat contract because No. 2 soft red winter is the cheapest grade and class deliverable at par in 
satisfaction of the contract. Due to this, the price of the Chicago wheat winter futures generally tends to 
reflect the value of No. 2 soft red winter wheat. 
193 The United States Department of Agriculture published figures every week, indicating the quantities of 
deliverable grade wheat located at various market areas around the country. However, these figures do not 
publish the ownership of such supplies. 
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wheat from the petitioners. 194 This sale, together with other commitments, left the 
petitioners with approximately 50,000 bushels of wheat. This constituted all of the wheat 
in the Chicago warehouses available for delivery under the May wheat futures contract. 
On the last day of trading, May, 21, though the trading had ended, there were still 420,000 
bushels remaining outstanding. From this number, the petitioners held 365,000 bushels. 
Shortly after the trading closed, the Acting Chairman of the Business Committee of the 
CBOT visited and requested the petitioners to orderly liquidate or offset its remaining long 
positions. The request was made in response to the apparent short supply of soft red winter 
wheat in the Chicago area. The Acting Chairman suggested that the petitioners offer to sell 
their warehouse receipts to the unresolved shorts in order to clear up the outstanding May 
wheat futures contracts. The petitioners replied that it had only approximately 35,000 
bushels of uncommitted wheat available for sale but would be able to offer more 
warehouse receipts at the price of $2.28 Y4 per bushel and an assurance of it getting back 
these receipts (as these receipts were actually needed for delivery on prior commitments). 
Upon getting such an assurance from the CBOT, the petitioners sold 100,000 bushels of 
warehouse receipts to various commission houses for $2.28 Y4 per bushel (approximately 
75,000 bushels of this wheat were already committed under prior sales). These receipts 
were then tendered to the petitioners in satisfaction of the shorts' delivery obligations, 
resold by the petitioners, and redelivered back to the petitioners and other longs in 
satisfaction of their contracts. 19S This process continued until 420,000 bushels of the 
unresolved open interest were liquidated by this method. 196 
The Secretary of Agriculture alleged that the petitioners manipulated the market price of 
the May 1963 wheat futures contract by means of a squeeze when (i) it acquired and held 
a controlling position of the May 1963 wheat futures contract, (ii) there was an insufficient 
supply of wheat available to be delivered by the shorts under their futures contract as the 
supply was controlled by the petitioners, (iii) it exacted an artificially high price in 
194 Cargill offered to sell to Spain 12,500 tons of wheat at a price which equalled $2.13 1/2 per bushel or 10 Y2 
cents over the May futures. On the next day, Cargill offered 15,000 tons at a price which equalled $2.09 per 
bushel or 5 1(2 cents over the May futures. Upon acceptance of the offer, Cargill loaded out 770,000 bushels 
of wheat from its Chicago elevators and shipped them to Spain. 
195 This process of continuous selling and repurchasing (in other words, recirculation) of the warehouse 
receipts amongst Cargill and other shorts and longs raised doubt as to the actual sufficiency of the quantity of 
wheat represented by these warehouse receipts. 
196 In summary, Cargill received 315,000 bushels of its own warehouse receipts plus 50,000 bushels of wheat 
from other sources. Other longs received 55,000 bushels of Cargill warehouse receipts. All of these 
warehouse receipts were sold at a price of $2.28 v.. per bushel. 
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liquidation of its futures contracts, and (iv) the squeeze was intentionally caused by the 
petitioners. In defence, the petitioners argued that, (i) a trader must commit an 
"uneconomic acC 197 in order to be guilty of manipulation under the Act; and (ii) a squeeze 
is not a form of manipulation prohibited by the Act. 
In determining this case, the court adjudicated on the issue of whether there was an 
insufficient supply of wheat from other sources than the petitioners, for the purpose of 
delivery under the May wheat futures· contract. In addressing this issue, the Eighth Circuit 
first referred to the delivery rules of the CBOT. According to the delivery rules, the wheat 
which was subjected to delivery must be stored in anyone of the designated warehouses 
located in the Chicago area. In addition to that, during the last three business days of the 
delivery month, the railroad cars on track in the Chicago switching district, in which cars 
are consigned to anyone of the designated warehouses, can also be the approved delivery 
point. The No.2 soft red winter wheat was the standard or grade of wheat acceptable as a 
fulfilment of the wheat futures contract. Hard wheat could also be delivered under such a 
contract. However, hard wheat is of a more expensive grade of wheat and no premium was 
allowed to the short for delivering such wheat under the futures contract. 
Applying this requirement to the facts of this case, the petitioners practically owned all the 
designated warehouses for the wheat in Chicago. From the evidence tendered in court, it 
appeared that no supplies of No. 2 soft red winter wheat were located within shipping 
distance from Chicago, by the close of trading. However, the evidence showed that there 
were ample supplies of hard wheat in the surrounding areas that could be shipped into 
Chicago in time for delivery. This evidence was followed by the next question, whether 
this hard wheat would satisfy the requirements of the standard of deliverable grade under 
the delivery rules. 
The Eighth Circuit referred to the case of Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v 
Brannan. 198 This case relates to the default in the physical delivery of eggs under the 
December 1947 eggs futures contract. The issue of the logistic supply of eggs deliverable 
under the December 1947 eggs futures contracts was discussed. The grade of eggs, 
deliverable under this contract, was comprised of refrigerator eggs, graded U.S. No.2 
197 Cargill did not specifically define the term "uneconomic act", but from its argument, it referred to an act 
which does not make profit for the party involved. 
198 201 F. 2d476; 1953 U.S. App. LEXIS 2315. 
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Extras and stored in approved warehouses in Chicago. 199 Nonetheless, the rules of the 
CME allowed the sellers to deliver eggs of other grades, namely, fresh eggs, or those of the 
same grade as refrigerator eggs but stored in approved, out-of-town warehouses. 
Based on the evidence tendered in that case, it was shown that customarily the price of the 
fresh eggs range higher than the price of refrigerator eggs. Despite the higher price, the 
sellers would not get any premium for the delivery of such eggs. It was also shown that the 
out-of-town refrigerator eggs presented a slightly different problem. Under the CME rules, 
if these eggs were tendered in satisfaction of his contract, the seller would be required to 
pay to the purchaser an equalising factor of $135 per carlot, plus freight charges to 
Chicago. Hence, an average cost of $315 per carlot was charged on the seller. In view of 
these "economic impediments" attached to their delivery, the court agreed to exclude fresh 
eggs and out-of-town refrigerator eggs from available supply when determining the 
elements of a comer. 
Based on the court's finding in the case of Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v 
Brannan, the Eighth Circuit referred to the evidence tendered in its court which showed 
that the hard wheat was more expensive than the No. 2 soft red winter wheat due to its 
higher quality. Despite its higher quality and price, no premium was allowed for its 
delivery. In addition to this, the cost of its shipment into Chicago would further escalate 
the cost of its delivery. In comparison, the No.2 soft red winter wheat, were grown mainly 
in farm areas surrounding the Chicago market and this type of wheat were primarily 
consumed there. Therefore it was more economical to pay the purchaser a premium than to 
pay the additional charges for premium wheat plus the shipping and handling charges in 
the case of the hard wheat. 
Relying on this evidence and the decision of the eggs futures case, the Eighth Circuit held 
that out-of-town wheat should be excluded from the available supply. Therefore, as the 
petitioner was in control of No.2 soft red winter wheat, his source of supply was the only 
one readily available to the sellers. Hence, the court held that there was a comer. As a 
result of this comer, the sellers who had to fulfil their delivery obligation were left with the 
199 The trading unit of the December eggs futures is one carlot, which consists of600 cases of30 dozen eggs 
or equivalent to 18,000 dozen eggs. 
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unfavourable choice of either having to offset their contracts or purchase warehouse 
receipts at a higher price fixed by the petitioners.2oo 
The following cases are drawn from the major physical default of the Maine potatoes 
futures contracts in the United States. In the words of the District Judge, MacMohan, in 
National Super Spuds, Inc., et. af. v New York Mercantile Exchange et. af., it is "perhaps 
one of the major defaults in the history of the New York Mercantile Exchange, namely, the 
failure to deliver on some 1,000 open futures contracts for Maine potatoes in May, 1976." 
The effect of the sellers' refusal to deliver potatoes spawned a long list of court battles in 
the United States. The huge number of parties involved in these cases depicts the severe 
magnitude of the issue it brought to the futures market as well as the cash market.201 
1- Joseph Strobl, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross-Appellant v New York Mercantile 
Exchange, Clayton Brokerage Co. of St Louis, Inc., Heinold Commodities, Inc., 
Thomson and McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc., Ben Pressner, Pressner 
Trading Corp., John Richard Simplot a/k/a Jack Richard Simplot, a/k/a J.R. 
Simplot, J.R. Company, Simplot Industries, Inc., Simplot Products Company, Inc., 
Peter J. Taggares a/k/a Peter J. Taggares, P.l. Taggares Company, C.L .. Otter, 
Simtag Farms, Kenneth Ramm, A & B Farms, Inc., Hugh D. Glenn, Gearheart 
Farming, Inc., Ed McKay, Harvey Pollak, Henry Pollak, Hnery Pollak Inc., Henry 
A. Pollak & Company, Inc., Robert Reardon a/k/a Bobby Reardon, F.J. Reardon, 
200 This decision, as well as the decision of Great Western Food Distributors, Inc. v Brannan, clearly 
contradicts the decision of Volkart Brothers, Inc. v Secretary of Agriculture. All these three cases dealt with 
the question of whether there existed a manipulative squeeze or corner in the commodities market. In 
addition to that, these courts had also considered the question of the logistics of the supply of cornered 
commodities within the surrounding area. The purpose of addressing this question is to establish that there 
was no other supply than the supply of the manipulators from whom the sellers would have to procure the 
commodities. The court in Volkart Brothers, Inc. v Secretary of Agriculture addressed the issue of whether 
the non-certificated cotton should also be considered as part of the available supply of cotton for delivery 
under the cotton futures contracts. The Secretary of Agriculture contended that it should be excluded from 
the available supply and also that the certificated cotton was the only acceptable standard for delivery under 
the cotton futures contracts. However, the court disagreed. Although the court was shown that, at the close of 
trading, the non-certified cotton was not able to be certified in time for delivery, the court still viewed that the 
shorts could still procure the cotton and place them for certification prior to the close oftrading. 
201 See also Kent Gneiting, R. Von Walker, Oscar Ellsworth and Ronald Ball v Peter 1. Taggares, James 
Minor, Harold Abend Robert Abend Kenneth Ramm, Modie 1. Spiegel, Arthur Spiegel, John Coleman, 
Charles M Cohen, Reddy-Chef Foods Corp., Agri-Empire, Inc., San Jacinto Packing Co., Idaho Potato 
Packers Corp. of Idaho, Idaho Potato Packers Corp. of New York, Universal Land Corp., Freehling & Co., 
Steinberg Bros. Co., and S. Friedman & Sons, Inc. (62 F.R.D. 405; 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14770; 17 Fed. R. 
Servo 2d. (Callaghan) 311; 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P74,440. This case involved a claim by the plaintiffs, 
sellers of May 1971 Idaho Russet potatoes for damages incurred as a result of the defendants' alleged 
conspiracy in manipulating supply and demand. Due to this conspiracy, the sellers had to fulfil their contracts 
by settling at manipulated and artificially set prices even though they had on hand stocks of fresh potatoes 
which they were forced to sell at low prices. 
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Inc., Alex Sinclair, Sinclair & Company, Stephen Sundheimer, Charles Edelstein, 
James Landry a/Ida Jim Landry and Jerry Rafferty, jointly and severally, 
Defendants, John R. Simplot, J.R. Simplot Co., Simplot Industries, Inc., 
P.J. Taggares, P.l. Taggares Company and Simtag Farms, Defendants-Appellants 
Cross Appellees. 202 
In this case, the Plaintiff, Joseph Stobl, claimed that he had suffered huge losses as 
a result of the defendants' manipulation of the 1976 Maine potatoes futures market. 
Plaintiffs loss started from his purchase of long May 1976 Maine potato futures 
contracts made in September and October, 1975. At this time, his average cost for 
the aforementioned purchase was approximately $18.30 per hundredweight (cwt). 
However, in May 4, 1976, he liquidated his entire long contract at an average price 
between $9.12 and $9.76 per cwt. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, Simplot 
and Taggares, two of the largest competitors in the purchase and processing of 
potatoes, conspired to manipulate the futures price of these potatoes. 
The evidence revealed that the Maine potato futures price was indeed unusually 
high in 1976. This was due to the high demand for, and low supply of, Maine 
potatoes. The increase in the potato futures price tended to drive up the price of the 
cash potatoes. The high price of the potatoes adversely affected the need of the 
defendant to purchase large quantities of potatoes. Therefore the defendants 
planned to push the price to the lowest possible. To serve this agenda, the 
defendants purchased vast amounts of short futures contracts. By purchasing 
heavily on the short side, the defendants artificially inflated the perceived supply of 
Maine potatoes. Hence, cash and futures prices went down. Despite owning a vast 
amount of short futures contracts, the defendants did not attempt to obtain the 
potatoes that they were obligated to deliver, nor did they offset their short positions. 
With so many short positions remaining open, there was a surplus of sellers which 
effectively caused the price of Maine potatoes commodities contracts to plummet. 
So when the plaintiff sold his long May 1976 Maine potato futures contracts, he 
suffered a significant loss. The jury found that the defendants did conspire to 
depress the price of the 1976 Maine potatoes futures contracts. 
202 768 F. 2d. 22; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 20438; 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P66, 692. 
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Sam Wong v New York Mercantile Exchange203 
This case relates to the default in the delivery of the March, April and May Maine 
1979 potato futures contracts. The facts of this case will be discussed in the later 
part of this chapter. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v Curran et. aZ?04 This case is decided 
together with New York Mercantile Exchange et. al. v Leist et. al., Clayton 
Brokerage Co. of St Louis and Inc. v Leist et. al.; Heinold Commodities, Inc., et. al. 
v Leist et. al.) 
In consequence to the default of the May 1976 Maine potato futures contracts, the 
buyers of the futures contracts sued the NYME, its officials, and the firms of 
futures commission merchants205 (who acted on behalf of the short conspirators), 
seeking damages under the CEA. Their basis was that the NYME had failed to 
prevent unlawful conspiracies of manipulating the price of the Maine potato market 
and that the futures commission merchants had failed to report such a violation to 
the NYME. The United State Supreme Court allowed the buyers to claim damages 
from the defendants, in violation of CEA. 
iv- Neil Leist, Philip Smith and Incomco, Plaintiffs-Appellants v John Richard Simp/ot, 
J.R. Simplot & Co., Simplot Products Co., Inc., Simplot Industries, Inc., Simtag 
Farms, Inc., Peter J. Taggares, P.J. Taggares & Co., Henry A. Pollack, Harvey B. 
Pollack, Harvey B. Pollack Company, Gerald Rafferty, Pressner Trading Corp., 
Benjamin Pressner, Stephen Sundheimer, Jules Nordlight, Edelstein & Co., Inc., 
Charles Edelstein, Robert Edelstein, Murial Edelstein, Meierfeld & Company, Inc., 
Gilbert Meierfeld, David Meierfeld, Robert Reardon, F.J. Reardon, Inc., Harold 
Collins, Caspar Mayerson, Lynnewood Exporting Company, Alex Sinclair, 
Manning Stoller, Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes Inc., MFX Commodities 
Inc., Donald Silver, Duane South, Kenneth Ramm, A & B Farming Inc., Hugh 
Glenn, Gearheart Farming, Inc., Edward McKay, "John" Humphreys, Frank 
Fullmer, Defendants, Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc., Heinold 
Commodities, Inc., Thompson & McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc., New 
203 73 5 F. 2d 653; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22544. 
204 456 U.S. 353; 102 S. Ct. 1825; 72 L. Ed. 2d 182; 1982 U.S. LEXIS 100; 50 U.S.L.W. 4457. 
205 FCM is defined in § 2(a)(1), 7U.S.C. §2 CEA as individuals or association "engaged in soliciting or in 
accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery ... on ... any contract market. .. " 
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York Mercantile Exchange, Richard B. Levine, Howard Gabler, Alfred Pennisi, 
Defendants-Appellees; Incomco, Plaintiff-Appellant v Wayne County Produce Co., 
and Harold Collins, Defendants, New York Mercantile Exchange, Defendant-
Appellee; National Super Spuds, Inc., William R. Buster, Jr., Willard C. Chiner, 
Eugene P. Weismen, Richard Welts, Raymond Rothberg, Arthur S. Armstrong, 
Theodore Brinek, Capgain Holdings, Inc., and Heiz Romminger, individually and 
on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffi-Appellants v New York 
Mercantile Exchange, Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc., Pressner Trading 
Corp., Jack Richard Simplot, J.R. Simplot Co., Simplot Industries, Inc., Peter 1. 
Taggares, P.J. Taggares Co., c.L. Otter, Simtag Farms, Kenneth Ramm, A & B 
Farms, Inc., Hugh v Glenn, Gearheart Farming, Inc. and Ed McKay, Defendants, 
Heinold Commodities, Inc., Thomson & McKinnon, Auchincloss, Kohlmeyer, Inc., 
Defendants-Appelleeio6 
In this case, the buyers claimed damages from the defendants for the default under 
the May 1976 Maine potato futures contract. The defendants, Simplot and Taggares 
were potato entrepreneurs. During the trading period of the Maine potato futures 
contracts, namely, May 7, 1975 till May 7, 1976, the Department of Agriculture 
issued reports which disclosed information on the low stock of potatoes, 
particularly the Maine potato stocks, relative to the previous year. The consequence 
of this report was that it induced investors to purchase May Maine potato futures 
contracts (on the expectation that they would profit from a shortage of potatoes in 
May) and that farmers would demand a higher price for their potatoes on the cash 
market. To counteract the anticipated price increase, Simplot, Taggares and other 
entrepreneurs formed a conspiracy to depress the price of the May Maine potato 
futures contract. 207 
The conspirators agreed (i) to accumulate massive large short positions in the May 
Maine potato futures contract; (ii) to make no offsetting purchases of long contracts 
at a price higher than that agreed among themselves; and (iii) to default, if 
necessary, on their short commitments. As part of the conspiracy plan, they shipped 
.large quantities of unsold Idaho potatoes to Maine markets. This multifaceted 
206 638 F.2d 283; 1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 15922. 
207 Simplot was driven by the fact that it was having difficulties in its customary negotiation with the Idaho 
Potato Growers Association (IPGA) as IPGA believed that the prices of potatoes, including Maine potatoes 
would be much higher than what Simplot was offering. IPGA based its belief on the report issued by the 
Department of Agriculture. 
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strategy was designed to give the Idaho Potato Growers Association (IPGA) the 
impression that the supply of Maine potatoes was plentiful. On the final trading 
day, these short sellers had accumulated a net short position of almost 1,900 
contracts, notwithstanding a Commission regulation limiting their lawful net 
position to 150 contracts. However, they did, in fact, default on their short 
commitments. 
At the same time, the May Maine potato futures price was also manipulated by a 
separate group described as the "long conspirators". The long conspirators were 
potato merchants and traders in the Maine futures market. A ware of the short 
conspiracy, they determined that they could not only counteract its effects but could 
also enhance the price. The purpose of this was to penalise the short conspirators 
when they liquidated their large massive short positions. They also created an 
artificial shortage of railroad cars during the contract delivery period. This was 
done by tying up all the railroad cars, hence preventing the owner of the 
warehoused potatoes from making deliveries to persons desiring to perform short 
contracts. At the close of trading on May 7, the longs controlled 911 open long 
positions and the shorts controlled 1893 open short positions. 
The Plaintiffs were caught in the middle of these two competing conspiracies. All 
the plaintiffs invested heavily in the long believing that the price of the long 
position would have gone up due to the shortage. One of the plaintiffs, Incomco 
accepted 1,500,000 pounds of Maine potatoes delivered to it pursuant to the March 
futures contracts. It planned to sell these potatoes to those shorts that needed them 
to satisfy their delivery obligations. Anticipating a cash market shortage, Incomco 
was expected to sell its potatoes at a handsome premium. Because of the 
conspiracy, however, Incomco was not able to deliver its warehoused potatoes to 
shorts seeking delivery as the long conspirators had successfully tied up all the 
freight cars. As a result, Incomco and all other plaintiffs suffered massive losses 
due to the unnatural fall in the price. 
The above cases evidenced the inadequacy of the trading regulation in overcoming 
manipulation in their commodity futures market. They also reinforce the effect of 
manipulation on the economy. The massive default in delivering underlying commodities 
deprives society of the consumption of basic commodities. In addition to that, any type of 
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manipulation would cause commodity prices to derail from their fair and real value as the 
price trends on the cash market are related to the price trends on the futures market. As a 
result, the general public have to pay prices for the processed commodity not warranted by 
real supply and demand (n.n.(g), 1955: 909). The next chapter will explicate more the 
devastating impact of this derailment. 
As described earlier, the default of the delivery transpires in two scenarios. This section 
demonstrates how the non-availability of the supply of the underlying commodities and the 
economic loss due to the artificially inflated price of the commodity causes sellers to 
default. The following section will display the default by failure to deliver the required 
quality of the underlying commodities. 
4.3.2.2 Non-fulfilment of Good Merchantable Quality 
This section discusses the failure of the seller to deliver crude palm oil in accordance with 
the contract specification. This failure is discussed in the context of the insufficient 
description of the phrase "crude unbleached palm oil of good merchantable quality", in its 
legal framework. A clear and sufficient description is vital as a buyer can only examine the 
quality of the oil when he/she receives its physical delivery.2os 
208 Besides the Malaysian case, Federal Flour Mills Bhd v Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd & Another 
Appeal, reference could also be made to other American cases which also involve defaults in the deliverable 
quality of futures commodities. White v Barber; Same v Sami08 relates to the default in July wheat futures 
contracts. In April, 1882, the customer, through his broker bought one short 100,000 bushels of wheat for 
July delivery. As there was a corner in the July wheat market, the price of wheat was forced up to ten or 
twelve cents. The customer was advised by his broker to make a tender of No. 2 red winter wheat as the No. 
2 red winter wheat was intrinsically more valuable than the No.2 spring. Hence, the customer tendered for 
No.2 red winter wheat as advised. The broker then informed his customer that he had borrowed warehouse 
receipts for the ten thousand bushels for No. 2 red winter wheat and tendered the same to several parties to 
whom he had sold the wheat. However, these tenders were declined by all the purchasers. They were 
declined as the quality of No. 2 red winter wheat was not of the kind and grade to be delivered under the No. 
2 red winter wheat futures contract. The wheat was also not in compliance with the rules of the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT), which states: 
"On contracts for grain for future delivery the tender of the higher grade of the same kind of grain as 
the one contracted for shall be deemed sufficient, provided the higher grade of 5rain tendered shall 
not be ofa colour or quality that will depreciate the value of the other, if mixed." 08 
Hence, the customer defaulted in performing his short No.2 red winter wheat futures contracts. As a result, 
the parties with whom he had made the contracts, and whom he had the right to call for delivery, made a 
large damages claim against the customer. The claims for damages were made on the basis that the tender 
was irregular and insufficient. Due to these claims, on September 11, 1882, the broker, on behalf of his 
customer sued the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). The customer alleged that the Board of the CBOT had 
unlawfully combined the wheat so as to prevent sellers like him from fulfilling their short wheat contract. 
Although the Supreme Court did not adjudicate on the issue of compliance with the required grade and 
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Rule 1303B.2 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules emphasises that 
delivery of crude palm oil must be made in accordance with the Business Rules. It states: 
"Where settlement of the Crude Palm Oil Futures Contracts has been determined to 
be by physical delivery, the tendering and delivery process shall be done in the 
manner prescribed by the Exchange and the Clearing House." 
Rule 1304 of the aforementioned Business Rules further stipulates that the condition and 
quality of the tendered crude palm oil must be: 
"Each tender 209shall consist of twenty-five (25) metric tons of Crude Palm Oil in 
bulk unbleached of good merchantable quality as specified in these Rules and 
stored at a Port Tank Installation located, at the option of the seller, in 
Penang/Butterworth, Port Klang, Pasir Gudang and such other ports to be declared 
by the Exchange from time to time." 
The quality of crude palm oil is further described in Rule 1317. Under this Rule, crude 
palm oil must meet the following criteria: 
"The contract grade shall be for crude unbleached ~alm oil of good merchantable 
quality, in bulk, in approved Port Tank Installations. 10 
In this regard, the following specifications shall be conformed to: 
quality, the facts of this case serve as a proof that the purchasers were injured when coerced to settle by cash 
instead of physical delivery. The injury is exacerbated by the comer in the July wheat market which caused 
the wheat price to inflate. 
In another case, John A. Dussault v Geldermann & Co., Inc., Chicago Mercantile Exchange, et al. 2os , the 
customer, John A. Dussault, through his broker entered into a "feeder cattle" futures contract with Gelderman 
& Co, a futures commission merchant cum member of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The feeder 
cattle futures contract specified the future delivery dates to be in May and October of 1974. However, at the 
time of delivering the feeder cattle, the customer alleged that the tendered cattle were inferior and not 
merchantable. As a consequence, the customer only accepted several lots of cattle outright, later accepting 
some with reservation of right as to their quality, and finally refusing to accept delivery upon the rest. Upon 
these allegations, the customer pleaded, amongst others, that there was negligence, intentional 
misrepresentation, and fraudulent conduct by the futures commission merchant in violation of the United 
States' Commodity Exchange Act. The customer also pleaded that the CME had breached its fiduciary duty 
to the customer by promulgating vague rules. The District Court of Utah, unfortunately, did not discuss the 
issue of default in the physical delivery. Instead it dealt with the issue on the personal jurisdiction of the 
customer over the CME. On this issue, the court held that CME was only liable to its members and since the 
customer was not its member, the CME was not liable to any losses suffered by the customer. 
209 The term "tender" is defined in Rule 201 of the said Business Rules as "the exchange of documents 
through the Clearing House in fulfilment of a Contract of future delivery of Crude Palm Oil and Crude Palm 
Kernel Oil." 
210 The phrase "Port Tank Installation" is defined in Rule 201 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad 
Business Rules as "the port installations approved by the Exchange as points of delivery for Crude Palm Oil 
and Crude Palm Kernel Oil tendered in fulfilment of Futures Contracts." 
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a) the Free Fatty Acid (FFA) content (as Palmitic-molecular weight 256) of palm 
oil delivered into Port Tank Installations shall not exceed 4% and of palm oil 
delivered from Port Tank Installations shall not exceed 5%;211 
b) the Moisture and Impurities (M&I) content shall not exceed 0.25%;212 and 
c) the Deterioration of Bleachability Index (DOBI) value of palm oil delivered 
into Port Tank Installations shall be at a minimum of 2.5 and of palm oil 
delivered from Port Tank Installations shall be at a minimum of 2.31, 
or such other grades to be declared by the Exchange from time to time, in 
accordance with sample(s) drawn and analysed on delivery into Port Tank 
Installations and from Port Tank Installations in accordance with procedures 
governing sampling and analysis as laid down by the Exchange." 
Similar provisions are also incorporated in the contract specification of crude palm oil 
futures contract, namely in Schedule 13 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business 
Rules. 
The quality of the tendered crude palm oil is also guaranteed by the issuance of a 
Certificate of Quality?13 The Port Tank Installation Owner issues this Certificate of 
Quality together with a Negotiable Storage Receipt (NSR). Rule 1306 of the Bursa 
Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules describes the NSR as follows: 
"Rule 1306 Negotiable Storage Receipt 
Upon completion of Appraisal of the Crude Palm Oil, the Port Tank Installation 
Owner shall issue a Negotiable Storage Receipt in the form as approved by the 
Exchange from time to time, for all Crude Palm Oil, which is deliverable. Such 
document shall show the name of the Port Tank Installation Owner, the date of 
appraisal and shall state that the oil in question meets the needs of the Exchange's 
specifications for delivery. A separate Negotiable Storage Receipt shall be issued 
for each lot of twenty-five (25) metric tons of Crude Palm Oil." 
211 According to Khera (1976: 7), most of the palm oil may contain the same fatty acids found in other 
vegetable oils and fats. The main difference between palm oil and vegetable oil lies in the proportions of 
saturated and unsaturated acids. The higher the FFA content the lower the usefulness of the oil content. A 
low FF A is easier to refine and bleach. The refining of poor quality oil involves considerable losses, and even 
when the FF A content is reduced, the chemical composition of the oil is not as desirable as a good quality oil. 
212 The effect of moisture on the FFA is also of importance. Iffats are exposed to enzymes in the presence of 
moisture, partial hydrolysis occurs, thus producing FF A. The presence of more moisture would result in a 
greater possible extent of hydrolysis: hence, detracting from the quality of the products of palm oil (Khera, 
1976: 7). 
213 See Rule 201 and 1307 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. The validity of the. 
Certificate of Quality is till the midnight of the last day of the appraisal month. This means that the validity 
period ofthe Certificate of Quality would practically be in the range of four weeks or so as the tender for the 
oil would commence from the first business day to the twentieth business day of the delivery month. 
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Although these provisions expressly stipulate the oil to be of "crude unbleached palm oil in 
bulk of good merchantable quality,,,214 this phrase is not defined in the crude palm oil 
futures legal framework. In order to understand the meaning of this phrase, reference is 
made to a Malaysian case, Federal Flour Mills Bhd v Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd & 
Another Appeal. 215 This case discusses and interprets the phrase "crude unbleached palm 
oil of good merchantable quality, in bulk" and, more importantly, the resulting 
interpretation has been affirmed and upheld by the highest court in Malaysia, the Federal 
Court. 
Federal Flour Mills Bhd v Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal involves a 
dispute over the quality of the crude palm oil tendered under the crude palm oil futures 
contract.216 This case involved a port tank owner, Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd 
("FIMA"), who was sued by the purchaser of the crude palm oil futures contract, Federal 
Flour Mills Bhd ("FFM"), for damages incurred as a result of the default in delivering the 
prescribed quality of crude palm oil. In brief, FIMA was one of the few port tank owners 
approved by the Commodity & Monetary Exchange of Malaysia ("COMMEX") to become 
a point of delivery for crude palm oil traded in COMMEX. Under the trading procedure, 
when a seller wants to discharge his delivery obligations, the seller will deliver the crude 
palm oil to any of the COMMEX's duly approved port tank installations. Before taking 
delivery of the crude palm oil, the port tank owner must ensure that the delivered crude 
palm oil is duly appraised.217 
Upon the completion and satisfaction of the result of the appraisal, the port tank owner will 
issue the NSR to the seller. The NSR certifies that the crude palm oil has been appraised 
and that its weight and quality are in conformity with the specifications regulated by the 
COMMEX rules. The relevant part of the NSR reads as follows: 
"I. The said Crude Palm Oil has been duly appraised and is hereby certified, as 
regards the weight and quality, to be inconformity with the specifications 
laid down by the Rules and Regulations of the Kuala Lumpur Commodity 
Exchange (hereinafter referred to as "Exchange Company")." 
214 The tenn "merchantable quality" merely means that the goods must satisfy the description in the contract. 
This is to enable goods tendered under such a description to be of a good tender (n.n.(e), 1922: 377). 
215 [2005] 4 CLl. 
216 The matter was first heard by the Arbitration Tribunal, then later in the Kuala Lumpur High Court, 
followed by the Court of Appeal, and finally the Federal Court. 
217 Section 201 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules define "appraisal" as the weighting, 
sampling and analysis of crude palm oil. 
1081 P age 
The seller will then surrender the NSR to the Clearing House for payment of his crude 
palm oil. The Clearing House would then pass on the NSR to any buyers who had paid for 
the amount of crude palm oil represented by the NSR. 
Returning to the facts of this case, from 30.l0.l998 to 19.11.1998,700 mit of crude palm 
oil were delivered by its seller, Guan Soon Heng Edible Oil Sdn Bhd ("aSHE"), to 
FIMA's port tank installation for appraisal. Upon completion and satisfaction of the 
appraisal test, FIMA issued 28 NSRs to aSHE. aSHE then surrendered 28 NSRs to the 
Malaysian Derivatives Clearing House218 (MDCH) for payment. FFM paid for and 
received the 28 NSRs from MDCH. On 20.11.1998, FFM informed FIMA that they had in 
their possession 28 NSRs and wished to take delivery of the crude palm oil from FIMA's 
port tank installation. Before taking delivery of the said crude palm oil, FFM conducted a 
test on the oil which resulted in FFM not being satisfied with the oil's quality. 
On 23.11.1998, FFM informed FIMA that the crude palm oil was not of the prescribed 
contract grade and hence refused to take delivery of the crude palm oil. FFM alleged that 
the Iodine Value (IV), which forms part of the crude palm oil, was below 50. As a result, 
FFM brought this matter to the arbitration tribunal to seek damages of RMl,622,250.00. 
The arbitrators found in favour of FFM and ruled that the crude palm oil was not of the 
contract grade required under Rule 1409 of COMMEX's Rules and Regulations and 
awarded the sum claimed to FFM. 
Nonetheless, when the FFM brought the matter to the High Court to enforce the arbitration 
award against FIMA, the High Court dismissed its application and instead allowed the 
application by FlMA to set aside the award. The High Court's decision was based on the 
following grounds, amongst others: that (i) the arbitrators did not objectively determine the 
evidence based on market practices; (ii) the IV range between 50 to 55 was not a necessary 
requirement under the Rules; (iii) FIMA was not responsible for the quality of the crude 
palm oil as it was merely a bailee and not a seller; and (iv) the crude palm oil was of good 
merchantable quality because it was proven to be saleable. Dissatisfied, FFM appealed to 
the Court of Appeal. 
218 The Malaysian Derivatives Clearing House is now known as Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing 
Berhad. 
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After considering the judgements of the High Court and the award of the arbitrators, the 
Court of Appeal decided only to address the question as to whether the crude palm oil had 
satisfied the criteria set out in rule 1409. Rule 1409 stipulates that: 
"(a) the contract shall be for Crude unbleached Palm Oil of good merchantable 
quality in bulk, in approved Port Tank Installations. 
(b) the free fatty acid content (as Palmitic-molecular weight 256) of Palm Oil 
delivered into Port Tank installations shall not exceed 4% and of Palm Oil 
delivered from Port Tank Installation shall not exceed 5% and the moisture 
and impurities content shall not exceed 0.25%, in accordance with 
sample(s) drawn and analysed on delivery into Port Tank Installations and 
from Port Tank Installations in accordance with procedures governmg 
sampling and analysis as laid down by the Exchange Company." 
In addressing this issue, the judges of the Court of Appeal have unanimously approved and 
adopted the approach taken by the arbitrators in interpreting the phrase "crude unbleached 
palm oil of good merchantable quality, in bulk". The arbitrators based their interpretation 
on the following arguments: 
1- The arbitrators contended that rule 1409 must be read disjunctively as it 
represents two distinct provisions; namely, rule 1409(a) and 1409(b). 
According to the arbitrators, rule 1409 should be read as follows: 
(a) The oil delivered under the contract to be crude unbleached palm oil of 
good merchantable quality, in bulk, and 
(b) The free fatty acid and moisture and impurities must be within the stipulated 
levels; namely, the free fatty acid content (as Palmitic-molecular weight 
256) of Palm Oil delivered into Port Tank installations shall not exceed 4% 
and of Palm Oil delivered from Port Tank Installation shall not exceed 5% 
and the moisture and impurities content shall not exceed 0.25%, in 
accordance with sample(s) drawn and analysed on delivery into Port Tank 
Installations and from Port Tank Installations in accordance with procedures 
governing sampling and analysis as laid down by the Exchange 
Company.219 
Based on this method of reading, the arbitrators set aside FIMA' s argument that 
rule 1409 was to be read conjunctively, which would result in FIMA having 
met the contract grade specification by meeting the requirement of FF A and 
M&l. 
219 Ibid., at 56. 
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11- After determining the disjunctive reading of rule 1409, the arbitrators then 
attempted to define the meaning of the phrase "crude unbleached palm oil of 
good merchantable quality, in bulk". The arbitrators dissected the phrase into 
two limbs. One is that the oil must be crude unbleached palm oil in bulk. 
Second, the crude palm oil must be of a good merchantable quality. 
111- In interpreting the phrases "crude unbleached palm oil in bulk" and "good 
merchantable quality", the arbitrators took note of the fact that the buyers who 
were given the NSR would not have the opportunity to negotiate the quality of 
the crude palm oil in order to meet their need or purpose of usage of the oil. In 
addition to that, the arbitrators found it important that the phrase "good 
merchantable quality" be objectively determined by reference to the established 
practices and generally accepted market quality.220 In achieving this, a number 
of expert witnesses from the crude palm oil industry were called to adduce 
evidence as to what constituted the quality of crude unbleached palm oil. Six 
experts were called to testify and the relevant parts of their testimonies are as 
follows: 
a- FFM's first expert witness, Tang Thin Sue had been a chemist in the Palm 
Oil Research Institute of Malaysia (PORIM) for twelve years. He stated that 
the characteristics of crude palm oil can be broadly divided into two 
categories. The first category is referred to as the inherent characteristic of 
crude palm oil and the other category is the variable characteristic of crude 
palm oil. The inherent characteristic is important, as without this 
characteristic, crude palm oil cannot be sold under the description "crude 
unbleached palm oil in bulk". The inherent characteristic consists of 
elements such as the IV and Slip Melting Point221 (SMP). The other 
category, namely the variable characteristic, involves elements such as FFA 
and M&I. The FF A and the M&I only affect the quality of the crude palm 
oil and not its identity as crude palm oil. On the testimony of Tang Thin 
Sue, the arbitrators made the following findings: 
220 Ibid., at p56. 
221 The lower the level of crude palm oil's melting point, the more solid it will be at a room temperature 
(Belai, Boakye, Vrakas and Wasswa, 2011: 21). 
I11IPage 
"We accept Mr Tang's testimony that the IV is an inherent chemical 
property of CPO and therefore is an inherent characteristic of CPO. The IV 
value of unbleached CPO in bulk is between the range 50-55. Mr Tang 
stated unequivocally that commercially produced CPO (crude palm oil), that 
is CPO produced in bulk from naturally occurring oil palm fresh fruit 
bunches in Malaysia always has an IV range between 50 and 55. If the IV 
drops below 50 it could only be because the oil has been contaminated, 
adulterated or blended.,,222 
b- FFM's second expert witness, Khoo Yok Lian, testified that if the IV level 
was less than 50, the buyer may not take delivery. She also stated that if the 
IV level is 48.7, the quality of the crude palm oil is considered to be below 
general market expectations. 
c- FFM's third expert witness, Richard Tan Kee Hock/23 gave evidence that if 
the crude palm oil is not in the range of 50 to 55, the oil is not of "good 
merchantable quality". He further testified that, because the phrase "good 
merchantable quality" is not defined in the COMMEX rules, the normal 
practice is that if this standard is not met, the parties would, via negotiation, 
adjust for the price difference. 
d- FFM's fourth expert witness, Ong Hai Ching, testified that if the IV level of 
the crude palm oil is less than 50, the oil may not be Malaysian crude palm 
oil or it could either be contaminated, adulterated, blended, or from a 
different geographical region. 
e- FIMA's expert witness, COMMEX general manager, Rajbir Singh, testified 
that the words "crude unbleached palm oil" and "good merchantable 
quality" are not defined in the COMMEX rules. This witness conceded that 
IV indicates a good merchantable quality if it is generally accepted by the 
traders in the cash market. 
IV- Relying on these evidences, the arbitrators found that the IV value in crude 
palm oil is an important factor in determining whether the crude palm oil would 
fall within the description of "unbleached crude palm oil of good merchantable 
222 Ibid, at 56 
223 Mr Richard Tan Kee Hock claimed that he had 19 years oftrade experience, including trading crude palm 
oil both on the Exchange as well as at the cash or physical market. 
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quality". As the IV level found in the 700 metric tons of crude palm oil was 
below 50, the arbitrators ruled that the crude palm oil had failed to satisfy the 
first limb of rule 1409, namely that, "'the contract shall be for Crude unbleached 
Palm Oil of good merchantable quality in bulk, in approved Port Tank 
Installations". 224 
In this case, FIMA also raised another important point as part of their contention that the 
crude palm oil had attained a standard of good merchantable quality. They relied on the 
fact that that the crude palm oil was still saleable. This is because the crude palm oil was 
later sold to a successful bidder at RM885-00 per mt. although the price was much lesser 
than what FFM had paid for, at RM2,3 17-00 per mt. This contention was rejected by the 
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal opined that the saleability of the crude palm oil has 
no bearing on the question of whether it is of good merchantability quality as the crude 
palm oil may be saleable with a different grade and a different price. The court referred 
and applied the observation of Lord Reid in the case of Henry Kendall & Sons (A Firm) v 
William Lillieo & Sons Ltd. And Ors. 225 where the judge states that: 
"But there are many cases in which different qualities of a particular kind of goods 
are commonly sold under different descriptions. Suppose goods are sold under the 
description commonly used to denote a high quality and the goods delivered are not 
of that high quality but of a lower quality, which is commonly sold under a 
different description, then it could not possibly be said that the goods in the form in 
which they were tendered were of no use for any purpose for which those goods 
would normally be used. They would be readily saleable under the appropriate 
description for the lower quality. But surely Lord Wright did not mean to say that 
therefore they were merchantable under the description which was appropriate for 
the higher quality. They plainly were not.,,226 
The judges227 also referred to the view of Dixon J in Australian Knitting Mills Ltd v Grant 
where he said: 
224 IV indicates the degree of saturation of an oil or fat. A decrease in IV is generally associated with an 
increase in melting point (Yusoff, 2000: 801; Corley and Tinker, 2003: 446). 
225 [1969}2 AC 31 at 77. 
226 Ibid., at 64. 
227 The court also referred to the view of Viscount Dilhorne in B.S. Brown & Son v Craiks Ltd. where he 
states, 
"In Hardwick Game Fair v Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1969] 2 AC 3; 31, 
75, Lord Reid said that 'Merchantable can only mean commercially saleable'. In the same case Lord 
Pearce said at p. 118: 
'The suggestion, without more, that goods are merchantable unless they are no use for any purpose 
for which they would normally be used and hence would be unsaleable under that description may 
be misleading, if it contains no reference to price. One could not say that a new carpet which 
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"The condition that goods are of merchantable quality requires that they should be 
in such an actual state that a buyer is fully acquainted with the facts, and therefore 
knowing what hidden defects exist and not being limited to their apparent 
conditions, would buy them without abatement of the price obtainable for such 
goods if in reasonably sound order and condition and without special terms.,,228 
Hence, relying on these cases, the court of appeal held that, although the crude palm oil 
was sold at a lower price than the price paid for by the FFM, it only verified the fact that 
the crude palm oil was of an inferior grade. Hence, the court concluded that the saleability 
of crude palm oil was no proof that the oil was of a good merchantable quality within the 
meaning of rule 1409. The Court of Appeal restored the award of-the arbitrators. FIMA 
appealed to the Federal Court but in August 20, 2009, their leave to appeal was rejected 
and instead the Federal Court upheld the award of the arbitrators. 
Following this case, FIMA sued the Exchange. In this case, Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn 
Bhd v Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad,229 FIMA claimed from the Exchange a sum of 
RM2,962,800-52 together with interest and cost. FIMA alleged that the Exchange owed 
them such an amount, as the Exchange had breached its duty to ensure that its crude palm 
oil contract specifications and requirements under its trading rules were free from any 
liability. In order to understand this legal duty, it is important to briefly explain the 
relationship between FIMA and the Exchange. The Exchange operates and provides a 
trading platform for crude palm oil futures contracts. As part of the crude palm oil futures 
trading procedure, the Exchange appointed and approved delivery points or designated port 
tank installations for crude palm oil. These delivery points or port tank installations were 
authorised to handle and store crude palm oil upon the terms and conditions contained in 
the Exchange'S standard letter of undertaking. The port tank installation owners undertook 
with the Exchange that: 
"The specification of CPO (crude palm oil) are to be in accordance with the 
COMMEX's Rule 1409 CONTRACT GRADE which provides the specifications 
of CPO of tenderable quality are, (a) The CPO shall be unbleached CPO of good 
merchantable quality, in bulk; and (b) The free fatty acid content (as Palmitic-
molecular weight 256) of Palm Oil delivered into Port Tank installations shall not 
exceed 4% and of Palm Oil delivered from Port Tank Installation shall not exceed 
happens to have a hole in it or a car with its wings buckled are of no use for their normal purposes 
and hence would be un saleable under that description. They would no doubt, if their price was 
reduced, find a ready market.,,227 
228 Ibid, at 65. 
229 Guaman Sivil No: D3-22-1749-2007. 
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5% and the moisture and impurities content shall not exceed 0.25%, in accordance 
with sample(s) drawn and analysed on delivery into Port Tank Installations and 
from Port Tank Installations in accordance with procedures governing sampling 
and analysis as laid down by the exchange company.,,230 
Nonetheless, FIMA argued that this provision is not adequate. It relied on the award given 
by the Arbitration Tribunaf31 which decided that the crude palm oil in FIMA's port tank 
installation was not of good merchantable quality as they failed to contain the three 
desirable levels of specifications; namely, the IV, Slip Melting Point C ("SMP"),232 and 
Deterioration of Bleachability Index ("DOBI,,)?33 As this decision was upheld by the 
Federal Court, PIMA claimed that the Exchange had failed to adequately describe in their 
rules, letter of undertaking and contract grade specifications these three desirable levels of 
'fi . 234 specl lcatlons. 
On that basis, FIMA claimed that the Exchange owed a duty to FIMA and all other port 
tank owners that its contract specifications, regulations, and rules were adequate. 
Furthermore FIMA claimed that these rules should not only be adequate but its compliance 
must be free from any liability. Based on this argument and the decision of the Federal 
Flour Mills Bhd v Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal, FIMA claimed that 
the Exchange is duty bound to ensure that the IV, the SMP and the DOBI are incorporated 
as part of the crude palm oil's standard merchantable quality. By excluding these in its 
legal framework, the Exchange had breached its duty towards FIMA and the Exchange's 
negligence had caused FIMA to suffer loss. FIMA quantified that its damages amounted to 
RM2,962,800-52. This amount accounted for the FFM's refusal to take delivery of the 
crude palm oil from its port tank installation and its losses in the legal suit against the 
230 Ibid., at 5 
231 As decided in the case of Federal Flour Mills Bhd v Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd & Another 
Agpeal[2005] 4 CU. 
2 2 The melting point is a characteristic property of oil. When a figure for melting point is quoted, it usually 
refers to "slip point", indicating the temperature at which melting starts. The melting behaviour is important 
in determining their suitability for particular uses (Corley and Tinker, 2003: 470). Equally, Yusoff (2000: 
801) adds that the melting point is a good parameter to ensure the consistency and quality of the oil's final 
~J~~:~~~y and Tinker (2003: 460) discuss the characteristics which good quality palm oil must contain: a low 
FF A content, a low level of contamination with water and other impurities, and a good bleachability. These 
characteristics interact. For example, a high level of water is likely to increase the FFA and a higher level of 
FF A leads to a proportionately lower oil yield after neutralisation. Bleachability depends on the carotene 
content but is more affected by the oxidation of the state of oil, the level of antioxidants, and the 
contaminations present. High temperatures encourage oxidation, and should be avoided as far as is 
compatible with storage and shipping requirement. Table A in Appendix II depicts the palm oil products 
based on the Malaysian standard specifications. Comparison could be made to Table B in the same Appendix 
where it shows the fatty acid composition of typical Malaysian palm oil and some of the fractioned products. 
234 Though FIMA acknowledged the fact that, in 2005, the Exchange rectified the contract to include DOBI, 
which is one ofthe three desirable specifications in its crude palm oil futures Contract Specification. 
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FFM. FIMA's claim against the Exchange was dismissed by the court on the basis that 
FIMA's claim was statute-barred as the cause of action had accrued more than six years. 
Due to this reason, the issue pertaining to the contract grade specification of the crude palm 
oil was not dealt with. 
On the basis of these two cases, Federal Flour Mills Bhd v Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn 
Bhd & Another Appeal and Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd v Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad, it is submitted that Rules 1304, 1306, 1317 and Schedule 13 of the 
Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules are not adequate. These provisions do 
not sufficiently describe the phrase "crude unbleached palm oil of good merchantable 
quality, in bulk". To attain this description, a good quality of crude unbleached palm oil 
must have the desirable levels of namely, the FFA, I&M, IV, SMP and DOBI incorporated. 
However, currently Rule l317 and Schedule 13 only contain FFA, I&M, and DOBI.235 The 
importance of a clear contract specification is underscored by the role it plays in 
determining the futures-spot price relation well before the delivery date (Kamara and 
Siegel, 1987: 1008).236 
Moreover, according to an interview with two crude palm futures traders in Malaysia on t h 
December 2011, the requirement of IV and SMP in the contract specification is to 
distinguish Malaysian-produced crude palm oil from the Indonesian produced version. The 
reason is that the quality of Malaysian-produced crude palm oil is higher than its 
Indonesian counterpart. According to Koswanage (2011: 17), China, the world's second-
largest edible oil shopper, imports Malaysian-refined palm oil as it is of a higher quality 
and its delivery can be guaranteed. China will only switch to Indonesia if there are 
shortages in Malaysia. Hence, it follows that to eliminate the element of gharar, the 
contract specification must clearly provide a "sufficient description of quality, quantity and 
special requirements of the present as well as future goods" (Zahraa and Mahmor, 2002: 
384). 
235 Though IV and SMP are not used to measure the quality ofthe oil (nonetheless Let (2011: 649) views that 
IV and SMP form part of palm oil quality), their establishment is fundamental as they determine the 
authenticity and purity of the oil as well as its uses in edible and non-edible products (Kuntom, 2004: 8). 
Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006: 63) rightly argue that the commodity futures contract is different from other 
financial assets in several aspects. Amongst them, financial assets are held for investment purposes, whereas 
commodities are produced for use, and derive their value from, ultimate consumption or inputs into the 
production of finished goods.235 Hence, their usage in the downstream or finished products makes it more 
imperative for the crude palm oil to contain the adequate quality which would eventually result in stable and 
~[6eserved refined oil.(Let,.20~0:. 806). . . 
The contract speCIfication IS Important to any partIcIpants in the futures market even though he may never 
make or take delivery. 
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To substantiate the above submission, rules 1317 and Schedule 13 also empower the 
Exchange to modify its contract specification. Pursuant to this power, on June 9, 2005, a 
circular was issued by the Exchange. This circular had the effect of incorporating DOBI as 
part of the crude palm oil's contract grade in Rule 1319 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives 
Berhad Business Rules,z37 On March 16, 2007, the Exchange yet again revised the crude 
palm oil contract specification. However this revision only increased the position limits, 
changed the price limits, and introduced six other contract months into Rule 1302, Para 
3.1.1.5 of Schedule 3 and Schedule 13, respectively, in the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives 
Berhad Business Rules.238 On November 18, 2009, the Exchange again revised Schedule 
13 by incorporating a new provision relating to the settlement of weight differences in the 
delivered oi1.239 At present, however, there has been no circular issued by the Exchange to 
the effect of incorporating the other two fundamental elements; namely, the IV and the 
SMP as part of the "good quality of crude unbleached palm oil". 
The failure of incorporating sufficient description of certain grades of futures com~odity 
in the exchange's trading rules is also deliberated in the case of Sam Wong & Son, Inc., a 
Corporation on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants v 
New York Mercantile Exchange, Richard B. Levine, Howard Gabler, Melvyn Farlis, Jayne 
Ball, Alfred S. Pennisi, Peter Johnston, Michel Marks, Victor Buccellato, Salvatore 
Calcaterra, Horace De Podwin, Sam Fis h berg, Richard Jarecki, Stanley Meierfeld, 
Charles Miller, Henry Polan, Jack Schwager, Ira Shein, Jacob Stern, Dennis Suskind, Sol 
Tanne, Harvey Wachman, Norton Waltuck, Joe Doe, Jane Roe, Richard Coe, Mary Smith, 
ABC, Inc., DEF, Inc., GHI Inc., JKL Inc., MNO Inc., and PQR, Inc. (the last ten names 
being fictitious), Defendants-Appellees; Anthony Spinale, Plaintiff-Appellant, v Sal 
Calcaterra, Norton Waltuck, George Gero, Stanley Meierfeld, Horace De Podwin, Jack 
Schwager, Sam Fishberg, Ira Shein, Jack Place, Harvey Wachman, and Charles Miller, 
Defendants-Appelleei40 (Sam Wong v New York Mercantile Exchange). 
This case deals with the issue of default in the delivery of quality potatoes on the New 
York Mercantile Exchange (NYME) on November 1978.241 From November 6 till 
237 At current, the relevant provision is Rule 1317. 
238 See Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Trading Participant Circular 8/2007. 
239 See Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Trading Participant Circular 38/2009. 
240 (735 F. 2d 653; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22544). 
241 According to the NYME rules, the Maine potatoes must be of grade U.S. No.1 for par delivery, except 
that for the April and May contracts "commercial" which are deliverable at a 25% discount from the 
settlement price for the last trading day of the delivery month. The contract requires two inspections - one by 
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November 20, 1978, fifty deliveries of potatoes were tendered. All these fifty deliveries 
passed the inspection in Maine but fifteen failed to pass the inspection at the Hunt Points 
Terminal Market in New York. Eleven loads failed because of the apparent deterioration 
since their inspection in Maine. The potatoes reached Hunt Points with high percentages of 
sunken and discoloured areas that exceeded the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 
specifications for U.S. No. 1 grade?42 Similar defaults took place during the week of 
March 5 till March 8, 1979?43 Twenty-nine out of thirty-two loads failed the inspection at 
the Hunt Points where similar symptoms were discovered in the potatoes. 
On March 8, 1979, after numerous meetings held between the NYME and USDA on the 
matter, the NYME became convinced that the real problem was with the quality of the crop 
and not with inspection inconsistencies (which was their initial primary concern). Hence, 
in consequence of the large numbers of potatoes failing to meet delivery standards at the 
Hunts Point, the Board ofNYME declared a market emergency. Due to this, trading halted 
and contracts were ordered to be liquidated at a certain settlement price. The appellants, 
being commodities traders, brought this action against the NYME, its governors and 
officers for certain actions and inactions in relation to the defaulted March, April and May 
1979 Maine potatoes futures contracts. 
One of the appellants, Wong, claimed that the NYME had failed to amend the Maine 
potatoes futures contract between the periods of mass default in the delivery of potatoes, 
namely November 1978 to March 1979. His claim was set aside on technical grounds as 
the United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit found that he had no right to sue 
the NYME. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note the argument of Wong in support of his 
application. Wong claimed that the defect in the Maine potatoes futures contract was in the 
a federally-authorised state inspector at the point of origin in Maine and the other by a federal inspector at the 
final point of destination at the Hunts Point Terminal Market, the Bronx, New Yark or Everett, 
Massachusetts. The grading standard follows the United States Standards for Grade of Potatoes promulgated 
by the Secretary of Agriculture. Delivery months are November, March, April and May. The contract 
requires that the potatoes be packed in 1000 fifty-pound bags. Delivery may be made by rail or truck. Each 
delivery generally consists of one truckload of potatoes, namely the contract amount of 50,000 pounds. 
242 The potatoes which failed to meet the Exchange specifications suffered from pressure bruises and 
discolouration. Such defects resulted from conditions during the growing and harvesting season in Maine, the 
subsequent storage in Maine, as well as the transportation of the potatoes to New York. The longer the 
potatoes .were kep~ in storage, th~ more their condition deteriorated. Such deterioration plus the warm 
weather m the sprmg was very hkely to cause more delivery problems in April and May. The USDA 
confirmed that the potatoes deteriorated while in transit from Maine to New York. 
243 Meanwhile the cash market potatoes, of which cash and futures prices would normally converge to a 
certain extent, did not rise. This is because the cash market price was based on potatoes from all sources not 
just Maine potatoes. ~ence, !t was marginally affected by the. information concerning a potential shortf~n in 
the supply oftop-quahty Mame potatoes. By the close oftradmg on March 8, the price of the April and May 
contracts had reached respectively $7.60 and $8.14 per hurrdredweight ($3,800 and $4,070 per contract). 
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contract grade. The prescribed contract grade for the potatoes futures contract is the Maine-
grown U.S. No.1. Notwithstanding the massive default in delivery between the period 
November 1978 and March 1979, the NYME failed to amend the futures contract by 
inserting potatoes of other qualities. 
In his application, Wong referred to § Sa( 1 0) of the Commodity Exchange Act which 
allows the exchange to permit the delivery: 
"of such grade or grades at such point or points and at such quality and Iocational 
price differentials as will tend to prevent or diminish price manipulation, market 
congestion, or the abnormal movement of such commodity in interstate 
commerce".244 
Wong compared the difficulties in procuring potatoes of grade U.S. No.1 for the delivery 
in the futures market, during that default period, with the cash market. In the later market, 
potatoes could come from many sources and not just Maine-grown U.S. No. I S?4S The 
mass failure of delivery also resulted in higher prices for the April and May contracts as 
news of a possibility of a shortage of deliverable Maine potatoes spread in the market. By 
the close of trading on March 8, the price of the April and May contracts reached 
respectively $7.60 and $8.14 per hundredweight ($3,800 and $4,070 per contract). This 
condition was anticipated as the shorts were faced with difficulties in procuring the 
gradable Maine potatoes needed to meet their delivery commitments. 
In dismissing Wong's contention, the court states that these sections do not expressly 
stipulate the duty of the NYME towards the public as to include that of amending the terms 
of a contract. The court also opined that revision of contractual terms is a matter for the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the NYME and not for the courts in 
private litigation.246 In other words, the power to amend lies with these authorities and 
2441n fact, to promote compliance with §5(a), Congress in 1974 empowered the CFTC to order changes in 
delivery points and to direct changes in price differentials based upon the commodity's quality or location. 
245 Reference was made to the following provisions: (i) § 5(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act which 
provides that unless otherwise approved by the CFTC, the board of trade shall be "located at a terminal 
market where any cash commodity of the kind specified in the contracts of sale of commodity for future 
delivery to be executed on such board is sold in sufficient volumes and under such conditions as fairly to 
reflect the general value of the commodity and the difference in value between the various grades of such 
commodity, and where there is available to such board of trade, official inspection service approved by the 
Secretary of Agriculture or the Commission for the purpose."; (ii) § 5(g) of the Commodity Exchange Act 
which states that the board of trade "demonstrates that transactions for future delivery in the commodity for 
which designation as a contract market is sought will not be contrary to the public interest." 
246 The court referred to the CFTC regulation 13.2, 17 C.F.R. § 13.2 which provides that "any person may 
file a petition with [the CFTC] for the issuance, amendment or repeal of a rule of general application." 
Similarly, § 8a(7) empowers CFTC to "alter or supplement the rules of the contract market", specifically 
including "terms or conditions in contracts of sale to be executed on or subject to the rules of such contract 
market." 
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even if they proposed for amendments in the futures contracts, there will be certain 
administrative procedures under the rules which need to be accomplished?47 
Nonetheless, the infamous mass default of Maine potato futures contract in the midst of 
1976 had damaged the NYME's integrity and reputation. The trading of potato futures 
contracts was later terminated from the NYME. However on September 1996, potato 
futures contracts resumed trading on the NYME (AllBusiness.com, 17 September, 1996). 
This time, contract specification of the deliverable potatoes had been amended. The potato 
futures contracts were now based on the delivery of 85,000 Ibs. of U.S. No. 1 Russet 
Burbank potatoes, for delivery in Idaho with 2/3rds non-size "A" potatoes packed in lOtb 
mesh bags, and 1/3rd 70 or 80 count potatoes packed in 50tb cartons (Battley, 2000: 107). 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the elements of uncertainty arising from the legal provisions of 
crude palm oil futures contract settlement. This element of uncertainty is based on the 
concept of gharar as discussed in the earlier gharar chapter. This chapter has found that 
the following elements of uncertainty are central to the disputes relating to contract 
settlement of commodity futures contracts. The elements are: (i) the lack of knowledge in 
the attributes of the emergency settlement price; (ii) the failure of the seller to deliver the 
underlying commodity; (iii) the underlying commodity being incapable of delivery; and 
(iv) the quality of the underlying commodity being insufficiently described. Based on the 
examination of these issues, this chapter reaffirms the finding of the earlier chapter that, 
inconsistent with the stance of the SAC, gharar permeates through crude palm oil futures 
contract and that it has not been eliminated by the legal framework of crude palm oil 
futures contract. 
247 When acting within § 5a( 1 0), the Commission must first notify the exchange of its concern and afford the 
exchange an opportunity to make appropriate changes. If the exchange, after such notification, fails to act, 
the statute authorises the Commission to change or supplement the contract rules, but only after granting the 
contract market an opportunity to be heard. Ibid., at 668. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Reasons for Maysir in the Futures Margin System, Offsetting 
Transaction, and Futures Speculation 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to investigate the element of maysir in the crude palm oil futures 
margin system, offsetting transaction, and futures speculative trading. Maysir, or gambling, 
is one of the foremost prohibitions in any contractual dealings in Islam. The SAC have 
resolved that the crude palm oil futures contract is free from any elements of gambling. 
This position is inconsistent with the IF AM and the AAOIFI, both of which have resolved 
otherwise. The debates on maysir in these resolutions centre around two important 
apparatus in. the commodity futures contract, the futures margin and the offsetting 
transaction. 
On this basis, this chapter will analyse the operation of the futures margin system and the 
offsetting transaction. The futures margin system is comprised of the initial margin, 
maintenance margin, variation margin, margin call, as well as marking to market. The 
futures margin system and the offsetting transaction serve as the vehicles for speculative 
trading in the crude palm oil futures market. Hence, speculators and their speculative 
trading will also be examined. The thrust of this analysis is premised on the notion that 
Sbarta scholars are not against the commodity futures contract being utilised as a risk 
management tool but only when it is used as a gambling tool. As gambling is strictly 
prohibited, so is any form of maysir-tainted business activiti~s. 
This chapter will examine whether the elements of maysir - namely, betting, chance, gain 
of one party at the loss of the other party, unlawful acquisition of wealth, as well as hatred 
and enmity - are to be found in the futures margin system, the offsetting transaction and 
futures speculation. This research adopts a similar method of analysis, as applied in the 
gharar chapter. Finally, this chapter seeks to establish that, inconsistent with the stance of 
the SAC, the futures margin system, the offsetting transaction, as well as futures 
speculation, are contaminated with maysir elements, and hence are forbidden. 
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5.2 The Prohibition of IHaysir 
Maysir is explicitly prohibited in the Qur 'an. Chapter AI-Baqarah (Hereafter), verse 219 
warns that: 
"They ask thee concerning wine and gambling. Say: In them is great sin, and some 
profit, for men; but the sin is greater than the profit." They ask thee how much they 
are to spend, say: "What is beyond your needs." Thus doth God make clear to you 
His Signs: in order that ye may consider." 
This verse was revealed at a time when the game of chance called al-maysir248 was 
prevalent in society. It is said that al-maysir envisaged an element of charity whereby 
proceeds gained from al-maysir were distributed amongst the poor. However, this charity 
spirit was gradually forgotten when al-maysir became a means of business without any 
consideration of munificence. The people then began to gamble with all their property and 
hence this resulted in people becoming destitute and penniless (Siddiqi, 1981: 137). 
Chapter AI-Maida (The Table), verses 93 and 94 promulgate the maysir injunction. AlHih 
says: 
"0 ye who believe! Intoxicants and gambling, (dedication of) stones, and 
(divination by). arrows, are an abomination of Satan's handiwork: eschew such 
(abomination), that ye may prosper." 
"Satan's plan is (but) to excite enmity and hatred between you, with intoxicants and 
gambling, and hinder you from the remembrance of God, and from prayer: Will ye 
not then abstain?" 
248 This game involved the slaughtering of numerous beasts, generally camel. The beast was cut into ten 
parts, of which the parts consisted of the thighs and shins of both the fore and rear legs plus two shoulders. 
The head and feet were given back to the butcher and the remaining inferior pieces were distributed 
proportionately into these ten parts. These parts were then represented by seven arrows and, by taking turns, 
the player inserted his left hand into the quiver containing these arrows till the arrows representing these ten 
parts were diminished. The arrows that were used in this game of chance were of two types: 
(l) Seven winning arrows (an~ibii '), each bearing a name and with notches (jar¢) or razz), by which they 
were identified; and 
(2) Three or four white arrows (grulf, ag~fii/), neither winning nor losing. The white arrows bore no notches 
and their purpose consisted in slowing the game and making it more difficult. This is because every time 
one of the white arrows was drawn, it was immediately replaced back into the quiver, making the 
chances of drawing the winning arrows consistently more difficult. 
This game consisted of seven players, no less or no more. If the number was fewer than seven, the players 
had to buy the remaining parts in order for the game to take place. The player who bought the remaining 
parts was called al-Tamfm, "he who completes". When he won twice in succession, he was called mutammin, 
generously donating his winning to his entourage. This act of charity was also carried out by any players who 
purchased the parts that had not been won and gave them to the poor (Bosworth, et aI., 923). 
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The mentioning of al-maysir together with other sinful conducts - namely, intoxicants (al-
khamr), idolatry (al-an~iib), fortune telling, and divining arrows (al-azliim) - are evidence 
for Sharta scholars to view all forms of al-maysir, conducted through card games, dice, 
games that involves risk, as strictly forbidden249 (McAuliffe, 2002: 281). Though maysir 
elements are conspicuous in these kinds of games, they may not be so in a pseudo sale 
transaction. The commodity futures contract is one of those instances. The next section 
adumbrates the divergence between the SAC on the one hand, and the IF AM and AAOIFI 
on the other, on the existence of maysir issues in commodity futures contract. 
5.3 nivergence on the Issue of IUuy .... 'ir in the Commodity Futures Contract 
The SAC resolves that the crude palm oil futures contract is free from any elements of 
gambling. In arguing that this is so, the SAC refers to the deposit or the initial margin 
payment imposed on a futures market trader before the start of a trading. Notwithstanding 
the fact that others view this initial margin payment as a form of prohibited bet, the SAC 
views it otherwise, as: 
" ... the fluctuation of the value occurs due to the change in demand in the crude 
palm oil futures markets. It is also a common phenomenon in the trading world. It 
is not appropriate to judge a contract whose value fluctuates due to the changing 
demands for crude palm oil futures market as a gambling activity. This is because 
gambling activities depend solely on luck and are not related to demand and offer." 
(2006: 76) 
In contrast, the IF AM resolves that the commodity futures contract is tainted with elements 
of gambling, exploitation, and unlawful devouring of the property of others. The IF AM 
reasons that commodity futures contracts are, by and large, paper transactions and are not 
genuine purchases as they do not involve real delivery and/or possession of the underlying 
commodities. It is also because the parties in the futures contract gain profit by giving and 
taking the price difference, similar to gamblers who undertake risk in a zero sum game250 
249 A similar note of abhorrence is shown in Aristotle's categorisation of gamblers where gamblers were held 
at the same level as thieves and robbers. The only difference is that thieves and robbers took great risks in 
their trade but the gamblers instead took money from their friend whom they should be helping (as cited in 
Jones, 1973: 16). This is the reason why in Islam, gambling is seen as a means to gain property from others 
easily and unfairly. 
250 A similar position is taken by the IF AJ, though its resolution is not particularly on the commodity futures 
contract but on indices trading. Index trading involves the sale and purchase of an index of stocks or bonds or 
commodities market. The IF AJ resolves that index trading is not permissible as it is pure gambling and it 
constitutes the sale of something fictitious (something that does not exists) (Islamic Research and Training 
Institute, 2000: 133). Likewise, the AAOIFI (2010: 487) resolves that Sbari'a prohibits trading in indices or 
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(as cited in ai-Amine, ~008: 14). Likewise, the AAOIFI (2010: 372) prohibits the 
commodity futures contract as it transgresses the contract requirement, and it results in 
f h . I 251 procuring the property 0 ot ers unjust y. 
These two opposing views implicate two fundamental trading mechanics in the commodity 
futures contract or, for that matter, the crude palm oil futures contract. They are the futures 
margin system and the offsetting transaction. For this reason, this chapter will analyse 
whether these two apparatus contain any elements of maysir. To do so, the notion of 
maysir needs to be understood. Hence, the next section discusses its definitions and 
concept. 
5.4 Maysir: Its Definition and Concept 
Literally defined, maysir refers to an ancient Arabian game of chance played with arrows 
without heads and feathering, for the stakes of slaughtered and quartered camels (Cowan, 
1979: 1107). According to Al-Shawkani, by playing this game, the winner gets an easy 
gain, by means of gambling, in the meat of this slaughtered animal (as cited in McAuliffe, 
2002: 280). The nature of this game is reflected in its root word, yasira, which means to be 
or become easy, to live in an easy circumstance, or to be or to become rich, lucky, and or 
fortunate252 (Cowan, 1979: 1107). AI-Zamakhshari denotes the word al-yasar to al-ghina 
(meaning wealth) which reflects "gambling (is) to grab someone's property" (as cited in 
McAuliffe, 2002: 280). According to Ibn Sirin, maysir applies to every practice in which 
there is an element of chance (Houtsma, et. at., 1987: 156). 
taking or receiving money on the mere occurrence of certain readings of the index. Such dealings are 
prohibited even if it is practiced for the sake of hedging against potential risk. The basis for such a 
prohibition is that the dealing is done without the selling or buying of real assets, which the index represents, 
or any other type of asset. It is nothing more than the payment or receipt of money for the mere existence of a 
certain reading or figure. It is a form of gambling and an illegal act of gaining money. 
251 This notion is based on the Qur'iinic verse 29, chapter 4 (al-Nisa '), in which Allah says, "Eat not up your 
property among yourself with injustice, but let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual consent." 
The AAOIFI (2010: 365) also invalidates the determination of the commodity futures contract in any of its 
modes of settlement; namely, by way of liquidation between the parties or a cash settlement or through a 
counter-contract. 
252 The meaning of yasira perhaps could be argued to connote the nature of humans which is impatient with 
delays of regular work. It wants to acquire earnings in one stroke, without trouble, and without the laborious 
accumulation of gradual earnings (Hastings, 1971a: 164). 
124lPagc 
Apart from maysir, a game of chance is also referred to as "al-qimar". Al_qimar253 literally 
means gambling, bet or wager (Cowan, 1979: 1107). Technically, it connotes the taking of 
ownership by way of a wager (ISRA, 2010: 276). AI-Jurjani defines qimiir as "taking one 
thing after the other from one's partner in a game" or "a game with the condition that the 
winner (ghiilib) of two contestants gets some thing from the loser (maghlub)" (as cited in 
Rosenthal (1975: 3). Ibn al-' Arabi describes qimiir as "Each one of two (contestants) seek 
to defeat his partner in an action or statement in order to take over property set aside for the 
winner" (as cited in Rosenthal, 1975: 3). Abu Habib defines it as "every game over 
property which the winner takes from the loser" (as cited in Kamali, 2002: 152). Ibn 
Man?iir says that it also refers to al-murahanah, which is equivalent to mukha,tarah, 
meaning "the taking of risk" (as cited in Hashim, 2003: 310). 
Though qimar and maysir have their own independent definitions, they are used 
interchangeably in the literature to describe gambling activities. For the purpose of this 
study, the term maysir will be used throughout this chapter. This is based on the views of 
Ibn Sirin, Mujahid, and 'Ata' that, "everything involving a stake (khatar) belongs to 
maysir, even the walnut game of children .. .' While Ash-Shari'i says: ' .. . maysir is 
something that necessitates paying out or obtaining property." (as cited in Rosenthal, 1975: 
77). 
The classical interpretation of mays;r is echoed in the contemporary work. Maysir or 
gambling is described by Kamali as: 
"a combative relationship between two contracting parties, each of whom 
undertakes the risk ofloss and the loss of one means gain for the other ... Gambling 
also consists of an appeal to chance, and making chance the arbiter of one's 
conduct is to subvert the moral order and stability of life." (2000: 151). 
Similarly, Rahman (1979: 115) describes gambling as a game of chance because it is based 
on the principle that the gain acquired or the loss suffered by the player is dependent upon 
luck or chance unless there is fraud. But even if there is no fraud, the player's gain is 
unearned and the player's loss is by a mere chance. EI-Din and Hassan refers to gambling 
as a: 
253 The Arabic noun al-qimtir derives from the word qamar (the moon) which increases at times and 
decreases at other times. It has been given this name due to the possibility that gamblers may at one time lose 
their wealth and, at the other time, gain wealth from their counterparties (Ahmad, 2010: 100). . 
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"two or more person game of chance which ends up in redistributing the total 
stakes committed by these players. It is purely a competitive zero sum game 
amongst the parties .... Although it is a game of chance, it has one sure outcome, 
excitement for one party and displeasure and vexation for the other." (2007: 246) 
Likewise Salamon denotes gambling as: 
"the betting of something of value, with unnecessary risk, hope of gain based on 
the elements of chance and uncertain events that involves to a certain extent 
economic manipulation and on occasion, loss of context of economic reality." 
(1998: 221) 
Equally, the SAC (2006: 104) defines gambling as: 
"any activities which involve betting, whereby the winner will take the entire bet 
and the loser will lose his beL.Gambling activities ... depend solely on luck and 
are not related to demand and offer" (Securities Commission, 2006: 104). 
The International Shari'ah Research Academy (2011: 183) defines gambling as any 
activity which involves betting whereby the winner will take the entire bet and the loser 
wi11lose his bet. 
Based on the above definations, maysir can be discerned by the following elements: 
betting, chance, unlawful gain of one party at the expense of the other party and unlawful 
misappropriation of one's property. Additionally, as expressly stipulated in the Qur'an, 
namely, Chapter AI-Maida (The Table) verse 94, maysir spurs the element of hatred or 
enmity between the contesting parties. Therefore, the question now is whether these 
elements exist in the crude palm oil futures margin system and the offsetting transaction. If 
it does, the futures margin system as well as the offsetting transaction are mays;r 
transactions and hence are religiously condemned. Otherwise they are not. The following 
section attempts to address this critical question. 
5.5 The Elements of Maysir in Crude Palm Oil Futures Contract 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part examines the futures margin system 
which is then followed by the identification of maysir elements in this system. The second 
part of this section deals with the offsetting transaction and, accordingly, the identification 
of maysir elements in this transaction. 
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5.5.1 Futures Margin System 
Rule 1 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules defines margin254 as: 
"initial margin, being payment or deposit from a Clearing Participant255 as security 
for non-performance by that Clearing Participant of obligations under all Open 
Contracts256 to which that Clearing Participant is a party." 
This initial margin must be paid by each and every contractual party prior to trading. Rule 
614.1 (b) of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules stipulates that: 
"A Trading Participant257 or Associate Participant258 shall not accept orders for new 
Contracts from a Client259 unless the minimum initial margin for the Contracts is on 
deposit or is forthcoming within such period as may be prescribed by the Exchange 
from time to time after a call for initial margin has been made by the Trading 
Participant or Associate Participant." 
The initial margin amount must be maintained throughout the party holding a futures 
position in the crude palm oil futures contract. Rule 614.l(a) of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad Business Rules requires that: 
"Every Trading Participant or Associate Participant shall obtain from its Clients a 
minimum initial margin and maintain the amount of minimum margins on all Open 
254 Rule 614.2 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules and Rule 613( c) of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Clearing Berhad provide that the margin payment may be in the form of cash, letters of credit, 
bank guarantees and any other approved securities, and forms as the Exchange and Clearing House may from 
time to time prescribe. 
255 Clearing Participant means "a Trading Participant or an Associate Participant who is a participant of the 
Clearing House for the closing, settlement and exercise of Contracts". See Rule 201 of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
256 Open Contract means "a Future Contract or Option between a Clearing Participant and the Clearing House 
which has not been extinguished or terminated in accordance with the Rules." See Rule 1 of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules. 
257 Trading Participant means "a Corporation holding any or all Preference Shares which shall be referred to 
as Equity Participant, a Non-Equity Financial participant or a Commodity Participant (as the case may be) 
and has been admitted as a trading Participant in accordance with these rules and has not ceased for any 
reason to be a Trading Participant." See Rule 201 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
258 Associate Participant means "a Corporation which has been admitted as an Associate Participant in 
accordance with these Rules and has not ceased for any reason to be an Associate Participant." See Rule 201 
of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
259 Client means " ... a person on whose behalf the Trading Participant trades or proposes to trade, or from 
whom the Trading Participant accepts instructions to trade in Contracts." See Rule 201 of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
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Positions260 and these margins shall be at least equivalent to the amount of margins 
. d b h Cl . H ,,261 reqUire y t e earmg ouse. 
In addition to this initial margin payment, contractual parties are required to make 
additional margin payments, namely the variation margin payment, upon them receiving a 
margin call from the Clearing House. In order to do that, Rule 614.1 ( c) of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad Business Rules provides that: 
"Each Client's Open Position must be marked to market daily and additional call 
for margins must be made if necessary." 
The method of marking to market is made daily by marking or assigning each of the 
outstanding futures positions to the daily settlement price. According to Rule 611 of Bursa 
Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules, the daily settlement price is the 
price in which: 
"The Clearing House will determine the Daily Settlement Price for each open 
Contract in accordance with its procedure. Such procedure must provide for 
consideration to be given to any bids, offers and traded prices quoted by an 
Exchange and such other information as may be deemed relevant by the Clearing 
House." 
The marking to market is the lynchpin of the futures margin system. King explains that: 
"Marking-to-market means that a futures contract can, in effect, be seen as a series 
of one-day forward contracts, each one having the previous business day's future 
settlement price as its maturity value. For each day, a party loses money through its 
variation margin if the settlement price has moved against it since the day before, 
and it gains if it has moved in its favour." (1999: 155) 
The fluctuation of the crude palm oil futures price and the marking to market is what 
triggers the Clearing House to make a margin call. This call is, in an actual sense, a 
demand by the Clearing House to the affected contractual parties to make the variation 
margin payment, this being the difference between the current daily settlement price and 
the previous day settlement price. In order to make this call, Rule 614 (a) and (b) of Bursa 
Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules prescribes that: 
260 Open Position means "the position of a party under a Contract whose rights or obligations have not 
expired or been discharged or where the rights and/or obligations under that Contract are yet to be fulfilled." 
See Rule 201 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
26\ Similar to the purpose of the margin payable to the Exchange, the Clearing House's margin is also to be 
held as security against the non-performance of the contractual obligation of its clearing participants or 
members. See Rule 613 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules. 
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"(a) On each Business Day, the Clearing House must make available to each 
Clearing Participant a statement advising the Clearing Participant of funds (if any) 
which must be paid to the Clearing House on the same day and showing the Margin 
which must be lodged with the Clearing House ... " 
(b) The Clearing House is entitled to set off any amount due from a Clearing 
Participant to the Clearing House against any amount due from the Clearing House 
to the Clearing Participant." 
It is important to note that this margin call is only exacted to the contractual party whose 
amount of initial margin has gone lower than the prescribed level. This level is known as 
the maintenance margin?62 This may happen on two occasions. First, when the current 
daily settlement price is determined to be lower than the previous days. The Clearing 
House will then extract the difference between the current and previous settlement price 
from the amount of the initial margin of the buyer and transfer this difference amount to 
the account of the seller. Second, when the current settlement price is determined to be 
higher than the price of the previous day, the Clearing House will extract the difference 
from the initial margin of the seller and transfer this difference amount to the account of 
the buyer?63 
5.5.1.1 Mavsir Elements in the Futures Margin System 01.' •• ... 
From the examination of the futures margin operation system, maysir could be located in 
the following areas: 
(i) At the time of making the initial margin payment, both contractual parties do not 
know the future daily settlement price or the direction of the crude palm oil futures 
262 The level of the maintenance margin is in fact lower than the initial margin. 
263 Hull (1997: 20) illustrates the process and effect of marking to market to the parties' account, "At the end 
of each trading day, the margin account is adjusted to reflect the investor's gain or loss. This is known as 
marking to market the account. Suppose for example, that by the end of trading June 3, the futures price has 
dropped from $400 to $397. The investor (who goes long) has lost $600 (200 ounce of gold x $3 the amount 
of loss). This is because the 200 ounces of December gold, which he or she contracted to buy at $400, can 
now be sold for only $397. The balance in the margin account would be reduced by $600. Similarly if the 
price of December gold rose to $403 by the end of the first day, the balance in the margin account would be 
increased by $600. A trade is first marked to market at the close of the day on which it takes place. It is then 
marked to market at the close of trading on each subsequent day ... When there is a $600 decrease in the 
futures price so that the margin account of an investor with a long position is reduced by $600, the investor's 
broker has to pay the exchange $600 and the exchange passes the money on to the broker of an investor with 
a short position. Similarly when there is an increase in the futures price, brokers for parties with short 
positions pay money to the exchange, and brokers for parties with long positions receive money from the 
exchange." In other words, the clearing house acts as a conduit to enable the flow of cash from one party to 
the other. 
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price. Due to this uncertainty, the initial margin payment signifies as bets, placed 
by both parties, on the future daily settlement price or the direction of the crude 
palm oil futures price. 
(ii) The next day's daily settlement price is the determining factor on who is to receive 
the variation margin, namely the differential amount, from the other contractual 
party via the Clearing House. As a result, this payment, known only on the 
following day, arises purely out of chance and or luck. 
(iii) The variation margin payment which the loser has to pay is exactly the same 
amount of money which the winner gets. This payment is made not for the delivery 
of crude palm oil or any counter values but merely on the changes in the price of 
the crude palm oil futures contract. Hence, the basis for gaining money from the 
loser is unlawful as the winner's gain is made at the loss of the loser; 
(iv) The variation margin payment which is paid by the loser to the winner is based on 
chance. Therefore the payment which the winner receives amounts to unlawful 
misappropriation of the loser's wealth; 
(v) The loss suffered by the loser on the basis of chance and luck engenders hatred and 
enmity in the loser towards the winner. 
The following section examines the offsetting transaction and its modus operandi. This 
examination will accentuate the maysir elements contained in the transaction. 
5.5.2 Offsetting Transaction 
As described in Chapter three, the eligible delivery agreement allows parties to discharge 
their contractual obligations prior to the expiry of the contract. This can be done by a 
process known as offsetting. Rule 608 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad 
Business Rules stipulates the manner of offsetting as follows: 
"608 Liquidation by offset 
a) A Clearing Participant who is Buyer to an Open Contract and a Seller to 
another Open Contract the terms of which are identical in all aspects but not 
necessarily price and contract date, and both Open Contracts are recorded in 
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either the Unsegregated Account264 and in the same Sub-Account265 , of that 
Clearing Participant, may request the Clearing House to liquidate by offsetting 
the rights and obligations under those two Open Contracts. 
b) Upon two Open Contracts being off-set pursuant to Rule 608(a), any settlement 
difference, as calculated by the Clearing House, becomes immediately due by 
the Clearing Participant or the Clearing House, as the case may be. 
c) Requests for liquidation by off-set in accordance with this Rule 608 must be 
submitted to the Clearing House in such manner and on such terms as may be 
determined by the Clearing House, from time to time." 
Offsetting entails the discharge or liquidation of one's futures obligation. This is done by 
the party entering into a new eligible delivery agreement with a new party, taking an 
opposite position to hislher current position. In addition to that, this mode of settlement 
essentially causes one party to pay the other contractual party, via the clearing house, the 
difference between the current and previous settlement price of the crude palm oil futures 
contract. The obligation to pay the differential payment depends on the futures position of 
the parties. The buyer will make a profit or receive the differential payment if the futures 
price rises. The seller, on the other hand, will make a profit if the futures price falls (Blake, 
2000: 240). 
5.5.2. t Maysir Elements in the Offsetting Transaction 
Similar elements of maysir, as recognised in the futures margin system, are found in the 
offsetting transaction. They are as follows: 
(i) The entry into a new eligible delivery agreement is not made to pursue a real sale 
and purchase of crude palm oil but is in fact to accommodate the remittance of 
betting proceeds from the loser to the winner; 
(ii) The differential payment received by the winner from the loser via the Clearing 
House is not made on the basis of an exchange of counter values, namely the 
delivery of the crude palm oil and its purchase payment. Instead it is made purely 
264 Unsegregated Account means an account maintained by the Clearing House in the name of a Clearing 
Participant and established under Rule 604. See Rule 1 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad 
Business Rules. 
265 Sub-Account is defined as an account maintained by the Clearing House within the Segregated Account of 
a Clearing Participant bearing such identification as adviced by that Clearing Participant. See Rule I of 
Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules. 
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on the basis of the winner's bet on the direction of the daily settlement price of the 
crude palm oil futures contract. Hence, the payment received by the winner 
amounts to an unlawful misappropriation of the loser's wealth; 
(iii) The differential amount received by the winner is exactly the same amount of 
money which the loser has lost to the winner. Hence, the winner's gain is unlawful 
as it is made at the loss of the loser; 
(iv) The loss suffered by the loser is purely based on chance and or luck. This kind of 
winning engenders hatred and enmity in the loser against the winner. 
The discovery of the above element of maysir in the futures margm system and the 
offsetting transaction is further distilled in the following section. 
5.6 i'I,Jaysir Elements in the Futures Margin System and the Offsetting Transaction 
The ensuing analysis is predicated on the premise that the objection of S~arira scholars 
towards the futures contract is not because it is being used as a tool of risk management but 
because it is being used as a tool of gambling (Obaidullah, 2005: 34). It is also premised on 
the fact that gambling, in all its forms, is forbidden; hence any business activities which 
contain any elements of gambling are prohibited (Algaoud and Lewis, 2007: 39). 
5.6.1 Betting 
The New Pal grave Dictionary of Money & Finance describes betting as: 
"the process whereby individuals voluntarily wager a sum of money or item of 
value on the uncertain outcome of an event. This process frequently arises to 
resolve differences of opinion, among various parties, concerning the likelihood of 
a probabilistic event. There are two principal types of betting: (i) bets against 
nature; and (ii) bets based on subjective probabilities.266Examples of the first type 
include various casino games (roulette, twenty-one) in which the winning 
probabilities are known a priori. The second type refers to wagers in which the 
266 Probability is the expedient devised to overcome the insufficiency of coarse logical classification. Hence 
subjective probabilities overcome the unquestionable gap between the certain and impossible, the dubious 
taking into account of the continuous range of degrees of doubts and degrees of beliefs. It is, in fact, a daily 
psychological experience. The theories under subjective probability characterise human physiological, 
consistent, and rational behaviour under uncertainty (Sills, 1972b: 499). 
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winning probabilities are unknown - for example, bets on professional sporting 
events. For this form of betting, individuals face both risk and uncertainty. Since 
the winning probability is unknown, the betters assume the risk if they determine 
that the odds offered understate the true probability of winning. Bets against nature 
offer no opportunity for improved payoffs even if the better acquires additional 
information. However, bets based on the subjective probabilities may yield 
improved earnings if the better can obtain and utilise relevant information." (1992: 
195) 
This definition underlies a critical question - whether payment of an initial margm 
assimilates betting on an uncertain outcome of an event - the future price of the crude palm 
oil futures contract - in which the probability of winning is unknown? 
According to the SAC, the initial margin payment is not a prohibited bet as: 
" ... the fluctuation of the value occurs due to the change in demand in the crude 
palm oil futures markets. It is also a common phenomenon in the trading world. It 
is not appropriate to judge a contract whose value fluctuates due to the changing 
demands for crude palm oil futures market as a gambling activity. This is because 
gambling activities depend solely on luck and are not related to demand and offer." 
(2006: 76) 
Similarly, Kamali (2000: 176) contends that margin payment is allowed as it represents a 
margin deposit, an equivalent to a good faith deposit. This margin, which is deposited in 
the broker's account, is to ensure the integrity of the transaction is protected. 
Correspondingly, the previous Chief Executive of the Kuala Lumpur Commodity 
Exchange, Syed Abdul Jabbar Shahabudin (1994: 3) maintains that the futures margin 
system assures contract integrity and financial stability in the market place. Rule I of 
Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules amplified the role of the initial margin 
as a security against the non-performance of contractual parties. To attain this, marking to 
market is executed to indicate to the contracting parties, whether their account is in their 
favour (in the money) or not in their favour (out of money) (Khorshid, 2009: 257). This 
begs one to question the position of such a deposit in the Sbari' a. 
5.6.1.2 Hambilljiddiyalt 
Kunhibava (2009: 243) posits that in Islamic commercial law, the futures margin payment 
is analogous to hamishjiddiyah.267 Hamishjiddiyah is referred to as: 
267 The suggestion of the futures margin to be similar with hamishjiddiyah is based on her interview with one 
of the Shari'a advisors, though she does not expound on the area of hamish jiddiyah in her thesis. 
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"margin reflecting firm intention of the promisee - earnest money taken from a 
person who intends to purchase a commodity from or enters into a contract with 
anyone to confirm its sincerity to actually purchase the commodity when offered. 
In the case of breach of promise, the promisee has the right to recover his actual 
loss incurred due to the breach." (Ayub, 2007: 488) 
In the current practice of Islamic finance, financial institutions hold this token money as a 
form of trust and adjust it with the sale price, at the time when the sale is executed. Hamish 
jiddiya is paid before the execution of a sale agreement but it does not form part of the 
object price. The whole purpose of having ham ish jiddiyah is for the victimised party to 
recover any actual loss, excluding losses with respect to the cost of funds, incurred in 
honouring the promise to purchase the sale of the object. Any excess after such a deduction 
will be returned back to the promisee (Ayub, 2007: 116). A similar description is given by 
the AAOIFFI (2000: 18). Hamish jiddiyah is applied in the case of a binding promise. 
Hence, in the event of default, the promisor need not demand compensation from the 
promisee as this may then be charged against the account of hamish jiddiyah. With the 
consent of the promisee, ham ish jiddiyah can be invested as an investment trust on the 
basis of mudarabah between the promisor and the promisee. 
Although initial margin and ham ish jiddiyah play a significant role as risk management 
tools in securing the performance of contractual obligations, they inevitably bear 
dissimilarities. It is submitted that this dissimilarity presents the futures margin system as a 
tool for betting. Firstly, the amount of initial margin fluctuates relative to the movement of 
the crude palm oil futures price while the amount of hamish jiddiyah remains fixed. 
Secondly, initial margin is paid out not as a compensation payment for a default in the 
buyer failing to purchase the crude palm oil but because the buyer or the seller, as the case 
may be, has bet on the wrong side of the price movement. 
Thirdly, hamishjiddiyah relates to the real purchase of the subject matter of the contract-
to compensate and reinstate the party's position to his original status quo before the 
purchase. However, in reality, only five per cent of crude palm oil futures trading ends 
with a real purchase of the oil. In this circumstance, it is obvious that initial margin is not 
actually meant to cover losses due to a default in the actual purchase of crude palm oil. 
Finally, the affiliation of the initial margin with marking to market and the variation 
margin, with daily paying into and paying out, of the account of contractual parties, 
accentuate the dissimilarities between the futures margin deposit and that of hamish 
jiddiyah. 
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5.6.1.3 Initial Margin - The Betting Tool 
Although initial margin is said to be a security tool for an efficient futures market, it is 
submitted that it is also being used as a betting mechanism to wager on the future direction 
of the crude palm oil futures price. This may not have been the case if the initial margin 
operated independently and solely on securing the contractual parties from any default of 
delivery. Instead, initial margin operates together with marking to market, margin call and 
variation margin. This framework alludes to betting on the future course of the crude palm 
oil futures price. Syed Abdul Jabbar Shahabudin clearly elucidates the ramifications of the 
futures margin system on the parties' gains and losses. He says: 
"Futures contracts are marked-to-market daily by the clearing house and the 
winners are paid for the paper profits and the losers have to pay for the paper losses 
in the form of variation margins. To ensure that losers have the money, the clearing 
house requires that they pay initial margins or earnest money when they establish 
positions. The combination of initial margins and variation margins ensures that 
players in the market have sufficient funds to meet their obligations." (1994: 3) 
This explanation falls squarely within the IFAM's resolution on the commodity futures 
contract. The IF AM resolves that the commodity futures contract is tainted with elements 
of gambling as they are, by and large, paper transactions. They are also not genuine 
purchases as they do not involve the real delivery and taking possession of the underlying 
commodities (as cited in ai-Amine, 2008: 14). 
According to Blake, the daily system of marking to market, which results in the gains and 
losses of the contractual parties, is an express demonstration that: 
"Futures trading is exactly like betting with a bookmaker268 (in this case the 
clearing house) on the price of the underlying good, with daily clearing bets." 
(2000,241 ) 
Similarly, Gorton and Rouwenhorst maintain that: 
"A futures contract is thus a bet on the futures spot price, and by entering into a 
futures contract, an investor assumes the risk of unexpected movements in the 
futures spot price." (2006: 48) 
268 In this situation, Chen (2006: 3) argues that a bookmaker is like a market maker in the betting market. It 
can at the same time be a bridge between two punters. 
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Likewise, the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences states that: 
"Elements closely parallel to gambling appear in conjunction with economic 
activities, especially those in which risk and uncertainty are prominent. In effect, 
speculators on the commodity markets bet against each other about the rise or fall 
of commodity prices." (Sills, 1972a: 53) 
Similarly, Stout269 articulates that: 
"These sorts of commercial wagers are neither new nor particularly 
innovative ... Originally, most commercial derivatives were bets on the future prices 
of agricultural commodities, like the rice derivatives traded in Japan in the fifteenth 
century or the com and wheat futures still traded on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange today. To use the language of derivatives traders, the 'underlying' - that is 
the thing being bet upon - was the future market price of rice, wheat or com." 
(2009: 5) 
This position is echoed by a well-known Slzarta scholar, Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo who 
states: 
"Generally speaking, a futures contract is a bet on which way prices will move. The 
attraction of such contracts to investors is that they, like short-selling and buying on 
margin, promise big profits. On the downside, however, the possibility of 
significant losses cannot be ignored ... none of this even remotely resembles the way 
envisioned by the S~arta for the proper conduct of business." (2004: 23) 
5.6.2 The Element of Chance 
The word "chance" derives from the Latin verb cadere, meaning to fall, which is a possible 
reference to the fall of a dice. Therefore, in the throwing of a dice, the result in every 
instance is due to chance in the sense that no uniformity of sequence between the 
antecedent and consequent can possibly be discovered however carefully and patiently one 
may experiment with the various conditions involved (Hastings, 1971b: 355). The 
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics Encyclopaedia describes "chance" as: 
"a complex of causal elements, in which indefinitely various combinations are 
possible, and each distinct combination yields a distinct result. Inasmuch as there is 
no possibility of knowing what particular combination may occur, there is no 
possibility of forecasting the precise effect which may follow .... Consequently there 
269 Again, Stout maintains that derivatives are essentially betting contracts. They are, "often described by the 
short word "bets." (Readers who prefer polysyllabic nouns can call derivatives "wagers.") ... Derivatives are 
literally bets - agreements between parties that one will pay the other a sum of money that is determined by 
whether or not a particular event occurs in the future ... This is exactly why derivatives are called derivatives. 
The value of a derivatives agreement is "derived" from the performance of the underlying financial 
phenomenon, just as the value of a betting ticket at the racetrack is "derived" from the performance of a horse 
in a race." (2011: 6) 
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is no basis whatsoever for the definite calculation of any future ~vent. But, while 
definite calculation is impossible, an estimate of general tendencies is quite within 
the scope of our capabilities ... Chance happenings become immoral solely in 
consequence of the uses to which they may be put. .. No evil principle can lurk in 
the simple fact itself of a chance event, whether it be the casting of the lot, the fall 
of dice, a hand at cards or the tum of a wheeL." (1971: 355) 
As explained above, chance by itself is not immoral. It becomes immoral depending on the 
way it is used. This notion is in parallel with the S~ar[<a. In this respect, Imam Malik 
demarcates the game of chance into two categories: (1) games of chance that are partaken 
for sport or fun purposes hence making this type of game of chance not considered 
gambling; and (2) games of chance which involve people making bets, hence such bets 
qualify these games of chance as gambling or maysir (as cited in Siddiqi, 1981: 131). The 
latter category is condemned as the gain acquired or loss suffered by the player is 
dependent on luck or chance (Rahman, 1979: 115). 
It follows that in a situation where parties are betting on an uncertain event, at the point of 
making a payment to initiate the contract, the parties are not actually interested with what 
they are actually transacting but rather with what they may gain or lose.27o Hence by 
relying on chance, one is betting that luck will be on one's side. However, chance is not an 
acceptable object in an exchange contract as it is not a material object (Elgari, 235). This is 
gambling in essence. The mere reliance on chance or hope is an irrational behaviour as 
chance and hope are not natural means in achieving the desired outcome (AI-Suwailem, 
2002: 24). 
5.6.2.1 Game of Chance in Variation Margin and Offsetting Transaction 
According to AI-Suwailem (2002: 25), a game of chance is prohibited as it involves a zero 
sum exchange with an uncertain payoff (he referred to the zero sum game not as merely the 
gain of one party is the loss of the other party, but strictly to the payoff of a player being 
unable to increase without also reducing the other player's payoft).271 He postulates that a 
270 When a future uncertain event is identified, players bid on chances based on whether they think the event 
is likely or unlikely to occur. The price at any point in time represents the players' collective consensus on 
the likelihood of the outcome (McCarthy, 2007: 750). 
271 It is a competitive game where preference of each party is diametrically opposed to the other, so one party 
can win only if the other loses (AI·Suwailem, 2000: 62). AI-Suwailem (2006: 74) explains that "eating 
wealth for nothing" is equivalent to a zero sum game and amongst the characteristics of a zero sum game is 
uncertainty at the time of the contract and gain and loss being determined bilaterally between the two 
contractual parties. 
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game of chance is characterised by: (i) each party relying on pure chance to win; (ii) 
.chance favouring only one player - the winner; and (iii) the risk involved in the game 
being uncontrollable with none of the players being able to influence the likelihood of his 
payoff. Hence, the question now is whether the winning, in the form of the differential 
payment received via the variation margin and the offsetting transaction, results from a 
mere chance or luck. 
In reality and as explained earlier, the determination of who, under the eligible delivery 
agreement, is to be receiving or paying the differential amount very much depends on the 
following day's daily price settlement and the position of the parties in the agreement. The 
contract price agreed to by the parties at the time of entering into such agreement varies 
with the next day's daily settlement or the next minute after the parties have entered into 
the agreement. Rule 611 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules 
provides for the nature of the daily settlement price. This price is determined daily by the 
Clearing House with reference to: 
"" .any bids, offers and traded prices quoted by an Exchange and such other 
information as may be deemed relevant by the Clearing House." 
This provision shows that the daily settlement price, which determines which party is to 
pay the difference, is not the decision of the parties concerned. The parties will not even be 
able to negotiate or do anything to influence the likelihood of their payoffs. The price is 
determined by the bids, offers and price quoted by the Exchange. Hence, if luck is on their 
side, the price will move in correspondence with their bet. This condition is exacerbated 
further by the constant change in the anticipated future price of the underlying commodity. 
According to Edwards and Ma (1992: 10), price fluctuation is one of the hallmarks of the 
commodity futures contract which affects contractual parties on whether they gain or lose. 
Dubosfky and Miller (2003: 5) view all futures contracts as zero sum games. In view of 
this, it is inevitable that one party will bet for the price to move in a direction which is 
totally opposite to the other party's bet. As a result, in each contract, there can only be one 
party that is likely to win. It is the element of chance that yields the outcome of the parties' 
bet. Taking into consideration the fact that the parties neither exchange any counter values 
nor have control over the influence of the movement of the crude palm oil futures price, 
chance is the arbiter on the parties' gain and loss. 
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The SAC, on the other hand views that: 
"It is not appropriate to judge a contract whose value fluctuates due to the changing 
demands for crude palm oil futures market as a gambling activity. This is because 
gambling activities depend solely on luck and are not related to demand and offer." 
(2006: 76) 
It is submitted that price fluctuation or volatility fits a gambling environment. It is the basis 
for betting the future movement of the crude palm oil futures price. It follows that when 
the resulting gain and loss is absolutely dependent on the movement of prices, of which 
movement is determined by factors wholly independent of one's control, the activity 
therefore is connotative of gambling (Thomas, 1995: 21). This is regardless of whether the 
value of the crude palm oil futures price is a reflection of supply and demand. 
5.6.3 Unlawful Gain of One Party is at the Expense of Another 
The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines gambling272 as: 
"a form of activity in which the parties involved, who are known as betters or 
players, voluntarily engage to make the transfer of money or something else of 
value amongst themselves contingent upon the outcome of some future or uncertain 
event." (Sills, 1972a: 53) 
The word gambling273 is defined by Rosenthal as: 
272 Gambling is the derivative of a game. According to Rosenthal (1975: 2), the term "gambling" was a 
recent coinage into the English language despite gambling activities having been played from the days of 
antiquity. The earliest form of gambling involved man-to-man games such as: contests of strength like 
wrestling and weight-lifting, followed by contests of speed, and competitions involving a degree of skill. 
These games involved players throwing spears or stones at a target or tossing a stone, shell, or bone into the 
air and guessing where it would fall (Jones, 1973: 13). These rudimentary features of games have evolved 
over the centuries. Hence, the later forms of gambling were extended to include activities or games which 
involve elements of pure hazard like betting and guessing games (games of pure chance); games of "pure 
adresse" (games of true skills) such as chess; board games involving dicing (games of a mix of chance and 
skill); and a variety of other types of activities that used both human and animal skills in the sport (such as 
horse racing and pigeon racing) (Rosenthal, 1975: 26). Wager or stake is the striking element in this later 
version of these games. 
273 It is also interesting to note the definition of gambling given by Boma and Lowry (1987: 219) who 
describe gambling as "reallocation of wealth on the basis of deliberate risk, involving gain to one party and 
loss to the other, usually without the introduction of productive work on either side." While Werhane and 
Freeman refer to gambling as "putting something valuable at risk in a process the end of which cannot be 
known to those whose risk it is." It also generally refers to "any activity in which there is risk (something 
valuable may be lost) and/or opportunity (something valuable may be gained) and the outcome is not 
knowable in advance." (1998: 294). 
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"contract among two or more human beings which involve the exchange of mone~ 
or other valuables depending upon the uncertain outcome of a staged event.,,2 4 
(1975: 2). 
The question then is whether the characteristic of transference of money from a loser to a 
winner upon the outcome of an uncertain event, is ingrained in the differential payment via 
the variation margin and the offsetting transaction? 
5.6.3.1 Unlawful Gain of One Party is at the Expense of Another: the 
Variation Margin and the Offsetting Transaction 
For variation margin, Rule 614 (a) and (b) of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad 
Business Rules stipulate that: 
"(a) On each Business Day, the Clearing House must make available to each 
Clearing Participant a statement advising the Clearing Participant of funds (if any) 
which must be paid to the Clearing House on the same day and showing the Margin 
which must be lodged with the Clearing House ... " 
(b) The Clearing House is entitled to set off any amount due from a Clearing 
Participant to the Clearing House against any amount due from the Clearing House 
to the Clearing Participant." 
Kolb elucidates the process of the variation margin as follows: 
"Because futures prices change almost every day, each account will have frequent 
gains and losses. The losses can require a variation margin payment, and the gains 
may entitle the trader to withdraw cash ... Any losses will be covered by the posting 
of additional variation margin." (2000: 19) 
Equally, Dubofsky and Miller explain that: 
"A trader is offsetting his position every day, and realising each day's profit or loss. 
The profits and losses are based on the changes in the settlement price, or closing 
futures price, of the futures contract. All profits that increase the margin account 
balance above the initial margin amount can be withdrawn daily and spent by the 
trader. Losses deplete the equity in the account, until there is a margin call, at 
which time variation margin must be deposited to bring the account balance back to 
the initial margin level." (2003: 130) 
274 Staged event refers to all kinds of games and competitions of men and animals that are associated with the 
exchange of property, but not to events which are natural-based, for example whether it will or will not rain 
tomorrow. 
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A similar procedure for the transference of the differential payment in the offsetting 
transaction is prescribed in Rule 608(b) of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad 
Business Rules. It states: 
"(b) Upon two Open Contracts being off-set pursuant to Rule 608(a), any 
settlement difference, as calculated by the Clearing House, becomes immediately 
due by the Clearing Participant or the Clearing House, as the case may be." 
For a clearer view, Table 1 illustrates the manner in which money from a loser IS 
transferred to a winner by the use of marking to market. The gain by the winner is 
evidenced by the receipt of the differential payment via the variation margin as well as the 
offsetting transaction. 
Table 1 
Day CPO Futures Margin Account Margin Account 
Settlement Farmer Confectioner 
Price Short Position Balance Long Position Balance 
(RM per ton) (RMl (RMl (RM) (RM) 
0 100 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 
1 98 +240 1,440 -240 960 
2 97 +120 1,560 -120 840 
3 98 -120 1,440 +120 960 
4 96 +240 1,680 -240 720* 
5 95 +120 1,800 +480* 1,200 
-120 1,080 
Source: Bacha (2007: 33) 
The above table demonstrates how the initial margm, RM 1,200, gets decreased or 
increased on a daily basis. The changes in the account results from the execution of 
marking to market which is influenced by the changes in the price of the crude palm oil. If 
the price of the crude palm oil increases, the farmer will get additional payment into his 
margin account, while the confectionary will lose his money in the margin account. The 
amount of money lost by the confectionary is equivalent to the amount of money that is 
paid into the farmer's margin account. Table 1 also shows how, on day 4, the 
confectionary's account is below the level of the maintenance margin where the account 
has only RM720. The confectionary then receives a margin call to top-up his margin 
account back to the level of initial margin which is shown in Day 5. An amount of RM480 
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is then added to the account. This example illustrates how the confectionary loses RM 1 080 
in five days of trading, which is almost all the money he had initially paid into his margin 
account. 
In economics, the gain of the farmer at the loss of the confectionary or vice versa is known 
275 A . as a zero sum game. zero sum game 1S: 
"one in which the payoffs of the two players add up to zero, no matter what 
strategy vector is played ... Consequently, the incentives of the two players are 
diametrically opposed - one player wins if and only if the other player loses." 
(Dutta, 2000: 139). 
All derivatives are zero sum games. Whatever the amount of money one party gains must 
equal the amount of money the other party loses (Dubofsky and Miller, 2003: 5). The zero 
sum game is unlawful as Sbari'a disallows one from benefitting at the expense of others, 
out of nothing, and in an unfair manner (Vemados, 2008: 106). 
In addition to that, the zero sum game conflicts with the precepts of the law on exchange; 
namely, any transfer of money must be made with a corresponding transfer of counter-
values between parties ('iwad) (Qatar Financial Centre Authority, 2010: 135). '/wad is the 
basic trait or condition sine qua non of a lawful sale, as a sale is necessarily an exchange of 
value against an equivalent value (Rosly, 2005: 30). Ayub (2002: 18) similarly argues that 
the absence of any (iwad recalls the case of riba, or usury in Islam, where usury is marked 
up to the loan without any plausible reason. In Islam, money is not considered a 
commodity and money cannot generate money (Kotby, 1990: 68). This receipt of an 
additional payment by one of the contractual parties coincides with the literal meaning of 
maysir which is to gain something with ease and without paying an equivalent (iwad for it. 
A similar position was found in English common law and American civil law in the 
seventeenth till the nineteenth century. A sale and purchase contract entered into without 
any intention of performing its contractual obligations but instead to settle by difference 
was considered a gaming or wagering contract. That was so as the contract was entered 
into for the sole purpose of gambling on the price difference. Nonetheless, at the dawn of 
the twentieth century, the contract for difference was no longer deemed a gaming or 
275, It, is also equivalent to a form of rent-seeking - trying to acquire wealth not by creating it but by taking 
eXlstmg wealth from someone else. Hence when rent-seeking exhausts valuable resources like time, money, 
or human ingenuity, the zero sum game becomes a negative sum game that reduces net social welfare (Stout, 
2011:9). 
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wagering contract. Instead they became valid and enforceable contracts so long as they 
were traded by members of an exchange on a formal exchange venue. The irony of this 
present law is that the contract for difference as it is today, as well as from previous 
centuries, is still innate with the element of wagering or gambling. Chapter six discusses 
in detail the development of the legality of the contract for difference. 276 
5.6.4 Unlawful Acquisition of Another"s \Vealth 
The notion of unlawful acquisition of another's wealth encompasses any ways or means of 
acquiring wealth that violates the rights of Allah, the contracting parties, or society at large 
(Iqbal, 2007: 13). This notion is clearly explicated in the Qur' an, Chapter An-Nisa', verse 
29: 
"0 ye who believe! Do not consume one another's wealth in wrongful ways (such 
as theft, extortion, bribery, usury and gambling); except it be dealing by mutual 
agreement; and do not destroy yourselves (individually or collectively by following 
wrongful ways like extreme asceticism and idleness. Be ever mindful that) God has 
surely been All-Compassionate towards you (particularly as believers)." 
Rosenthal aptly describes the importance of this notion when she states that: 
"Islam, with its strong feelings and laws about how property should be acquired 
and distributed, was naturally inclined toward greater strictness in classifying 
gambling as everything where the acquisition and distribution of property took 
place outside the generally accepted categories (by way of gift, labour or 
exchange), but the specific character of gambling was well understood." (1975: 3). 
Ibn Taymiyyah (2000: 41) describes two ways in which property or wealth are gained 
unlawfully, namely, the properties themselves are unlawful and the manner in which the 
properties are acquired. He further postulates that: 
"If a sale which partakes in gharar also involves devouring the property of others-
akl ai-mal bi 'I-bali!', then it becomes indistinguishable from qimar and maysir, 
which are clearly forbidden. If in one contract of sale one party receives what was 
276 The differential contract resembles the offsetting transaction in the sense that, "on the ascertainment of 
the future price, one party must pay to the other an amount originally unfixed. Neither party has any interest 
in the contract beyond that amount, and since neither knows what the amount at stake is, it is impossible to 
say that either has any interest in the event such as may represent it." (Street, 1937: 129) 
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due to him but the other does not and the latter's side of the bargain is open to risk-
taking (mukha!arah) of a kind that frustrates and nullifies his right, then the sale 
partakes both in gharar and gambling at the same time ... God Most High has 
forbidden the unlawful devouring of the property of others, and it occurs in two 
ways, namely, usury and gambling (riba and maysir), and the Book of God is 
explicit in respect of both." (as cited in Kamali, 2002: 155) 
In Islam, an individual's property is sacred. No property can be taken from him except 
through a lawful exchange or unless he gives it freely as a gift or a charity (Yusuf AI-
Qaradawi, 2003: 281). Hence when one of the contractual parties takes what is due to him 
while the other contractual party face the risks of not getting what is due to him, an 
unlawful acquisition of property has occurred (Kamali, 2000: 151). 
5.6.4.1 The Futures Margin System and the Offsetting Transaction: Unlawful 
Acquisition of Another's Wealth 
According to Kamali (2000: 176), the margin payment in a commodity futures contract is 
valid, as its purpose is to secure the contract's integrity and the rights of contractual parties 
against excessive price fluctuations. Therefore there is no issue of unlawful gain. However, 
in reality, the futures margin system and the offsetting transaction entail one party to 
transfer his money to the other party without anything in return. In other words, one party 
gains while the other party loses. Hence, Coulson (1984: 11) argues that the gain earned by 
the winner is unearned as the gain results from speculative transactions and cannot be 
calculated in advance by the contracting parties. 
Apart from that reason, S/wrta strictly requires the exchange of counter-values in any 
transaction.277 Legally, a contract to transfer, as compared to a contract of exchange, lacks 
the balance of t;laman (liability or contractual liability). The receipt of payment by one 
party without any corresponding t;lamiin from the other party results in the contract being 
invalid as the t;laman is unjustified (Habil, 2010: 102). Additionally according to Sanhuri, 
the Islamic law of contract "has an altruistic moral role: to intervene in the contractual 
277 The exchange of real counter-values strikes at the very foundation of a balanced economy or equilibrium 
in society. The exchange of counter-values creates wealth. However, a gambling contract is not an exchange 
contract but is instead a transfer contract. It transfers wealth from the losers to the winners. It lacks the 
benefit which trade offers; for example, the sale of food enhancing man's longevity and survival. Sale 
transactions also create wealth by virtue of the exchange of money and food, hence they benefit not only the 
buyer and the seller but society in general (EI Diwany: 2003, 99). 
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content in order to create a just and balanced society" (as cited in Bechor, 200 I: 189). As a 
result, an individual's right to property or an individual's self-interest is restricted to the 
social good or to the needs of the society (Bechor, 2001: 180). 
5.6.5 Hatred and Enmity 
In Chapter Ai-Maida (The Table) verse 94, Allah says: 
"Satan's plan is (but) to excite enmity and hatred between you, with intoxicants and 
gambling, and hinder you from the remembrance of God, and from prayer: Will ye 
not then abstain?" 
Yusuf AI-Qaradawi succinctly adduces the notion of enmity and hatred from the above 
verse where he says: 
"3. It is therefore not surpnsmg that gamblers develop hatred and enmity 
towards one another, although they may claim that losing does not trouble them. 
There is always a winner and a loser. The loser may seem composed but behind his 
composure is frustration, anger and regret: frustration due to disappointment, anger 
at the loss of money, and regret for not having played a winning game. 
3. Gambling has its own compulsion. The loser plays again in hope of winning the 
next game in order to regain his earlier losses, while the winner plays again to 
enjoy the pleasure of winning, impelled by greed for more. Naturally luck changes 
hands, the loser becomes the winner and the winner becomes the loser, and the joy 
of winning changes into the bitterness of loss. Thus, the gamblers may persist at 
playing the game, unable to bring themselves to leave it; this is the secret of the 
addiction to gambling.278 
5. Because of this addiction, gambling is a danger to the society as well as to 
the individual. This habit consumes gamblers' time and energy, making them non-
productive idlers and parasites on society, who take but do not give, who consume 
but do not produce. Moreover, due to his absorption with gambling, the gambler 
neglects his obligations towards his Creator and his duties towards his community. 
It often happens that a gambling addict sells his honour, religion and country for 
278 Similarly, Statman views that "Hope and fear may be the strongest emotions that drive lottery players and 
stock traders, but regret is not so far behind. Regret is the pain we feel when we find, too late, that a different 
choice would have led to a better outcome ... the wide array of securities advice and research tools enhances 
the play value of securities trading. Illusion of control leads people to act as if they have control in situations 
that are in fac~ determined by chance. The illusion of control leads stock traders to believe that their chosen 
stocks have better odds than stock chosen by darts thrown at stock tables." (2002: 17). Based on this premise, 
it is not suprising to find a survey by Ross (1975) on 558 customers of a large Chicago-based commodity 
house with branch offices throughout the country. The survey has shown that almost all of the customers of 
the commodity house lost their money in futures trading. 
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the sake of the gaming table, since his devotion to this table dulls his sense of 
values and kills all other devotions." (2003: 281-282). 
Likewise, Ibn Taymiyyah argues that, though the primary purpose of gambling may 
originally be to gain property and for the pleasure of play, the resulting loss and the pain 
and harm caused by playing were greater. For these reasons, maysir was not prohibited 
mainly because of the frivolous exchange of property attendant upon gambling but more 
because of its effects on the mind and heart. (as cited in Rosenthal, 1975: 80). The harm of 
gambling affects not only the individual player, but also society as a whole. Hence, by 
prohibiting gambling, Islam negates these few benefits and wards off the harms (AI-
Raysuni, 2005: 228). Chapter six evidences this vexatious situation. Through case laws, 
this chapter demonstrates how the parties in the commodity futures contract wage legal 
battles against one another over the claims of betting proceeds. 
The next part of the chapter discusses another fundamental component of the crude palm 
oil futures contract - futures speculation or speCUlative trading. The question that this part 
will attempt to address is whether futures speculation is contaminated with elements of 
maysir. If this question is answered in the affirmative, futures speculation is deemed 
prohibited. Otherwise, it is not. Similar to the analysis on the futures margin system and 
the offsetting transaction, the analysis on futures speculation is premised on the fact that 
speculation in commodity futures contract is condemned if it is being used as a tool of 
gambling and that any business activities which contain elements of gambling are hence 
prohibited. 
5.7 Speculation in the Commodity Futures Contract 
Kaldor defines speculation as: 
"the purchase (or sale) of goods with a view to resale (repurchase) at a later date, 
where the motive behind such action is the expectation of a change in the relevant 
prices relatively to the ruling price and not a gain accruing through their use, or any 
kind of transformation effected in them, or their transfer between markets."(as cited 
in Feiger, 1976: 677). 
Hence, in the futures market:279 
279 According to Blake, speculation in the futures market is where: 
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"Speculators have no intention of making or taking delivery of the commodity. 
They don't even have any connection with the production or use of the commodity. 
Speculators enter the market anticipating that prices are going to change. In doing 
so, they take futures positions with the intention of making a profit." (Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, 2006: 54). 
The speculators buy futures contracts when they believe the price of goods will rise and 
sell futures contracts when they believe the price will fall (Dubofsky and Miller, 2003: 
126). To speculate, they use techiques called fundamental analysis;280 namely, the study of 
supply and demand; and or technical analysis,281 which is the study of price and volumes 
charts. These analyses aid in forecasting the movement of the underlying commodity price. 
Due to the typical volatility of the prices of the underlying commodity as well as the high 
leverage of futures trading, large profits can be earned and large losses can be suffered 
"Speculators are simply interested in taking either a short or long position in a particular security in 
the hope of making a quick short-term profit. They believe that they have better information than 
other market participants about whether a security is overpriced or underpriced compared with its 
fair or fundamental value ... Ifthey think that a security is overpriced they take short positions, while 
if they believe that it is underpriced they take long positions. Similarly, they could accept that a 
security is fairly priced currently, but believe that they have superior information indicating that the 
fair price and hence the market price is about to rise or fall. Again, they could take long or short 
positions to back their view ... which allows them to take their positions earlier than the other 
participants. They can then sit back and wait for the slower investors to recognise the mispricing and 
to move en masse in or out of the security and so act to correct the mispricing. The speculators can 
then take their profits and run." (2000: 415). 
280 Fundamental analysis - it uses supply and demand information to interpret and determine its anticipated 
impact on prices. In hoping to predict which way prices will move, they are interested in identifying factors 
that are likely to affect the supply and demand of the respective underlying commodity. When the supply ofa 
commodity increases and demand decreases or stays the same, the price falls. When supply decreases and 
demand increases or stays the same, the price of that commodity rises. If supply stays the same, changes in 
demand will cause prices to rise or fall. Fundamentalists also study how and when events change the value of 
the commodity - whether it becomes more valuable or less valuable as a result of an event - and whether 
prices can be expected to increase or decrease because of such an event. In addition to the above studies, 
fundamentalists also study psychology effects of various kinds of information on other market traders to see 
how and when these traders respond to a certain type of event or release of information. By analysing this 
response, fundamentalists hope to trade before information is incorporated into the price. The time lag 
between an event and its resulting market response presents a trading opportunity (Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, 2006: 69). 
28) Technical analysis interprets historical price movements to predict prices in the future. Its basic goal is to 
determine the direction and strength of the current trend in the market and to identify when such a trend is 
about to change. If the technician identifies the trend as bullish, the forecast is to remain long and to keep 
buying until the trend is deemed to be over. The technical analysis places focus almost exclusively on past 
and current prices. The technicians believe that all economic supply/demand news and forecasts are built into 
current prices. Besides studying the price of the underlying commodities, technicians are also interested in 
the patterns of volume and open interest. These patterns help them to chart and identify the strength and 
direction of the market trends. Spotting trend is also another interest - to chart the bullish and bearish of the 
markets. If they see that on one day the market finishes on an upward note with high volume and open 
interest but it finishes down on a low volume and a similar or decreased open interest the next day, they 
would note that the market might be turning bullish as the sellers in the market were not as keen to sell as 
buyers had been keen to buy on the previous day. They also study the cyclical repetition of price patterns 
over time. This requires an in-depth analysis of market movements, ranging from relative high and low points 
which last for two or three years, integrated with those that last only for a few days. Like fundamentalists, 
technicians also look to complex computer programs for assistance in interpreting the behaviour of market 
players in order to identify trading opportunities (Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 2006: 76). 
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within a short time in the futures market (Securities Industry Development Corporation, 
2007: 1-19). 
The above description discerns two characteristics of futures speculation: namely, (i) the 
buying and selling of crude palm oil futures contract with the intention of gaining from the 
price difference, and not from the physical delivery of crude palm oil, and (ii) the gain by 
price difference, results in one gaining at the expense of others. These characteristics are 
fundamental to the issue on maysir. Hence, the next section examines whether the SAC 
resolution has resolved this big question. 
5.8 The SAC's Position on Futures Speculation 
The SAC (Securities Commission, 2006: 78) resolves that speculation in crude palm oil 
futures contract is permissible. This view is grounded on the basis that speculation exists in 
all forms of business and is not limited to futures transactions. The SAC further argues that 
making profit from price difference is not forbidden in Islam. This is due to the fact that 
Islam allows sale and purchase transactions, such as bay(muziiyadah282 and muriibahah/83 
which involve profiting from the difference between the original price and the selling price 
(Securities Commission, 2006: 109). 
The SAC (Securities Commission, 2006: 111-112) further contends that speculation is 
different from gambling. The act of speculation can be distinguished from the act of 
gambling by checking the motives and conduct of the investors. Those investors who are 
well informed and invest with careful consideration are speculators while those who enter 
the market and invest solely on luck are gamblers. Hence in futures speculation, the issue 
is whether it is done excessively or moderately. This issue can be overcome by the 
monitoring and supervision of speculative activity to ensure fairness to market players as 
well as to minimise forbidden practices in Islam, for example fraud and manipulation. 
Despite permitting futures speculation on the basis that it is analogous to ordinary 
commercial trading and not gambling, the SAC has not attended to two important issues 
inherent in futures speculation, namely: (i) buying and selling of crude palm oil futures 
contract with the intention of gaining only from the price difference and not from real 
282 Bay' muziiyadah is defined as sale by auction (Securities Commission, 2006: 171). 
283 Muriibahah is defined as cost plus profit sale (Securities Commission, 2006: 174). 
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delivery, and (ii) such gains results in one gaining at the expense of others. Although the 
SAC argues that Islam permits profiting from price difference, it is submitted that such 
permission is based on transactions involving real delivery of commodities or exchange of 
counter-values. It is further submitted that though speculators speculate responsibly and 
carefully, it does not extinguish the fact that, the gain from price difference at the expense 
of one's losses, is a characteristic of a probihited maysir activity. 
The pursuing section will further distill the question as to whether futures speculation is an 
investment or a gambling. This section will be followed by the examination of issue (i) 
above under the following sub-headings: namely, short-term trading, disassociation from 
the real economy, the method of trading and the ramification of futures speCUlation. 
However, issue (ii) above will not be dealt with, as this issue has been examined in the 
earlier part of this chapter. 
5.9 Futures Speculation - An Investment or Gambling? 
The controversies surrounding futures speculation result from its activities being akin to 
gambling. However, Teweles, Harlow and Stone (1977: 4) view it differently. They argue 
that gambling involves the creation of risk for the sole purpose of someone taking it. 
Hence, horse races, poker games and roulette wheels are vehicles where risks are created 
that would not be present without them in the first place. A gambler willingly accepts this 
risk in return for an opportunity to win some money. On the other hand, speculation deals 
with risks that are necessarily present in the process of marketing goods in a free capitalist 
system. Therefore in the case of the commodity futures contract, the risk of price changes 
is inevitable. This risk exists regardless of whether there exists any futures market for the 
said commodities. Nonetheless, Stout (2011: 9) argues that the risks that speculators are 
exposed to are new risks which were not there before, namely the risk of losing their bet 
and the risk of their counter-party defaulting. Thus, instead of risk bei~g shifted, risk is 
created hence becoming artificial risk. Similarly, Toutounchian (2009: 81) argues that this 
artificial risk is created by the futures market and by speculators, out of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is an essential element in all speculative activities and its sole purpose is to 
make a suitable environment for a few speculators to make a "profit" ?84 
284 In view of the involvement of risk in both of these professions, the gambler, as the risk-maker, and the 
speculator, as the risk-taker, share one motivation: namely, to willingly take relatively large risks in return for 
a chance to gain large profits. Both professions derive some pleasure and excitement from their activities -
getting rich fast and the thrill of taking a risk (Teweles, Harlow and Stone, 1977: 4). 
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Naturally, futures speculation is distinct from commercial investment. 285 An American 
court in the case of Kirkpatrick v Bonsall, aptly distinguishes commercial speculation from 
futures speculation, which is akin to gambling. It says (in deciding the legality of the 1870 
futures contract to sell 5000 barrels of oil): 
"We must not confound gambling, whether it be in corporation stocks or 
merchandise, with what is commonly termed speculation. Merchants speculate 
upon the future prices of that in which they deal, and buy and sell accordingly. In 
other words, they think of the weigh, that is speculate upon, the probabilities of the 
coming market, and act upon this lookout into the future, in their business 
transactions: and in this they often exhibit high mental grasp, and great knowledge 
of business, and of the affairs of the world ... But when ventures are made upon the 
tum of prices alone, with no bona fide intent to deal in the article, but merely to risk 
the difference between the rise and fall of the price at a given time, the case is 
changed ... Then the bargains represents not a transfer of property, but a mere stake 
or wager upon its future price. The difference requires the ownership of only a few 
hundred or thousands of dollars, while the capital to complete the entire purchase or 
sale may be hundreds of thousands or millions ... such transactions are destructive 
of good morals and fair dealing, and of the best interest of the community." (as 
cited in Tate, 2007: Ill). 
A similar view is echoed in The Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics where it 
distinguishes futures speculation, which is betting on future price, from commercial 
speculation. It says: 
285This notion is supported by the following views. Khan (1982: 240) views speculation as a purchase and 
sale of an asset, in the expectation of a gain from changes in the price of the assets. Investment, on the other 
hand, is the purchase of any asset or expenditure on capital goods. In speculation, the objective is to derive 
any gain from a shift in the price level without getting involved in the production process while in investment 
the purpose is to participate in the production activity. Chapra (1986: 96) explains that investors make 
purchase by making a full payment followed by a reciprocal delivery. The objective of investors is to seek an 
outlet for their savings, to earn an income, and to profit from any appreciation in the value of their stock-
holdings. The investors do not indulge in short-term transactions and their intention at the time of purchase is 
to hold the stock for a long period. The shorter the time of holding, the lesser the investment motive, though 
they may change their mind and sell off their stocks. This is in line with the requirements in Islamic 
investment. According to Levy (1999: 3) an investor is an individual who is willing to forgo consumption 
today to achieve the goal of a higher level of consumption in the future. When an investor invests, he uses 
financial capital in an effort to create more financial capital in the future. Investment also refers to a vehicle 
used to make more money. Some investments are speCUlative as they involve a high degree of risk. Seeto 
(2004: 38) describes an investor as one that actively researches financial instruments to be invested in, 
whether they are company shares, commodities, currencies, or derivatives of those instruments. On the basis 
of that analysis, an investment decision is formed. On the other hand~ a speculator may know nothing of the 
instrument that is being invested in or has little to do with the underlying value of the company or 
commodity, but attempts to forecast current or future sentiment with no solid foundation or standard of 
measure with which a price can be stabilised. Similarly, Sardehi (2008: 50) argues that speculation, which is 
backed by proper risk assessment, analysis, and interpretation of relevant information, is not pure gambling 
and accordingly is not prohibited in Islam (Sardehi, 2008: 50). However, what is prohibited is the absence of 
these conditions and the excessive uncertainty that is akin to speculation in a game of chance (Obaidullah. 
n.d: 3). 
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"Men buy or sell cotton or com for future delivery, without ever intending to 
handle or distribute the actual commodities, but merely with a view to closing the 
contract before it is due, and profiting by the fluctuation of prices ... But there is 
also a commercial speculation which is necessary and legitimate. The merchant has 
to make provision for social need, and, in buying ahead, chance must inevitably 
enter into calculation. The gambler's business is wholly self-centred; he subserves 
no need of the community. The merchant whole policy is to eliminate risk as far as 
possible. The gambler desires risk." (Hastings, 1971 a: 166). 
A parallel illustration286 is given by Kamali where he states: 
"If A buys a com futures contract from a farmer and B sells a com futures contract 
to a flour mill, A and B are speculating in the futures contract. However if the 
farmer sells a futures contract directly to the miller and A and B makes a bet with 
one another on the direction of the com prices, they are gambling. They do not 
invest any capital labour or skill, but engage in a bet than a commercially beneficial 
endeavour or enterprise." (2002: 147) 
In this respect, Ahmad Muhyi aI-Din (as cited in aI-Amine, 2008: 147) explicates that in 
Islam, futures speculation is unlawful as it does not involve physical delivery of the 
underlying commodity. This contract, settled by way of difference, is an evidence of 
gambling. The mere fact that this contract is called a sale contract is just a form of bilah 
(legal trick). Khan (1995: 46) similarly argues that earning an income from mere 
speculation on prices without having an implicit part in real activity is gambling. 
Further, Toutounchian (2009: 75) contends that speculation in stock and commodities 
functions as a medium for exchanging money with money "as if loan is taken and the stock 
or commodity is being used as collateral in this disguised loan contract". The intention of a 
speculator is not to buy stocks or commodities for himself, or for trade, but is merely to 
exchange money with money and to make a gain from the difference between the selling 
and buying price. To understand Toutounchian's contention, it is worth noting the view of 
Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali on money where he said, in Islam, money: 
" ... only reflects the value of goods ... money should not be created just because its 
very existence should create a demand for it, but rather it should be used for the 
procurement of other goods ... the money itself has no intrinsic values. Had it an 
intrinsic value, it could not have played its role as money and would have become 
like commodities" (as cited in Thomas, 2005: 9). 
286 Stevens (1892: 421) likens an investor in a commercial or industrial line with a "bull operator", who 
expects and intends to profit by making the property productive. Speculators, who are not investors, are ones 
who make profits from an increase in the value of the property rather than it being made productive. 
1511 P age 
5.10 The Element of May.,-;r in Futures Speculation 
This section discusses one of the two important issues inherent in futures speculation~ 
namely, the buying and selling of crude palm oil futures contract with the intention of 
gaining only from the price difference and not from real delivery. This discussion is 
divided into four sub-headings: namely, short-term trading, disassociation from the real 
economy, the method of trading and the ramification of futures speculation. 
5.10.t A Short-Term Trading 
Futures speculators are distinguishable by the type of futures position they hold. A position 
trader is a type of speculator who looks for long-term price trends. He takes on a position 
and may hold it over a period of days, weeks, or months and close his position when the 
price moves favourably (Securities Industries Development Corporation, 2007: 1-20). On 
the other hand, a day trader is a type of speculator who closes out his position on the same 
day. Thus, if a trader has taken a long position, the plan is to take an offsetting short 
position later in the day; and if the trader has taken a short position, the plan is to take an 
offsetting long position later in the day (Hull, 1997: 23). In view of the very short period 
held by day traders, often minutes or hours, day traders represent a major group of market 
traders which require high speed computer access and real-time market quotes to enable 
them to capitalise on small changes in the price (Seeto, 2004: 45). A scalper also trades 
like a day trader as a scalper rarely holds a position overnight. 
The structure of commodity futures trading: namely the non-involvement of making and 
taking delivery of the underlying commodity; the high leverage; and price volatility, 
accentuate the appeal of quick gain trading. Naughton and Naughton (2000: 146) argue 
that speculative trading, which is purely for short-term gain and is executed on the basis of 
uncertainty in the market, embeds characteristic of qimiir or gambling. 
In reality, day trading has raised problems. The problem lies in predicting how fast or by 
how much ,Prices will change. If the buying and selling is done at lightning speed, traders 
stand to lose as much money as traders would have gained, if not a lot more (Morris and 
Ingram, 2001: 33). Hence, Shapiro attests that day trading is: 
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" ... a risky, speculative activity and even the most experienced day traders may 
suffer severe and unexpected financial losses, even beyond their initial investment." 
(as cited in Kamal, 2001: 117) 
Meanwhile, Skeel (2006: 3) labelled day trading as "gambling, pure and simple". The US 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has investigated day trading activity. 
Following eight months of investigation, the Subcommittee concluded that day trading is a 
highly speculative activity which is equivalent to a certain type of gambling. Day trading 
has even been called "gambling,,287 by both the Chairman of the Securities of the Exchange 
Commission and the President of the North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NAASA). Evidence had shown that only a small fraction of novice traders 
were ever profitable. Traders who were novice and undercapitalised had almost no chance 
of success. The NAASA has also released a professional report based on a seven month 
investigation, which found that at least 70 per cent of day traders lose money and only 11.5 
per cent show the ability to conduct profitable short-term trading (as cited in Seeto, 2004: 
45). 
The image of the day trader is further smeared by the shooting rampage of Mark Barton, 
the Atlanta day trader. As a result of this incident, Robert Bontemp0288hit out on day 
trading as: 
"These people are not investors ... Calling this investment is totally missing the 
point.. .It's a casino." (as cited in Statman, 2002: 19). 
5.10.2 Disassociation from the Real Economy 
According to Bacha (2007: 44), only five per cent of the total trading of crude palm oil 
futures contracts will eventually end with the real delivery and payment of crude palm oil. 
The rest of the contracts are settled by payment of difference. Jobst (2007: 25) argues that 
the difference settlement transforms the commodity futures contract into a paper 
transaction without any element of genuine sale. Mohamad and Tabatabaei (2008: 10) 
argue that the detachment of the futures contract from real economic activities distorts the 
supply and demand condition of real economy. 
287 Skeel (2006: 3) labelled day trading as "gambling, pure and simple". 
288 An Associate Professor of Management at Columbia University Business School who gave an interview 
with Buckman and Simon. 
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Nonetheless, Kamali (2002: 7) argues that the detachment from the real economy allows 
for the "selling and buying of commodities" to take place indefinitely throughout the 
tenure of the contract. Unlike securities, where a company may offer a set number of 
stocks for sale, a commodity futures contract exists whenever there is a buyer and a seller. 
There is no limit to the number of futures contracts that can be created. The process of 
contract creation can theoretically go on as long as buyers find sellers and vice versa. In 
reality, the quantity of futures contracts exceeds the actual available commodity supply.289 
That is why at the time of selling the commodity futures contract, there is no obligation on 
the seller to show that he has the capacity to supply the underlying commodity (Khan, 
1995: 50). Hence, Alkaff (1986: 50) argues that in the commodity futures market, there is 
no real buyer and seller. 
Based on these conditions, futures speculation is detached from the real economy 
(International Shari'ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance, 2011: 492). Hence, it 
breaches the fundamental precept that all trade must represent real economic transactions. 
Al-Suwailem (2006: 14) explicates that to profit, risk must not be separated from goods or 
services.29o Risk must be integrated with real activities so that it is naturally controlled by 
the real economy. This integration will eventually stimulate real economic activities and 
generate sufficient wealth. Hence it compensates such risk. This strategy creates value and 
minimises risk in any economic activity. However, futures speculation separates risk from 
its underlying asset. It unbundles risk from real economy activity and trades it separately as 
the "underlying" commodity.291 It transforms risk into a commodity which is bad and 
toxic. Equally Shahid and Rahman (2005: 170) argue that the severance of risk from its 
289Hence, offsetting transactions are not real sales (n.n.(h), 1942: 507). Hutcheon (1992: 302) argues that, 
from the business point of view, an excess of speculative transaction relative to the actual delivery 
demonstrates that speculative transaction is a bet on the future price ofthe commodities. 
290 Risk is divided into three categories. The first is entrepreneurial risk where the risk of losing is part of the 
normal course of gaining profit in any business dealings. Every economic activity involves risks of 
uncertainty and the need to indulge in such risk is what society cannot do without. The second category of 
risk is from natural disasters or calamities which are part of human life. People throughout history have no 
choice but to seek ways and means to protect themselves from the fear of personal and collateral damage 
caused by natural disasters. The final category is risk that is self-created from gambling activities. This risk is 
unnecessary as the individuals can choose not to indulge in these risky activities nor do these activities create 
any wealth or bring benefit to society (Molyneux and Iqbal, 2005: 160, Iqbal, 2007: 17). On the other hand, 
Ibn Taymiyyah (as cited in AI-Suwailem: 2006: 55), categorises risk into two types. The first is commercial 
risk, where one would buy a commodity in order to sell it for a profit and to rely on Allah for that. This risk 
is necessary for the merchant and although one might occasionally lose, that is but the nature of commerce. 
This type of risk is acceptable in a normal economic transaction as it is a value-added and wealth creating 
activity. The second type is gambling risk which implies eating money for nothing. This risk is proscribed in 
Islam. This risk does not add any value and create any wealth. 
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underlying commodity and the creation of a contract to transfer such risks results in it 
being a zero sum game which is strictly prohibited in Islam. 
5.10.3 Method of Futures Speculation - Technical Analysis and Fundamental 
Analysis 
Most speculators adopt technical analysis in predicting the future price of underlying 
commodities. They believe that in doing so they can consistently make money in a simple 
buy-and-hold strategy. The difference between technical analysis and fundamental analysis 
is that fundamental analysis attempts to predict future prices by finding out what the 
underlying commodity is really worth - its intrinsic value - which may have little to do 
with its current quoted price. On the other hand, technical analysis does not look at 
fundamental information such as political events or industrial data but instead focuses on 
studying the changes in the value of the underlying commodities. They believe that market 
price contains all the relevant information, whether it be rational or irrational, and therefore 
the trader does not need to go behind the price (the fundamentals) to forecast its future path 
(Hallwood and MacDonald: 2000: 280). 
One of the best known patterns used in technical analysis, and one regarded as having good 
predictive powers, is the "head and shoulders reversal pattern". Hence when the price 
movements produce a pattern resembling a head and a pair of shoulders, it signals that the 
price has reached the "top" (the head) and will start declining. Many technical analysts 
believe that the psychology of investors' en masse causes this pattern. Gough (1997: 120) 
maintains that technical analysis encourages trading as speculator respond to the "buy" or 
"sell" signals indicated in the chart. However, Pepper raises concern on this method of 
speculation when he states: 
"Market participants detect that following a trend tends to be a profitable course of 
action. The herd instinct then prevails. Crowd psychology becomes more important 
than the behaviour of investors acting as rational individuals. Technical analysis 
(chartism) which is based on crowd psychology becomes more important than 
fundamental analysis." (as cited in El Diwany, 2003: 114). 
Similarly, Keynes (as cited in El-Din and Hassan, 2007: 244) argues that market 
participants based their investment decisions on expected movements in stock markets 
291 Similarly, Stout (1995: 66) argues that by adding risk to the market place and diverting scarce resources 
from more productive forms of investment as well as the highly leveraged derivatives trading may actually 
do much harm. 
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prices rather than on real economic information. These players try to predict what other 
players believe is the right decision. They are trained in mass psychology to guess better 
than the crowd about how the crowd behaves, in the same manner as judges in a beauty 
contest base their valuations on what they expect other judges to do. 
As a result of this imaginative mode of speculating - rumours and the market trend -
Salamon (1998: 225) argues that it breeds element of betting. He distinguishes the conduct 
of real investors who buy shares based on the real analysis of the economic fundamentals 
of a company with speculators who buy shares based on the sentiment of the market and 
detach themselves from the economic reality.292 The deliberate spreading of rumours, 
made to influence the market price, aggravate the fluctuation of the futures price unrelated 
to the spot market price. Although the market has corrective mechanisms, this disruption 
impairs the successful operation of the market (n.n.(d), 1963: 174). Nonetheless, Kamal 
(2001: 120) maintains that there is nothing wrong with technical analysis when it is used 
simultaneously with fundamental analysis. It is undesirable when it fuels the instability of 
the market. The instability which is caused by high speculative activities will eventually 
cause harm to other market participants. 
5.11 The Ramification of Futures Speculation 
The discussion on the ramification of futures speculation will be divided into two sub-
headings: firstly, the impact of speculation on the price of commodities hence affecting the 
social-wellbeing of community, and secondly, its contagious destabilising effect on the 
global economy. 
292 Tilburg and Stichele (20 t 1: 30) raise concerns about the emergence of increasing numbers of speculators, 
sometimes with very large positions, who do not trade based on fundamental supply and demand 
relationships, in the commodity futures market, but who nonetheless influence commodity price 
development. Coming from gigantic financial institutional backgrounds, these financial speculators may be 
looking more for financial data, which they are used to dealing with, rather than the real development in the 
physical agricultural market. They may also be less able to interpret (and therefore debunk) misleading 
rumours about certain supply and demand developments, This increases the possibility of herd behaviour, not 
only when prices increase but also when they decline. Several empirical studies have found that, in the last 
decade, commodity futures prices became ever more detached from real factors and have started to move in 
line with the position held by these financial speculators and other developments in the financial market. 
Dema (2009: 10) also view that when these financial institutional speculators decide to allocate one percent 
to the commodity futures contract, they come to the market with a set of money. They are not concerned with 
the price per unit and they will buy as many futures contracts as they need, at whatever price is necessary, 
until all their money has been put to work. Their insensitiveness to commodities prices multiplies their 
impact on commodity markets. 
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5.11.1 The Intlation of the Price of Commodities 
In 2008, the Minnesota-based Institute of Agriculture and Trade Policy issued a report 
which analysed the increment of commodity prices from the period of 2006 to July 2008. 
Due to these high prices, the total developing country food import bill rose from about 
$191 billion in 2006 to $254 billion in 2007. This was despite the fact that developing 
countries consume less food as a result of higher prices. The number of those 
undernourished and food insecure in the world has increased along with the prices. The 
report suggests that speculation contributes to extreme price volatility which distorts the 
agriculture market. This distortion becomes excessive relative to the actual value of the 
commodity as determined by real supply and demand and other fundamental factors. 
The report refers to the United Nation's Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAD) which 
stipulates that, as of April 2008, com volatility was recorded at 30 per cent and soybean 
volatility was at 40 per cent, beyond what could be accounted for by supply and demand or 
market fundamentals. Prices are particularly vulnerable as they are being moved by big 
speculative "bets" when a commodity's supply and demand relationship is "tight" due to 
production failures, high demand, andlor a lack of supply management mechanisms. 
Though a number of studies negate the influence of price increases by speculative 
activities, the report contends that these studies do not take into account the over-the-
counter trades that dominate commodities speculation.293 These studies are also being 
limited by the quantity and quality of the United States Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission's reported data on which they rely. Hence this report argues that these studies 
are inadequate to discern the actual condition on the ground. 
It is widely recognise that the global food crisis is intimately connected with the impact of 
financial speculation on the world trade prices of food (Ghosh, 2011: 288). Greenberger 
(2011: 26) contends that the higher price of commodities has been affected by the copious 
inflow of purely financial speculative capital. Apart from the unprecedented increase in 
financial speculation, there have also been dramatic changes in real supply and demand 
293 For example Bohl and Stephen (2012: 3) argue that since futures trading in c~mmodity markets are not 
limited to speculators but are also (and often predominantly) done by hedgers, nobody should simply 
conclude that increased spot or futures price volatility is necessarily caused by growing speculative positions. 
Their study on six heavily traded agricultural and energy commodities-corn, crude oil, natural gas, soybeans, 
sugar and wheat - has found that the alleged destabilising impact of futures speCUlation on commodity spot 
price is unwarranted. 
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factors. These include the growing population and income in emerging and developing 
countries, weather-related crop losses, export restrictions, high oil prices, the depreciating 
US dollar, and the demand for food and feed crops for the production of biofuels. 
Nevertheless there is a growing consensus that increased financial speculation in 
agricultural commodities markets has contributed to their volatility and higher prices. In a 
joint study published in May, 2011, the F AO, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, the W orId Bank and others 
concluded that: 
"While analysts argue about whether financial speculation has been a major factor, 
most agree that increased participation by non-commercial actors such as index 
fund, swap dealers and money managers in financial markets probably acted to 
amplify short term price swings and could have contributed to the formation of 
price bubbles in some situations." (as cited in Greenberger, 2011: 26) 
In a speech at the University of Chicago on May 5, 2011, the Commissioner of the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Bart Chilton, elucidated the impact of futures 
speculation on commodities prices: 
"There are now more speculative positions in the commodity markets than ever 
before. The number of futures equivalent contracts held by these types of 
speculators increased 64 percent in energy contracts between June of 2008 and 
January 2011. In metal and agricultural contracts, those speculative positions 
increased roughly 20 per cent or more. I think there's good evidence that excessive 
speculation is heating up the market and prices have gotten out of line as a result. 
Rather than help to fairly discover and "make the price," these speculators "shake 
and bake the price" - up or down, depending on which side of the market they're 
in ... And, President Obama correctly spoke about speculators' impact on 
consumers ... Researchers at Oxford, Princeton and Rice Universities and many 
other private researchers say that speculators have had an impact on prices-oil 
prices and food prices most notably." (Chilton, 2011). 
In fact, this heated issue has been raised by a number of international institutions. For 
example, in 2006, the Societe Generale (as cited in Antoshin and Samiei, 2006: 153) 
postulated that speculative activity has been a major contributor to the surge of crude oil 
and metals prices and may have even caused a bubble. They argued that speCUlation has 
magnified the impact of changes in the fundamental determinants of supply and demand 
(which have been supportive of higher prices) to the extent that, in some cases, prices have 
risen far in excess of levels justified by fundamentals. At a similar time, the Organisation 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (OPEC, 2006) issued a press release 
highlighting its concern about the sudden rise in the volatility of oil prices. The OPEC 
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argued that speculation played a significant role in driving up the price despite the market 
. . 11 l' d . h d 294 remammg we supp Ie WIt cru e. 
Pavaskar (2005: 15) contends that the impact of price volatility in the commodity market is 
different compared to the security market, where in the security market, the impact is on 
willing investors in the market. However, the impact of the sharp rise and fall in the price 
of commodities is borne by the entire economy; namely, the large innocent bystanders. It 
forebodes an impending crisis - fuelling inflation in the economy and bringing the much 
dreaded recession. Likewise, Toutounchian (2009: 186) adduces that the effect of 
speculative trading, in the secondary market, is that the price is manipulated far exceeding 
its real value. This exceeded value does not contribute to the assets or capital of the issuing 
firm. The difference in value is nothing but bubbles. Based on this condition, Imai, Gaiha 
and Thapa (2008: 3) aptly maintain that the combination of a mismatch between futures 
and cash prices, and high volatility, has undermined the role of commodity exchanges as a 
guide to future price and risk management. 
It is worth noting that the high cost of food has severely affected the majority of the 
world's population. The World Food Programme (2012) views that, although the food is 
available and is sufficient enough to feed the entire global population of 7 billion people, 
there are still 925 million people in the world going hungry. In view of this dire situation, it . 
• 
is estimated that around 146 million children in developing countries are underweight as a 
result of acute or chronic hunger. The World Bank (2012) reported that the impact of the 
hike in food prices exposed children to the risk of increased malnutrition, increased 
294 A number of studies have been carried out on this topic. Sornette, Woodard, and Zhou (2009) study the 
volatility and significant increase of the oil price traded in the US Dollar and other major currencies during 
the year 2006 to 2008. The study addressed the question of whether (1) oil prices exhibit bubble-like 
dynamics, which may be a symptomatic of speculative behaviour; and (2) whether the faster-than-
exponential price rises resulted from a faster-than-exponential rise in demand which was actually not met by 
supply. The analysis was based on statistical physics and complexity theory; and data was taken from 
published reports of two leading agencies, the International Energy Agency (lEA) and the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA). These reports show the world's total liquid fuel demand and total world 
supply. The study found that oil price run-ups, expressed in any oil major currencies, have been amplified by 
speculative behaviour of the type found during bubble-like expansions. The underlying positive feedbacks, 
nucleated by rumours of rising scarcity, may result from one or several of the following factors acting 
together: (1) protective hedging against future oil price increases together with a weakening dollar; (2) the 
search for a new high-return investment with growing numbers of hedge funds, pensions and sovereign 
funds; (3) since the deregulation of oil futures trading in 2006, the spot price has actually been more and 
more determined by speculative futures markets and thus more and more decoupled from genuine supply-
demand equilibrium. Went, et al. (2009) has also conducted a study to investigate the speculative bubbles in a 
host of commodities due to a sizable increase in commodities prices. The study found evidence of speculative 
bubbles in the wider agriculture sector, as well as the grains and oil seeds sector, such as, corn, soya bean and 
wheat. 
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susceptibility to infections, slow cognitive development, poorer school performance, and 
reduced work productivity. 
Islamic economics safeguards the economy from this humanitarian crisis. 295 This is why 
Islam disciplines the way to earn a living - fair but profitable without exploiting others. 
The emphasis is on the benefits and rights of the community over the individual. Hence 
when even a small portion of society earns its living by harmful and unwholesome means, 
the repercussion of this type of trading is felt by the rest of society (De Lorenzo, 2004: 12). 
This concept collides with the open-market approach to economic management -
"unbridled capitalism" - which emphasises economic growth at all costs without regard to 
the quality of life and the widening gap between the rich and poor in the society 
(Vernados, 2008: 44). 
5.11.2 The Contagious Effect of Destabilising Speculation296 
Kamali (1999: 488) maintains that futures speculation does not expose contractual parties 
to risk-taking, unlawful appropriation, and gain of one party at the expense of others. This 
is because speculators act as risk-takers who convert the risk-taking motive in the futures 
contract into an economically productive channel, hence making risk-taking a real 
commercial risk. To enable futures speculation in becoming an economically productive 
activity, Rilk and Dar (2009: 344) suggest a certain standard of investors and level of 
speculation. They argue that where speculative trading is conducted by qualified and 
sophisticated investors, who are well informed and are able and willing to bear the risk, 
speculation can be transformed into entrepreneurial risk-taking. 
However, Chapra (2010: 36) views that speculative activity by supposedly sophisticated 
and able institutions, for example in the case of the large hedge fund, LCTM, has caused 
major disruptions in financial markets, due to its knock-on effect. In the words of Alan 
Greenspan: 
295 Similarly Dema (2009: 8) argues that the increase in commodity prices has also occurred before in the 
past as a result of supply crises, such as during the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. But today, unlike previous 
episodes, there is sufficient supply. There is no line at the gas pump and there is plenty of food on the 
shelves. But prices are still rising. 
296 Destabilising speculation is the sale of stocks or commodities without the intention of taking or making 
actual ~elivery. The gain is generated from the price difference and it indulges only in a short-term 
transactIOn. 
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"Had the failure of the LCTM triggered the seizing up of the markets, substantial 
damage could have been inflicted on many market participants, including some not 
directly involved with the form and could potentially impaired the economies of 
many nation including our own." (as cited in Chapra (2010: 36). 
The collapse of another hedge fund, Amaranth in 2006, is another testimony to the failure 
of sophisticated and able institutions to contain the adverse impact of destabilising 
speculation. Amaranth was forced to close after it incurred substantial losses of around 
$6billion in a single week from a wrong bet in the natural gas spread. In a paper issued by 
the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority (2007: 42), it reported that the collapse 
can be used as an important test to the stability of the market. It also demonstrated the 
ability of the market to spread risk. The aftermath of the Amaranth collapse resulted in an 
$18billion increase in consumers' energy prices. In another paper on the Commission's 
Review of the Financial Regulatory Framework for Commodity and Exotic Derivatives 
(2007: 19), the Financial Services Authority reports that the failure of Amaranth did cause 
a negative impact on market confidence. 
In 1997, Malaysia experienced a currency crisis. The then Malaysian Prime Minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad, alleged that the crisis was the result of a speculative attack on the 
currency by short-term speculators. This monetary crisis had depreciated the Malaysian 
ringgit rapidly against the US Dollar. The aftermath of the crisis caused a total loss of 
RM2.3 billion to the nation due to the increase of the non-performing loan in the local 
banking system. The crisis also caused economic standstills which led to workers losing 
their jobs, a high rate of bankruptcies due to defaults, and the people's standard of living 
being forced to a minimum level (Mohamad, 2000). 
In another episode of destabilising speCUlation, a number of Islamic financial institutions, 
which put their financial resources into futures markets, were forced to face the brunt of 
massive losses due to futures speculation. These institutions engaged in precarious futures 
speculation in gold, foreign currencies, and commodities. Inevitably a number of 
institutions suffered heavy losses. Some were at the brink of insolvency. The International 
Islamic Bank for Investment and Development, for example, incurred heavy losses due to 
its involvement in speCUlative trading in the US commodity market and was taken over 
temporarily by the Central Bank of Egypt (Warde, 2000: 84). 
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These are amongst the many examples of the impact of destabilising speculation. 297 Borna 
and Lowry (1987: 221) maintain that a business activity is a gambling activity by virtue of, 
not its inherent risk but the impact of such risk had on the society. It follows that 
destabilising speculation generates erratic and unhealthy movement in stock or commodity 
prices which entails quick gains at the expense of community. It disturbs the economy 
which emphasises cash flow or resources to be distributed to productive investments. The 
sheer wastage of economic resources created by the destabilising speculation affects all 
levels, micro and macro?98 Maurice Allais aptly describes the adventure of futures 
speculation when he says: 
" ... be it speculation on currencies or speculation on stocks and shares, the world 
has become one big casino with gaming tables distributed along every latitude and 
longitude. The game and the bids, in which millions of players take part, never 
cease." (1993: 11) 
5.12 \Vhat Matters: ~la~\1tl~llIh vis-ii-vis the Crude Palm Oil Futures Contract or 
Gambling Legislation 
History has shown that the commodity futures contract evolved from the on-spot grain 
market in Chicago, America. The objective of the market was then to principally trade 
forward contracts, which allowed buyers and sellers to agree for the delivery of a specified 
quantity and quality of grain at a predetermined price and date. This type of trading was to 
address the problem of glut and scarcity in the commodity market (Lurie, 1979: 24). 
Hciwever, this classic futures market evolved into a modern futures market when it 
introduced contract standardisation as well as offsetting into the structure of the futures 
contract. This structure attracted the attention of speculators, and thus led to a rapid 
increase in the volume of futures contracts in the grain market (Spence, 1999: 24). 
297 The Metallgesellshaft lost $1.4 billion speculating in oil futures in 1993. The Sumitomo Corporation lost 
$2.6 billion mostly in copper futures. The future value of the underlying assets are extrinsic to the derivatives 
contract and to the counterparties in the sense that the counterparties have no or very limited ability to control 
the outcome of these contingencies. This is unlike a farmer with a forward contract on his wheat who would 
be able to influence the market price of the wheat if he produces so much wheat that the market price of 
wheat declines (Lynch, 2011b: 12). Stout (1995: 54) argues that derivatives trading poses not only public 
problems like systemic risk, it also reduces net social welfare by reducing the welfare of the derivatives 
traders, namely, the banks, corporation, and retirement funds to which depositors, investors and pensioners 
confide their savings. 
298 For more discussion on this subject, please see (Ariff (a) and (b) (1982: 15), Ai-Yousef (2005: 84), 
Chapra (1986: 95) and El-Saifand Hassan, 2007: 249). 
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The proponents of the commodity futures market contend that the market plays a more 
important role than a mere platform for buying and selling commodities. It is a price 
discovery and risk-shifting mechanism, enabling those exposed to price risk, like hedgers, 
to shift this risk to other interested players, like speculators. Speculators are now the main 
player in most of the commodity futures markets in the world. They are said to playa key 
role as risk-takers as they provide the depth and volume needed in the market (Securities 
Industry Development Corporation, 2007). On this basis, the proponents argue that the 
commodity futures contract is permissible under the principle of ma$la~ah (punlic interest) 
(AI-Amine, 2008, Kamali, 2002, Kunhibava, 2009, Ibrahim, 2000 and the SAC, 2006). 
Kamali (2002, 148) further contends that in dealing with the futures contract, its economic 
effect is what really matters relative to the motive of the players. Tamer (2005: 127) 
propounds similar views when he slated Sharfra scholars for missing the broader picture of 
why instruments like futures and options were needed in modem business environments. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the ma#a~ah to use the commodity futures contract as 
protection against price risk cannot be overruled by the norms of ethics, riba, gharar, and 
maysir (Obaidullah, 2005: 381 and: 6). Additionally, the commodity futures contract must 
be in harmony with the objectives (maqa$id) of Shari'a. The five objectives: namely, 
religion, human life, progeny, material wealth, and human faculty of reason, must be 
protected and not transgressed at any cost. Protection of material wealth, for example, is 
endowed with the right of ownership - to be catered with fair trade and lawful exchange of 
goods and services. Although individuals are allowed to acquire their own wealth, its 
acquisition and utilisation must not be in conflict with the interest and benefit of the 
community (AI-Omar and Haq, 1996: 5). 
The analysis of maysir elements in the futures margin system, offsetting and futures 
speculation as well as the adverse social and economic impact brought about by the futures 
contract evidence the non-compliance of the above ma#a~ah prerequisites on the 
commodity futures contract. The distortion of the role of the futures contract as a 
mechanism of price discovery and risk management is clearly described by Greenberger 
where he said?99 
299 Manipulation and cornering also distort the useful function of the futures market. Any type of 
manipulation will trigger prices which are unrelated for a short time to the estimated future supply and 
demand. As the price trend' on the cash market is related to the price trend on the futures market, 
manipulation of the futures prices might cause the general public to pay prices for the processed commodity 
not warranted by the supply and demand (n.n.(g), 1955: 908). 
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"One of the fundamental purposes of futures contract is to provide price discovery 
in the "cash" or "spot" markets. Those selling or buying commodities in the spot 
market rely on futures prices to judge amounts to charge or pay for the delivery of a 
commodity ... it has been widely accepted that excessive speculation undermines the 
price discovery function of the futures market. This distortion of the economic 
fundamentals is otherwise manifested by the unnecessary and substantial price 
increases that consumers around the world pay for energy, especially crude oil and 
other everyday consumer staples." (Greenberger, 2011: 6). 
The recent bankruptcy of the American derivatives trading company, MF Global, 
augments the above submission. Its bankruptcy provoked wrath from the Midwest farmers. 
These farmers placed their money with MF Global for the purpose of hedging - to lock in 
a price for wheat, com, soybeans or whatever they plan to sell in the future. Instead of their 
risks being hedged, these farmers had to face bigger risks when their capital "were stolen 
from them" (Bemfeld and Durban, 2011). The futures risk management tool also lost its 
appeal when Wallace Damielle, the President of the Plains Cotton Cooperative Association 
stated: 
"The market is broken .. .1t no longer serves its purpose." (as cited in Tilburg and 
Stichele, 2011: 35) 
A similar view is given by Roger Johnson, the President of the US National Farmers' 
Union: 
"Excessive speculation led to commodity price bubble. Unfortunately, as 
speculators created this market bubble, many farmers ended up locking in higher 
input and feed costs. Now, following the market collapse, farmers and ranchers are 
struggling to pay these higher costs and rural communities, in tum, are feeling the 
pinch." (as cited in Tilburg and Stichele, 2011: 35) 
Additionally, the European Commission has found that there is considerable mistrust in the 
gas and electricity market. This is due to the opacity in the commodity derivatives market 
which has prevented market participants from having complete trust in the pricing 
mechanism of the commodities (as cited in Cinquegrana, 2008: 17). 
Despite the speculative derivatives contract providing for better price discovery in the 
market, Lynch (2011a: 51) questions whether this benefit is great enough to warrant the 
existence of this contract. He even argued that the other plausible alleged societal benefits, 
such as enhancing liquidity for the hedging market and redistributing wealth from less 
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efficient investors to more efficient ones, are probably illusionary. On the basis that the 
social cost of the speculative derivatives contract (the contract entered into between a 
speculator and a speculator) outweighs their social benefits, Lynch (2011 a: 51) maintains 
that it should be declared void on public policy grounds.30o 
5.13 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined three fundamental parts of the crude palm oil futures contract -
the futures margin system, the offsetting transaction and futures speculation. This 
examination has addressed the question of whether they are contaminated with elements of 
maysir; namely, betting, chance, gain of one party at the loss of the other party, unlawful 
acquisition of wealth as well as hatred and enmity. The analysis has revealed that these 
three sets of apparatus are contaminated. In addition to that, this chapter has shown that 
though proponents of the commodity futures market argue for it to be permissible under 
the concept of ma~la~ah, the evidence has proven that the commodity futures market has 
failed to represent its purpose as a mechanism of risk management and price discovery. 
Based on the analysis and in line with the notion that all maysir activities including maysir-
tainted activities are prohibited, the chapter has established that, contrary to the SAC 
resolution, the crude palm oil futures contract is not free from any of elements of maysir. 
300 El-Diwany (2010; 121) argues that the harm done by speculation substantially outweighs any supposed 
benefit in the longer term. Similarly, El-Gamal (2009: 48) contends that though futures contracts can be used 
judiciously to reduce risk and enhance welfare, they can, on the other hand, entice otherwise cautious 
individuals to engage in ruinous gambling behaviour. Stout (1995: 57) argues that though the futures contract 
offers hedging and arbitrage, deemed as having an element of social values, the futures market is widely 
recognised to further speculation. Carter (n.d., 216) has found that, despite theoretical literatures stating that 
primary commodity producers (or even marketing boards or entire countries) stand to derive considerable 
price reduction benefits from hedging with futures, this appears to contradict the reality. The reality is that 
very few primary producers actually hedge. For example, a 1977 survey by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission found that only 7 per cent of US grain farmers use futures and many of these farmers were 
speCUlating rather than hedging. In a 1993 survey of California farmers, only 6 per cent of the surveyed 
farmers hedged with futures contract. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Legitimacy of Gaming or Wagering in the Crude Palm Oil 
Futures Contract 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the analysis on maysir in the offsetting transaction and the variation 
margin mechanism in the crude palm oil futures contract. Chapter five has shown that 
these two mechanisms were designed to enable parties to wager under the pretext of the 
sale and purchase of crude palm oil. With this background, this chapter sets out to establish 
that wagering via crude palm oil futures contracts is legitimate by virtue of section 103 of 
the 2007 Act. Section 103 stipulates that: 
"For the purpose of any written law, a futures contract made or traded-
(a) on the futures market of a futures exchange; or 
(b) on an exempt futures market, 
or anything done under such a futures contract, shall not to be taken to be a gaming, 
or wagering contract." 
The legitimacy of wagering via futures contracts was the result of the revolution in the law 
on gaming or wagering. This chapter investigates this revolution which was predicated 
upon the liberalisation movement of futures contracts from the claw of gambling law. This 
analysis will show that section 103 is premised upon the fact that the wager or bet is legal. 
It follows that betting or wagering on the rise and fall of the future price of crude palm oil 
is legitimate and enforceable. 
This revolution on the law on gaming or wagering was primarily contributed to by the 
cooperation and facilitation rendered by the English judiciary. As early as the nineteenth 
century, the judiciary has demonstrated its willingness to gradually accept the normality of 
wagering or betting or speculation in the stock and futures exchange. The validation of 
wagering in the stock and futures exchange was attained through the formulation of three 
legal tests: namely, the mutual gain and loss; the SUbjective intention test; and the literal 
intention test. The literal intention test was obviously engineered towards legitim ising 
wagering on the exchange market. This activity was finally officially sanctioned by the 
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promulgation of section 63 of the UK Financial Services Act 1986 (which has now been 
replaced by section 412 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000) and section 102 
of the Malaysian Futures Industry Act 1993, which has since been substituted by the 
current section 103. 
The analysis here is primarily founded on English common law and statute law. This heavy 
reliance on the English legal regime is due to the fact that the Malaysian legal system is 
inherited, via colonisation, from the English legal system. It must also be noted that the 
cases analysed here are not only cases of commodity futures contracts but also the sale and 
purchase of shares or stocks. The reason is that the sale and purchase of shares or stocks 
have been consistently referred to and considered by the English judiciary in adjudicating 
the legitimacy of commodity futures contracts. It is also due to the fact that these contracts 
entail a wagering mechanism in the form of settlement by difference in their trading. 
6.2 The Relationship between the Commodity Futures Contract and the Gaming 
01' \\'agcring Contract 
Section 2 of the 2007 Act defines a futures contract as an agreement that is, or has at any 
time been, an eligible delivery agreement or adjustment agreement. The nature of an 
eligible delivery agreement or an adjustment agreement is elucidated by Slate L.J., in the 
case of S C F Finance v Masrpo 1 as: 
" ... a legally binding commitment to deliver at a future date, or take delivery of, a 
given quantity of a commodity, or a financial instrument, at an equal price. The 
contract is standardised in all aspects, except with regards to the price and terms of 
delivery. Standardisation of contracts allows interchangeability with all other 
contracts of the same delivery period. This allows buyers and sellers to offset or 
liquidate any of their open position with an equal and opposite transaction of a 
futures contract." 
In practice, the commodity futures contract is essentially a trading of contracts (James, 
1999: 21). This trading entails that its contractual parties only acquire the ordinary rights 
and obligations in the nature of an ordinary sale and purchase transaction. The right to 
receive physical delivery and its payment are enforced in the future (Dalhuisen, 2010: 
279). Similarly, Chaikin and Moher explicate that the contractual parties in the futures 
contract do not receive: 
301 [1986] 2 Llyod's LR 366. 
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"an interest in the underlying commodity or financial instrument, whether it be 
shares, soya beans or dollars. There is no tangible participation in an asset; there is 
merely a contractual right either to make delivery or to take delivery of a given 
commodity or financial instrument at a future time and a given price." (1986: 390). 
So where is the relationship between the commodity futures contract, and the gaming or 
wagering contract? The relationship lies in the inherent nature of these two contracts. 
According to Taylor (1993: 65), the structure of the commodity futures contract, which 
facilitates the so-called buyer or the so-called seller to wager on the rise and fall of the 
price of the underlying commodity, characterises it as a gaming or wagering contract.302 
Thus, Wood (2008: 429) argues that the futures contract is not a contract for the sale of a 
commodity. This is based on the fact that most of these contracts are settled by offset or by 
cash instead of physical delivery. Street (1937: 116) elucidates that the contract for future 
delivery of goods is sometimes even referred to as a "disguised wager", as it operates on 
the basis of not having "any interest in the event which may reasonably be represented by 
such stake." This is so as the party must pay to the other the future price of the underlying 
goods (and not for the underlying goods) which was originally unfixed. The parties have 
no other interest in the contract beyond that amount and they do not even know what the 
actual amount at stake is.303 
The issue on whether the commodity futures contract is a contract by way of gaming or 
wagering or a legitimate sale and purchase contract has long enveloped the English 
judiciary. As far back as the seventeenth century, English courts have regarded some 
contracts for future delivery as wagers and would not attempt to enforce them. This legal 
position was further bolstered by the statutory proscription - the Gaming Act 1845 (the 
1845 Act) - which declared contracts by way of gaming or wagering as void and 
unenforceable (Gray and Fennell, 1997: 161). This position has vexed commodity futures 
market players.304 Nevertheless, this position has changed over the centuries as trading by 
302 He also raised an intriguing legal argument in deciding the legality of this contract. The question is 
whether trading in contractual rights to goods is regarded as an equivalent to trading in the goods themselves; 
or is trading a mere contractual interest in which parties have the option to perfect into a property interest 
(namely. acquiring legal proprietary interest over the property). 
303 Hence it is impossible to say that either party has any interest in the event as represented by such stake. 
304 There will not be a problem if parties intend to settle the contract by physical settlement. In a case where 
parties have an election to either settle physically or by cash settlement, it would then be necessary for the 
parties to prove that they have a genuine intention in taking delivery as part of some commercial purposes 
and not as merely a sham (Hudson, 2006: 258). 
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difference or futures speculation in the commodity futures market has become part of the 
custom and norm of the market.305 
The reason for this shift is because speculation has become "domesticated" as people have 
come to believe that, like investment and unlike gambling, it was a legitimate way to risk 
money. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain experienced, on the one hand, a 
legal growth in the restrictions on gambling and on the other hand, a rise in the removal of 
restrictions on speculation (Itzkowitz, 2002: 126). At this juncture, it is worth noting the 
remark of J. Phillip Jones: 
"As in all advanced societies the British gamble on the stock exchange and in 
currency speculation, but there is an element in British society, perhaps unique in 
the word, which, while, vociferously anti-gambling in the betting sense, does not 
hesitate to take speculative risks on the Stock Exchange. These people regard the 
investment in stocks and shares solely in the expectation of a rise in value as a 
legitimate enterprise and, in the absence of the customary appurtenances of 
gambling, this can never in their view be a gamble in the ethical sense." (1973: 28) 
Hence, it is not surprising that the proponents of the commodity futures contract maintain 
that the commodity futures contract is just like any other contract. 306 The complex structure 
of its trading just warrants it to be treated distinctively (Kwai, 1996: 4). This distinctive 
treatment is meted out in the following areas: (i) that the commodity sold in the futures 
contract is not owned by the seller or even exists at the time of contract, yet is not only 
common but legal; (ii) that the transaction which is entered into on "margin" will not be 
branded as a wager but as a legal contemplation in the event of a default;307 and (iii) that 
305 The setting up of the private exchange with membership requirements, margin requirements and a host of 
other rules was to ensure that fellow speculators make good on their contract promises. This establishment 
together with its governing framework ameliorated the problem of unenforceability of contract of difference 
(Stout, 2009: 6). 
306 On the other hand, Taylor contends that it is a contract of sale but in the form of, "the purchase and sale of 
contract rights in unidentified grain. A speculator makes no promise of a performance for which there is no 
agreed exchange; if he undertakes to deliver, he receives a promise to pay for what is delivered and by 
delivering he requires full payment. If he promises to pay for a given amount of goods, he receives a promise 
to deliver that identical amount, and, by paying in full, he can enforce such delivery. He clearly has an 
"interest" outside of the contingency which determines whether he gains or loses, for he always has a 
contract right to trade money for goods, or goods for money." (1993: 89) 
301 Simon and Novack argue that, " ... where both parties to a market transaction are market traders who are 
dealing with commodities of fluctuating value, the contract should be treated as equivalent to a bet which the 
parties are making against the future market price. Payment of market damages amounts to specific 
performance of the bet. Since a functioning futures market is predicated on a system of enforceable bets 
against the future, "specific performance" of those bets - through payment of market damages - can be 
viewed as fundamental to the continued existence ofthe market itself." (1979: 1437) 
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trade settled by difference rather than physical delivery308 is an instance of damages paid 
for an anticipatory breach represented by differential sum (Kreitner, 2000: 1103). 
In order to comprehend this development, the pursuing sections analyse the revolution of 
gaming or wagering contract law from the aspect of intervention rendered by the English 
judiciary and statute. The discussion will illuminate the progressive liberalisation of 
commodity futures contracts from the claw of gaming or wagering law. As the discussion 
is essentially predicated on the development of English common law, it is important to 
explain the connection and influence of English common law and statutes to the legal 
system in Malaysia. 
6.3 The Application of the English Legal System in lVlalaysia 
The English legal system plays a significant role in the existing features and structure of 
the Malaysian legal system. Malaysia's current legal system is the result of one hundred 
and seventy years309 of British colonisation (Andaya and Andaya, 200 I). Section 3 of 
Malaysia's Civil Law Act 1956 (1956 Act) enshrines the wholesale application of English 
law into Malaysia (application is qualified by the existence of local laws and customs) 
while section 5 provides for the mandatory areas of application.3lO 
308 On the ground that commodity futures contracts would commonly provide for substitution of physical 
delivery with cash settlement, Patterson (1931: 855) questions the legality of such a provision. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this contractual provision specifies the measures for damages due to a breach in 
the agreement (which is equivalent to the measures taken by the court in the absence of any agreement), the 
law does not recognise such provisions which ostensibly stipulate that payment of money shall be substituted 
for other performances. It is submitted that at present, the futures legal framework accommodates and 
validates such practices of incorporating substitution provision in the commodity futures contract. Even the 
mechanic of setting off (settlement by way of difference) is by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Board o/Trade a/Chicago v Christie, is now legally regarded as delivery (n.n.(b), 1932: 914). 
309 Malaysia was a British colony from 1791 till 1957. 
310 Section 3(1) states that "Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be made by any 
written law in force in Malaysia, the Court shall -
1. in West Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity as 
administered in England on the t h day of April, 1956; 
ii. in Sabah, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with statutes 
of general application, as administered or in force in England on the 1 sl day of December 
1951 ; 
iii. in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of equity, together with 
statutes of general application, as administered or in force in England on the 121h day of 
December, 1949, subject however to subsection (3)(ii): 
Provided always that the said common law, rules of equity and statutes of general application shall be 
applied so far only as the circumstances of the States of Malaysia and their respective inhabitants permit 
and subject to such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary. 
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Section 26 of the 1956 Act and section 31 of Malaysia's Contracts Act 1950 (1950 Act) 
envisage the laws on the gaming or wagering contract. These statutory provisions are 
modelled after section 18 of the 1845 Act. Section 26 ofthe 1956 Act provides that: 
"(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
All contracts or agreements whether by parol or In writing by way of 
gaming or wagering shall be null and void." 
No action shall be brought or maintained in any Court for recovering any 
sum of money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon any wager or which 
has been deposited in the hands of any person to abide the event on which 
any wager has been made. 
Subsections (1) and (2) shall not be deemed to apply to any subscription or 
contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, for or toward any 
plate, prize, or sum of money to be awarded to the winner or winners of any 
lawful game, sport, pastime or exercise." 
Section 31 of the 1950 Act stipulates that? \ I 
"( 1) Agreements by way of wager are void; and no suit shall be brought for 
recovering anything alleged to be won on any wager, or entrusted to any 
person to abide the result of any game or other uncertain event on which 
any wager is made. 
(2) This section shall not be deemed to render unlawful a subscription or 
contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, made or entered into 
for or toward any plate, prize, or sum of money, of the value or amount of 
(2) Subject to the express provisions of this Act or any other written law in force in Malaysia or any 
part thereof, in the event of conflict or variance between the common law and the rules of 
equity with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail." 
Section 5( I) states that "In all questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided in the States of 
West Malaysia other than Malacca and Penang with respect to the law of partnerships, corporations, 
banks and banking, principals and agents, carriers by air, land and sea, marine insurance, average, 
life and fire insurance, and with respect to mercantile law generally, the law to be administered shall 
be the same as would be administered in England in the like case at the date of the coming into force 
of this Act, if such question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in England, unless in any case 
other provision is or shall be made by any written law. 
2. In all questions or issues which arise or which have to be decided in the States of Malacca, Penang, 
Sabah and Sarawak with respect to the law concerning any of the matters referred to in subsection 
(1), the law to be administered shall be the same as would be administered in England in the like 
case at the corresponding period, if such question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in 
England, unless in any case other provision is or shall be made by any written law." 
For a more comprehensive discussion on the reception of English common law and statute law, please see 
Ahmad (2007), Batholomew (1985), Harding (1985), Hooker (1983) and Rutter (1989). 
311 Gengatharen (2001: 103) suggests that though both provisions, namely; section 26 of the 1956 Act and 
section 31 of the 1950 Act achieve a similar flavour of legal effect, however, in the event of any 
inconsistency, section 26 supersedes section 31. 
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five hundred dollars or upwards, to be awarded to the winner or winners of 
h " any orse-race. 
Their predecessor, section 18 of the 1845 Act312 prescribes that: 
"All contracts or agreements, whether by parole or in writing, by way of gaming or 
wagering, shall be null and void; and no suit shall be brought or maintained in any 
court of law or equity for recovering any sum of money or valuable thing alleged to 
be won upon any wager, or which shall have been deposited in the hands of any 
person to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made: provided 
always, that this enactment shall not be deemed to apply to any subscription or 
contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, for or toward any plate, prize, 
or sum of money to be awarded to the winner or winners of any lawful game, sport, 
pastime or exercise." 
The application of the doctrine of binding precedent or stare decisis313 as well as section 3 
of the 1957 Act binds the Malaysian judiciary to take the precedent of their English 
counterparts in deciding cases related to the contract of gaming or wagering.314 For 
instance, in the case of S E Mizrahie v Stanton Nelson & Co Ltd,315 the question oflegality 
of the rubber futures contract was raised by one of the parties. The court held that the 
rubber futures contracts which were entered into between the client via his broker and third 
parties (in this case, the client, via his broker, entered into two sets of futures contracts. 
One was with the members of the public and the other set was with the Singapore Chamber 
of Commerce Rubber Association) were not real transactions of commerce for the 
purchase and sale of rubber but were entered into for the purpose of enabling the client to 
gamble in difference.316 The contracts, therefore, were contracts of gaming or wagering. In 
312 This section is also referred to as section 18 of8 & 9 Vict. c. 109 (Street, 1937: 129). 
313 Stare decisis is a maxim which denotes the binding nature of an earlier judgement or decision onto a later 
case which litigates on the same or similar points (Law and Martin, 2009: 524). 
314 Other Malaysian cases which bear reliance on English law are Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v The 
Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange & Drs [1988) 1 CLJ (Rep) 56, where the issue was whether the KLCE 
was acting judiciously in their administrative decision-making; Pet Far Eastern (M) Sdn Bhd v Tay Young 
Huat & Drs [1999] 2 CLJ 886 which deals with the issue of legality in conducting gambling activities over 
an international waters and the case of Southern Acids (M) Berhad v Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia 
Berhad [2011] 1 LNS 132 which deals with the issues of conflict of laws and that the ISDA (International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association) Master Agreement is alleged as a wagering contract and hence 
unenforceable in law. 
315 [1958] 1 LNS 73. 
316 In the case of the contracts entered into between the clients via his broker with the members of the 
Singapore Chamber of Commerce Rubber Association, the court held that they still amounted to contracts for 
difference. This was due to the method the broker adopted in performing the contract entered into with these 
members. Under the Rubber Association's rules, bye-laws and FOB conditions of sale, the clients (because 
they were members of the public and not being a member of the Association) could not accept or deliver the 
contract notes (made pursuant to the sale and purchase of rubber futures); namely, the registered tender, from 
and to the actual members of the Association. On this condition, and to avoid breaching the conditions of 
sale, when the broker received the registered tender from a member of the Rubber Association, the broker 
would not deliver it to his clients, who were members of the public, but instead diverted it to another member 
of the Association who wished to receive a registered tender for that particular month. Due to this 
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coming to this decision, the court relied on the judgement of English cases; namely, 
Weddle, Beck & Co v Hackett, Thacker v Hardy, Universal Stock Exchange v Strachan and 
Woodward v Wolfe. 317 
In another case, John Lo Thau F ah v Face Resorts Berhad,318 the court had to determine 
whether some terms of the contract, which are contingent in nature, would amount to a 
contract of wager. In deciding this issue, the court relied on the decision of Carlill v 
Carbolic Smoke Ball & Co and Earl of Ellesmere v Wallace. 319 Similarly, the Court of 
Appeal in the case of YK Fung Securities Sdn Bhd v James Capel (Far East) Ltd320 adopted 
the decision of Universal Stock Exchange v Strachan, Re Gieve and Philp v Bennet. By 
taking precedent from these English cases, the court held that the forward contract for the 
sale and purchase of shares was not illegal nor was it a contract for gaming or wagering. In 
passing, their Lordships even referred to section 18 of the UK Financial Services Act 1986. 
This section stipulates that no contract which is entered into by any or either of the parties 
for the purpose of business shall be void or unenforceable for reasons of section 18 of the 
1845 Act. 321 
Finally, in the case of Macphail & Company (Jpoh) Ltd v Oam Parkash, 322 a share broker 
company sued his customer for a sum of money incurred in the course of performing their 
contractual duty. The question to be decided was whether the contractual relationship 
between the customer and the broker company was so tainted with wagering or gaming 
that it could render the company's claim unenforceable. Applying the case of Cooper v 
Stubbs, Universal Stock Exchange v Strachan and Thacker v Hardy, the court held that the 
broker company was entitled to recover as the transaction was not held to be a gambling 
contract. 323 
Based on the above legal position, English common law on gaming and wagering contracts 
is very significant in the legal framework of the Malaysian crude palm oil futures contract. 
manoeuvring, the broker was able to ensure that the futures contracts which he entered to on behalf of his 
client with the members of the Association were resolved by payment or receipt of difference. In this regard, 
the court held that though the contracts initially had the appearance of genuine contracts, the contracts 
eventually became contracts for the payment of difference, indistinguishable from the contracts for difference 
entered into by the broker on behalf of his client, a member of the public with another member of the public. 
317 Ibid., at 79. 
318 [2007] 8 CLJ 484. 
319 Ibid., at 491. 
320 [1997] 4 CLJ 300 .. 
321 Ibid" at 333. 
322[1964] 1 LNS 108. 
m Ibid" at 109. 
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The revolution of this law has not only revolutionised the UK futures market but also 
Malaysia's. The following discussion on this revolution will commence with the definition 
and concept of a contract by way of gaming or wagering. 
6.4 Gaming or \Vagering Contract: Its Detinition and Concept 
The term "gaming or wagering contract" is not defined anywhere in the UK or the 
Malaysian gambling statutes. As a result, the British judiciary came up with its own 
judicial interpretation.324 This section initiates the definition of the gaming or wagering 
contract by first defining its basic words. For a start, the word "wager" is defined by Sir 
William Anson (as cited in the case of Ellesmere v Wallace325 ) as: 
"a promise to give money, or money's worth, upon the determination or 
ascertainment of an uncertain event; the consideration for such a promise is either 
something given by the other party to abide the event, or a promise to give upon the 
event determining in a particular way ... there must be mutual chances of gain and 
loss ... and the parties must contemplate the determination of the uncertain event as 
the sole condition of their contract.,,326 
Wager is also defined by Lord Hunter in his judgement in the case of Strang v Brown327 
where he says: 
" ... a man hands over a certain amount of money to another on the understanding 
that he will receive a larger sum of money if some uncertain future event occurs in 
the way in which he predicts it will occur.,,328 
Lord Alverstone C.J. in Lockwood v Cooper329 describes gaming, which is essentially 
wagermg: 
"To amount to gaming the game played must involve the element of wagering -
that is to say, each of the players must have a chance of losing as well as 
winning. ,,330 
324The terms gambling, gaming, betting and wagering are often used interchangeably. Technically however, 
these terms are derivatives of gambling. The discussion on the legal position of gambling covers a vast area 
of gambling which includes not only gambling activities as understood in the ordinary sense of the word, for 
example horse racing, lotteries, jackpots, but also relates to contract for difference practiced in futures and 
stock exchange (Chenery, 1963: 1). 
32S [1929) All ER Rep Ext 7S 1. 
326 Ibid., at 761. 
327 (1923) J.C. 74. 
328 Ibid., at 78. 
329 [1903] 2 K.B. 428. 
330 Ibid., at 431. 
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Similarly, Huddleston, B., in deciding the case of Dyson v Mason,331 described gaming as a 
game, whether it is one of skill or chance, and that it is played for money. It is a game 
which involves both players initially staking an agreed sum of money and that the winner 
will eventually take all the money staked. The amount of stake that is involved in such a 
game is not a material issue. 
Hence, the expression of a gaming contract or wagering contract indicates the parties' 
agreement, either orally or in writing, made to materialise their arrangement of a wager. In 
this respect, Lawrence LJ in the case of Ellesmere v Wallace332 defined a contract by way 
of gaming, as expressed in section 18 of the 1845 Act as: 
" ... the contract resulting from the mutual promises which the players necessarily 
make (expressly or by implication) in playing for stakes, as to the transfer of such 
333 
stake upon the result of the game. 
Whereas a wagering contract is defined by Hawkins J. in the case of Carlill v Carbolic 
334 Smoke Ball C. as: 
"A wagering contract is one by which two persons professing to hold opposite 
views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, mutually agree that, dependent 
upon the determination of that event, one shall win from the other, and that other 
shall payor hand over to him, a sum or money or other stake; neither of the 
contracting parties having any other interest in that contract than the sum or stake 
he will so win or lose, there being no other real consideration for the making of 
such contract by either of the parties. It is essential to a wagering contract that each 
party under it either win or lose, whether he will win or lose being dependent on the 
issue of the event, and, therefore, remaining uncertain until that issue is known. If 
either of the parties may win but cannot lose, or may lose but cannot win, it is not a 
wagering contract. ,,335 
Finally, the contract by way of gaming or wagering is described by Cotton LJ in the case of 
Thacker v Hard/36 as: 
"(t)he essence of games and wagering is that one party is to win and the other to 
lose upon a future event, which at the time of the contract is of uncertain nature -
331 (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 351, 354. 
332 [1929] All ER Rep Ext 751, 765. 
333 Ibid., at 765. 
334 [1892] 2 Q.B. 484. 
335 Ibid., at 490. 
336 (1878) 4 Q.B.D. 685. 
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that is to say, if the event turns out one way A will lose, but if it turns out the other 
h ·11 . ,,337 way eWl WIn. 
The above definitions of the gaming or wagering contract echoe the difference settlement 
achieved through offsetting and the variation margin. These futures mechanics enable 
contractual parties to wager on the rise and fall of the underlying commodity prices, which 
eventually results in one party gaining at the expense of the other. In economic reality, 
futures contracts performed through set-off were difference contracts by another name338 
(Stout, 2011: 15). The offsetting enables parties to settle their contract by way of difference 
instead of delivery. Lord Donaldson MR in City Index v Leslie339 described contract for 
difference as: 
"pairs of contract, one for the notional sale and one for the notional purchase of a 
particular quantity of the commodity, the intention of both parties being that no 
property in the commodity shall pass, but that the contracts will be fulfilled by 
paying sums of money based upon price differences at different times.,,34o 
In the same case, Leggatt LJ refers to a contract for difference as: 
"a contract intended by both parties to end in the payment of differences.,,341 
Hence, as will be shown in the later section, contract for difference clearly contradicts the 
law on gaming or wagering held prior to the twentieth century. In principle, the application 
of this law would inevitably outlaw the whole mechanism of commodity exchanges. 
However, due to the legal revolution, this is no longer the case (n.n.(b), 1932: 914). 
The next section analyses the evolution of the law on the gaming or wagering contract 
which went through a few stages of legal tests. As a result of these legal tests, the 
commodity futures contract was no longer adjudicated as a contract by way of gaming or 
337 Ibid., at 695 
338 This is done by a procedure where either party to the contract extinguishes his or her contractual 
obligation by selling or purchasing (as the case may be) a second offsetting contract. For example, a trader is 
obligate.d to sell 100 bushels of wheat on May 1 but, prior to May 1, decides to offset her obligation by 
p~rchasmg a ~ontract to buy 100 bushels of wheat on May 1. By doing this, she will absorb the price 
difference as either a profit or loss (Stout, 1999: 720). 
339 [1992] 1 QB 98. 
340 Ibid., at 106 
341 Ibid., at Ill. 
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wagering but rather a valid and enforceable contract on the basis that it is traded on a legal 
and official institution.342 
6.5 The Revolution of the Law on Gaming or 'Vagerjng 
The laws on contract by way of gaming or wagering have been laid down in numerous 
English gambling statutes as early as the fourteenth century.343 By the passing of the 1845 
Act, all contracts by way of gaming or wagering became void and unenforceable in courts 
of law.344 Though the 1845 Act has been repealed and replaced by the Gambling Act 
2005,345 for the purpose of this discussion, section 18 of the 1845 Act will be referred to in 
the analysis of the liberalisation movement. The reason is that section 18 was the catalyst 
for the illegitimacy of most ofthe on-exchange commodity futures contracts. 
To be precise, the effect of section 18 was not that it caused gaming or wagering contracts 
to become illegal, but it only made such contracts unenforceable (Chenery, 1963: 11). In 
other words, it became legal to gamble, bet or wager but any disputes arising from such 
betting or wagering arrangement would not be meted out by the courts due to their invalid 
nature. However with the increase in the trading volume of commodity futures, in the 
nineteenth century, this trend has changed. English courts were inundated with cases 
342 Purely on technical reasons, the transactions on the stock exchange (as well as the futures exchange) were 
seen as legal even if they might have the appearance of gambling. Coldridge and Hawkford wrote, "The 
result of the speculator may be the same as if he had entered into a mere differential transaction. But he has 
employed a different machinery and has utilised a separate legal obligation which could have been 
specifically enforced or for a breach of which damage of an ascertainable amount could have been 
recovered" (as cited in Itzkowitz, 2002: 127). 
343 The effect of these statutes includes declaring certain games to be illegal, making certain lawful games 
unlawful due to the involvement of wagering, restricting the use of certain places for gaming and betting, 
and, by virtue of Gaming Act 1845, preventing the enforcement of gaming or wagering contracts (Chenery, 
1963: 7). 
344 Beside the UK, the wild speculation of the tulip bulbs futures market in Holland in the year 1634-1637 
(better known as the "Tulip Mania") had sanctioned the pure speculative futures contract as unenforceable. 
The authorities lambasted it as immoral gambling. Nonetheless, futures for hedging were permitted. See also 
Day (2004) and Weber (2008). 
345 On 1 sl September 2007, all statutory provisions which previously prevented the enforcement of 
commodity futures contracts were repealed. As a result, the commodity futures contract which embodies a 
differential settlement mechanism is now valid and enforceable so long as it falls under the category of 
regulated activities under the Gambling Act 2005 (the 2005 Act) and the Financial Services Market Act 2000 
(the 2000 Act) (Halsbury(b), 2008: 362). The 2005 Act provides for the licensing of gambling businesses 
and exempted from these businesses activities which are regulated by the 2000 Act. Section 335 of the 2005 
Act provides for the enforcement of gambling contracts where it states, "335(1) The fact that a contract 
relates to gambling shall not prevent its enforcement". However, this legal position is not applicable if there 
is any rule of law which prevents the enforcement of such contract on the ground of unlawfulness. Section 
412 of the 2000 Act generally exempts contracts from being contracts of gaming or wagering if the contracts 
are entered by way of business by one ofthe contractual parties. 
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involving contracts for difference, in the form of commodity futures. In most of these 
cases, the judiciary were assigned to construe whether they were contracts by way of 
gaming or wagering or real commercial contracts. 
The absence of the definition of the phrase "gaming or wagering contract" in the 1845 Act 
is capitalised on by the judiciary to reengineer the working of the 1845 Act. Bearing the 
task of defining the context of such a phrase, the judiciary has innovatively formulated a 
series of legal tests to ascertain whether the difference contract underneath a commodity 
futures contract is to be adjudicated as a contract by way of gaming or wagering or a 
commercial contract of sale and purchase. The judiciary has devised the following legal 
tests: 
(a) the mutuality of gain and loss; 
(b) the mutuality of intention to execute the delivery of stocks or commodities (Chaikin 
and Moher, 1986: 393). This test can be further divided into two: 
(i) the subjective intention of non-delivery derived from an underlying secret 
arrangement, irrespective of the express provision of delivery; or 
(ii) the literal intention of delivery derived literally from an explicit contractual 
provision of delivery. 
For the purpose of this discussion, the mutuality of gain and loss will be discussed prior to 
the mutual intention tests though, historically, the mutual intention tests were the first test 
introduced. The reason for doing so is that mutual intention tests were applied more 
extensively by the courts. 
6.5.1 The Mutuality of Gain and Loss 
This test came from an 1878 Court of Appeal case, Thacker v Hardy.346 The claim involves 
a contract made between a stock broker who, at the same time, was a member of the 
London Stock Exchange, and his principal cum client. This contract was for the 
appointment of the broker to enter into speCUlative buying and selling of stocks on behalf 
346 (1878) 4 Q.B.D. 685. 
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of his client at the London Stock Exchange. Though the instructions were to enter into 
buying and selling of contracts, the broker was aware that his client intended to neither 
accept the stocks bought nor deliver the ones that were sold. The broker was also aware 
that the" client was not in the capacity to carry out these obligations of making and taking 
delivery. There was in fact an arrangement between the client and the stock broker for 
these transactions to be settled by way of difference. Despite the stock broker performing 
his contractual duties, his client refused to pay his commission. The broker brought this 
case to the court to claim his due and an indemnity for the liabilities incurred by the broker 
on behalf of his client. 347 
The crux of the dispute involved two sets of contracts. One was the contract between the 
broker and his client and the other type of contract was the contract between the broker and 
a third party, and in this case, a jobber. One of the judges, Lindley J., found that the 
contract between the broker and his client was not a buying and selling contract but a 
contract to cause the broker to enter into buying and selling contracts with the jobber on 
behalf of his client. It was in respect of the contract between the broker and the jobber that 
the broker had incurred a liability on behalf of his client and, against this contract, the 
broker had sued his client. As the buying and selling of stocks in the stock exchange were 
deemed legal transactions, the judge held that the transaction entered into between the 
broker, on behalf of his client, and the jobber was a real and valid transaction. On this line 
of reasoning, the judge held that the broker was entitled to indemnity under the contract 
between the broker and jobbers, notwithstanding the demoralising and reprehensible nature 
of gambling in the transaction between him and his client.348 
As the decision was not in his favour, the client appealed to the Court of Appeal. In 
delivering their judgment, one of the judges in the Court of Appeal, Cotton L.J., 
propounded the test of mutuality of gain and loss. He states: 
"The essence of games and wagering is that one party is to win and the other to lose 
upon a future event, which at the time of the contract is of uncertain nature - that is 
to say, if the event turns out one way A will lose, but if it turns out the other way he 
will win. ,,349 
3~7 ~~ .ag~nt, in this particular c.ase, the ~roker, is entitled in law to an indemnity from his principal for all 
hablhtles mc~rre~. ~Y t~e agent In executmg the orders of the principal, so long as the orders are not illegal 
orders or the hablhttes mcurred are not due to the fault or negligence of the agent. 
34S Ibid., at 688. 
349 Ibid., at 695 
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Relying on this test, he argued that the broker had derived no gain from the transactions in 
which he entered with the jobbers, on behalf of his client. The broker was only gaining 
from his commission, the gain of which he was entitled to for performing his contractual 
obligations. The commission was due and payable to him by his client irrespective of the 
trading result. In view of this, the judge held that the contract between the broker and his 
client was absent from any element of gaming or wagering. 
The judges have also distinguished the test of mutuality of intention, formulated in an 
earlier case, Grizewood v Blane, in order to justify the non-applicability of the 
Grizewood's test to the fact of Thacker v Hardy. In Grizewood v Blane, the contract for the 
sale and purchase of stocks was entered into between a broker and another broker. Both of 
these brokers never intended to execute th~ contract as actual buyer and seller. It was 
simply a bargain which resulted in the parties gaining or losing based on the rise or fall of 
stock price on an agreed future date. On this fact, the court in Grizewood v Blane decided 
that such contract was a wagering or gaming contract as there was an essential element of 
wager. The court in that case applied the mutual intention test to the facts of the case and 
found that the contract, though it appeared as a contract for sale of stock, was, in reality, 
made purely to carry out a gambling transaction.350 
Before going to the next case, namely the case of Forget v Ostigny, it is important to note 
two pointers made in Thacker v Hardy. First is the contract factor in which Lindley 1. 
states that though: 
"This Act (the 1845 Act) does not expressly mention or allude to Stock Exchange 
transactions; but it has been decided that agreements between buyers and sellers of 
stocks and shares, to payor receive the differences between their prices on one day 
and their prices on another day, are gaming and wagering transactions within the 
meaning of the statute.,,351 
Accordingly, a "sale and purchase" agreement is adjudicated a gaming and wagering 
transaction if there is an additional agreement which letters the agreement of the parties to 
pay and receive the differential payment instead of delivery. If no such agreement is found, 
the "sale and purchase" agreement is not a gaming or wagering agreement. Based on this 
premise, the contract to appoint the broker to enter into such sale and purchase transactions 
on behalf of his client was held to be not a gaming or wagering contract. This was held 
350 Ibid., at 698. 
351 Ibid., at 686. 
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notwithstanding as Lindley J. found facts pertaining to gambling in the transaction between 
the broker and his client. 352 
At this juncture, it is worth noting the gambling elements found by Lindley 1.: namely, (i) 
the client was a speculator and the broker was aware of this fact; Oi) the client appointed 
the broker to speculate for him in the Stock Exchange; (iii) the client knew, or must be 
taken to have known, that in order to carry out this instruction, the broker would have to 
enter into a series of contracts to sale and in return, contracts to purchase; (iv) there was no 
other way for the broker to speculate for his client; (v) the broker did buy and sell 
accordingly; (vi) the client never expected or intended to accept or make actual delivery of 
the stocks and the broker was aware of this fact; (vii) the client knew that he incurred the 
risk of having to accept or deliver but was content to assume such risk in the expectation 
and hope that his broker would be able to arrange matters so as to render nothing but 
difference payable by or to him; and (viii) unless the broker could arrange matters as 
expected, the client would not be able to pay what had been bought for him nor deliver 
what was sold for him and the broker was fully aware of this fact. 
Second is the party factor. As the sale and purchase bargain transpires between the broker 
and a third party, and not between the broker and his client, the court would only scrutinise 
this broker and third party relationship to find out whether the parties have in fact mutually 
entered into a bargain of wager or a real bargain of sale and purchase. The examination of 
this relationship is feasible in the case of the sale and purchase of stocks as parties would 
have the knowledge and information pertaining to one another and the contract itself 
matures between the original parties. However,. the examination of contractual parties in 
commodity futures contracts may not be feasible as Taylor (1993: 75) contends that: (i) 
contracts are assigned freely between a multitude of parties in the exchange; (ii) 
consensual elements between the initial parties or principal parties disappear; hence (iii) 
discovering the intent of prIncipal parties are accordingly difficult. This gets complicated 
with the procedure of the clearing house interposing itself as the counter-party to each 
individual contract. 
Thus, this raises the question on how to examine the intent of the clearing house - whether 
it would have had any intention to wager with its counter-party or not. James (l~99: 23) 
352 Cooper and Cridlan (1971: 25) have also observed that despite such dealings are speculative, it is only in 
very rare cases that a contract between a broker and his client is considered under the law as a wager 
contract. 
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argues that the clearing house does not have any intention of wagering as it does not incur 
any profit or loss from the movement of the price of the underlying commodity. By taking 
the margin from its counter-party, the clearing house is insulated from any credit risk or 
loss. Nevertheless, it is submitted that though in theory the clearing house is not exposed to 
the gain and loss, in reality the clearing house may still be held in a detrimental position. 
For example, due to the substantial concentration of risk on the central counter-party on 
October 19, 1987 ("the Black Monday"), Hong Kong's futures exchange was suspended. 
The temporary suspension was due to the failure of the clearing house via its Guarantee 
Corporation to cope with the crash caused by the collapse of the global stocks market. As a 
result, the market faced a wave of dishonoured contracts due to the continued sharp 
descent of the futures price. This failure brought Hong Kong's futures market to the brink 
of collapse, disabling numerous members of the exchange from getting their winnings, 
worth billions of dollars (Gunningham, 1990: 2).353 
In the case of Forget v Ostigny,354 the court had referred to and applied the decision of 
Thacker v Hardy. This case involved an appeal to the Privy Council by a stock broker who 
sued his client to recover a sum of $1926 arising out of a series of sales and purchases of 
shares. These contracts were entered into by the broker on behalf of the client in the 
Montreal Stock Exchange. The trail of transactions was initiated with the purchase of 
shares of the Montreal Railway Street Company, which was then followed by a later 
purchase of shares of other companies. The shares so purchased were sold from time to 
time. In every case, the delivery of shares was obtained by the stock broker from a 
member of the Stock Exchange from whom he purchased the shares and these shares were 
duly paid for. In between the time of the purchase and that of the sale of particular shares, 
dividends were paid upon them and credited into the account of the client. The Court of 
Queen's Bench for Lower Canada had decided that these transactions were gaming 
contracts and hence under article 1927 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada,355 the stock 
broker was not entitled to recover such sums of money from his client. Hence, the stock 
broker appealed to the Privy Council. 
353 The failure was exacerbated by the fact that the total paid-up capital of the Guarantee Corporation of $15 
million (US 2 Million) was disproportionate with the total trading of the futures market, namely, multi 
billions of US dollars. The Hong Kong's futures market was reported to be trading HK4.3billion in August, 
1987. This was due to the amount of 14,000 financial futures contracts being traded in a day. As the result of 
having such a massive amount tied up in the futures market, the Hong Kong's stock exchange and futures 
exchange were suspended to avoid catastrophic consequences to the entire financial system of Hong Kong. 
354 [1895-9] All ER Rep Ext 2120. 
355 Article 1927 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada stipulates that, "There is no right of action for the 
recovery of money or any other thing claimed under a gaming contract or bet." 
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The judgement of the Privy Council was delivered by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Herschell. 
Applying the test as laid down in Thacker v Hardy, the judge held that the contract was not 
a gaming contract nor involved any betting as the broker who acted as the client's agent 
did not suffer any losses for any gain acquired by the client in the series of speculative 
purchases and sales of shares. Nor did the broker acquire any gain for any losses suffered 
by the client. This is because whatever the result of the market value of the shares, the 
broker was entitled to benefit exclusively from his remuneration fixed at 1/4 per cent 
commission for each and every transaction entered.356 
In adjudicating this case, the court referred to and evaluated the contract entered into 
between the broker and his client and the contracts entered into between the broker on 
behalf of his client and the jobber. After ascertaining the exact nature of these contracts, 
the court outlined the following findings: 
1- the stock broker was employed by his client to act as his agent to make certain 
contracts of purchase and sale; 
11- the contracts entered by the stock broker were made within his given authority; 
111- the shares purchased and sold via these contracts were in every case delivered and 
the price on them paid and received; 
On this finding, the court held that they constituted real transactions. The court refers to the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Thacker v Hardy where in that case, 
Bramwell L.J. remarked that: 
"The bargains made by the Plaintiff on behalf of the defendant were what they 
purported to be; they gave the jobber a right to call upon the broker or the principal 
to take the stock, and they gave the broker the right to call upon the jobber to 
deliver it. .. I would assume that was the nature of the bargain between the parties, 
and that by its terms the principal would be entitled to call on the broker to' resell 
the stock, so that, instead of taking and paying for it, the principal would have to 
pay only the differences. ,,357 
It is important to note that the facts of this case clearly exhibit a real sale and purchase 
transaction. There was delivery of shares and payment for delivery, including a receipt of 
dividend by the client, being the owner of the company shares, throughout the business 
356 Ibid., at 2122. 
357 Ibid., at 2124. 
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period. Based on these facts, the proposition of Lord Herschell of the intention test in the 
form of express stipulation in the contract is well premised. In this respect, he states that: 
"(m)uch stress was laid on the fact that the respondent never asked for delivery of 
any of the shares purchased, and the appellant never tendered any such delivery. 
The question whether a contract is intended to be executed by delivery according to 
the obligation expressed upon the face of it is no doubt an important test for 
determining whether it is a real one or only a gambling arrangement under the guise 
. 1 " 358 (0 h· ) of a commerCIa contract. wn emp aSIS 
In a later case, Richards v Starks,359 the judge, Channell L.J, adopted the decision of 
Thacker v Hardy but held a different ruling. This case involved a contract between a 
London stock broker and his client. The contract, in the form of a circular, showed that the 
stock broker would, upon payment of the subscription money, speculate the money of his 
subscribers in three named stocks held under the broker's three-month's trust. The broker 
had promised that the subscriber would be entitled to the profit which was made from the 
difference between the price of stocks on the opening day in the London Stock Exchange 
and the prices at the end of ninety days from that date in the same exchange. In the event 
that there was no such profit, the subscriber would be entitled to the return of their 
subscription. The client made two subscription payments for the two trusts in which one of 
them resulted in a loss. The client sued the broker to recover the amount of profit, less than 
ten per cent, accrued under the first trust and a reimbursement of the subscription payment 
from the second trust. 
In deciding whether this contract was a contract by way of gaming or wagering, the judge 
referred to the test of mutuality of gain and loss. Based on this test, Channel LJ. opined 
that the contract made between the client and the broker could not be a gaming or wagering 
contract as the client did not incur any loss due to the refund of his subscription. However 
in view of the fact that the subscription money was returned to him without its accrued 
interest, the judge found that this was a loss to the client. Due to this loss in interest, the 
judge held that this contract was a contract by way of gaming or wagering under section 18 
of the 1845 Act. It is intriguing that despite the glaring indication in the contract that the 
broker would wager on behalf of the client on the rise and fall of the stock price in the 
London Stock Exchange this did not form part of the judgement. 
358 Ibid., at 2123. 
359 [1911] 1 K.B. 296. 
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A similar attitude is exhibited in the case of Weddle, Beck and Company v Hackett. 36o In 
this case, the judge, Swift J., had to decide on the legality of a claim to recover payments 
for the shares paid by the stock brokers on behalf of their clients. The arrangement was that 
one of the agents of the stock brokers would enter into a series of contracts to buy and sell 
shares which the client was not expected to take up or make delivery of these shares. The 
arrangement also included the sale of shares by the agent before they became due and the 
client would then settle these contracts either by receiving the gains or paying the loss -
namely the difference between the buying and selling price of the shares. To implement the 
instruction of his client, the agent would enter into contracts to buy and sell shares with 
stock jobbers who did not know that the transactions were not genuine and that, in due 
course, the shares would not be taken up. The client objected to the claim and argued that 
these transactions were void and unenforceable under the Gaming Act 1892 and, under this 
Act, the stock brokers were not entitled to recover any money which they may have paid 
away on his behalf or in commissions. 
In ascertaining the legality of the contracts for the sale and purchase of shares made 
between the agent of the stock brokers and the stock jobbers, the judge referred to the 
decisions of Thacker v Hardy, Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball C. and Grizewood v Blane. 
Based on these decisions, the judge held that the contracts between the agent and the stock 
jobbers were not wagers. The judge found that the wager was carried by only one of the 
contractual parties. The evidence shows that the agent had entered into these contracts on 
behalf of his client solely to enable the client to gamble in differences. The client's 
intention to wager was supported by the fact that the client never intended to take up the 
shares but to speculate in the difference of their values between different dates. Despite the 
conspicuous wager intention by the client, the contract was not a wager contract as the 
judge could not find any evidence from the stock jobbers of their intention to wager. 
Instead the judge found that the stock jobbers entered the contracts for the sale and 
purchase of shares as genuine transactions which bound them to deliver or take up the 
delivery. As these intentions were at variance, the want of mutuality had destroyed the 
wagering element and left it enforceable by law as an ordinary contract.361 
360 [1929] 1 K.B. 321. 
361 Ibid., at 329. 
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6.5.2 The Subjective Intention Test 
The subjective intention test was propounded by the Lord Chief Justice, Jervis C.J. m 
Grizewood v Blane. 362 The case involved a series of contracts of sale and purchase of 
railways shares entered into between a stock jobber in London and a client of another 
broker. Essentially, this series of contracts was initiated by the sale of the railways shares 
from the broker (on behalf of his client) to the stock jobber at a certain purchase price and 
delivery time. Later, another contract of sale was then entered into by the same parties, 
though this time the contract was for the sale of an equivalent number of railways shares 
from the stock jobber to the broker (on behalf of his client) at the prevailing market price 
which was higher than the price agreed to in the first contract. 
The judge found that these two sale contracts were in fact setting-off not only the delivery 
of shares against each other but also the payment of the purchase price for the said shares. 
These two contracts had, in fact, facilitated parties to settle by way of a differential 
payment. It was found that the parties had, on a few occasions, gone through dealings of a 
similar character with no shares passing and merely settlement on differences according to 
the usual .course of speculators in the Stock Exchange. The judge ruled that these facts 
could only establish a wager if they were corroborated with the mutual intention to wager. 
As the determination of this intention is held to be a question of fact, the question on the 
intention to wager was assigned to the jury. The jury were left to say what the intentions of 
the stock jobber and the stock broker (acting for his client) were at the time of making the 
contract - whether either party really meant to purchase or to sell the shares in question. If 
the parties had no such intention, the contract was a gambling transaction and was 
accordingly void.363 The jury found that there was no intention of the parties to enter into a 
real agreement for the sale and purchase of shares. Unsatisfied, the stock jobber applied for 
a new trial on the basis that the jury was misdirected. 
The judges, who heard the motion for a new trial, all agreed with the direction of Jervis 
C.J. to the jury. One of the judges, Creswell 1., pointed out that: 
"The contest at the trial was, whether Colonel Blane (client to the stock broker) had 
entered into contract with Mr. Grizewood (the stock jobber) for the purchase and 
362 (1851) 11 C.B. 526. 
363 Ibid., at 584. 
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sales of shares, - a bona fide contract which each at the time meant to perform. The 
jury were told, that, if neither party intended to buy or to sell, it was no bargain, but 
a mere gambling transaction. I think that was the true question to leave to them. As 
to the evidence, I think it abundantly warranted the jury in coming to the 
conclusion that there was no real contract of sale, but that the whole thing was to be 
settled by the payment of differences. It clearly was a gaming transaction within the 
meaning of the statute (8 & 9 Viet. c. 109, s. 18).,,364 
It is important to note that the approach in this case is distinguishable from the approach 
taken in the case of Forget v Ostigny. In the latter case, the actual dealings and actual 
delivery and payment for the shares were consistent with what was provided for in the 
contract. In this respect, the court found it sufficient to ascertain the intention of the parties 
based on what was expressly written in the contract. However the facts in Grizewood v 
Blane demonstrate otherwise. Hence it is submitted the test laid in this case affects most of 
the eligible delivery agreements. This is because most of the parties settled by way of 
difference despite contracts provided for physical delivery.365 In this circumstance, this test 
allows a court to unveil the express contractual tenns for delivery for the purpose of 
examining the underlying intention of the parties (n.n.(c), 1905: 677). 
This subjective intention test was later adopted in Barry v Croskey.366 In this case, a stock 
jobber ("stock jobber A") sued another stock jobber ("stock jobber B"), who acted on 
behalf of his client, for a relief under certain contracts for the sale and purchase of shares 
entered into between them. Stock jobber B, on behalf of his client, entered into a contract 
to purchase shares of Buenos Ayres and San Fernando Railway Company from stock 
jobber A.367 According to the terms of the contract, the shares were deliverable on the first 
settling day to be appointed by the committee of the London Stock Exchange. Stock broker 
A then entered into another contract with stock broker B to sell the shares of the company 
to be delivered on the first settling day (to be appointed by the same exchange). 
Just before the time appointed for the delivery, stock jobber A was not able to find the 
company shares to be delivered (as the whole shares of the company had been fraudulently 
acquired by stock jobber B and his colleagues). Stock jobber A was given respite by stock 
jobber B by cancelling the sale contract and entering into a new contract for the next 
364 Ibid. at 540. 
365 The position is different in the case of sale and purchase of stock, in the stock exchange as rules of this 
exchange necessitates delivery of stocks (n.n.(b), 1932: 913). 
366 (1861) 2 Johnson and Hemming 1, 70 E.R. 945. 
367 It was claimed by the stock jobber A that this was part of the stock jobber B's scheme to acquire the 
whole shares ofthe company, either by way of allotments and contracts to purchase, at which only a minimal 
price of the shares was deposited initially. 
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settling day's delivery with a higher selling price on the condition that stockjobber A pay a 
moderate sum of money to stock jobber B as the cancellation fees. Similar arrangements 
were entered into for a period of two months until stock jobber A requested to be released 
from the contract. Upon paying a sum of money to stock jobber B, he was then released. 
Later, the stock exchange discovered the fraudulent scheme of stock jobber Band 
eventually the name ofthe company was struck out from the list of the exchange. 
Stock jobber A then sued stock jobber B for repayment of all the monies paid including 
interest. Stock broker A claimed that stock broker B had manipulated the rules and 
customs of the stock exchange in a way to fraudulently acquire a large sum of money from 
him. Hence, the sale and purchase contract entered into by stock broker B, on behalf of his 
client, was not for any bona fide purpose. On the other hand, stock jobber B argued that 
these contracts were contracts by way of gaming or wagering within section 18 of the 8 & 
9 Vict. c.l 09 which rendered the contract to be null and void. 
In determining this issue, the judge adopted the subjective intention test as laid down in 
Grizewood v Blane. This test required that for a contract of sale and purchase to become a 
contract by way of gaming or wagering, both parties must mutually intend to end the 
bargain with a difference and not physical delivery. Therefore, in the current case, stock 
jobber A was able to prove that he had the intention to end the bargain with delivery and to 
receive from stock jobber B payment for such delivery. On this basis, the judge held that 
the stock jobber A had sufficiently proven that, at the time of entering into these contracts, 
he had a bona fide intention to deliver the shares in question.368 
The subjective intention test laid down in Grizewood v Blane is further articulated in the 
case of Universal Stock Exchange, Ltd v Strachan. 369 This action was about a claim by a 
customer to recover his shares which were deposited with stock jobbers, who were not 
members of the stock exchange. The customer alleged that a number of contracts for the 
sale and purchase of shares, stocks, and securities between them were made by way of 
gaming or wagering and not by way of a valid sale and purchase contract. These shares 
were deposited by him as a cover or security for the payment of differences upon the rise 
a~d fall of the tape prices of the shares, stocks, and securities. The defendant denied that 
368 Ibid., at 958. 
369 [1895-99J All ER Rep 75l. 
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the transactions were gambling transactions, as if they were gambling, he would not be 
able to retain and realise the deposited securities. 
Cave J., who adjudicated this case at the Queen's Bench Division, left the question on the 
parties' intention to the special jury to decide. He gave the jury the following direction: 
"The question that you have to try is, whether these transactions were real bargains 
for purchase of stock or whether they were simply gambling transactions intended 
to and in flee payment of differences ... 1 have no doubt that most, if not all, of you 
are perfectly familiar with transactions on the Stock Exchange, but I may make use 
that as an illustration of my meaning. A man goes to a broker and directs him to 
buy or sell so much stock, as the east, may be. That may be in the eyes of the 
purchaser a gambling transaction, or it may not. If he means to invest his money in 
the purchase of the steel which he orders to be bought, that undoubtedly is a 
perfectly legitimate and real business transaction. If he does not mean to take up his 
stock, if he means to sell again before the settling day arrives, that may be a 
gambling transaction so far as he is concerned; but it is not necessarily a gambling 
transaction so far as the broker is concerned; and in order to be a gambling 
transaction, such as the law points at, it must be a gambling transaction in the 
intention of both parties to it...Notwithstanding the ostensible terms of business 370, 
was there a secret understanding that the stock should never be called for or 
delivered, and that differences only should be dealt with? If there was that secret 
understanding, then the plaintiff (customer) is entitled to recover his securities. If 
there was not that secret understanding, he is not entitled to recover them, and that 
is the only question with which I need trouble yoU.,,371 
Based on this direction, the jury found that the real contract between the parties was that 
there should be no delivery of shares and that those parties should pay for the difference. 
On this premise, these contracts were held to be contracts by way of gaming or wagering 
and the judge ordered the shares to be returned back to the customer. Dissatisfied, the stock 
jobbers appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the judge had misdirected the 
jury. 
370 Based on the fact of this case, the terms of business as provided for in the contract were as follows: 
1- all bargains were to be completed on the next settling day unless the stock brokers agreed to a 
postponement at the request of the stock exchange; 
ll- the stock brokers were to receive interest at 5 per cent per annum on the purchase money on all 
stocks from the date of purchase until completion; 
iii- the stock brokers were to have lien upon certain of the stock exchange's property for the due 
performance of the contract; and 
iv- the contract was not of a gaming or wagering (at 752). 
371 Ibid., at 752. 
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The judges in the Court of Appeal collectively approved the direction given by Cave J. to 
the jury in ascertaining the legality of these contracts. In supporting the decision of the 
jury, one of the Court of Appeal judges, Rigby L.J. remarked that: 
" ... there was evidence upon which a jury might well find that the written 
transactions, which are of course in form - it is an elementary part of such a 
transaction that they should be in form - were a cloak for the real transactions, and 
that the real transactions were transactions for differences - gaming and wagering 
. f' 1 h ,,372 transactlOns 0 a slmp e c aracter. 
The stock brokers lost their appeal and now appealed to the House of Lords. The House of 
Lords overwhelmingly approved the direction of Cave 1. to the jury. One of the judges in 
the House of Lords, Lord Halsbury LC., upheld the findings of the jury. He referred to the 
terms of business contained in the contract and found that it was an ingenious device made 
to cover the scheme of an unreal transaction. This was so as no real sale and purchase had 
been proven to exist throughout the said transaction. Based on these conditions, the jury 
rightly inferred that the real meaning of the parties was to be only the payment of 
d 'f:C, 373 1 terence. 
It is submitted that the decision in Strachan establishes two important points. Firstly, 
anyone who uses the means of a sale and purchase contract to wager on the rise or fall of 
the price of a stock or commodity is, in fact, carrying out a gambling activity. This is 
regardless of whether his counterparty also has similar intentions to him. It is only when a 
person needs to defend or excuse himself from bearing the responsibility arising out of 
such ostentatious sale contracts, must he then prove that he and his counterparty mutually 
intend to enter into a contract of difference and not a contract of sale and purchase. To 
prove this intention, J.S.R.C. (1928: 261) suggests it must be determined by the existence 
of an actual agreement between the parties to non-delivery. The production of such a 
binding agreement is conclusive of the mutual wagering intention. Without this, a mere 
assumption of intention is immaterial and not conclusive. 
This approach is applied in the case of Ironmonger & Co. v Dyne. 374 The plaintiff in this 
case sued the defendant for a sum of £39,000 with respect to the foreign currency sold by 
the defendant to the plaintiff and later re-sold by the plaintiff to the defendant. The 
372 [1895] 2 Q.B. 329,335. 
373 Ibid., at 753. 
374 Times, Jan. 27 - 2 Feb, 1928. 
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defendant pleaded that the contracts were not a real sale and purchase of foreign 
currencies. The parties neither intended to deliver nor accept deliveries. Applying the 
decision of Strachan, Horridge J states: 
"The defence is that this is a gaming transaction; but one must be careful as to use 
the word "gaming". Every day people speculate on the Stock Exchange without the 
least intention of taking up the stocks they buy. The question to be decided is, Was 
there an agreement between the defendants and the plaintiff that in case should the 
defendant have to deliver and in no case should she have to receive, and that the 
only thing agreed by their contract was that they should respectively receive and 
pay according to the market prices? If there was such an agreement, judgement 
must be given for the defendant; if there was not, it must be given to the plaintiffs." 
(lS.R.C., 1928: 261) 
The jury found no evidence as to such an agreement and the judgement was delivered in 
favour of the plaintiffs. 
Secondly, the fact that the contract incorporates expressions to negate it as a gaming or 
wagering contract does not bar the court from disputing it as such. It is submitted that if 
this test is to be applied to the commodity futures contract, the impact would be 
devastating. To address this problem, section 103 of the 2007 Act insulates the legitimacy 
of the commodity futures contract by providing that all futures contracts traded on the 
Exchange are deemed not to be contracts by way of gaming or wagering. 375 The question 
is whether the subjective intention test can prevail over section 103. Theoretically it could 
if it is based on the following case, Re Gieve and the view of H.G. Robertson (as cited by 
Swift 1. in Weddle, Beck and Company v Hackett) where he states: 
"It may, then, be stated as a general rule that, apart from the very unusual 
circumstances, a contract made on the Stock Exchange, or upon any provincial 
Stock Exchange with similar rules and usages, and whether between principals 
direct or through agent, is not made by way of gaming and wagering. The mere fact 
that a contract purports to be subject to such rules is not conclusive, and will not 
exclude evidence that there was in fact a tacit understanding that, in spite of the 
form of the contract, there should be no obligation on either party to take or deliver, 
375 Section 103 of the 2007 Act states, "For the purposes of any written law, a futures contract made or 
traded-
(a) on the futures market of a futures exchange; or 
(b) on an exempt futures market, 
or anything done under such a futures contract, shall not to be taken to be a gaming or wagering 
contract. " 
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but that in any event differences only should be payable. If such an understanding 
were established by evidence, the contract would be null and void.,,376 
The decision of Strachan is applied later in Re Gieve. 377 The judge in the Queen's Bench 
Division, Wright 1., construed a series of contracts of sale and purchase of shares between 
two stock dealers and found that the claim by one of the stock dealers to recover an amount 
of money was not based on a gambling transaction. The judge also ruled that this case was 
not within the decision of the Universal Stock Exchange, Ltd v Strachan. This was because 
the judge found that, though the contract prima facie resulted in a differential settlement, 
there was not enough evidence to support that the parties had mutually agreed to conceal a 
bargain solely for difference. The trustees for the bankrupt stock dealer, Gieve, then 
appealed against this decision to the Court of Appeal. 
One of the judges in the Court of Appeal, Vaughan Williams LJ., disputes the inference 
made on these contracts by Wright J. He said that though the contract provides the right for 
the parties to call for the delivery or acceptance of the stocks, this does not bar the court 
from drawing any inference that there was a secret bargain or understanding or practice 
between the parties which was inconsistent with what was written in the contracts. 
Applying the decision of Universal Stock Exchange, Ltd v Strachan into the facts of this 
case, he said: 
" .. , to use the words of Cave J .... 'notwithstanding those ostensible terms of 
business, was there a secret understanding that the stock should never be called for 
or delivered, and that difference only should be dealt with? If there was that secret 
understanding, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover his securities. If there was not 
that secret understanding, then he is not entitled to recover them'. In my judgement, 
if you look at the whole of the transaction in the present case, the proper inference 
to draw is that neither of the parties ever contemplated delivery or acceptance of 
stock, but that both of them intended that the matter should be dealt with as a 
matter for difference only, and not of delivery or acceptance ... the condition as to, 
in the one case, the payment of an additional of one-eighth if the stock is taken up, 
and as to, in the other case, the deduction of one-eighth if the stock is delivered, 
shows that these parties were minded to prepare a contract between them which 
should facilitate that which was their sole object, namely gambling in 
difference ... The whole form of the transaction is just what one would have 
expected if the parties were minded to gamble in differences but were anxious to 
put the contract into such a form as to cloak or conceal the fact that they were 
gambling. Then, when one adds to that the history of the transactions from 
376 Ibid, at 331. 
371 [1899] 1 Q.B. 794. 
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beginning to end, the conduct of the parties leads almost necessarily to the 
inference that they only intended gambling transactions.,,378 
Lindley M.R. who adjudicated the appeal together with Vaughan Williams in the Court of 
Appeal also opined that Wright J. was wrong as he did not attend to the form of the 
agreement sufficiently. Lindley claims that the judge had failed to give effect to the real 
intention of the parties as expressed by the terms of the contracts. The following are the 
terms and conditions contained in the contract for sale: 
"".I beg to advise having sold to you 20 Canadas, Cover 1 %, Price 50 liS, Plus 
lISth if stock is taken up ... (1) All stocks or shares become closed without notice 
whenever the cover is exhausted, so as to limit the liability of the operator, unless 
arrangements are made to the contrary. (2) All stocks or shares, unless closed prior 
to the first day of the account, must either be taken up or carried over to the next 
flccount. (3) If contangoes or backwardations are not settled separately, the cover 
will be increased or reduced by the same amount. (4) If it is desired to increase 
cover, cash must accompany order before the margin is reached, unless 
arrangements are made to the contrary. And any orders for increasing cover, if not 
altered before the close of business on one day, must hold good till the opening 
price of the next day. (5) It is distinctively understood that I am prepared to deliver 
the stock or shares to which this contract refers, if demanded, but require cash on 
the first day of the account for securities, I have to deliver to customers.,,379 
The contract for purchase contained similar terms and conditions as the contract for sale 
except in the following variations: 
"".I beg to advise having bought of you 20 Canadas, to close at 52l,4 Less 1/8th if 
stock is delivered ... (2) If to be delivered, the certificate or scrip must reach me 
before twelve o'clock on the first day of the account ... (5) It is distinctively 
understood that I am prepared to accept delivery of the stock or shares to which this 
contract refers, if required, and will pay cash if desired at any time, subject to 
discount for cash.,,38o 
Lindley M.R. suggested that if the provision of " I beg to advise having sold to you 20 
Canadas " is taken by itself, it would show an ordinary sold note which represents the 
intention of the parties. However, the additional expression "plus 118 if stock were taken 
up" clearly shows the intention of the parties to not take up the shares. It shows that the 
buyer had an option to either not take delivery or, if he chose, to take delivery. In the later 
option, the buyer has to bear an additional payment of one eighth. Hence, on the surface, 
this was not a bargain for sale and purchase. This was in effect the parties' real intention as 
378 Ibid, at 803. 
379 Ibid., at 795. 
380 Ibid., at 795. 
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explicitly shown in the contract.38I The judge also considered the conditions, namely 
condition (1) to (5), and said that they accentuated the contract to look like more of a 
bargain for difference rather than an ordinary sale of stocks. He went further to suggest that 
the true intention of the parties, based on the language used in these contracts was that 
"(t)his is a bargain for differences, but if you, the buyer like to pay 1/8th more, then, I, the 
seller, will deliver at the increased price.,,382 
Both judges especially Lindley, also seemed to apply the approach propounded by Lord 
Herschell in Forget v Ostigny. By applying this approach, the intention of the parties is as 
literally expressed in the contract. This means that the explicit contractual terms mirrored 
the actual transaction as was carried out by the parties. Hence, in the current case, the 
parties have incorporated a term which connotes to negation of delivery. By having such a 
term in the contract and substantiated with the proof of difference settlement, a mutual 
intention to wager was deemed established. This approach is submitted to bear a 
detrimental effect on the majority of the eligible delivery agreement as they are offset or 
settled by difference. The offset mechanism is further supported by its governing legal 
framework which entails express provisions that negates delivery and settlement by 
difference. For example, rule 1303A.l of the Rules of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad 
incorporates that: 
"Settlement of Crude Palm Oil Futures Contracts may either be by cash or physical 
delivery, as determined by the Exchange from time to time." 
Similarly, rule 608(b) of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules 
stipulates the manner of offsetting: 
"608 Liquidation by offset 
b) Upon two Open Contracts being off-set pursuant to Rule 608(a), any settlement 
difference, as calculated by the Clearing House, becomes immediately due by 
the Clearing Participant or the Clearing House, as the case may be." 
381 Ibid., at 799. 
382 Ibid., at 799. 
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6.5.3 The Literal Intention Test 
In 1892, the Universal Stock Exchange v Stevens383 developed a new test which founded 
the legitimacy of futures trading.384 In this case, a stock jobber company claimed that their 
customer had failed to pay them a sum of money from which payment was derived from a 
series of contracts of sale and purchase of shares entered into with their customer. The 
relationship between the stock jobber company and their customer was governed by the 
terms of business, written at the back of all their contract notes. The material tenns of 
business were as follows: 
"1- The company acts as principal or jobber in all transactions and buys from 
and sells to customers on its own responsibility. The company never acts as a 
broker or agent, and it is of paramount importance that before opening an 
account customers should fully understand the difference between brokers and 
agents and principals or jobbers and be cognisant of all the rudiments of stock 
and share dealing ... 
2- Every purchase or sale contracted by the company is a bona fide transaction 
for delivery on a specified settling day, and the company is always prepared, 
and by means of its capital able, to deliver or take up any stock it may at any 
time have bought or sold, and the contracts entered into by the company are not 
contracts of gaming or wagering. All bargains are to be completed on the 
settling day named in the contract, but any customer wishing to postpone 
completion of a purchase or sale may arrange with the company (upon terms) 
for postponement of completion until a future date (carryover), but the 
company being always prepared to complete on the settling day originally 
fixed, may decline to postpone completion, at its option. 
3- .. , The buyer to receive from the seller all dividends falling due while the 
account is ensuing, the buyer paying all expenses of transfer of stocks. 
383 (1892) 66 L.T. 612. 
384 At the same time, in America, a congregational hearing was debating the subject of Fictitious Dealings in 
Agricultural Products. The opposition of futures trading argued that settling by difference is not legitimate 
trading. It was argued so as "no one can claim a right to sell that which he does not own, never intend to 
acquire and consequently never intends to deliver, for he is selling that which nobody owns and which in the 
nature of things, has no real existence ... (hence) Trader's sale were sale of Minnesota wind instead of 
Minnesota wheat, and yet help to determine the price the Ohio farmer shall receive for his wheat. The futures 
market abrogated the independent producer's dominion over his product, his right to negotiate the sale of his 
own property." (as cited in Levy, 2006: 323). In 1892, a paper was issued after the Farmers' Anti-Option Bill 
was thrown out by the U.S. House of Senate's Committe on Agriculture, which rebuked the decision of the 
Committee. It stated that, "This move leaves the Chicago Board of Trade to continue its gambling in grain 
without interference. It is not too much to say, that our Boards of Trade are the worst nest of gamblers that 
they are in this country. They are the most subtle, the most infamously designing crowd the most audacious 
robbers of the farmers that this country has ever produced!" (Smith, 1896: 18). On the other hand, Emery 
(1895: 79) suggests that the reason for despoiling the farmers from the voice of fixing the price of their own 
produce was, contrary to experienced, knowledgeable and courageous speculators, that the farmers lacked the 
competency to forecast the course of the future prices and forestall probable events by their own purchases 
and sales. 
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4- The completion of all purchases and sales shall take place at the company's 
office at noon on the day specified in the contract, or otherwise as may be 
mutually agreed upon. All customers shall, not less than seven days before the 
settling day, give to the company notice in writing of the manner in which they 
desire to deal with the stocks they have bought or sold, and stating what they 
. h d l' k ,,385 WIS to elver, ta e up, or carry over.~. 
The customer argued that these contracts were, in effect, gaming or wagering transactions 
and hence were null and void under section 18 of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109. The customer alleged 
that not one of the pretended purchases or sales were ever intended by either party to be 
actually completed and neither party intended to pay to the other more than the difference 
of the price of the shares. 
In deciding that these contracts were not gaming or wagering, Romer J. remarked that: 
"The written term between the parties was that the contracts between them should 
take the form of purchases or sales of stock, involving the liability for, or 
contemplating the actual delivery, the stock dealt with. The evidence itself shows 
no agreement or understanding that these written terms should not be acted upon, or 
should not be binding upon both parties, or the written terms were in fact illusory, 
or made between the parties merely to cloak, by agreement between them, a 
gaming or wagering transactions. No doubt the parties contemplated that actual 
delivery of stock would not take place except under special circumstances, but the 
contracts were, in fact, sales and purchases of stocks, and were not wagering or 
gaming, and not the less so because both parties may have thought that as a whole, 
the contracts would result in the long run in the mere payment of differences.,,386 
This decision echoed the opinion of Bramwell L.J. in the case of Thacker v Hardy where 
he said: 
"The bargains made by the Plaintiff on behalf of the Defendant were what they 
purported to be; they gave the jobber a right to call upon the broker or the principal 
to take the stock, and they gave the broker the right to call upon the jobber to 
deliver it. .. I would assume that was the nature of the bargain between the parties, 
and that by its terms the principal would be entitled to call on the broker to resell 
the stock, so that, instead of taking and paying for it, the principal would have to 
pay only the differences.,,387 , 
This decision signifies the literal approach in construing a contract of sale and purchase of 
stock or commodity futures contracts. Using this approach, the court construed a contract 
based on what was explicitly written in the contract. Chaikin and Moher (1986: 395) 
385 Ibid, at 612. 
386 Ibid. at 614. 
387 (1878) 4 Q.B.D. 685, 690. 
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rightly argue that this approach symbolises the wiI1ingness of the court to tum a blind eye 
to the actual subjective intentions of the parties and instead to only consider the explicit 
form of the contract. Raines and Leathers (1994: 198) suggest that, by this approach, the 
incorporation of the purchaser's right to demand actual delivery, in a contract or under the 
rule of the exchange, is adequate to establish the intention of delivery irrespective of 
whether the action would eventually be carried out. 
In principal, this legal notion runs contrary to the earlier subjective mutual intention 
propounded by Grizewood v Blane and Forget v Ostigny. These two cases cast importance 
on the intention of parties in a case which involves an ostentatious sale and purchase 
contract. Kreitner (2000: 1105) suggests that the implication of this literal approach is that 
a legitimate and an illegitimate contract can be identical. The only distinction is the ability 
of the court to discover whether the legitimate form is only a ruse to cover the illegitimate 
form. However it is submitted that the discovery of such ruse depends not only on the 
ability but also on the willingness of the court to do SO.388 
Around the same period, and in response to the tolerability of commodity futures contracts 
by the British judiciary, one Charles William Smith (l894a: 9) delivered a lecture on 
agricultural and commercial depression caused by exchange-traded futures contracts.389 
This lecture was conducted before the National Agricultural Union Rural Councils of 
Bristol, Bath and Chepstow. In his lecture he described futures exchange as a system of 
artificial trade or "speculative gambling" as it is based on vouchers of property and not on 
the property. He further explained that, in real practice, the bargain was not about 
commodity but price. This is so as there is no need to exchange a ton of com in order to 
close the transaction. As a result, the transaction resembles a bet upon the course of the 
com market; namely, the agreement by party A to pay if the price of com falls and party B 
to pay if it rises. The effect of this system is that it destabilises the price of commodities. 
388 Some courts are, doubtless, moved by the desire to protect such transactions between the customer and the 
broker, despite the striking pertinent facts as evidence of intention to gamble. Others have less difficulty in 
finding illegality in the usual transaction between a customer and a broker. The effort to find the intention of 
non-delivery when it is perfectly obvious that such an intention exists seems a useless expenditure of energy. 
On the other hand, if the court wishes to protect the customer and the broker, they must, in order to satisfy the 
common law rule, close their eyes to the facts and draw a fine distinction between intention and expectation 
(n.n.(a), 1927: 639). 
389 See also Smith (1894b). 
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The prices were no longer regulated by supply and demand but instead by the quotation of 
f bl ' 390 values 0 gam mg papers. 
Oblivious of the angst it created, the literal approach began to proliferate in the British 
judiciary at the start of the twentieth century. The courts have shown much interest in 
applying this test more than other legal tests: namely, the mutual gain and loss~ and the 
subjective intention test. The literal approach was applied in the year 1902 in the case of 
Philp v Bennet & CO. 391 This case involved a claim by a customer to recover from his stock 
jobber a sum of money being the difference on certain stocks and shares transactions 
entered into between them. The customer signed an application form which was addressed 
to the stock jobber. The form contained terms, amongst others, that the customer agreed to 
accept the amount of stock that the stock jobber may sell to him. Besides this form, the 
customer also received from the stock jobber an advice note regarding the sale of shares 
which stipulated that, "Plus 1/8 if stock is taken up." The customer then sold some stock 
back to the stock jobber at a profit before the end of the account and claimed for this profit, 
being the difference, from the stock jobber. However, the stock jobber refused to pay on 
the ground that the contract was a gambling transaction. 
The judge, Bingham J., distinguished this case with Re Gieve. He argued that the question 
of whether the transactions were gaming or wagering contracts or not was entirely a 
question of fact. The application form shows that that the customer had agreed to accept 
the amount of stock that the stock jobber may have sold to him and hence was bound to 
accept the stocks which had been bought. He contended further that the phrase "Plus 1/8 if 
stock is taken up", as contained in the advice note, must be read together with the term 
stipulating delivery in the application form, of which the form preceded the advice note. 
Hence, based on these facts, the judge declared that they were not betting or gaming 
transacti ons. 
It is submitted that from this case, the whole concept of the literal approach is, to take the 
words of Kreitner (2000: 1109), a "fig leaf' to legitimise contracts of gaming or wagering 
390 In the issue of destabilised commodity prices. Easterbrook (1986: 118) maintains that an exchange 
member who trades by betting on his ability to conceal his position from other traders for the sole purpose of 
gaining profit from such concealment has committed an offence of manipulation. The effect of his action is 
likely to cause commodity prices to diverge from those that reflect the underlying conditions. According to 
Hutcheon (1992: 299) manipUlation is the most serious crime of speCUlation as it produces artificial price 
fluctuations. As a result, the whole economy is left in a dire confused situation and the community is forced 
to pay more for a commodity than they would necessarily have. See also Davis (1892). 
391 (1901) 18 TLR 129. 
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under the pretext of sale and purchase contracts, of shares or commodity. This is so 
observed as the court would not hesitate to blatantly ignore a potential non-delivery 
contractual term; namely, "Plus 118 if stock is taken up", but instead have construed the 
said term as contemplating delivery. The decisions of the later cases securitised the futures 
and stock market liberalisation movement from the incarceration of gaming and wagering 
law. 
The case of Cooper (Inspector o/Taxes) v Stubbs392 involved the issue of whether revenues 
derived from speculative cotton futures trading were deemed as "profit" or "gains". If this 
is so held, the revenues would accordingly be assessable to tax under Schedule D Para 1 of 
the Income Tax Act 1918. In this case, a cotton futures trader challenged the income tax 
assessment made by the Additional Commissioner of the Liverpool Division in respect of 
profits made from his speculative cotton futures trading. He contended that these dealings 
were gambling transactions and as such were not assessable to income tax. In deciding 
that such a speculative cotton futures contract was not a wager contract, the judges in the 
Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the decision of Thacker v Hardy. One of the judges 
in the Court of Appeal, Pollock M.R. went on to say that: 
" ... these futures delivery contracts which are made upon the Cotton Exchange or 
the contracts which are made upon the Stock Exchange in London are real contracts 
in the sense that the party with whom they are made is a real party, and if the dealer 
and broker making them should desire at any moment to have the contract 
implemented he can do so. There is no distinction between contracts which are 
made for the real purpose of securing the sale or purchase of stock or cotton ... It 
may be that they were speculative in the sense that they were for his own purposes 
a speculation ... and that it may be said that he was gambling in making these 
contracts, but the purpose for which he made them did not alter the character or 
nature of the contracts that he did make: they were real transactions, although the 
purpose of them may have been in his mind, in respect of all or some of them, to 
fulfil his desire to gamble in speculative transactions.,,393 
Atkin LJ. reinforced the view of Pollock M.R. and said that: 
" ... all contracts that were entered into by the appellant, whether they were entered 
into by him through his firm or through other brokers, were in fact real transactions. 
They gave rise to real contractual rights: they were contracts either for the purchase 
392 (19251 2 K.B. 753. The issue involved in this case was not so much of ascertaining the enforceability of 
the exchange-traded cotton futures contract but it was more to ascertain the taxability of the gain resulting 
from such trading. Hence, there is a slight difference in the way the court directed their minds. However, this 
case is relevant as it shows the trend of decision-making held by the courts from the beginning of the 
twentieth century till the statutory intervention, namely, the 1986 Act (Financial Services Act 1986). 
393 Ibid., at 763. 
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or for the sale of cotton in future which could be enforced, and so far as the other 
party to the contract, who might be a dealer in this country, or a dealer in America 
was concerned, he would not know whether the contract into which he had entered 
would be eventually closed by a contra contract or whether it would not. For these 
reasons, it seems to me to be plain law that transactions such as the appellant 
entered into were real transaction and not mere bets. I think that the principle in 
respect of wagering is this, that it takes two parties to make a bet, and, that if you 
consider one party alone, you do not sufficiently consider all the elements of the 
case; you have to consider the other party, and unless that other party is also betting 
there cannot be a bet. Therefore these transactions were, as I have said, real and 
enforceable contracts, in which the differences could have been sued for on one 
side or the other. It is true that they were speculations, and I think myself that that 
may be one of the material facts to be considered in respect of the question whether 
or not the appellant was engaged in a trade, because for my part I see some 
difficulty in forming a conception of a trade which consists solely of entering into 
transactions which would merely result in differences, and when the supposed 
trader never intends to get possession or control of any commodity, so that he may 
have the disposal of it. Although I do not say it is impossible to have a trade or 
adventure of that nature, I think it is a fact to be taken into account. ,,394 
The exchange-traded commodity futures contract, whether it be settled by way of 
difference or delivery is no longer discriminated. Gambling or wagering in the form of a 
commodity futures contract is now legitimate and enforceable. The shift in the mind of the 
judiciary is said to stem from the fact that speculation, and its attendant risks and the 
possibility of rapid gain, had become more respectable during the period of the eighteenth 
to the nineteenth century in the United Kingdom (Itzkowitz, 2002: 129). Itzkowitz (2002: 
144) believes that the "domestication" and moralisation of speculation in that era was due 
to the members of the London Stock Exchange being constituted of respectable people 
from society. 
In this manner, the judiciary, including the society, had legitimised the conduct of these 
members in the exchange, yet, on the other hand, illegitimised the activities of the outside 
brokers (who were not members of the exchange but carried out their speculative stock 
trading in shops called the bucket shops). Raines and Leathers (1994: 200) maintain that by 
stigmatising bucket shops, the exchange has successfully diverted the charges that 
commodity futures contract and various types of stock market practices constituted 
gambling. The speculation on organised exchanges was defended on the basis of their 
economic efficiency. Instead, the bucket shops were physically demolished from society 
despite the fact that similar settlement by difference was carried out in these two places. As 
394 Ibid., at 771. 
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a result the question is no longer about distinguishing speculation with gambling but 
between legitimate speculation and illegitimate speculation. 395 
The following cases rooted the domestication and moralisation of the commodity futures 
contract. The court in Barnett v Sanker396 dealt with a claim by a general merchant for the 
monies he had paid to a member of the London Metal Exchange. The merchant alleged that 
the money was paid for the losses on speculations caused by a clerk who worked for that 
exchange member. Because of the close relationship between the merchant and the clerk, 
the merchant agreed for the clerk to use the name of his finn to enter into speculative 
dealings at the London Metal Exchange. The judge, McCardie, J., referred to the decisions 
in Universal Stock Exchange, Ltd v Strachan, John Shaw v Caledonian Railway Company 
and Thacker v Hardy. In giving legal recognition to futures speculative dealings, he said: 
"If the parties meant that no legal bargain should be effected between them, and 
that there should be no right to demand a payment of differences except a moral 
right, the contract was a gaming contract. But if the parties intended to enter into a 
legal contract, which gave legal rights and imposed legal obligations, then the 
contract, though it dealt with speculative transactions, was enforceable.,,397 
Similar treatment is found in Woodward and Another v Wolfe. 398 This case involved a 
claim to recover an amount 'Of money, being the differences, interest, and brokerage due 
and owed to the broker by his client. The broker, who was a cotton futures broker and a 
member of the Liverpool Cotton Exchange was appointed by his client to speculate for 
difference in cotton futures. The futures broker entered into the futures contract to buy and 
sell cotton in form, and in accordance with the rules, regulations, and usages of the 
Liverpool Cotton Association. His clients challenged the claim and contended that these 
contracts were contracts by way of gaming or wagering, and hence were unenforceable. He 
supported his contention by stating that the contract between the futures broker and him 
was made between them as principals and not as a broker and principal. He further 
contended that there was an express understanding that there should be no delivery on 
either side but only an eventual payment of difference. 
395 Throughout the legislative debate on futures trading during the late nineteenth century and the early 
twentieth century, futures transactions were often equated with speCUlation, and speCUlation and gambling 
were thought to be no different than identical twins (Pashigian, 1986: S56). 
396 (1925) 41 TLR 660. 
397 Ibid, at 662. 
398 [1936] 3 All ER 529. 
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The judge, Hilbery J., dismissed the applicability of the decision of Universal Stock 
Exchange, Ltd v Strachan and held that, in the current case, the futures broker entered into 
these contracts as an agent for his client and not as a principal. As an agent, the futures 
broker was merely trading for the purpose of implementing the client's instruction to buy 
and sell. Hence, the futures contracts were held to be genuine contracts. Applying the 
decision of Weddle, Beck and Company v Hackett, he remarked that: 
"True ... the defendant (the client) would not be expected to take delivery of the 
cotton or to deliver it and that it was to be a matter only of differences between the 
purchases and the sales, but the plaintiffs (the broker) in fact merely allow the 
defendant in form to buy from or sell to them. They acted for the defendant to 
enable him to gamble and they acted in the capacity of brokers in the market in 
which the defendant wished to gamble in the only way in which the defendant 
could gamble in that market. If all that the Plaintiffs had done was to pass a form of 
contract made directly between themselves and the defendants with an existing 
arrangement that only differences should be paid, the matter might well be 
concluded on the principle of the decision in Universal Stock Exchange, Ltd v 
Strachan. It is not, however what took place here. The plaintiffs made contracts on 
the market for the defendant to give effects to his orders. Those contracts I am 
satisfied in the evidence bound him and they have, I am satisfied, had to meet their 
bl" d h ,,399 o IgatlOns un er tern. 
It is submitted that this case reinforced the following facts about the eligible delivery 
agreement: (i) the legality of wagering on the fall and rise of commodity prices in the 
futures exchange; (ii) the acceptability of provision for delivery in pseudo-sale contracts 
when such contracts are formed on Exchange;400 and (iii) actual delivery, or the parties' 
intention of delivery, is immaterial. To preserve this status quo, statutory intervention is 
mandatory. 
6.6 Statutory Intervention 
In July 1981, Professor LCB Gower of Southampton University was commissioned by the 
UK Secretary of State for Trade to: (i) consider the statutory protection required by private 
and business investors in securities and other properties; (ii) consider the need for statutory 
control of dealers in securities, investment consultants and investment managers; and (iii) 
advise on the need for a new legislation (Elliott and Henshaw, 1995: 9). Later in 1986, 
Professor Gower issued the result of his findings and named the report the "Review of 
399 Ibid., at 533. 
400 Patterson (1931: 864) contends that since the exchange has prescribed rules for every contract to contain 
the provision relating to delivery and the fact the parties are customarily referred to as "buyer" and "seller", it 
is practically impossible to rebut contrary intention against delivery. 
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Investor Protection - A Discussion Document". In this report, he commented on the issue 
of the unenforceable gaming and wagering contract where he said: 
"Another problem that has caused difficulty in recent months is that of 
distinguishing between legitimate investments and unenforceable gaming contracts. 
The public has been offered arrangements ranging from betting on whether the 
quoted price of a listed stock or an index (such as FT Index) will rise or fall to 
entrusting a capital sum to a company to invest and to use the income to bet on 
race-horses. On the face of it, all these seem more akin to gaming and wagering 
contracts and therefore unenforceable. On the other hand, in the former type the 
objectives of the participants may be indistinguishable from those when purchasing 
options or futures. To treat them as gaming contracts would be the worst possible 
way of protecting investors. The Act must find a way of clearly distinguishing 
legitimate investments from illegitimate wagers." (as cited in Chaikin and Moher, 
1986: 390) 
As the result of his report, the Financial Services Act 1986 (the 1986 Act) came into force. 
Section 63 of the 1986 Act stipulates that: 
"( 1) No contract to which this section applies shall be void or unenforceable by reason 
of-
(a) Section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845, Section 1 of the Gaming Act 1892. 
(2) This section applies to any contract entered into by either or each party by way of 
business and the making or performance of which by either party constitutes an activity 
which falls within paragraph 12 of Schedule 1 to this Act or would do so apart from 
Parts III and IV of that Schedule.,,401 
By the promulgation of this section, the question of whether or not the commodity futures 
contract was a contract by way of gaming or wagering and such, not being enforceable 
under section 18 of the 1845 Act is immaterial. This section is intended to replace the blunt 
all-embracing prohibitions in the Gaming Act 1845. Section 63 is enshrined with 
elaborately qualified permissions for wagering contracts to be held as investment 
contracts402 and are hence enforceable403 (Fisher, 1990: 104). McCowan LJ in City Index 
Ltd v Leslie remarks that: 
401 Paragraph 1 to 11 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 sets out what constitutes an "investment" and paragraph 12 of 
Schedule 1 defines various types of dealing in investments as activities which constitute investment business. 
Included in the definition of investments, at paragraph 7 to 9, are contracts for options and futures and 
contracts for differences (Hogarth, 1993: 333). 
402 Yet the Gower's Report gives no inkling as to how the gambling contracts are distinguishable from the 
investments (White, 1984: 561). 
40JOn f h . I . . d' e 0 ~ e Import~nt e ements 10 generatl~g tra ers confidence in the futures exchanse is to have a legal 
system whlch recogmses and enforces the nghts and duties embodied in the contract (Powers and Tosini, 
1977: 982). 
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" ... that section (section 68) and paragraph (33 of Schedule 10f 1986 Act)404 make 
it plain that the intention of the 1986 Act is to reduce the circumstances in which a 
contract falls foul of s 18 of the Gaming Act 1845.,,405 
Similarly, Hobhouse J in the case of Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd v Welwyn Ha(field 
District Council and Islington London Borough Counci1406 maintains that the intention 
behind section 63 of the 1986 Act was to reduce the uncertainty brought about by gaming 
or wagering legislations and to increase the statutory level of investor protection. This was 
achieved by the wide coverage of its regulated investments, enlisted under Schedule 1 of 
the 1986 Act, to include the speculative nature of commercial or financial transactions. 
The contract for difference is now part of a legitimate investment under the 1986 Act. 
Paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 states that: 
"Rights under a contract for differences or under any other contract the purpose or 
pretended purpose of which is to secure profit or avoid a loss by reference to 
fluctuations in the value of or price of property of any description or in an index or 
other factor designed for that purpose in the contract. 
Note: This paragraph does not apply where the parties intend that the profit is to be 
obtained or the loss avoided by taking delivery of any property to which the 
1 ,,407 contract re ates. 
Lord Donaldson elucidates this provision in the case of City Index Ltd v Leslie where he 
said: 
H ••• it is clearly intended to legitimise contracts, which, whilst pretending to be 
agreements for the actual sale and purchase of shares, commodities or other 
property, are intended by the parties to be fulfilled by the payment of 
differences. ,,408 
404 "In determining for the purpose of this Schedule, whether anything constitutes an investment or the 
carrying on of investment business, section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845 ... whereby a contract by way of 
~aming and wagering is not legally enforceable shall be disregarded." 
05 [1991] BeLe 643,660. . 
406 [1995] 1 All ER 1. 
407 Meanwhile Leggat LJ. in the same case, City Index Ltd v Leslie, explains the Note in Para 9 above as 
indicating the means of distinguishing a commercial contract with a differential contract. The difference 
could be ascertained by the (1) real delivery of property; (2) the mutual intention of the parties; and (3) 
obtaining of profits being equated to securing it. Hence, based on the 1986 Act, the contract for difference 
which is entered to under the disguise of a commodity futures contract falls under the category of "any other 
contract" under Paragraph 9 of Schedule 1. 
408[1991] BeLe 643, 658. 
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In 2001, the 1986 Act was repealed and replaced by the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (2000 Act) (Halsbury(a), 2008: 226). Embodying substantially similar wording 
from section 63 of the 1986 Act, section 412 of the 2000 Act409 also exempts contracts 
from falling within the ambit of any applicable gaming legislation. Treitel (1994: 856) 
rightly adduces that, although the contract for difference had become a binding legal 
contract under the 1986 Act, the legality of this contract did not alter the fact that this 
contract may amount to wager. 
The revolution of the legitimacy of the contract of gaming or wagering is followed closely 
by the Malaysian futures legal system. Taking the same approach of displacing gaming and 
wagering law from the realm of the futures contract, Section 100(2) of the Malaysian 
Futures Industry Act 1993 (the 1993 Act) was incorporated. In 2007, the 1993 Act was 
replaced by the 2007 ACt.410 Section 103 of the 2007 Act also incorporated similar 
provisions to its predecessor, namely, section 100(2), where it states: 
"103 Futures contract not gaming or wagering contract 
409 The half part of subsection (a) of section 412(1) has been left blank. Its original wordings, as contained in 
the repealed section 63 of the 1986 Act were, "(a) section 18 of the Gaming Act 1845". Section 412 of the 
2000 Act states that: 
"( 1) No contract to which this section applies is void or unenforceable because of -
(a) ... Article 170 of the Betting, Gaming, Lotteries and Amusements (Northern Ireland) Order 1985; 
(b) 
(2) This section applies to a contract if-
(a) It is entered into by either or each party by way of business; 
(b) The entering into or performance of it by either party constitutes an activity of a specified kind or 
one which falls within a specified class of activity; and 
(c) it relates to an investment of a specified kind or one which falls within a specified class of 
investment. 
Part II of the 2000 Act contained activities which are categorised as investments and this includes futures 
contracts (in Para 18) and contracts for differences (in Para 19). It says: 
18 Rights under a contract for the sale of a commodity or property of any other description under which 
delivery is to be made at a future date. 
19 Rights under-
(a) a contract for differences, or 
(b) any other contract for the purposes or pretended purpose of which is to secure or avoid a 
loss by reference to fluctuations in-
(i) the value or price of property of any description; or 
(ii) an index or other factor designated for that purpose in the contract." 
410 This Act was formed in 2007 through the consolidation of the Securities Industry Act 1983 and the 
Futures Industry Act 1993. The purpose of the consolidation of these two Acts under an umbrella governing 
statute is to streamline the regulation of the securities and the futures market. Prior to the coming into force 
of the 2007 Act, the regulatory framework for the commodity futures market was contained in the 
Commodities Trading Act 1985, which was later abrogated and placed under the Futures Industry Act 1993. 
(Geoffrey, 2010: 4 and 95). 
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For the purposes of any written law, a futures contract made or traded-
(a) on the futures market of a futures exchange; or 
(b) on an exempt futures market, 
or anything done under such a futures contract, shall not to be taken to be a gaming 
or wagering contract." 
Though the wording of section 103 of the 2007 Acts does not explicitly insulate 
commodity futures contracts from falling foul to section 26 of the 1956 Act and section 31 
of the 1950 Act, the wording "For the purpose of any written law" in section 1 03 
encapsulates it as a safe harbour for commodity futures contracts. The incorporation of 
section 412 of the later 2000 Act also reverberates in section 1 03 of the 2007 Act. The 
effect of this is that the crude palm. oil futures contract is legitimate and enforceable 
regardless of whether it is entered to wager on the rise and fall of the crude palm oil futures 
. 411 pnce. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the revolution of the law on gaming or wagering, in partiCUlar, 
the issue of enforceability ofthe commodity futures contract. The product of the revolution 
was that betting or wagering on the rise and fall of the future price of crude palm oil was 
deemed legitimate. The liberalisation of commodity futures contracts from the claw of the 
gambling laws was mainly due to the role played by the British judiciary as well as the 
shift in the norm and perception of the society towards futures speCUlation. The legitimacy 
of the difference settlement is further materialised by the statutory intervention in the UK 
and Malaysia. 
Essentially, this finding draws a more important picture In this study. This finding 
implicates the legitimacy of the crude palm oil futures legal framework within the context 
of Sharta. Betting or wagering is religiously condemned. It follows that section 103 of the 
2007 Act, rule 614.1 (c) of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules and rule 
614(a) and (b) of the Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Berhad Business Rules, which 
provide for legitimacy of the act of wagering and accordingly facilitate the difference 
settlement, is deemed to be against Sharr a. In addition to that, the case laws shown in this 
411 Gengatharan (2001: 103) views that since the definition of futures contract in the 1993 Act covers most of 
the derivatives contract, which take the form of eligible delivery agreement or adjustment agreement, the 
likelihood of derivatives contracts to be rendered void is less likelihood. 
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chapter aptly illustrate the element of hatred and enmity amongst gamblers. Hatred and 
enmity is one of the many reasons as to why Islam prohibits gambling. Based on this 
analysis, this chapter reaffirms the finding of Chapter five that, inconsistent with the stance 
of the SAC, the crude palm oil futures contract, including its legal framework, is not free 
from any element of maysir. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion 
.-- -------
This study has analysed one of the many controversial resolutions issued by the SAC on 
capital market products and services. It examined the SAC resolution on the crude palm oil 
futures contract. This resolution, as many others, is contentious as it collides with the 
resolutions of other internationally represented bodies of Shari'a scholars like the IFAM, 
the IFAJ and the AAOIFI. The aim of this study was to analyse the adequacy of the SAC 
resolution. This study has resolved the two critical research questions; namely, whether or 
not the SAC resolution is coherent with the real trading of crude palm oil futures contracts 
and whether or not the legal framework of crude palm oil futures contracts has eliminated 
the Shari' a prohibitions inherent in the contract. 
The study has found that the SAC resolution is not coherent with the real trading of crude 
palm oil futures contracts based on the following grounds. Firstly, the SAC has not 
accurately defined the meaning of crude palm oil futures contracts. It defines the contract 
as an exchange-traded agreement to buy and sell a commodity in an actual market (cash 
market). However, in reality, physical delivery of crude palm oil transpired not on a cash 
market, but instead on the Clearing House via the transfer of a warehouse receipt or 
Negotiable Storage Receipt (NSR). Additionally, and in reality, most of the crude palm oil 
futures contracts do not end with physical delivery but cash-settled on the Clearing House. 
Secondly, the SAC has not adequately examined the contract specification of the crude 
palm oil futures contract. The SAC contends that there is no element of gharar in crude 
palm oil futures contract as, when the contract is offered, the contract specifications such 
as quantity, type, price, and delivery date are made known to the contractual parties. 
However, this study has found that the delivery date and type or quality of the oil is not 
adequately described in the legal framework. For example, Rule 1317 and Schedule 13 of 
Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules describe that the delivered crude palm 
oil must be of "crude unbleached palm oil of good merchantable quality, in bulk". To 
attain this description, the desirable level of specifications - namely, FFA, I&M, IV, SMP 
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and DOBI - must be incorporated. Currently, Rule 1317 and Schedule 13 only contain 
FF A, I&M and DOBl. The inadequacy in the description is supported by the judgement of 
a Malaysian case, Federal Flour Mills Bhd v Fima Palm bulk Services Sdn Bhd & Another, 
which declared such an inadequacy in the contract specification of crude palm oil futures 
contracts. 
In relation to the issue of the existence and quality of the oil, Rule 1305 and 1306 of Bursa 
Malaysia Derivatives Berhad Business Rules provides that after crude palm oil has been 
appraised, a Negotiable Storage Receipt (NSR) together with a certificate of quality will be 
issued. The certificate of quality is a declaration of guarantee with respect to the quality of 
the crude palm oil. However, this appraisal will only take place when a seller wishes to 
deliver his crude palm oil to the buyer via the Clearing House at any business day between 
the first till the twentieth day of the delivery month. On this condition, any eligible 
delivery agreement, which is traded without a valid NSR, will not escape the taint of 
gharar. Even with an NSR, this study has found that parties were still disputing the quality 
of the oil delivered, for example, Federal Flour Mills Bhd v Fima Palm bulk Services Sdn 
Bhd & Another Appeal. 
Besides the inadequacy of the description of the quality of the oil, the contract 
specification does not specify the delivery date. Schedule 13 of Bursa Malaysia 
Derivatives Berhad Business Rules provides that, in the delivery month, the seller may 
dispose of the crude palm oil in any of these business days, the first till the twentieth day of 
that calendar month. The uncertainty of the actual delivery date reverberates in the actual 
date for the buyer to remit the purchase price of the oil. 
Thirdly, the SAC argued that, as commodity futures contract can be settled in cash before 
the due date or that the settlement can be made by physical delivery on the due date, the 
element of gharar has been eliminated. The SAC relied on the existence of a guarantee 
system in which the Clearing House guarantees the delivery and settlement of crude palm 
oil futures contract. Even if there was gharar, it has been eliminated by the provision of the 
Futures Industry Act 1993 and Business Rules (Exchange and Clearing House) which 
provide for surveillance and insulation against any form of cheating. Nonetheless this 
study has found that gharar has not been eliminated in the contract settlement of crude 
palm oil futures contract. In reality, when the seller defaults in making a physical delivery 
of the crude palm oil, Rule 1102 of Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Business Rules 
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empowers the Exchange to instruct parties to settle their contract with cash, which amount 
will be determined solely by the Exchange. This amount is known as the "emergency 
settlement price". However, the crude palm oil futures legal framework is silent on the 
method of its calculation. The uncertainty in the manner of its calculation has brought 
about legal suits challenging the validity of emergency settlement price. Amongst those 
cases are Ganda Oil Industries Sdn Bhd & Ors v The Kuala Lumpur Commodity Exchange 
& Anor and Palmco Holdings Bhd v Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors. 
Apart from showing that gharar exists In the method of calculating the emergency 
settlement price, this study has found that the operational method of futures trading, or 
guarantee system, has not been able to effectively eliminate the prospects of non-delivery 
or the failure of parties to fulfil their contractual obligations. Irrespective of the guarantee 
mechanism, defaults still transpired, on two occasions. First, when the seller failed to 
deliver the required quality of the crude palm oil, as eNidenced in Federal Flour Mills Bhd 
v Fima Palmbulk Services Sdn Bhd & Another. Second, when the supply of the commodity 
was not available at the time of delivery, as demonstrated in the massive physical default 
of the Maine potatoes futures contract in America. The physical default was exacerbated 
by the artificially inflated commodity price, which made it uneconomical for the seller to 
procure and sell the underlying commodities to the buyer. This precarious condition is 
evidenced by the case of Peto v Howell (involving com futures contracts) and Cargill, 
Incorporated, et. al., v Clifford M Hardin, Secretary of Agriculture, Thomas 1. Flavin, 
Judicial Officer by Appointment of the Secretary of Agriculture, and the United States 
Department of Agriculture (involving wheat futures contracts). 
Fourthly, the SAC contended that, even if there was gharar, it has been eliminated by the 
regulatory provisions which are designed to protect the futures market from offences like 
cheating. Nonetheless, this study has shown that, despite trading regulation endeavouring 
to circumvent such a situation, the futures market authority has constantly been 
undermined by their members' manipulation and cornering. Chapter four demonstrates the 
adverse impact of manipulation and cornering on the economy and society at large. 
Fifthly, the SAC has not adequately described the whole system of the futures margin. The 
SAC has described only the initial deposit. In reality, the futures margin is comprised of 
not only the initial margin but also the maintenance margin, variation margin, margin call, 
as well as marking to market. This study has shown that the mays;r (gambling) element is 
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found to be inherent in the futures margin system. The analysis of the whole futures margin 
system revealed that at the time of making the initial margin payment, both contractual 
parties do not know the future daily settlement price or the direction of the crude palm oil 
futures price. Based on this uncertainty, the parties actually bet or wager on the direction of 
the crude palm oil futures price. The outcome of the bet is determined by the next day's 
daily settlement price. This price will determine who is to pay the variation margin, namely 
the differential amount, to the other contractual party via the Clearing House. As a result, 
this payment obligation known only on the following day, arises purely out of chance and 
or luck. The variation margin payment which the loser has to pay is exactly the same 
amount of money which the winner gets. 
Sixthly, although the SAC has not found any issue with the crude palm oil futures contract 
being cash-settled before its due date, this method of settlement, namely offsetting, is 
found to contain a maysir element. The offsetting transaction, as stipulated in rule 608 of 
Bursa Malaysia Derivatives Clearing Business Rules, is essentially a mechanism to cause 
one party to pay the other contractual party the difference between the current and the 
previous settlement price of crude palm oil futures. The obligation to pay the differential 
payment depends on the futures position of the parties and not on the basis of an exchange 
of counter-values. Under the offsetting transaction, whatever amount of money that one 
party receives is the exact amount of money that one party loses. Hence when this gain and 
loss is absolutely dependant on the movement of the prices, in which movement is 
determined by factors wholly independent of one's control, this connotes gambling 
(Thomas, 1995: 21). 
In relation to the issue of maysir, this study has learned that section 103 of the 2007 Act, 
which states that the exchange traded futures contract shall not to be taken to be a gaming 
or wagering contract, is premised on the fact that wagering or betting is legal. This section 
validates and enforces a futures contract even though, by nature, this contract is formed 
and entered into for the purpose of betting or wagering. Hence, in reality, betting or 
wagering on the rise and fall of the future price of crude palm oil is legitimate and 
enforceable. The cases discussed in Chapter six demonstrate the revolution of the law on 
gaming and wagering. It also evidences the shift in the public perception as to the morality 
and legality of wagering in the prices of commodities. Apart from this finding, the case 
laws aptly exhibit the reason why Islam prohibits gambling - engenderisation of hatred and 
enmity amongst the gamblers. 
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Seventhly, the SAC has not adequately distinguished futures speculation from typical 
commercial speculation. The SAC argues that futures speculation is no different to 
commercial speculation as both transactions involve parties profiting from price difference. 
However, one distinguishing characteristic of futures speculation, which was not analysed 
by the SAC, is that it does not involve the intention or act of taking or making a delivery 
nor any connection with the production or use of the commodity; and that it involve gain 
made at the lose of the loser. Hence, futures speculation is to make profit solely from the 
change in the future price of the underlying commodity. The detachment of futures 
speculation from economic realities breached a fundamental precept in Islam, namely, all 
trade must represent real economic transactions. 
Eightly, the SAC contends that the commodity futures market plays the role of price 
discovery and risk-shifting mechanism, enabling those exposed to price risk, like hedgers, 
to shift this risk to other interested players, like speculators. The benefit of the futures 
market as a price discovery and risk management mechanism qualifies its trading to be 
permissible under the principle of ma$la~ah (permissibility). However so, for the principle 
of ma$la~ah to be applied in this case, it must be in harmony with the objectives (maqii$id) 
of Shari'ah - religion, human life, progeny, material wealth, and the human faculty of 
reason. Nevertheless, this study has found that its role as a mechanism of price discovery 
and risk management has been distorted (Greenberger, 2011 and Tilburg and Stichele, 
2011). The distortion of this market mechanism affects the social well-being of society. 
Excessive speculation distorts the useful function of the futures contract and the real 
supply and demand of commodities. It attributes to the unnecessary and substantial 
increase in the price of food commodities. This leads to an increase in the number of poor, 
undernourished, people and hence the food insecurity in the world. 
There is, therefore, a definite need for the SAC to revisit and review its inadequate 
resolution on crude palm oil futures contract. Although the power to review its resolution 
is not expressly stipulated in the 2007 Act, the SAC may still be able to review its 
resolution under section 316A(2)(b) of the same Act. This section empowers the SAC to 
determine its own procedure. Hence, taking into consideration that the review involves the 
SAC resolution and matters pertaining to the Islamic capital market, the SAC will not be 
breaching or transgressing any of its statutory rights and duties in performing such a 
reVIew. 
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Juristic review of existing resolutions is not something new. In 2007, the AAOIFI 
reviewed its Shari'a standard as they found that almost 85% of Gulf Islamic bonds (sukuk) 
were not in compliance with Shari' a. The flaw of this sukuk was that the risk and reward 
in the sukuk was not shared in accordance with actual venture proceeds. Though the 
repercussion of this decision would cost the industry as much as $50 billion, the AAOIFI 
reviewed and republished its fresh rulings on sukuk (Reuters, 2007). Undertaking such 
action, the President of the AAOIFI Shari'a Council, Mufti Taqi Usmani, reminds the 
Shari'a advisory institution of their duties. He said: 
"It is now incumbent upon these Islamic banks and financial institutions to 
cooperate among themselves for the purpose of developing authentic products that 
are far removed from empty stratagems, ... and that aim to serve the higher 
purposes of Islamic law in the spheres of economics, development, and social 
justice. None of this will come about without the guidance and encouragement of . 
the Shariah supervisory boards. If these boards continue with their present policies, 
however, Islamic banks will stumble on the road, and there is a danger, God forbid, 
that this virtuous movement will fail. It is time for Shariah supervisory boards to 
review their policies .. .Instead, the Shariah supervisory boards need to apply 
themselves to upholding the Shariah standards issued by the Shariah Council, 
which are not insensitive to the real need of these institutions. Personally, I am 
certain that if Shariah supervisory boards uphold these Standards, the exceptional 
professional qualifications found in today's Islamic financial institutions will have 
no difficulty in developing viable alternatives to these dubious products ... Allah 
willing." (n.d.: 14) 
It follows that Muslims believe that they are accountable to their Creator and answerable to 
Him in the Day of Judgement. Due to this belief, Muslims are duty bound to ensure that all 
their undertakings, being in privy or public, are not inimical to the spirit and letter of the 
Sharl'a. This position is underscored by Nik Ramlah Mahmood, the Deputy Chief 
Executive of the Malaysian Securities Commission, who said that: 
"ICM (Islamic Capital Market) products and services have unique characteristics 
especially those related to Shariah compliance. Also it must be borne in mind that 
in subscribing to ICM products and services, Muslim issuers and investors place 
their trust in the regulatory system and expect the products and services to be true 
to label." (2004: 2) 
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The review of the SAC resolution will draw more confidence and trust from Islamic capital 
market players into the SAC and the governing system. On the other hand, the inaction of 
the SAC to revisit and review its SAC resolution would not only be detrimental to the 
validity of its resolution and its credibility as a "Shariah Advisory Council" but more 
importantly to Malaysia's reputation as the international Islamic capital market hub. 
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APPENDIX I 
The Specimen of Contract Specification of a Crude Palm Oil Futures Contract 
Contract Code 
Underlying Instrument 
Contract Size 
Minimum Price Fluctuation 
Daily Price Limits 
Contract Months 
Trading Hours 
Final Trading Day and 
Maturity Date 
Tender Period 
Contract Grade and Delivery 
Points 
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FCPO 
Crude Palm Oil 
25 metric tons 
RMl ~er metric ton 
RM 1 00 per metric ton above or below the 
Settlement Prices of the preceding day for all 
months, except spot month. Limits are expanded 
when the Settlement Prices of all three quoted 
months immediately following the current month, in 
any day, are at limits as follows: 
Day 
First Day 
Second Day 
Third Day 
Limit 
RMIOO 
RM1S0 
RM200 
Daily price limits will remain at RM200, when the 
preceding day's settlement prices of all the three 
quoted months immediately following the spot 
month settle at limits of RM200. 
Otherwise, it shall revert to the basic limit amount of 
RMIOO. 
Spot and the next 5 succeeding months and 
thereafter, alternate months up to 12 months ahead. 
First trading session: Malaysian 10:30 a.m. to 12.30 
p.m. 
Second trading session: Malaysian 3.00 p.m. to 6.00 
p.m. 
Contract expires at noon on the 15tn day of the 
delivery month. If the 15th is a non-market day, the 
preceding Business Day. 
First business day to the 20tn Business Day of the 
delivery month, or if the 20th is a non-market day, 
the_preceding Business D~. 
Crude Palm Oil of good merchantable quality, in 
bulk, unbleached, in Port Tank Installations located 
at the option of the seller at Port Kelang, 
PenangiButterworth and Pasir Gudang (Johor). 
Free Fatty Acids (FFA) of palm oil delivered into 
Port Tank Installations shall not exceed 4% and 
from Port Tank Installations shall not exceed 5%. 
Moisture and impurities shall not exceed 0.25%. 
Deterioration of Bleachability Index (DaB) value of 
palm oil delivered into Port Tank Installations shall 
be at a minimum of 2.5 and of palm oil delivered 
from Port Tank Installations shall be at a minimum 
of2.31. 
Deliverable Unit 25 metric tons, plus or minus not more than 2%. 
Settlement of weight differences shall be based on 
the simple average of the daily Settlement Prices of 
the delivery month from: 
(a) theIst Business Day of the delivery month to the 
day of tender, if the tender is made before the 
last trading day of the delivery month; or 
(b) the I st Business Day of the delivery month to the 
Business Day immediately preceding the last 
day of trading, if the tender is made on the last 
tradinA daL or thereafter. 
Reportable Position Open Position of 100 or more open contracts, long 
or short, in anj' one delivety month. 
Position Limit 500 contracts net long or net short on the spot 
month. 
1,500 contracts on any single month except for the 
spot month. 
2,500 contracts on all contract months combined. 
Source: Securities Industry Development Corporation. (2007: 2). 
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APPENDIX II 
Palm Oil Products and Malaysian Standard Specifications 
TABLE A 
Product FFA(max %) M&I(max%) IV Colour Melting Point(C) 
Crude palm oil 5 
Neutralised palm oil 0.25 0.1 50-55 33-39 
Neutralised and 0.25 0.1 50-55 max 20 red 33-39 
bleached palm oil 
Source: Corley, R.H.V. and Tinker, P.B. (2003: 471). 
Fatty Acid Composition and Other Properties of Malaysian Palm Oil 
TABLE B 
Fatty acid Palm oil mean Range of palm oil 
C 14:0 Myristic l.1 0.9-1.5 
C 16:0 Palmitic 43.5 39.2-45.8 
C 18:0 Stearic 4.3 3.7-5.1 
C18:101eic 39.8 37.4-44.1 
C 18:2 Linoleic 10.2 8.7-12.5 
C 18:3 Linolenic 0.3 0.0-0.6 
Iodine value 53.0 51.0-55.3 
Slip melting point (C) 36.0 32.3-39.0 
Cloud point (C) 
Source: Corley, R.H.V. and Tinker, P.B. (2003: 447). 
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